弗洛伊德和没有父亲的社会
译自《LIFE CONDUCT IN MODERN TIMES》
MATTHIAS BORMUTH

哈贝马斯和亚历山大·米切利希之间的友谊对米切利希关于精神分析医学理念汇入到20世纪60年代现在被称为法兰克福学派或批判理论的社会科学理论大潮流的建立扮演了至关重要的权威角色。早在1963年，哈贝马斯肯定了米切利希在他的名为 Society without a Father 没有父亲的社会 (Auf dem Weg zur vaterlosen Gesellschaft 走向没有父亲途中的社会)的研究中阐明的关于精神分析作为社会的解放指导理论的理念。哈贝马斯对米切利希的现代性分析的印象特别深刻。正如米切利希认为的，文明理性的进程促成了“父性文化的”侵蚀，同时也很难建立一个“成功的认同，比如，对‘时代的来临’”，这便构成了“一个没有父亲社会的潜在可能，因为有些东西仍然心存风险”。就像米切利希，哈贝马斯根据当前的情景，将所有在前现代结构权威的冲突中寻找解决方案的恢复性冲动视为错误。他坚持认为，当尝试作出“通过援引固定的行为典规则，严格的规范，盲眼的官僚机构和习惯的反应，来驱使老亚当进行一个解放进程。”的时代已经结束。

如果研究《没有父亲的社会》，值得注意的笔记是，米切利希拒绝雅斯贝尔斯所做的各种各样的某些意义上的具有教育性的教条主义，当呼唤“批判性思维的自由”而反对“强制遵守”时，他转向了新教的传统。为了保持批判理论，米切利希首当其冲的反对他认为的西方社会镇压本国公民的企图，他写道：

难道一个社会实践，即其成员的需要在社会形成的过程中扮演了批判性寻找真相的角色：针对自己的影响，针对魔术，针对狂妄自大？还是让他们不敢让他们审查，以让他们听话？

根据米切利希的观点，如果使用精神分析的见解，社会可能最有效地发生解放性的进程。他想要开创一个方法“来揭露可疑的声称的权威（以及同样可疑的在令人安慰世界里的沉思）”，以此来“失去的批判性的自我”创造一个空间，知道如何“察觉防御机制”同时将“对本我的遵从”置于“禁忌之上”。这里“对本我的遵从”充当了类似于自我和社会批判个体的指导观念的角色。他们已经从被权威传统设置的习惯性的“服从于道德”中解放了出来。

在此概念的框架内，米切利希试图通过援引弗洛伊德对三种羞耻的的名言，引入精神分析作为必要媒介来论述解放。正如哥白尼让人类丧失了地球是宇宙中心的假象，以及达尔文所证明的，我们起源于从类人猿，在天地中剥夺人类自身的独特地位，“潜意识精神活动的证据”已经对“理性统治的自我”提出了质疑。在米切利希的说法中，在一个已经“成熟”的社会中，个体自身已经成功地从过时的父性权威中分离，在这个“没有父亲的社会”中自授权，在所有这些相对的见解之后，权力留给了人类。

除了批判传统权威的来源，米切利希也间接的批评了作为自恋屈辱修复性补偿形式的存在主义哲学的现代性概念。在此他假定了自然的知识与“人类生存的哲学自我提升”之间的“鸿沟”。对于米切利希，“通往没有父亲社会”的替代，在精神上的不存在。

米切利希勾勒出他的关于精神分析概念的细节，作为实用工具，被用来处理理论上得出的诊断治疗。他认为个人的神经症充当了社会恶劣条件的指标。

神经性障碍的人比适应良好的人蒙受的更多；但在许多方面，他们蒙受了同样的已经哑然顺应的事情。作为在社会倒退中统治结构的后果，这些木然失色无声的生活，其实是值得研究的中心事项，因为这是解放的最大障碍。

就像1950年与雅斯贝尔斯争议中，医学作为当时的实践，被指控企图复制自然科学的成功，同时剔除了显然不是基于精确本质的心身解释。正如米切利希的争辩，精神分析已经是听从“人类”表达自己能力的唯一纪律。同时知道如何促使其帮助“在治疗情景中，分离且参与的关系”，从而能够“回归经验”。在他的观点中，神经症状态的“起源”，可以理解为“由社会环境提出的要求”和“精神”或“心身组织”之间的妥协。就像米切利希认为的，这种见解可能会导致“两个方面的解放”的可能，首先在的“社会性”方面，其次是作为个体自身性格中看似固定的本质。通过他事无巨细的社会批判解释，精神分析师成为了- 在米切利希眼中 -在解放性的战斗中争取更多自主权的一个教育作用的“模范”。他的社会关键外延的假设适用于心身关心和精神分析的思想，在他“社会心理学观点”的希望中找到归属。现在可以在应用“在社会学领域，教学领域，和法律和政治学”之中。

Freud and “Society Without a Father”

