THE CAUSE OF PSYCHOSIS 精神病的原因
In Seminar III, Lacan did not content himself with describing the principal features of psychotic communication—the exclusion of the Other, the semantic ‘shallowness’ of language, a code that has become message and a message that has been reduced to its code, and the compulsory nature of the exchange—he also tried to delineate the cause of these features.
在第三研讨班，拉康并没有满足于描述精神病者的沟通的主要特征—大他者的排除，语言的语意的“浮浅化”，已经变成讯息的符码，以及被化简成为它的符码的讯息，跟交换的强迫性的特性。拉康也尝试描述这特征的原因。
Assuming that the dimension of the Other and the possibility to define positions within a particular exchange are due to the wall imposed by language, Lacan had to conclude that in psychosis this wall has somehow not been erected. In psychotic patients, language has not been anchored.
当拉康假设，大他者的维度与定义特殊的交换里的立场的可能性，是由于被语言赋加的墙壁所形成。拉康必须获得结论：在精神病，这个墙壁因为某种原故，并没有被竖立。在精神病的病人身上，语言并没有被锚定。
Rather than a firmly embedded, solid structure, it is a free-floating, flat and permeable screen. Implicitly referring to Freud’s idea that in psychosis the link between the word-presentation and the thingpresentation has been severed, Lacan defined this non-embedment of language as a lack of ‘quilting points’ (points de capiton) between the signifier and the signified (Lacan 1993[1955–56]:268–270), for which he in turn held the foreclosure (forclusion) of the Name-of-the-Father responsible (Lacan 1977h[1957–58]:215).8
非但不是被坚固的镶嵌的牢固的结构，在神经病者的语言是一种自由漂浮，平坦与可被污染的帘幕。拉康暗示地提到弗洛伊德的观念：在精神病者，字词表象与物表象已经被撕裂开来。拉康定义语言的非-镶嵌，作为是处于能指与所指的“锚定点的欠缺”。因为这样，精神病者自己将“以父之名”的除权封闭负起责任。
In the final session of Seminar III Lacan proposed ‘foreclosure’ as the best translation of Freud’s term Verwerfung (Lacan 1993[1955– 56]:321). In Freud’s works, Verwerfung can hardly lay claim to conceptual status— there are very few passages in which the term appears—and it is not really elaborated as the specific cause of psychosis.9 In conceptualizing Verwerfung as a distinct mechanism for psychosis, Lacan took his main lead from Freud’s formula in his case-study of the Wolf Man that a ‘repression [Verdrangung] is something very different from a condemning judgement [Verwerfung]’ (Freud 1918b[1914]:79–80).
在第三研讨班的最后一堂，拉康建议“除权弃绝”作为是弗洛伊德的术语“否认”的最佳翻译。在弗洛伊德的著作里，“否认”几乎无法宣称具有观念的地位—这个术语出现的段落非常少—这个术语并没有确实地建构，作为是精神病的明确的原因。当拉康将“否认”形成观念，作为是精神病的明显的心理机制，他主要是从弗洛伊德的公式引申而来，在他研究“狼人”的个案：压抑跟谴责的判断是某件非常不同的东西。
Between 1954 and 1956, he then tried to define Verwerfung in opposition to repression, but also in relation to the mechanisms of Verneinung (negation) and Bejahung (affirmation), which Freud had discussed in his paper ‘Negation’ (1925h). Eventually, Lacan reached the conclusion that Verwerfung and Verdrangung differ with regard to their effects: What comes under the effect of repression returns, for repression and the return of the repressed are just the two sides of the same coin. The repressed is always there, expressed in a perfectly articulate manner in symptoms and a host of other phenomena. By contrast, what falls under the effect of Verwerfung has a completely different destiny …[W]hatever is refused in the symbolic order, in the sense of Verwerfung, reappears in the real. (Lacan 1993[1955–56]:12–13)
在1054年与1056年之间，拉康因此尝试定义“否认”跟“压抑”作为对立，而且也跟“否定”与“肯定”的心理机制息息相关。弗洛伊德在1925年曾经有篇论文“论否定”讨论到。最后，拉康获得这个结论：否认与除权弃绝关于它们的影响，有所不同。在压抑的影响下来临的东西，回再回来，因为压抑与被压抑物的回来，仅是相同铜板的两面。被压抑物总是在那里，用非常清楚的方式被表达，在症状与许多其他的现象。对照起来，在“否认”的影响下发生的东西，具有完全不同的命运。在象征秩序被拒绝的任何东西，用“否认”的意义来说，会重新出现在实在界。
The meaning Lacan gave to Verwerfung here—a process through which something reappears (as a hallucination) in the real—tallies with Freud’s description of the mechanism of psychotic symptom formation in his Schreber study. A paranoid patient suffering from hallucinations or persecutory delusions was in Freud’s opinion subject to a process whereby ‘an internal perception is suppressed, and…its content enters consciousness in the form of an external perception’ (Freud 1911c [1910]:66).
