NEUROTIC SPEECH 神经症的言说
In his ‘Rome Discourse’ Lacan drew attention to a second clinical paradox in the relations between speech and language. After having categorized as psychotic those people who talk freely and fluently without really speaking, he defined people who also speak beyond the words they consciously use as neurotic. In the first (psychotic) situation, language operates without speech, whilst in the second (neurotic) case speech also functions beyond verbalized language. Whereas psychotics do not manage to speak, however articulate the sentences they produce, neurotics cannot prevent themselves from saying more than what they intend to convey (Lacan 1977e[1953]:69–70).
在他的“罗马辞说”,拉康注意到第二个临床悖论,在言说与语言之间的关系。他将那些人们归类为精神病者,那些自由地侃侃而谈而没有确实在言谈的人们。他定义那些人们,那些言说超过他们意识所使用的字词的人们,作为是神经症者。在第一个情况,精神病的情况,语言没有言说地运作。而在第二个情况,神经症的情况,言说也发挥功能,超越文词化的语言。精神病者没有成功地言说,无论他们产生的句子多么清楚。神经症者则是无法阻止他们自己言说超过他们意图要表的东西。
Twenty years later, in his seminar Encore, Lacan rephrased this insight as follows: ‘I speak without knowing it. I speak with my body and I do so unbeknownst to myself. Thus I always say more than I know’ (Lacan 1998a[1972–73]:119).
二十年后,在他的研讨班“再来”,拉康重新铨释这个洞见,如下:「我不知道言说地言说,我用我的身体言说,我这样言说,我自己却不知道。因此,我总是说出超过我知道的东西。」
Here, Lacan aimed less at a reintegration of the communicative value of non-verbal cues in psychoanalysis—he actually vilified clinicians who interpreted the patients’ bodily movements as well as their associations (Lacan 1966b[1955]:337) —than at restoring neurotic symptoms, inhibitions and anxieties as meaningful units of analysis. To Lacan, this neurotic paradox, much more than its psychotic counterpart, encompassed ‘the privileged domain of psychoanalytic discovery’ because Freud would not have developed psychoanalysis if he had not regarded neurotic symptoms (ranging from bodily disorders to slips of the tongue) as being sustained by an unconscious idea (wish, representation) that tries to express itself (Lacan 1977e[1953]:69).
在此,拉康目标并不是朝中重新融合精神病者的非文辞的线索的沟通的价值—他实际上贬低那些临床医生,当他们铨释病人的身体的动作与他们的联想。拉康的目标是要恢复神经症者的症状,压抑与焦虑,作为是精神分析的有意义的单位。对于拉康,这个神经症的悖论,远超过它的精神病的伙伴,它涵盖精神分析的发现的特权的领域。因为弗洛伊德本来不会发展精神分析,假如他当时没有将神经症的症状(范围从生理的疾病到口误),视为是由尝试表达它自己的无意识的观念(愿望,表象)所维持。
As to the nature of this neurotic economy, Freud had already cleared most of the ground in two seminal essays on the neuropsychoses of defence from the mid-1890s (Freud 1894a; 1896b). In these papers, he had argued that both hysteria and obsessional neurosis originate in an unconscious act of defence against a traumatic experience, whose nature is always sexual.23 When individuals encounter something that is incompatible with the reigning mass of representations (Vorstellungsmasse) in their ego (Ich), the latter tries to maintain its integrity by driving the event out of consciousness. Freud believed that this defence (or repression) takes place via a withdrawal of the affect (a quantum of energy) from the event’s psychic representation, through which the event itself is transformed into an unconscious memory trace, while its affect is displaced to another representation.
至于这个神经症的经济活力的特性,弗洛伊德已经清理出大部分的场域,在两篇影响巨大的论文“论神经症这与精神病者的防卫机制”,在1950年代中叶。在这些论文里,他曾经主张,癔症与妄想神经症起源于无意识的防卫行动,抵挡创伤的经验。创伤的经验总是性。当个人遭遇某件不相和谐的东西,跟他们的自我的统辖的表象集团不相和谐的东西。自我的统辖集团尝试维持它的尊严,凭借将事件从意识驱赶出去。弗洛伊德相信,这个防卫机制(或压抑),发生,凭借将情感(能源的量子)撤退,从事件的心灵的表象。通过事件的心灵表象,事件本身被转化成为无意识的记忆的痕迹。虽然它的情感被替换成为另外一个表象。