我们应当归功于这些英国心理学家的还有初探道德发生史的尝试，可惜他们并没有就此提出任何疑点。我承认，他们本身就是个疑点，他们甚至在写书之前就把一些基本观点提出来了——他们本身就很有意思！这些英国心理学家们到底想要做什么？人们发现他们总是在有意或无意地做着同一件事：就是把我们内心世界中的龌龊部分暴露出来，从中寻找积极的、先进的、于人类发展有决定作用的因素，而这是些人类智慧的尊严最不愿意看到的部位，他们就是在这些习惯势力中，在健忘中，在盲目和偶然的思想网络和思想机制中，在任何一种纯粹被动的、机械的、反射性的、微不足道的和本质上是愚蠢的部位找寻积极的因素。到底是什么东西使得这些心理学家总是朝着这一个方向努力？是否是一种隐秘的、恶毒的、低级的、连他们自己都不愿意承认的贬低人类的本能？是否是一种悲观主义的猜忌，一种对失意的、干瘪的、逐渐变得刻毒而幼稚的理想主义的怀疑？是否是对于基督教（和柏拉图）的一种渺小的、隐秘的、从未跨过意识门槛的愤忿和积怨？抑或是对于稀奇的事物、对于令人头疼的反论、对于存在本身的可疑点和荒唐处的一种贪婪的嗜好？当然，也可能是一种混合，其中含有少许卑劣、少许忧郁、少许反基督教、少许快感、少许对调味品的需求？……

可是有人告诉我说，这不过是些冷血的、乏味的老青蛙，它们在人的周围爬行跳跃，好像是在它们自己的天地中：在一个泥塘中一样。我很不愿意听到这些，而且我不相信这些。假如允许人在不知情的情况下表达一个愿望的话，那么我真心地希望这些人能够是另外一副样子，希望这些灵魂的研究者们和显微观察者们能够是基本上勇敢的、高尚的、自豪的动物，能够知道如何控制他们的情感，并且训练他们自己为真理牺牲所有的欲望——为任何一种真理，哪怕是朴素的、辛辣的、丑陋的、令人不快的、非基督教的、非道德的真理，因为这种真理确实存在着。

These English psychologists, whom one has also to thank for the only attempts hitherto to arrive at a history of the origin of morality—they themselves are no easy riddle; I confess that, as living riddles, they even possess one essential advantage over their books—they are interesting! These English psychologists—what do they really want? One always discovers them voluntarily or involuntarily at the same task, namely at dragging the partie honteuse of our inner world into the foreground and seeking the truly effective and directing agent, that which has been decisive in its evolution, in just that place where the intellectual pride of man would least desire to find it (in the vis inertiae of habit, for example, or in forgetfulness, or in a blind and chance mechanistic hooking-together of ideas, or in something purely passive, automatic, reflexive, molecular, and thoroughly stupid)—what is it really that always drives these psychologists in just this direction? Is it a secret, malicious, vulgar, perhaps self-deceiving instinct for belittling man? Or possibly a pessimistic suspicion, the mistrustfulness of disappointed idealists grown spiteful and gloomy? Or a petty subterranean hostility and rancor toward Christianity (and Plato) that has perhaps not even crossed the threshold of consciousness? Or even a lascivious taste for the grotesque, the painfully paradoxical, the questionable and absurd in existence? Or finally—something of each of them, a little vulgarity, a little gloominess, a little anti-Christianity, a little itching and need for spice?

But I am told they are simply old, cold, and tedious frogs, creeping around men and into men as if in their own proper element, that is, in a swamp. I rebel at that idea; more, I do not believe it; and if one may be allowed to hope where one does not know, then I hope from my heart they may be the reverse of this—that these investigators and microscopists of the soul may be fundamentally brave, proud, and magnanimous animals, who know how to keep their hearts as well as their sufferings in bounds and have trained themselves to sacrifice all desirability to truth, every truth, even plain, harsh, ugly, repellent, unchristian, immoral truth.—For such truths do exist.—

　　那么就向那些想支配这些道德史学家的好人们致敬吧！可惜的是，历史精神本身肯定会背弃这些道德史学家，恰恰是历史上的全体好人自己弃他们于艰难境地！他们全体都遵循已经陈旧的哲学家习俗，基本上不用历史的方法思维，这点是没有疑问的。他们撰写的道德谱系从一开始着手调查“好”的观念和判断的起源时就立刻暴露了其拙劣。他们宣称，“最初，不自私的行为受到这些行为的对象们，也就是这些行为的得益者们的赞许，并且被称之为好；后来这种赞许的起源被遗忘了，不自私的行为由总于是习惯地被当作好的来称赞，因此也就干脆被当作好的来感受——似乎它们自身就是什么好的一样。”我们立刻发现，在这第一段引言中已经包含了英国心理学家的特异性的全部典型特征。我们已经看到了“有益”、“遗忘”、“习惯”，最后还有错误，所有这些都被当成了受人尊敬的依据，迄今为止比较高贵的人们甚至引以为自豪。就像引一种人类的艺术特权为自豪一样。这种自豪应当受到羞辱，这种尊敬应当被贬值：目的达到了吗？……

我现在才看清了，这种理论是在错误的地方寻找和确定“好”的概念的起源：“好”的判断不是来源于那些得益于“善行”的人！其实它是起源于那些“好人”自己，也就是说那些高贵的、有力的、上层的、高尚的人们判定他们自己和他们的行为是好的，意即他们感觉并且确定他们自己和他们的行为是上等的，用以对立于所有低下的、卑贱的、平庸的和粗俗的。从这种保持距离的狂热中他们才取得了创造价值、并且给价值命名的权利：这和功利有什么关系！功利的观点对于维持最高等级秩序的热情、突出等级的价值判断的热情表达恰恰是如此陌生和极不适宜：此刻方才出现了那种卑微的热情的对立感觉，这种热情以每一种功于心计的精明，以每一种功利的算计为前提，——而且不止一次地，不是特殊情况，而是永久的。高尚和维持距离的狂热，就是我们说过的上等的、统治艺术的那种持久的、主导的整体和基本感觉，与一种低下的艺术、一个“下人”的关系——这就是“好”和“坏”对立的起源。（主人有赐名的权利，这意味着人们可以把语言的来源理解为统治者威权的表达：他们说，“这是什么，那是什么”；他们用声音给每一物、每一事打下烙印，并且通过这种方法将其立即据为己有。）从这个起源出发——“好”这个词从一开始就根本没有必要和“不自私”的行为相关联：那是道德谱系学家们的偏见。事实上，只是在贵族的价值判断衰落的时候，“自私”和“不自私”的这种全面对立才越来越被强加于人的良知，——用我的话说，群体本能终于用言辞（而且用多数的言辞）得到了表述。此后还要经过很长的一段时间这种本能才会在群众中变成主人，使对道德价值的评定形成，并且陷入上述那种对立（这就是目前欧洲的状况：如今占据着统治地位的是成见，成见正被看作是和“道德”，“不自私”，“公平”相等同的概念，而且已经具有了一种“固定观念”和脑病特有的威力）。

All respect them for the good spirits that may rule in these historians of morality! But it is, unhappily, certain that the historical spirit itself is lacking in them, that precisely all the good spirits of history itself have left them in the lurch! As is the hallowed custom with philosophers, the thinking of all of them is by nature unhistorical; there is no doubt about that. The way they have bungled their moral genealogy comes to light at the very beginning, where the task is to investigate the origin of the concept and judgment "good." "Originally"—so they decree—"one approved unegoistic actions and called them good from the point of view of those to whom they were done, that is to say, those to whom they were useful; later one forgot how this approval originated and, simply because unegoistic actions were always habitually praised as good, one also felt them to be good—as if they were something good in themselves." One sees straightaway that this primary derivation already contains all the typical traits of the idiosyncrasy of the English psychologists—we have "utility," "forgetting," "habit," and finally "error," all as the basis of an evaluation of which the higher man has hitherto been proud as though it were a kind of prerogative of man as such. This pride has to be humbled, this evaluation disvalued: has that end been achieved?