在此，拉康给予“否认”这个意义：某件东西在实在界的重新出现（作为幻觉）的过程。这个意义符合弗洛伊德对于精神病的症状的形成的心理机制的描述，在他研究许瑞伯的案例。依照弗洛伊德，遭受幻觉或迫害狂的幻觉的妄想症的病人，隶属于这一个过程：“内部的感觉被压制，它的内容进入意识，以外在的感觉的形态”。
Initially, Freud called this process ‘projection’, but owing to the fact that people regularly attribute their mental states to external rather than internal causes—which also deserves to be called projection—he came to question his own designation: ‘It was incorrect to say that the perception which was suppressed internally is projected outwards; the truth is rather…that what was abolished internally returns from without’ (ibid.: 71). Lacan must have noticed that Freud was looking in vain for an appropriate denominator to grasp the psychic mechanism of psychosis, which prompted him to designate the mechanism as Verwerfung, bearing in mind that Freud himself had conceived Verwerfung as radically different from repression.
起初，弗洛伊德称这个过程为“投射”，但是由于这个事实：人们规律地将他们的心灵的状态，归属于外在，而不是内在的原因--这也应该被称为是投射--弗洛伊德逐渐质疑他自己的指定：“这是不正确的，假如我们说，内部被压制的感知被投射到外部。相反地，真相是：内部被废除的东西，从外部回来。拉康当时一定曾注意到，弗洛伊德白费力气地正在寻找一个适当的分母，为了要理解精神病的心灵结构。这激发他指明这个心理机制，作为是”否认“。他切记在心：弗洛伊德自己曾经构型”否认“作为是跟压抑强烈不同的东西。
In ultimately choosing to translate Verwerfung as foreclosure, Lacan re-emphasized the linguistic nature of the psychotic mechanism. Indeed, whereas foreclosure is a juridical term expressing the expiration of a person’s assigned rights (for instance, the legal access to one’s children after a divorce) when he does not exercise them, Lacan took it from a paper on the nature of French negations by Damourette and Pichon (1928). With French negations generally consisting of two parts—as in ne…pas and ne…jamais—Damourette and Pichon redefined the first part as the discordant component and the second one as the foreclosure, observing that the latter part is more akin to the rough logical negation than the former, which can in some cases even be omitted without the meaning of the sentence being lost.
当拉康最后选择将”否认“翻译成为”除权弃绝“时，他重新强调精神病的心理机制的语言的特性。的确，虽然”除权弃绝“是一个司法的术语，表达一个人的被指定的权利的终止，（譬如，离婚之后，合法地承接自己的小孩），当他没有运用这些权利时。拉康从达摩瑞特与皮琼探讨法文的”否定词“的特性的论文，获得这个观念。法文的否定词通常由两个部分组成--如同在ne…pas and ne…jamais--达摩瑞特与皮琼重新定义第一部分，作为是不协调的成分，将第二部分定义作为”除权弃绝“。他们观察到，后者部分更加类似简陋的逻辑的否定，比起前者。在某些的情况，前者会被省略，而不会丧失句子的意义。
They also considered foreclosure to be the linguistic index of a desire to exclude the possibility that a certain event exists or happens again, a phenomenon which they compared to the excision (scotomization) of a perception from the field of vision.10 Without restricting himself to this particular structure of French negation, Lacan substituted foreclosure for other translations of Verwerfung, because in his view the operation epitomized the exclusion of a linguistic element (a signifier) rather than an ‘internal perception’. As to the exact nature of this signifier, he explored various avenues throughout Seminar III, finally designating it as the Name-of-the-Father from his 1957–58 text on psychosis onwards.