The friendship between Jürgen Habermas and Alexander Mitscherlich played no small role in the definitive incorporation of Mitscherlich’s concept of psychoanalytic medicine into the large stream of socio-scientific theory formation during the 1960’s which is now known as the Frankfurt School or Critical Theory. As early as 1963,Habermas affirmed the way in which Mitscherlich elucidated his notion of psychoanalysis as a guiding theory of societal emancipation in his study entitled Society without a Father (Auf dem Weg zur vaterlosen Gesellschaft).Habermas is particularly impressed by Mitscherlich’s analysis of modernity. As Mitscherlich argues, civilizational rationalization processes promoted the erosion of “a culture of fathers” but they also made it harder to establish a “successful identity, i.e. to ‘come of age’”, this constituting the “positive potential of a fatherless society as something which still harbors risks”. Like Mitscherlich, Habermas views all restorative impulses to look for a solution to the conflict in pre-modern structures of authority as wrong in light of the situation at hand. As he maintains, the times are over when the attempt could be made to “set old Adam on a reliable course by invoking fixed behavior codexes, strict norms, blind institutions and accustomed reflexes”.

If one studies Society without a Father, it is remarkable to note that Mitscherlich rejects educative dogmatism of all kinds in the sense that Jaspers does, turning to the Protestant tradition when he calls for “critical freedom of thought” in resistance to “the compulsion to conform”. In keeping with Critical Theory, Mitscherlich primarily opposes what he sees as the attempts of Western societies to repress their citizens, writing:

Does a society practice, i.e. demand of its members acts of a critical search for truth in the process of social formation: against their own affects, against magic, against megalomania, or does it make them afraid to keep them in check, to keep them obedient?

According to Mitscherlich, society could take this emancipatory course most effectively if it utilized psychoanalytic insights. He wanted to inaugurate a “methodology for unmasking questionable claims to authority (and equally questionable meditativeness in consolatory worlds)” which made room for “lots ofcritical ego”, knew how to “detect defense mechanisms” and put “obedience to theego” before “tabus”. Here “obedience to the ego” acted as a kind of guiding notion for the self- and socio-critical individual who had emancipated himself from the customary “obedience to morals” set down by authoritative tradition.

Within the framework of this concept, Mitscherlich attempts to introduce psychoanalysis as a necessary medium for emancipation by citing Freud‘s dictum concerning the three mortifications. Just as Copernicus had robbed human beings of the illusion that the earth was the center of the universe and Darwin had demonstrated that we originate from the apes, robbing mankind of its exclusive status in creation,“proof of unconscious psychic activity” had contested the “dominion of reason overthe self”. The authority left to mankind after all these relativizing insights is thus,in Mitscherlich’s terms, that of individual self-authorization within a “society without a father” which has “matured” in society in so far as it has succeeded in divorcing itself from obsolete fatherly authorities.

Apart from criticizing traditional sources of authority, Mitscherlich also indirectly casts aspersions on the existence-philosophical concept of modernity as a form of restorative compensation for narcissistic mortifications in that he posits a “divide” between knowledge of nature and the “philosophical self-elevation of human existence”. For Mitcherlich, there is no alternative to the psychological “road to society without a father”.

It is not until he comes to the after word that Mitscherlich lays out in any detail his notion of psychoanalysis as a practical instrument which can be used to deal with the theoretically derived diagnosis therapeutically. As he argues, individual neuroses serve as indicators of societal malconditions:

Persons with neurotic disorders suffer more than well-adapted people do; but in many respects they suffer from the same things which adaptation has rendered dumb. This vegetative speechlessness to which life in society regresses as a result of structures of dominion is a central matter of fact worthy of investigation, for it is the large obstacle for emancipation.

As in the dispute with Jaspers in 1950, medicine as it was practiced at the time is charged with attempting to copy the successful natural sciences and of excluding psychosomatic interpretations on the basis of their apparently inexact nature. As Mitcherlich contends, psychoanalysis had been the only discipline to heed “humankind’sability to articulate itself ” and know how to promote it with the help of the “distanced but participatory relationship which was established in the the rapeuticsituation”, making it possible to “return to experiences”. In his perspective, the “genesis” of the neurotic condition could be understood as a compromise between “demands made by the social environment” and the “psychic” or “psychosomatic organization” of the individual. As Mitscherlich argues, such insights could lead to a possible “emancipation in two respects”, first of all in terms of the “nature of society”, and secondly as concerned the seemingly fixed nature of one’s own character. Through his unavoidably socio-critical interpretations the psychoanalyst becomes –in Mitscherlich’s eyes – an educative “model” in the emancipatory battle for more autonomy. His postulate of the extensive socio-critical applicability of psychosomatic and psychoanalytic thought culminates in the hope that his “ideas on social psychology” could now be applied in “the sociological realm, the pedagogical realm, in legislation and the political sciences”.