Now it is plain to me, first of all, that in this theory the source of the concept "good" has been sought and established in the wrong place: the judgment "good" did not originate with those to whom "goodness" was shown! Rather it was "the good" themselves, that is to say, the noble, powerful, high-stationed and high-minded, who felt and established themselves and their actions as good, that is, of the first rank, in contradistinction to all the low, low-minded, common and plebeian. It was out of this pathos of distance that they first seized the right to create values and to coin names for these values: what had they to do with utility! The viewpoint of utility is as remote and inappropriate as it possibly could be in face of such a burning eruption of the highest rank-ordering, rank-defining value judgments: for here feeling has attained the antithesis of that low degree of warmth which any calculating prudence, any calculus of utility, presupposes—and not for once only, not for an exceptional hour, but for good. The pathos of nobility and distance, as aforesaid, the protracted and domineering fundamental total feeling on the part of a higher ruling order in relation to a lower order, to a "below"—that is the origin of the antithesis "good" and "bad." (The lordly right of giving names extends so far that one should allow oneself to conceive the origin of language itself as an expression of power on the part of the rulers: they say "this is this and this," they seal every thing and event with a sound and, as it were, take possession of it.) It follows from this origin that the word "good" was definitely not linked from the first and by necessity to "unegoistic" actions, as the superstition of these genealogists of morality would have it. Rather it was only when aristocratic value judgments declined that the whole antithesis "egoistic" "unegoistic" obtruded itself more and more on the human conscience—it is, to speak in my own language, the herd instinct that through this antithesis at last gets its word (and its words) in. And even then it was a long time before that instinct attained such dominion that moral evaluation was actually stuck and halted at this antithesis (as, for example, is the case in contemporary Europe: the prejudice that takes "moral," "unegoistic," "désintéressé" as concepts of equivalent value already rules today with the force of a "fixed idea" and brain-sickness).

　　可是第二：那种关于“好”的价值判断的起源的假说除了在历史上是完全站不住脚的以外，在心理分析方面也是荒诞不经的。不自私的行为的功利被说成是该行为受到称赞的根源，而这个根源却被遗忘了——怎么可能遗忘呢？也许这种行为的功利曾在某时失效？情况恰恰相反，事实上这种功利在所有的时代都司空见惯，而且不断地得到重新强调；因此，功利不是从意识中消失了，不是被遗忘了，而是必然地越来越清晰地显现在意识中。这样一来那种反对派理论倒是更为清晰合理了（那理论并不因此而更正确——）。例如赫伯特·斯宾塞就表述了这派理论：他认为“好”的概念就其本质来说与“有益”、“实用”相通，因此在“好”和“坏”的判断中人类总结并确认的正是他们关于有益——实用和有害——不实用的那些未被遗忘和遗忘不掉的经验。根据这种理论，“好”即是那种迄今一直被证明是有益的：因此，好被看成“最高等级的有价值的”效用，被看成“自身有价值的”效用。正像我所说的，这种解释方法也是错误的，但是它本身至少是清晰合理的，而且从心理的角度上看也是站得住脚的。

In the second place, however: quite apart from the historical untenability of this hypothesis regarding the origin of the value judgment "good," it suffers from an inherent psychological absurdity. The utility of the unegoistic action is supposed to be the source of the approval accorded it, and this source is supposed to have been forgotten—but how is this forgetting possible? Has the utility of such actions come to an end at some time or other? The opposite is the case: this utility has rather been an everyday experience at all times, therefore something that has been underlined again and again: consequently, instead of fading from consciousness, instead of becoming easily forgotten, it must have been impressed on the consciousness more and more clearly. How much more reasonable is that opposing theory (it is not for that reason more true—) which Herbert Spencer, for example, espoused: that the concept "good" is essentially identical with the concept "useful," "practical," so that in the judgments "good" and "bad" mankind has summed up and sanctioned precisely its unforgotten and unforgettable experiences regarding what is useful-practical and what is harmful-practical. According to this theory, that which has always proved itself useful is good: therefore it may claim to be "valuable in the highest degree," "valuable in itself." This road to an explanation is, as aforesaid, also a wrong one, but at least the explanation is in itself reasonable and psychologically tenable.

　　有个问题为我指出了通向正确道路的方向，这个问题的提出本来是因为在词源学中出现了各种不同的表述“好”的词言文字：在这里我发现所有这些名称都把我们引回到同一个概念转化——基本概念的等级含义往往是“高尚”、高贵”，由此又必然转化出含有“精神高尚”，“高贵”意思的“好”，含有“精神崇高”，“精神特权”意思的“好”；这一转化又总是伴随以另外那种转化，“普通的”、“粗俗的”、“低贱的”终于被转化成“坏”的概念，这后一种转化的最有力的例证就是德文字“坏”本身；“坏”字（“Schlecht”）和“简朴”

　　（“Schlicht”）通用——请比较“直截了当”（“Schlechtweg”，直译：“坏的方式”），“简直不堪”（“Schlechter－dings”，直译：“坏的事物”）——因此“坏”这个字起初就是这样不屑一顾地径直把简朴的，普通的人置于高尚的对立面。大约到了三十年战争时期，也就是说到了很晚的时候，上述内容才转变为现在通用的意思。——这就为我的道德谱系的研究展示了一条重要的线索，它之所以这么晚才被找到是因为在现代世界上，民主的偏见对所有追根溯源的工作施加了障碍性的影响，甚至连那个看来是最客观的自然科学和生理学领域也不例外，当然我在此只能是点出问题而已。那么这种偏见，一旦它燃起仇恨的烈焰，能给道德和历史造成什么样的特殊危害？这已由臭名昭著的布克尔事件表明了。起源于英国的现代精神的平民主义在它的故乡的土地上再次爆发，激烈得有如一座喷发的火山，伴随着迄今为止所有的火山都发出的那种令人扫兴的、噪音过大的、粗野的、不容争辩的声音。——

The signpost to the right road was for me the question: what was the real etymological significance of the designations for "good" coined in the various languages? I found they all led back to the same conceptual transformation—that everywhere "noble," "aristocratic" in the social sense, is the basic concept from which "good" in the sense of "with aristocratic soul," "noble," "with a soul of a high order," "with a privileged soul" necessarily developed: a development which always runs parallel with that other in which "common," "plebeian," "low" are finally transformed into the concept "bad." The most convincing example of the latter is the German word schlecht [bad] itself: which is identical with schlicht [plain, simple]—compare schlechtweg [plainly], schlechterdings [simply]—and originally designated the plain, the common man, as yet with no inculpatory implication and simply in contradistinction to the nobility. About the time of the Thirty Years' War, late enough therefore, this meaning changed into the one now customary.