他们也将”除权弃绝“认为是欲望的语言索引，欲望要排除这个可能性：某个事件存在或再次发生。某个现象，他们将它类比赛某个感知的切除，从视觉的景象里被切除。拉康并没有限制自己于法文的否定词的这个特殊结构。他将”除权弃绝“用来替换”否认“的其他翻译。因为依他的看法，除权弃绝的这个运作描绘语言元素（一个能指）的被排除，而不是”内部的感知“。至于这个能指的确是对特性，拉康探索各式各样的管道，在第三研讨班。他最后指明能指的意义，作为是”以父之名“。从拉康的1957年到1958年探讨精神病的文本开始。
Lacan had introduced the concept of the Name-of-the-Father in a 1953 lecture on the neurotic’s individual myth, in order to separate the real father, a flesh and blood man, from the symbolic ‘function of the father’, which he interpreted as the culturally determined regulation of the natural order of things (Lacan 1979[1953]:422–423). In the contemporaneous ‘Rome Discourse’, he further specified that ‘in the name of the father… we must recognize the support of the symbolic function which, from the dawn of history, has identified his person [the person of the father] with the figure of the law (Lacan 1977e[1953]:67).11
在1963年的演讲，拉康介绍以父之名的这个观念。他探讨神经症者的个人神话，为了将现实的父亲，血肉之躯的人，跟象征的“父亲的功能”区分开。他解释象征的父亲的功能，作为是事情的自然的秩序的文化所决定的规范。在同时间的“罗马辞说”，他更进一步地指明，以父之名，我们必须体认错象征功能的支持，自古以来，象征功能的支持已经将父亲这个人，跟法则的人物认同一致。
Hence, in Lacan’s theory of the 1950s the signifier of the Name-of-the-Father bears a striking resemblance to how the Jewish God Yahweh was understood by Freud in his Moses and Monotheism (1939a[1937–39]). Yahweh is an upholding, yet demanding agency which never reveals its true face. An immaterial, yet speaking creature which promises redemption in exchange for a strict obeyance to the divine law, whose first indication is the act of circumcision, it is an abstract intangible principle imposing an alternative, symbolic order onto the people of Israel, which reshapes their natural living conditions.
因此，在拉康的1950年的理论，以父之名的能指具有明显的类似，跟犹太教的耶威上帝被弗洛伊德理解的方式，在他的“摩西与一神教。耶威是一位作为支撑，可是要求的代理者。它从来没有显露它的真实的面貌。它是一位抽象，可是会言说的神性，它承诺给予救赎，以交换严格的服从神性的法则。这个神性法则的第一个指示是切割包皮。这是一个抽象的非实质的原则，赋加一个替代的象征的秩序，给以色列的民族，它重新塑造自然是•生活的情况。
Lacan’s concept of the Name-of-the-Father conveys a similar meaning, because it is held to represent an imposed transcendence of natural provisions with a view of a higher order of mental and social functioning. Although Lacan’s notion betrays its grounding in religion, he extended its operation beyond this realm, conceiving it as the guiding principle of every sociocultural organization. Similar to Moses’ God, the Name-ofthe- Father thereby remained an essentially linguistic principle, not so much due to the fact that it speaks, but rather because Lacan regarded it as the cornerstone of a shared language system. He also pointed out that in most cultures and throughout history the representation of this regulatory father-function is considered to be one of the tasks of real fathers, their relationships with children being less irrefutable than those of real mothers.12
拉康对于以父之名的观念，传递类似的意义，因为以父之名被认为是代表自然情况的被赋加的超验神性。具有更高秩序的精神与社会的功能的观的。虽然拉康的观念显露它以宗教作为基础，他延伸它的运作，超越这个领域，构想它作为是每个社会与文化的组织的引导原则。跟摩西的上帝一样，以父之名因此始终是以语言为基础的原则。倒不是因为它会言说的这个事实，而是因为拉康将它视为是共享的语言的系统的基石。他也指出，在大部分的文化，有史以来，规范的父亲的功能的表象被认为是现实的父亲的其中一个工作，他们跟小孩的关系，不像现实的母亲的那些关心，那么容易反驳。
The foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father in psychosis thus means that an individual has been excluded from the possibility of substituting a culturally determined symbolic pact, including injunctions, prohibitions and allowances, for an unblemished, yet chaotic natural condition.13 In Lacan’s view, the psychotic is literally an outlaw, because she has not assimilated the cultural laws of language. As described on p. 12, the effect is not that language is completely eradicated, but that it no longer sets a barrier between the individual and his environment. This foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father and the ensuing absence of quilting points between the signifier and the signified also entail that the meaning of words no longer shifts, but solidifies to the point where it becomes petrified on the level of the code itself.
精神病者的以父之名的除权封闭意味着，个人已经被排除这个可能：替换被文化决定的象征的盟约，包含命令，禁止与容许，替换一个没有被污染，可是混乱的自然的情况。依照拉康的观点，精神病实质上是一个非法之徒。因为她并没有接受语言的文化的法则。如同第12页所描述的，结果并不是语言完全被抹除，，而是语言不再竖立一个阻碍，在个人与环境之间。父亲之名的除权弃绝与随后的能指与所指之间的缝合点的缺席，也意味着，字词的意义不再改变，而是凝固到这个程度，字词变得僵化，在符码自身的层面。
This may seem odd when taking into account that the absence of quilting points appears to suggest an endless fluctuation of the signified (the thing-presentation, the culturally imposed meaning) under the signifier (the word-presentation), whereas firmly established quilting points would signal the allocation of a fixed meaning to certain signifiers.