With regard to a moral genealogy this seems to me a fundamental insight; that it has been arrived at so late is the fault of the retarding influence exercised by the democratic prejudice in the modern world toward all questions of origin. And this is so even in the apparently quite objective domain of natural science and physiology, as I shall merely hint here. But what mischief this prejudice is capable of doing, especially to morality and history, once it has been unbridled to the point of hatred is shown by the notorious case of Buckle [Henry Thomas Buckle (1821-1862), English historian]; here the plebeianism of the modern spirit, which is of English origin, erupted once again on its native soil, as violently as a mud volcano and with that salty, noisy, vulgar eloquence with which all volcanos have spoken hitherto.—

　　说到我们的问题，我们完全有理由称其为一种安静的问题，它只是有选择地针对少数几个听众。同样有趣的是我们发现，那些标志着“好”的词汇和词根至今仍然含有某种不同一般的东西，使高尚者据此感到他们才是上等人。他们固然经常根据他们对权力的考虑称呼自己（称为“强有力的人”，“主人”，“领主”），或者根据这种考虑的最明显的标志称呼自己，例如称为“有钱人”，“占有者”（这个意思取自阿瑞阿语，在伊朗语和斯拉夫语中也有类似的表达），不过这些高尚者也根据一种典型的特性称呼他们自己这就是我们所要探讨的问题。例如他们称自己是“真实的”：最先这样做的是希腊贵族，其代言人是麦加诗人蒂奥哥尼斯。用来表达这个意思的词：esthlos的词根意味着一个人只要是存在的，现实的，真切的，他就是真正的人；而后，经过一个主观的转变，真正就变成了真实：在概念转化的这个阶段，真实成了贵族的口头禅，而且彻底地包含在“贵族的”词义里，以示和被蒂奥哥尼斯认之为并描述为不诚实的下等人相区别——一直到贵族没落以后，该词才最终被保留下来用于标志精神贵族，与此同时该词也变熟、变甜了。在kakos和deilois这两个词中（a－gathos的反义词：庶民）都强调了懦弱：这也许是一个提示，循此方向我们必须去寻找意思清楚得多的aga－thos的词源。拉丁文中的坏（malus）字可以用来指深肤色，特别是黑头发的人为粗俗的人，即在雅利安人以前居住在意大利土地上的居民，他们和成为统治者的黄头发雅利安征服者种族最明显的区别就是颜色；至少克尔特语为我提供了正好类似的情况——fin（例如Fin—Qal这个名词），就是用来标志贵族的，最后被用来标志好、高贵、纯洁、本原是黄头发，以此和肤色暗、头发黑的土著居民相对照。

顺便说一下，凯尔特人纯粹是黄头发人种。有人（譬如维尔科夫）错把德国人种分布图上的那些暗色头发人种聚居地段同什么凯尔特人的后裔和血缘联系在一起。其实，在这些地段居住着的是雅利安以前的德国居民（在整个欧洲情况几乎相同，从根本上说，被征服的种族最终再一次占了上风，在肤色上，在缺乏头脑上，甚至在智识本能和社会本能上，有谁赞成我们如下的观点，难道不是时髦的民主，难道不是更为时髦的无政府主义，尤其是现在所有的欧洲社会主义者对于“公社”这种最原始的社会形式的共同偏爱，难道它们的主旨不像是一种惊人的尾声，象征着征服者和主人种族的雅利安人甚至在生理上都处于劣势了吗？……）

拉丁文字bonus我斗胆译为斗士；假如我可以将bonrs引溯到一个更为古老的词duonus（请比较bellum和du－ellum，以及duen－lum，在我看来，这中间好像保存了那个duonus），那么donus就可以译成与人纷争的人、挑起争端的人（duo），斗士：我们看到，在古罗马是什么使一个人形成他的“善良”。我们德国人的“好”本身难道不是标志“神圣者”，“神圣种族”的人吗？而且这难道不是和哥特人的人民（起初是贵族）的名称相一致吗？在此不宜阐述这些猜测的原因——

With regard to our problem, which may on good grounds be called a quiet problem and one which fastidiously directs itself to few ears, it is of no small interest to ascertain that through those words and roots which designate "good" there frequently still shines the most important nuance by virtue of which the noble felt themselves to be men of a higher rank. Granted that, in the majority of cases, they designate themselves simply by their superiority in power (as "the powerful," "the masters," "the commanders") or by the most clearly visible signs of this superiority, for example, as "the rich," "the possessors" (this is the meaning of arya; and of corresponding words in Iranian and Slavic). But they also do it by a typical character trait: and this is the case that concerns us here. They call themselves, for instance, "the truthful"; this is so above all of the Greek nobility, whose mouthpiece is the Megarian poet Theognis [Theognis of Megara, 6^th Cent. B.C.]. The root of the word coined for this, esthlos [Greek: good, brave], signifies one who is, who possesses reality, who is actual, who is true; then, with a subjective turn, the true as the truthful: in this phase of conceptual transformation it becomes a slogan and catchword of the nobility and passes over entirely into the sense of "noble," as distinct from the lying common man, which is what Theognis takes him to be and how he describes him—until finally, after the decline of the nobility, the word is left to designate nobility of soul and becomes as it were ripe and sweet. In the word kakos [Greek: bad, ugly, ill-born, mean, craven], as in deilos [Greek: cowardly, worthless, vile, wretched] (the plebeian in contradistinction to the agathos [Greek: good, well-born, gentle, brave, capable]), cowardice is emphasized: this perhaps gives an indication in which direction one should seek the etymological origin of agathos, which is susceptible of several interpretations. The Latin malus [Bad] (beside which I set melas [Greek: black, dark]) may designate the common man as the dark-colored, above all as the black-haired man ("hic niger est—" [From Horace's Satires]), as the pre-Aryan occupant of the soil of Italy who was distinguished most obviously from the blond, that is Aryan, conqueror race by his color; Gaelic, at any rate, offers us a precisely similar case—fin (for example in the name Fin-Gal), the distinguishing word for nobility, finally for the good, noble, pure, originally meant the blond-headed, in contradistinction to the dark, black-haired aboriginal inhabitants.

The Celts, by the way, were definitely a blond race; it is wrong to associate traces of an essentially dark-haired people which appear on the more careful ethnographical maps of Germany with any sort of Celtic origin or blood-mixture, as Virchow [Rudolf Virchow (1821-1902), German pathologist and liberal politician] still does: it is rather the pre-Aryan people of Germany who emerge in these places. (The same is true of virtually all Europe: the suppressed race has gradually recovered the upper hand again, in coloring, shortness of skull, perhaps even in the intellectual and social instincts: who can say whether modern democracy, even more modern anarchism and especially that inclination for "commune," for the most primitive form of society, which is now shared by all the socialists of Europe, does not signify in the main a tremendous counterattack—and that the conqueror and master race, the Aryan, is not succumbing physiologically, too?

I believe I may venture to interpret the Latin bonus [Good] as "the warrior," provided I am right in tracing bonus back to an earlier duonus [Old form of bonus; duellum old form of bellum (war)] (compare bellum=duellum=duen-lum, which seems to me to contain duonus). Therefore bonus as the man of strife, of dissention (duo), as the man of war: one sees what constituted the "goodness" of man in ancient Rome. Our German gut [good] even: does it not signify "the godlike," the man of "godlike race"? And is it not identical with the popular (originally noble) name of the Goths? The grounds for this conjecture cannot be dealt with here.—

　　政治优越观念总是引起一种精神优越观念，这一规则暂时尚未有例外（虽然有产生例外的机会），当最高等级是教士等级的时候，这一规则表现为教士们喜欢采用一种向人们提醒教士职能的称呼来作为他们的共同标志。譬如在这里我们第一次碰上了像“纯洁”和“不纯洁”这样的对立的等级观念，同样也是在这里后来产生了不再具有等级意义的“好”和“坏”的观念。但是人们应该当心，不要立刻把“纯洁”与“不纯洁”这种观念看得过重、太广，甚至看成象征性的：古人类的所有观念都应当从一开始就被理解为一堆我们几乎不能想像地粗糙的、笨拙的、浅薄的、狭窄的、直截了当的，特别是不具有代表性的东西，“纯洁的人”的最初的意思不过是洗澡的人，拒绝吃某种感染腹疾的食品的人，不和肮脏的下层妇女睡觉的人，厌恶流血的人——只此而已，岂有它哉！此外，当然，从以教士为主的贵族的全部行为可以看清楚，为什么恰恰是在这种早期阶段，价值的对立能够以一种危险的方式内向化、尖锐化。事实上，由于这种价值的对立在人与人之间最终扯开了一道鸿沟，就连精神自由的阿基利斯也难于毫不畏惧地逾越这道鸿沟。早在一开始就有某种有害的因素孕含在这种贵族气派中，孕含在这统治者的、疏远商贸的、部分是深思熟虑、部分是感情爆发的习惯中，其结果是各个时期的教士们都很快地、不可避免地感染上那种肠道疾病和神经衰弱，可是他们为自己找到了什么方法来医治他们这些疾病？——难道人们不能说这种医疗方法的最终结果已经显示比它要治愈的疾病本身还要危险百倍吗？人类自身仍然在受着那些教士们的医疗方式的后果的煎熬！让我们试想某种饮食方式（禁忌肉类），试想斋戒、节制性欲、“向沙漠”逃循（维尔·米切尔式的孤立，当然不包括由此产生的强饲法和营养过度，那里包含了医治禁欲主义理想的所有歇斯底里发作的最有效的方法）；再试想，教士们的全部敌视感官的和懒惰而诡诈的形而上学，他们依据苦行僧的和使用玻璃扣而且观念固执的婆罗门的方式实行的自我催眠术，以及对其根治术——虚无的、最后的、非常可以理解的普遍厌倦（或者对上帝的厌倦——渴望和上帝结成一种神秘联盟是佛教徒所渴望的虚无，涅盘——仅此而已！）在教士们那儿一切都变得格外危险，不仅仅是医疗方式和治疗技术，而且还包括傲慢、报复、敏锐、放荡、爱情、权力追求、贞操、疾病——凭心而论，无论如何还应当加上一句：只有在这块土地上，在这块对人类和教士的生存来说基本上是危险的土地上，人才能够发展成为一种有趣的动物，只有在这里，人的精神才更高深，同时也变得凶恶了——正是这两个原因使得人迄今为止优越于其它的动物。

To this rule that a concept denoting political superiority always resolves itself into a concept denoting superiority of soul it is not necessarily an exception (although it provides occasions for exceptions) when the highest caste is at the same time the priestly caste and therefore emphasizes in its total description of itself a predicate that calls to mind its priestly function. It is then, for example, that "pure" and "impure" confront one another for the first time as designations of station; and here too there evolves a "good" and a "bad" in a sense no longer referring to station. One should be warned, moreover, against taking these concepts "pure" and "impure" too ponderously or broadly, not to say symbolically: all the concepts of ancient man were rather at first incredibly uncouth, coarse, external, narrow, straightforward, and altogether unsymbolical in meaning to a degree that we can scarcely conceive. The "pure one" is from the beginning merely a man who washes himself, who forbids himself certain foods that produce skin ailments, who does not sleep with the dirty women of the lower strata, who has an aversion to blood—no more, hardly more! On the other hand, to be sure, it is clear from the whole nature of an essentially priestly aristocracy why antithetical valuations could in precisely this instance soon become dangerously deepened, sharpened, and internalized; and indeed they finally tore chasms between man and man that a very Achilles of a free spirit would not venture to leap without a shudder. There is from the first something unhealthy in such priestly aristocracies and in the habits ruling in them which turn them away from action and alternate between brooding and emotional explosions, habits which seem to have as their almost invariable consequences that intestinal morbidity and neurasthenia which has afflicted priests at all times; but as to that which they themselves devised as a remedy for this morbidity—must one not assert that it has ultimately proved itself a hundred times more dangerous in its effects than the sickness it was supposed to cure? Mankind itself is still ill with the effects of this priestly naïveté in medicine! Think, for example, of certain forms of diet (abstinence from meat), of fasting, of sexual continence, of flight "into the wilderness" (the Weir Mitchell isolation cure—without, to be sure, the subsequent fattening and overfeeding which constitute the most effective remedy for the hysteria induced by the ascetic ideal): add to these the entire antisensualistic metaphysics of the priests that makes men indolent and overrefined, their autohypnosis in the manner of fakirs and Brahmins—Brahma used in the shape of a glass knob and a fixed idea—and finally the only-too-comprehensible satiety with all this, together with the radical cure for it, nothingness (or God—the desire for a unio mystica with God is the desire of the Buddhist for nothingness, Nirvana—and no more!). For with the priests everything becomes more dangerous, not only cures and remedies, but also arrogance, revenge, acuteness, profligacy, love, lust to rule, virtue, disease—but it is only fair to add that it was on the soil of this essentially dangerous form of human existence, the priestly form, that man first became an interesting animal, that only here did the human soul in a higher sense acquire depth and become evil—and these are the two basic respects in which man has hitherto been superior to other beasts!

　　读者已经可以猜测出，教士的价值方式可以多么轻易地脱离骑士——贵族的价值方式而向其反面发展了。在每一次这种脱离发生时都有一个契机，都是发生在教士阶层和斗士阶层相互嫉妒、无法和解的时候。骑士——贵族的价值判断的前提是一个强有力的体魄，是一种焕发的、丰富的、奔放的健康，以及维持这种体魄和健康的条件：战斗、冒险、狩猎、跳舞、比赛等等所有强壮的、自由的、愉快的行动。贵族化教士的价值方式，正像我们所看到的，具有其它的前提：战斗对他们来说是糟糕造了！正如我们所知，教士是最凶恶的敌人——为什么这么说？因为他们最无能。从无能中生长出来的仇恨既暴烈又可怕，既最富才智又最为阴毒。世界历史上最大的仇恨者总是教士，最富有才智的仇恨者也总是教士——在教士的报复智慧面前，其它所有的智慧都黯然失色。没有这种无能者提供的才智，人类历史将会过于乏味——让我们举个最重大的事例。在地球上，所有反对“高贵者”、“有力者”、“主人”、“权力拥有者”的行动都不能和犹太人在这方面的所为同日而语：犹太人，那个教士化的人民，深知只需彻底地重新评定他们的敌人和压迫者的价值，也就是说，以一种最富有才智的行动而使自己得到补偿。这正适合于教士化的人民，这个有着最深沉的教士化报复心理的人民。正是犹太人敢于坚持不懈地扭转贵族的价值观念（好＝高贵＝有力＝美丽＝幸福＝上帝宠儿），而且咬紧了充满深不可测的仇恨（无能的仇恨）的牙关声称“只有苦难者才是好人，只有贫穷者、无能者、卑贱者才是好人，只有忍受折磨者、遭受贫困者、病患者、丑陋者才是唯一善良的、唯一虔诚的，只有他们才能享受天国的幸福，——相反，你们这些永久凶恶的人、残酷的人、贪婪的人、不知足的人、不信神的人，你们也将遭受永久的不幸、诅咒，并且被判入地狱！”……我们知道，是谁继承了这种犹太人对价值的重新评价。一想起这可怕的、祸及全体大众的首创，这一由犹太人提出的所有战争挑战中最根本的挑战，我就记起我在另一场合（《善恶的彼岸》第一一八页）说过的话——即犹太人开始了道德上的奴隶起义：那起义已经有了两干年的历史，我们今天对此模糊不清只是因为那起义取得了完全的成功……