这看起来是古怪的，当我们考虑到，缝合点的缺陷，似乎意味着所指的永无止境地摇摆，（物表象，被文化赋加的意义），在能指之下（字词表象）。另一方面，坚固被建立的缝合点将会指示著固定的意义被分配给某些的能指。
Yet, as Lacan saw it, the absence of quilting points precludes semantic ambiguity, because equivocality presupposes that at least two different meanings can be balanced against each other, which in turn requires that at least one meaning has been established.14 In Freudian terms, the installation of a link between the word-presentation and the thing presentation implies that the literal meaning of a word can be weighed against the figurative one, whereas the absence of such a link makes this process impossible.
可是，依照拉康的看法，缝合点缺席预先包含语意的模糊嗳昧。因为模糊嗳昧预先假设：至少有两个不同的意义能够被互相对抗与平衡。这反过来会要求：至少有一个意义已经被建立。用弗洛伊德的术语来说，字词表象与物表象之间的关联的安置暗示着：字词的实质意义能够被用来跟想像的意义互相抗衡。另一方面，这样的联接的缺席让这个过程成为不可能。
Who or what is responsible for the foreclosure of the Name-of-the- Father is a particularly vexed issue within Lacanian theory. In the final pages of his 1957–58 paper on psychosis Lacan proceeded with the greatest caution when broaching this question.
在拉康的理论里，一个特殊的令人懊恼的问题是：谁来负责，或什么在负责以父之名的这个除权封闭？在1957年到1958年之久的最后几页，拉康探讨精神病，他小心翼翼地进行，当他揭露这个问题。 First of all, he repudiated the idea that foreclosure stems from the parent’s mutual competition to win and sustain the child’s love, whereby the mother would for instance ridicule the father systematically in front of her child. Instead of this parental rivalry to the detriment of one parent (notably the father), Lacan highlighted the place each parent accords to the symbolic position of the Name-of-the-Father in his or her relationship with the child. In this way, he decomposed the classic Oedipal triangle of mother-father-child into two sub-structures, mother-child-Name-of-the-Father and father-child18 Name-of-the-Father.
首先，他排除这个观念：除权弃绝起源于病人的互相竸争要战胜，并且维持小孩的爱。譬如，母亲经常会在小孩的面前，习惯性嘲笑父亲。并不是父母的敌对，结果伤害其中一位父母（特别是父亲）。相反地，拉康强调这个位置，每位父母给予以父之名的象征的地位，在他跟小孩的关系。以这个方式，他瓦解古典的伊狄浦斯的母亲-父亲-儿子的三角地位，成为是次级结构：母亲-小孩-以父之名，与父亲-小孩-以父之名。
Within each of these sub-structures, the parental agencies ought to ensure that the transcendental, symbolic paternal function is acknowledged. This implies that the father and the mother need to let the child know in no uncertain terms that they are subjected to a symbolic order which they cannot alter or control. Both the father and the mother need to acknowledge that they do not epitomize the law, but that the law transcends them and that they themselves are forced to comply with it as much as everybody else. To put it in even more concrete terms, this comes down to the parents telling their children that they are expected to observe certain social rules (for example, the basic ‘Freudian rule’ of the incest prohibition) and that this expectation also applies to them, despite the fact that they are in a parental position. Such a concession might pose serious difficulties, as Lacan stressed, to those fathers who really have the function of legislators (Lacan 1977h[1957– 58]: 218–219).
在每个这些次级结构里，父母作为代理者应该保证，这个超验，象征的父母的功能比承认。这暗示着，父亲与母亲需要让小孩知道，用明确的术语，他们隶属于象征的秩序，他们无法改变或控制这个象征秩序。父亲与母亲需要承认，他们并没有具体体现法则，而是法则作为他们的超验神性。他们自己被迫同意法则，如同其他的人一样。用更加具体的术语言，这总结作为父母告须他们的小孩，他们被期望遵守某些的社会的规则（譬如，乱论禁忌作为基本的弗洛伊德的规则）。这个期望也运用到他们身上。尽皆这个事实：他们处于父母的立场。这样一种退让可能形成严重的困难，如同拉康强调的，对于那些拥有立法的功能的父亲。
Needless to say that Lacan’s deconstruction of the Freudian Oedipal triangle into two distinct triads does not yet outline the necessary and sufficient conditions for the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father and the ensuing emergence of a psychotic structure in the child. Is it sufficient for one of the child’s parents to dishonour the paternal function, or should the parents do it in tandem? And if the Name-of-the-Father is debased by both parents, does that automatically induce psychosis in the child or should some auxiliary condition be fulfilled?