One will have divined already how easily the priestly mode of valuation can branch off from the knightly-aristocratic and then develop into its opposite; this is particularly likely when the priestly caste and the warrior caste are in jealous opposition to one another and are unwilling to come to terms. The knightly-aristocratic value judgments presupposed a powerful physicality, a flourishing, abundant, even overflowing health, together with that which serves to preserve it: war, adventure, hunting, dancing, war games, and in general all that involves vigorous, free, joyful activity. The priestly-noble mode of valuation presupposes, as we have seen, other things: it is disadvantageous for when it comes to war! As is well known, the priests are the most evil enemies—but why? Because they are the most impotent. It is because of their impotence that in them hatred grows to monstrous and uncanny proportions, to the most spiritual and poisonous kind of hatred. The truly great haters in world history have always been priests; likewise the most ingenious [Geistreich] haters: other kinds of spirit [Geist] hardly come into consideration when compared with the spirit of priestly vengefulness. Human history would be altogether too stupid a thing without the spirit that the impotent have introduced into it—let us take at once the most notable example. All that has been done on earth against "the noble," "the powerful," "the masters," "the rulers," fades into nothing compared with what the Jews have done against them; the Jews, that priestly people, who in opposing their enemies and conquerors were ultimately satisfied with nothing less than a radical revaluation of their enemies' values, that is to say, an act of the most spiritual revenge. For this alone was appropriate to a priestly people, the people embodying the most deeply repressed [Zurückgetretensten] priestly vengefulness. It was the Jews who, with awe-inspiring consistency, dared to invert the aristocratic value-equation (good = noble = powerful = beautiful = happy = beloved of God) and to hang on to this inversion with their teeth, the teeth of the most abysmal hatred (the hatred of impotence), saying "the wretched alone are the good; the poor, impotent, lowly alone are the good; the suffering, deprived, sick, ugly alone are pious, alone are blessed by God, blessedness is for them alone—and you, the powerful and noble, are on the contrary the evil, the cruel, the lustful, the insatiable, the godless to all eternity; and you shall be in all eternity the unblessed, accursed, and damned!" . . . One knows who inherited this Jewish revaluation . . . In connection with the tremendous and immeasurably fateful initiative provided by the Jews through this most fundamental of all declarations of war, I recall the proposition I arrived at on a previous occasion (Beyond Good and Evil, section 195)—that with the Jews there began the slave revolt in morality: that revolt which has a history of two thousand years behind it and which we no longer see because it—has been victorious.

　　——可是你们没有听懂？你们没有看到某种东西需要两千年的时间才能取得成功？……这没有什么奇怪的：所有长期性的发展都很难观察、很难判断。可这是个大事：从那报复的树干中，从那犹太的仇恨中，从那地球上从未有过的最深刻、最极端的、能创造理想、转变价值的仇恨中生长出某种同样无与伦比的东西，一种新的爱，各种爱中最深刻最极端的一种：——从其它哪根树干中能够长出这种爱？……

但是也不要误以为这种爱是对那种报复渴望的否定，是作为犹太仇恨的对立面而萌发的！不是的！事实恰好相反！这种爱正是从那树干中长出来的，是它的树冠，是凯旋的、在最纯洁的亮度和阳光下逐渐逐渐地伸展开来的树冠。既使在光线和高度的王国里，这树冠也似乎以同样的渴求寻求着那仇恨的目的、胜利、战利品、诱惑，这种渴求使那种仇恨的根在所有的深渊中越扎越深，在所有的罪恶中越变越贪。拿撒勒斯的这位耶稣，爱的人格化福音，这位把祝福和胜利带给贫苦人、病患者、罪人的“救世主”，——他难道不正是最阴险可怕、最难以抗拒的诱惑吗？这诱惑和迂回不正是导向那些犹太的价值和理想的再造吗？难道以色列不正是通过这位“救世主”的迂回，这位以色列表面上的仇敌和解救者来达到其精心策划的报复行动的最后目标的吗？这难道不算是报复的一种真正重大的策略所使用的秘密非法的艺术吗？这不是一种有远见的、隐蔽的、缓慢的和严密策划的报复吗？以色列本身不正是这样被迫当着整个世界像唾弃死敌一样唾弃其报复的真正工具、并且让它钉在十字架上，从而使“整个世界”，即所有以色列的敌人，都不假思索地吞下这诱饵吗？难道还有人能从精神的所有诡计中再想出一种更加危险的诱饵吗？什么东西的诱惑人、陶醉人、麻痹人、使人堕落的力量能和“神圣的十字架”这个象征、“钉在十字架上的上帝”那恐怖的自相矛盾、上帝为了人类幸福而把自己钉在十字架上这种无法想像的最后的残酷行动的神秘色彩相提并论？

至少可以肯定，以色列以这种情景，用其对迄今为止所有价值的报复和重新评定，不断地战胜了一切其它的理想，战胜一切更高贵的理想。——

But you do not comprehend this? You are incapable of seeing something that required two thousand years to achieve victory?—There is nothing to wonder at in that: all protracted things are hard to see, to see whole. That, however, is what has happened: from the trunk of that tree of vengefulness and hatred, Jewish hatred—the profoundest and sublimest kind of hatred, capable of creating ideals and reversing values, the like of which has never existed on earth before—there grew something equally incomparable, a new love, the profoundest and sublimest kind of love—and from what other trunk could it have grown?

One should not imagine it grew up as the denial of that thirst for revenge, as the opposite of Jewish hatred! No, the reverse is true! That love grew out of it as its crown, as its triumphant crown spreading itself farther and farther into the purest brightness and sunlight, driven as it were into the domain of light and the heights in pursuit of the goals of that hatred—victory, spoil, and seduction—by the same impulse that drove the roots of that hatred deeper and deeper and more and more covetously into all that was profound and evil. This Jesus of Nazareth, the incarnate gospel of love, this "Redeemer" who brought blessedness and victory to the poor, the sick, and the sinners—was he not this seduction in its most uncanny and irresistible form, a seduction and bypath to precisely those Jewish values and new ideals? Did Israel not attain the ultimate goal of its sublime vengefulness precisely through the bypath of this "Redeemer," this ostensible opponent and disintegrator of Israel? Was it not part of the secret black art of truly grand politics of revenge, of a farseeing, subterranean, slowly advancing, and premeditated revenge, that Israel must itself deny the real instrument of its revenge before all the world as a mortal enemy and nail it to the cross, so that "all the world," namely all the opponents of Israel, could unhesitatingly swallow just this bait? And could spiritual subtlety imagine any more dangerous bait than this? Anything to equal the enticing, intoxicating, overwhelming, and undermining power of that symbol of the "holy cross," that ghastly paradox of a "God on the cross," that mystery of an unimaginable ultimate cruelty and self-crucifixion of God for the salvation of man?

What is certain, at least, is that sub hoc signo [Under this sign] Israel, with its vengefulness and revaluation of all values, has hitherto triumphed again and again over all other ideals, over all nobler ideals.——

　　——“可是您还谈论什么更高贵的理想！让我们顺应现实吧！人民获得了胜利——或者说是‘奴隶’获得了胜利，或者说是‘暴民’，或者说是‘百姓’，随便您怎么去称呼它，反正这胜利是由于犹太人而获得的，而发起的！任何其他的人民都未曾有过这样一种世界历史使命。‘主人’被打败了，平民的道德取得了胜利。这种胜利同时又可以被看成是一种败血症（它已经在各个种族中融通蔓延），我不否认，无疑地，人类中毒了。‘拯救’人类于‘主人’的统治的事业正获全胜。一切都明显地犹太化了，或者基督化了，或者暴民化了。（不管用什么词吧！）这种毒症在人类全身的蔓延看来是不可阻止的了，其蔓延的速度从现在起倒是可能不断地放慢，变得更细致、更微弱、更审慎——人们还有时间……如今教会还能有什么了不起的任务，甚至还有什么存在的理由？也许人们可以不需要教会？请回答吧。看上去教会是在阻止和控制而不是促进毒症的蔓延？这正可能是它的有用之处。可以肯定地说，教会简直就是粗鲁村野的东西，是和细腻的智慧，和一种本来很时髦的趣味相对立的，它难道不应当至少自我完善一点儿吗？……它如今得罪的人要比它诱惑的人多了……假如没有教会，我们之中有谁会成为自由思想家？是教会而不是它的毒素在和我们作对……撇开教会，我们还是热爱毒素的……——

这是一位“自由思想家”对我的讲话的反应——他是一个诚实的家伙，反正他明显地表现出他是一个民主主义者，他一直在倾听我讲话，而且不容我沉默，可是我在这个问题上却有充分的理由沉默。

"But why are you talking about nobler ideals! Let us stick to the facts: the people have won—or 'the slaves' or 'the mob' or 'the herd' or whatever you like to call them—if this has happened through the Jews, very well! in that case no people ever had a more world-historic mission. 'The masters' have been disposed of; the morality of the common man has won. One may conceive of this victory as at the same time a blood-poisoning (it has mixed the races together)—I shan't contradict; but this in-toxication has undoubtedly been successful. The 'redemption' of the human race (from 'the masters,' that is) is going forward; everything is visibly becoming Judaized, Christianized, mob-ized (what do the words matter!). The progress of this poison through the entire body of mankind seems irresistible, its pace and tempo may from now on even grow slower, subtler, less audible, more cautious—there is plenty of time.— To this end, does the church today still have any necessary role to play? Does it still have the right to exist? Or could one do without it? Quaeritur [One asks]. It seems to hinder rather than hasten this progress. But perhaps that is its usefulness.— Certainly it has, over the years, become something crude and boorish, something repellent to a more delicate intellect, to a truly modern taste. Ought it not to become at least a little more refined?— Today it alienates rather than seduces.— Which of us would be a free spirit if the church did not exist? It is the church, and not its poison, that repels us.— Apart from the church, we, too, love the poison.—"

This is the epilogue of a "free spirit" to my speech; an honest animal, as he has abundantly revealed, and a democrat, moreover; he had been listening to me till then and could not endure to listen to my silence. For at this point I have much to be silent about.

　　奴隶在道德上进行反抗伊始，怨恨本身变得富有创造性并且娩出价值：这种怨恨发自一些人，他们不能通过采取行动做出直接的反应，而只能以一种想像中的报复得到补偿。所有高贵的道德都产生于一种凯旋式的自我肯定，而奴隶道德则起始于对“外界”，对“他人”，对“非我”的否定：这种否定就是奴隶道德的创造性行动。这种从反方向寻求确定价值的行动——值得注意的是，这是向外界而不是向自身方向寻求价值——这就是一种怨恨：奴隶道德的形成总是先需要一个对立的外部环境，从物理学的角度讲，它需要外界刺激才能出场，这种行动从本质上说是对外界的反应。高贵的价值评定方式则相反；这些价值是自发地产生和发展的，它只是为了更心安理得、更兴高采烈地肯定自己才去寻找其对立面。

它们的消极的概念如“低贱”、“平庸”、“坏”都是在与它们的积极的概念相比较后产生的模糊的对照，而它们的积极的概念则是彻底地渗透于生命和热情的基本概念：“我们是高贵者，是好人；我们是美的、是幸福的。”如果说贵族的价值方式有过失，强暴现实，那么这种情况就发生于他们不够了解的领域，他们不是去了解实情，而是矜持地进行自卫：有时他们会错误地判断一个他们所蔑视的领域，比如平民的领域，地位低下的人民的领域。另一方面，人们也要考虑到，不管怎么说，蔑视的情绪、倨傲的情绪、自负的情绪的产生，人们对蔑视情景的伪造，这都远远无法和无能者以受压抑的仇恨向他的对手（当然是虚构的）进行报复的那种虚伪相比。事实上，在这种蔑视中有过多的疏忽和轻浮，过多的不顾事实和不耐烦，夹杂着本来就过多的与生俱来的愉快心情，使这种蔑视能够把它的对象转变成真正的丑角和怪物。请注意，希腊贵族为了和地位低下的人民拉开距离，在所有有关的词句中加上几乎是仁慈的声调，怜悯、关怀、容忍这类的词一直不断地相互搅拌，并且包裹上糖衣，直至最后几乎所有和平民有关的词句就只省下了诸如“不幸”、“可怜”这类的表达（参见deilos，deilaios，poneros，mo－chtheros，最后两个词的本意认平民为工作奴隶和负重的牲畜）——而另一方面，“坏”、“低贱”、“不幸”这类词又没完没了地用一个单音，用一种“不幸”占优势的音色，轰击着希腊人的耳朵；这是古老的、更高贵的贵族价值方式的传家宝，即使在蔑视时也不会须臾背弃。“出身高贵者”的确感到他们自己是“幸福者”，他们不是先和他们的敌人比较，然后才来人为地造就他们的幸福，或者使人相信，或者骗人相信他们的幸福（所有充满仇恨的人们都惯于此道）。他们浑身是力，因此也必然充满积极性，同样，他们知道，不能把行动从幸福中分离出去，他们把积极行动看成幸福的必要组成部分。

所有这些都和无能者以及受压抑者阶层的“幸福”形成鲜明的对立，他们这些人感染了有毒和仇恨的情感，这些情感很快就被消极地表现为麻醉、晕眩、安宁、自由、“安息日”、修养性情和伸展四肢等。高贵的人生活中充满自信和坦率（“血统高贵”强调“真诚”，或许还有“天真”），而怀恨的人既不真诚也不天真，甚至对自己都不诚实和直率，他的心灵是斜的，他的精神喜欢隐蔽的角落、秘密的路径和后门；任何隐晦的事都能引起他的兴趣，成为他的世界、他的保障、他的安慰，他擅长于沉默、记忆、等待，擅长于暂时地卑躬屈膝、低声下气。这种仇恨者的种族最终必然会比任何一个高贵的种族更加聪明，而且它对聪明尊崇的程度也大不相同：它把聪明当做其生存的首要条件，而高贵者只是把聪明当作奢侈和精致的一种高雅的变味品来享受：——即使在这方面，聪明比起无意识的调节本能那样一种完美的功能性保障也早已不那么重要了，甚至比起一种特定的不聪明来，比起某种更加勇敢的蛮干，哪怕蛮干会招灾树敌，比起那为所有时代的高尚灵魂都要重新认识的激怒、热爱、敬畏、感激和报复等等狂热的情感爆发来，聪明早已不再重要了。当一个高贵的人感受到怨恨的时候，这怨恨会爆发，并且消耗在一种瞬间的反应中，因此也就不会起毒化作用：此外，在许多场合下，高贵者丝毫不感到怨恨，而所有的软弱者和无能者却会毫无例外地感到怨恨。