自不待言，拉康的解构弗洛伊德的三角位置，成为两个清楚的三角位置，并没有描绘以父之名的除权弃绝的必要与充分的条件。以及在小孩身上，精神病的结构的随后的出现。让小孩的父母的其中一位不尊敬父权的功能就足够了吗？或者，父母应该协调来不尊敬父权的功能？假如以父之名被父母亲除掉基础，那会自动自发地导致小孩的精神病吗？或是，某个辅助的条件应该被满足？
On occasion, people commenting on Lacan’s theory have argued that the mother’s refusal to accept the paternal authority is sufficient for psychosis to occur in the child, by which they have reduced Lacan’s complex Oedipal schema to its simple triangular roots, and by which they have also realigned it with the post-Freudian view that a child’s psychic normality is predicated upon its separation from the pre-Oedipal dyadic relation with the mother, through the intervention of the father and the concurrent ‘triangulation’.15
有时，评论拉康的理论的人们争辩说：母亲的拒绝接受父权的权威，就足够让精神病发生在小孩身上。凭借这个，他们将拉康的复杂的伊狄浦斯情结的基模化简成为简单的三角位置的根源。评借这个，他们也重新安排它，用后-弗洛伊德的观点： 小孩的心灵的正常被陈述在它跟前-伊狄浦斯跟母亲的二元关系的分开。通过父亲与同时间的“三角位置”的介入。
Nowhere does Lacan’s work allow us to make these kinds of inferences, yet neither does it suggest a good alternative answer to the problem. Jacques-Alain Miller (1987) has proposed to complicate Lacan’s model even further by taking into account the child’s own involvement. Explicitly eschewing a structuralist (social constructionist) conception of Lacanian theory, Miller took his bearings from Lacan’s 1946 essay on psychic causality, in which he had asserted that psychosis ultimately rests upon an ‘unfathomable decision of being’ (Lacan 1966a[1946]:177).16
拉康的研究根本没有让我们能够从事这些种类的推测。它也没有暗示对于这个难题有一个好的替代答案。艾伦 米勒曾经建议要将拉康的模式甚至变得更加复杂。他考虑到小孩自己的参与。当米勒明确地规避拉康的理论的结构主义（社会建构主义）的观念。他从拉康的1946年的论文“探讨心灵的因果律”开始申论。在那篇论文，拉康曾经主张，精神病最后依靠“深不可测的生命实存的决定”。
According to Miller, ‘the formula of foreclosure has paralysed the debate on madness to such an extent that it has become impossible for us to read what is supporting this formula, notably that it is unthinkable without the implication of a subjective position’ (Miller 1987:143). When human beings become psychotic, it is not simply because they have been the passive victim of deleterious parental attitudes, but because they themselves have ‘decided’ to reject the Name-of-the- Father, just as much as neurotics themselves, rather than their parents, have repressed certain traumatic incidents.
依照米勒，除权弃绝的公式让对于疯狂的辩论动弹不得。我们甚至不可能阅读支持这个公式的东西。特别是，这是不可思议的，假如没有主体的立场的暗示。当人类变成精神病，这不仅是因为他们是灵巧的父亲的态度的受害者，而且是因为他们自己已经“决定”要拒绝以父之名。如同神经症者已经压抑某些的创伤的意外，而不是他们的父母亲压抑。
However, Lacan’s statement also underscored that it is impossible to probe into the exact nature of this ‘decision’. Although foreclosure cannot be operative without a supporting subject, how, when and where this component has entered, or will enter the play remains a mystery. In its impenetrability, the decision is both untraceable and unforeseeable. Likewise, we are forced to remain silent concerning the question as to whether this decision implies a free choice or has already been shaped by the demands and desires of others, and perhaps also as to whether it is modifiable or not.
可是，拉康的陈述也被强调。我们不可能探索这个“决定”的确实的特性。虽然除权弃绝无法运作，而没有一个支持的主体。这个成分用什么方式，何时，何地，进入，或将会进入这个运作，始终是个神秘。由于它的不可贯穿，这个决定既是无法追踪，也是无法预先看见。同样地，我们被迫保持沉默，关于这个问题，关于这个决定是否暗示一个自由的选择。或已经被塑造，被别人的要求与欲望，或许，也关于它是否可以被修改。
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