具有坚强完美的天性的人的标志是根本不会长期地把自己的敌人、不幸和失误看得很严重，因为他们有丰富的塑造力、修复力、治愈力，还有一种忘却力（现代世界上有个很好的例子，他就是米拉保，他记不住任何别人对他的侮辱和抵毁，他不能原谅别人，只是因为他把一切全忘记了。）这种人猛然一甩就抖落了许多寄生虫，而这些寄生虫却深入其他人的皮下；也只有在这种情况下地球上才可能出现所谓的“爱自己的敌人”。一个高贵者已经向他的敌人表示了多少尊重！而这种尊重本身就是通向爱的桥梁……是的，他以己度自己的敌人，以自己的高标准要求敌人！是的，除了这种丝毫不值得蔑视，而且非常值得尊敬的敌人，他不能容忍其他种的敌人！试想，一个充满仇满恨的人构想出来的“敌人”将是什么样的——这正是他的行动，他的创造：他构想了“丑恶的敌人”，构想了“恶人”，并且把它作为基本概念，然后又从此出发产生了余念，设想了一个对立面，即“好人”——

　　也就是他自己。

The slave revolt in morality begins when ressentiment itself becomes creative and gives birth to values: the ressentiment of natures that are denied the true reaction, that of deeds, and compensate themselves with an imaginary revenge. While every noble morality develops from a triumphant affirmation of itself, slave morality from the outset says No to what is "outside," what is "different," what is "not itself"; and this No is its creative deed. This inversion of the value-positing eye—this need to direct one's view outward instead of back to oneself—is of the essence of ressentiment; in order to exist, slave morality always first needs a hostile external world; it needs, physiologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act at all—its action is fundamentally reaction.

One should not overlook the almost benevolent nuances that the Greek nobility, for example, bestows on all the words it employs to distinguish the lower orders from itself; how they are continuously mingled and sweetened with a kind of pity, consideration, and forbearance, so that finally almost all the words referring to the common man have remained as expressions signifying "unhappy," "pitiable" (campore deilos, deilaios, poneros, mochtheros, the last two of which properly designate the common man as work-slave and beast of burden) [Greek: The first four mean wretched; and also, deilos: cowardly, worthless, vile; deilaios: paltry; poneros: oppressed by toils, good for nothing, worthless, knavish, base, cowardly; mochtheros: suffering hardship, knavish]—and how on the other hand "bad," "low," "unhappy" have never ceased to sound to the Greek ear as one note with a tone-color in which "unhappy" preponderates: this as an inheritance from the ancient nobler aristocratic mode of evaluation, which does not belie itself even in its contempt (—philologists should recall the sense in which oïzyros [woeful, miserable, toilsome; wretch], anolbos [unblest, wretched, luckless, poor], tlemon [wretched, miserable], dystychein [to be unlucky, unfortunate], xymphora [misfortune] are employed). The "well-born" felt themselves to be the "happy"; they did not have to establish their happiness artificially by examining their enemies, or to persuade themselves, deceive themselves, that they were happy (as all men of ressentiment are in the habit of doing); and they likewise knew, as rounded men replete with energy and therefore necessarily active, that happiness should not be sundered from action—being active was with them necessarily a part of happiness (whence eu prattein [To do well in the sense of faring well] takes its origin)—all very much the opposite of "happiness" at the level of the impotent, the oppressed, and those in whom poisonous and inimical feelings are festering, with whom it appears as essentially narcotic, drug, rest, peace, "sabbath," slackening of tension and relaxing of limbs, in short passively.

While the noble man lives in trust and openness with himself (gennaios [high-born, noble, high-minded] "of noble descent" underlines the nuance "upright" and probably also "naïve"), the man of ressentiment is neither upright nor naïve nor honest and straightforward with himself. His soul squints; his spirit loves hiding places, secret paths and back doors, everything covert entices him as his world, his security, his refreshment; he understands how to keep silent, how not to forget, how to wait, how to be provisionally self-deprecating and humble. A race of such men of ressentiment is bound to become eventually cleverer than any noble race; it will also honor cleverness to a far greater degree: namely, as a condition of existence of the first importance; while with nobler men cleverness can easily acquire a subtle flavor of luxury and subtlety—for here it is far less essential than the perfect functioning of the regulating unconscious instincts or even that a certain imprudence, perhaps a bold recklessness whether in the face of danger or of the enemy, or that enthusiastic impulsiveness in anger, love, reverence, gratitude, and revenge by which noble souls have at all times recognized one another. Ressentiment itself, if it should appear in the noble man, consummates and exhausts itself in an immediate reaction, and therefore does not poison: on the other hand, it fails to appear at all on countless occasions on which it inevitably appears in the weak and impotent.

To be incapable of taking one's enemies, one's accidents, even one's misdeeds seriously for very long—that is the sign of strong, full natures in whom there is an excess of the power to form, to mold, to recuperate and to forget (a good example of this in modern times is Mirabeau [Honoré Gabriel Riqueti, Comte de Mirabeau (1749-1791), a French Revolutionary statesman and writer], who had no memory for insults and vile actions done him and was unable to forgive simply because he—forgot). Such a man shakes off with a single shrug many vermin that eat deep into others; here alone genuine "love of one's enemies" is possible—supposing it to be possible at all on earth. How much reverence has a noble man for his enemies!—and such reverence is a bridge to love.— For he desires his enemy for himself, as his mark of distinction; he can endure no other enemy than one in whom there is nothing to despise and very much to honor! In contrast to this, picture "the enemy" as the man of ressentiment conceives him—and here precisely is his deed, his creation: he has conceived "the evil enemy," "the Evil One," and this in fact is his basic concept, from which he then evolves, as an afterthought and pendant, a "good one"—himself!

　　正好相反，精神高贵者预先自发地创造了“好”的基本概念，也就是说从自身获得了这一概念，而后才由此引伸出一种关于“坏”的概念！这种起源于高贵的“坏”和那种产生于不知魇足的仇恨的大锅中的“恶”——这看上去同样是“好”物概念的反义词的—“坏”和—“恶”是多么不相同啊！前者是附产品，是一种附加成分，一种补充色调，而后者却是本源、是起点，在奴隶的道德观念中是原始的创造活动。可是在这里同样被称为“好”的概念并不相同：最好还是过问一下，依照仇恨的道德究竟谁是“恶人”。最确切的答案是：这里的所谓“恶人”恰恰是另一种道德中的“好人”、高贵者、强有力者、统治者，他们只不过是被仇恨的有毒眼睛改变了颜色、改变了含义、改变了形态。

This, then, is quite the contrary of what the noble man does, who conceives the basic concept "good" in advance and spontaneously out of himself and only then creates for himself an idea of "bad"! This "bad" of noble origin and that "evil" out of the cauldron of unsatisfied hatred—the former an after-production, a side issue, a contrasting shade, the latter on the contrary the original thing, the beginning, the distinctive deed in the conception of a slave morality—how different these words "bad" and "evil" are, although they are both apparently the opposite of the same concept "good." But it is not the same concept "good": one should ask rather precisely who is "evil" in the sense of the morality of ressentiment. The answer, in all strictness, is: precisely the "good man" of the other morality, precisely the noble, powerful man, the ruler, but dyed in another color, interpreted in another fashion, seen in another way by the venomous eye of ressentiment.

　　此刻，我不拟压抑我的感叹和我最后的期望。什么东西是我完全无法忍受的？是我独自一人无法结束的？是令我窒息、使我忍受煎熬的？是恶劣的空气！恶劣的空气！是某种失败的东西在接近我，是我被迫去嗅一种失败者的内脏……

At this point I cannot suppress a sigh and a last hope. What is it that I especially find utterly unendurable? That I cannot cope with, that makes me choke and faint? Bad air! Bad air! The approach of some ill-constituted thing; that I have to smell the entrails of some ill-constituted soul!

　　言归正传，关于“好人”观念的另外一个起源，也就是仇恨者想像出来的那种好人，这个问题出需要有一个解。

But let us return: the problem of the other origin of the "good," of the good as conceived by the man of ressentiment, demands its solution.

　　有谁想上下求索一番、看看理想是怎么制造出来的？谁有这份胆量？……好，让我们开始吧！这儿有一条缝，可以经常窥见这些阴暗的作坊。请稍候片刻，我的冒失大胆先生，您的眼睛必须先习惯于这变幻无常的光线，……好了，现在请告诉我，那里发生了些什么事？说出来您都看到了些什么，您这个最危险的好奇家伙——现在我是倾听者——

Would anyone like to take a look into the secret of how ideals are made on earth? Who has the courage?— Very well! Here is a point we can see through into this dark workshop. But wait a moment or two, Mr. Rash and Curious: your eyes must first get used to this false iridescent light.— All right! Now speak! What is going on down there? Say what you see, man of the most perilous kind of inquisitiveness—now I am the one who is listening.—

—Go on!

—Go on!

—Go on!

—"I understand; I'll open my ears again (oh! oh! oh! and color my nose). Now I can really hear what they have been saying all along: 'We good men—we are the just'—what they desire they call, not retaliation, but 'the triumph of justice'; what they hate is not their enemy, no! they hate 'injustice,' they hate 'godlessness'; what they believe in and hope for is not the hope of revenge, the intoxication of sweet revenge (—'sweeter than honey' Homer called it), but the victory of God, of the just God, over the godless; what there is left for them to love on earth is not their brothers in hatred but their 'brothers in love,' as they put it, all the good and just on earth."

—And what do they call that which serves to console them for all the suffering of life—their phantasmagoria of anticipated future bliss?

—"What? Do I hear aright? They call that 'the Last Judgment,' the coming of their kingdom, of the 'Kingdom of God'—meanwhile, however, they live 'in faith,' 'in love,' 'in hope.'"

—Enough! Enough!

　　信仰什么？爱什么？期望什么？无疑，这些软弱者也希望有朝一日他们能成为强者，有朝一日他们的“王国”也能来临，他们就把这个王国称这“上帝的王国”——他们事事处处都如此谦卑！可是为了获得在这个王国生活的经历，人必须活很长时间的、必须越过死亡，是的，必须获得永生才能够永久地在“上帝的王国”里使自己那“在信仰、爱期望中”渡过的尘世生活得到补偿。可是补偿什么？用什么来补偿？……

In faith in what? In love of what? In hope of what?— These weak people—some day or other they too intend to be the strong, there is no doubt of that, some day their "kingdom" too shall come—they term it "the kingdom of God," of course, as aforesaid: for one is so very humble in all things! To experience that one needs to live a long time, beyond death—indeed one needs eternal life, so as t be eternally indemnified in the "kingdom of God" for this earthly life "in faith, in love, in hope." Indemnified for what? How indemnified?

　　让我们来总结一下。“好与坏”和“善与恶”这两种对立的价值观在这个地球上进行了一场旷日持久的恶战，虽然第二种价值观长期以来一直稳占上风，但是只要战争仍在持续，胜负的问题就悬而未决；甚至可以说，在此期间战争又升级了，因而它也就变得更深刻，更具有斗智的性质了，结果是目前也许还找不到更确切的标志来标记那超越这种对立的“更高级的自然力”，即更智慧的自然力，那种对立的另一真实的战场。这场战斗的象征在所有人类历史上垂训千古，这就是“罗马人对以色列人，以色列人对罗马人”。

Let us conclude. The two opposing values "good and bad," "good and evil" have been engaged in a fearful struggle on earth for thousands of years; and though the latter value has certainly been on top for a long time, there are still places where the struggle is as yet undecided. One might even say that it has risen ever higher and thus become more and more profound and spiritual: so that today there is perhaps no more decisive mark of a "higher nature," a more spiritual nature, than that of being divided in this sense and a genuine battleground of these opposed values.

是否有朝一日那古老的、憋闷己久的火势必会复燃成可怕得多的烈焰？不仅如此，这难道不正是有人全心全力渴望的吗？甚至有人要求，以至努力促使这一天的到来。

如果此时此刻有谁像我的读者一样刚刚开始思考，开始拓展思维，他还很难迅速地得出结论，而我则有足够的理由做出结论，因为还是在很早以前我就很清楚我想要什么，我提出那句危险的口号是为了什么，那句口号写在我上一本书的扉页上：“善恶的彼岸”，至少我没有写上“好坏的彼岸”。

Was that the end of it? Had that greatest of all conflicts of ideals been placed ad acta [Disposed of] for all time? Or only adjourned, indefinitely adjourned?

Must the ancient fire not some day flare up much more terribly, after much longer preparation? More: must one not desire it with all one's might? even will it? even promote it?

Whoever begins at this point, like my readers, to reflect and pursue his train of thought will not soon come to the end of it—reason enough for me to come to an end, assuming it has long since been abundantly clear what my aim is, what the aim of that dangerous slogan is that is inscribed at the head of my last book Beyond Good and Evil.— At least this does not mean "Beyond Good and Bad." ——

——此外，显然还有必要争取生理学家和医学家来帮助解决这一问题（即迄今为止的价值判断的价值这个问题）。在这里，也仅仅是在这种情况下，应当委托专业哲学家来充当代言人和协调人，因为他们成功地把哲学、生理学和医学之间的那种本来是非常冷淡、非常多疑的关系变成了友好的，富有成果的交往。事实上，所有那些历史研究和人种学研究所熟知的品行戒律，所有那些“你应当……”条款，都要求首先进行生理的阐释和说明，然后才能进行心理的分析，所有类似的问题都要首先经过医学知识的评判。问题的症结在于：各种品行戒律或“道德”价值到底是什么？如果不从各种不同的角度去观察它们，就无法精细地分解“价值目标”。比如某种东西对于某一种生物的长久生存来说可能有明显的价值（对于这种生物提高适应特定气候的能力，或对于它维持最多的数量来说），但是对于造就一种更强壮的生物来说，它就不会具有同样的价值了。大多数的利益和极少数的利益是相互对立的价值观点，认定前者是更高的价值，这属于英国生理学家的天真……现在所有的科学都在为哲学家未来的使命进行准备工作，而哲学家的使命就是：他们必须解决价值的难题，必须确定各种价值的档次。

On the other hand, it is equally necessary to engage the interest of physiologists and doctors in these problems (of the value of existing evaluations); it may be left to academic philosophers to act as advocates and mediators in this matter too, after they have on the whole succeeded in the past in transforming the originally so reserved and mistrustful relations between philosophy, physiology, and medicine into the most amicable and fruitful exchange. Indeed, every table of values, every "thou shalt" known to history or ethnology, requires first a physiological investigation and interpretation, rather than a psychological one; and every one of them needs a critique on the part of medical science. The question: what is the value of this or that table of values and "morals"? should be viewed from the most divers perspectives; for the problem "value for what?" cannot be examined too subtly. Something, for example, that possessed obvious value in relation to the longest possible survival of a race (or to the enhancement of its power of adaptation to a particular climate or to the reservation of the greatest number) would by no means possess the same value if it were a question, for instance, of producing a stronger type. The well-being of the few are opposite viewpoints of value: to consider the former a priori of higher value may be left to the naïveté of English biologists.— All the sciences have from now on to prepare the way for the future task of the philosophers: this task understood as the solution of the problem of value, the determination of the order of rank among values.