作者: 安东尼奥·达马西奥 / 782次阅读 时间: 2018年3月12日
来源: 《当自我来敲门》 标签: 心脑等价假说


-C|E6T9E.~xs GF0
心理学空间x+E~7i&IF } ns


心理学空间"^V5o*d!g-@6~ dJ

The perspective adopted in this book contains a hypothesis that is not universally liked, let alone accepted—namely, the idea that mental states and brain states are essentially equivalent. The reasons for the reluctance in endorsing such a hypothesis deserve a hearing.心理学空间$N,R's nw^


In the physical world, of which the brain is unequivocally a part, equivalence and identity are defined by physical attributes such as mass, dimensions, movement, charge, and so forth. Those who reject the identity between physical states and mental states suggest that while a brain map that corresponds to a particular physical object can be discussed in physical terms, it would be absurd to discuss the respective mental pattern in physical terms. The reason given is that to date science has not been able to determine the physical attributes of mental patterns, and if science cannot do so, then the mental cannot be identified with the physical. I fear, however, that this reasoning may not be sound. Let me explain why I think so.

1e'j7Wq9_z0心理学空间'CbsT AB0S?

First, we need to consider how we determine that nonmental states are physical. In the case of objects out in the world, we proceed by perceiving them with our peripheral sensory probes and by using varied instruments to execute measurements. In the case of mental events, however, we cannot do the same. This is not because mental events are not equivalent to neural states but because, given their place of occurrence—the interior of the brain—mental states are simply not available for measurement. In fact, mental events can be perceived only by part of the very same process that includes them—the mind, that is. The situation is unfortunate but says nothing whatsoever about the physicality of the mind or lack thereof. The situation does impose major qualifications on the intuitions that can emerge from it, however, and it is thus prudent to doubt the traditional view that asserts that mental states cannot be equivalent to physical states. It is unreasonable to endorse such a view purely on the basis of introspective observations. The personal perspective should be used and enjoyed for what it gives us directly: experience that can be made conscious, and that can help guide our life, provided extensive reflective analysis conducted offline—which includes scientific scrutiny—validates its counsel.心理学空间kUzWW7O
我们首先需要考虑的是如何确定非心理状态就是物理的。我们利用了周围感觉探测器来感知外界的客体,并利用各种手段进行测量。然而,对于心理活动,我们无法做到这一点。这并不是因为心理活动与神经状态不等价,而是因为它们发生的位置在大脑内部,是无法测量的。事实上,这些心理活动只能通过心智来感知,而心智和这些心理活动一样,属于同一种加工。这种情形令人感到遗憾,但并未提供有关心智是否具有物理性的任何信息。 然而,这一情形的确给由此产生的直觉施加了重要的限制,因此,怀疑心理状态无法等价于物理状态这一传统观点才是明智的。仅仅基于内省观察就认同这种观点是不合理的。我们应该好好利用个人视角直接提供的经验,它能产生意识、帮助引导生活,并通过离线加工提供丰富的反思性分析,其中也包括科学研究,经验提供的忠告正是通过科学研究来验证的。


,hxzA%MJC0The fact that neural maps and the corresponding images are found inside the brain, accessible only to the brain’s owner, is a hurdle. But where else would the maps/images be found but within a private, secluded sector of the brain, given that they are formed inside the brain to begin with? What would be surprising would be to find them outside the brain, given that brain anatomy is not designed to externalize them.心理学空间^nV{-xV


For the time being, the mental state/brain state equivalence should be regarded as a useful hypothesis rather than a certainty. It will take a continued accrual of evidence to lend it support, and for that we need an additional perspective, informed by evidence from evolutionary neurobiology aligned with varied neuroscience evidence.心理学空间kO)B gDL

.N1m `~4h-[|0心理学空间1F)s3n ~n:VAl_

Some may question the need for an additional perspective to make sense of mental events, but there are good justifications for an added perspective. The facts that mental events are correlated with brain events—and no one disputes that fact—and that the latter exist inside the brain, inaccessible to direct measurement, justify a special approach. Also, given that mental/brain events are certainly the product of a long history of biological evolution, it makes sense that evolutionary evidence be included in their consideration. Last, given that mental/brain events are possibly the most complex phenomena in nature, the need for special treatment should not be regarded as exceptional.
fX$ef.K0有人或许会质疑,理解心理活动是否需要另外一种视角,但我们有理由这样做。事实上,心理活动与大脑活动是相关的,这一点不存在争议,而大脑活动存在于大脑内部,无法直接测量,这就证明我们需要一种特殊的方法。此外,由于心理和大脑活动的确是生物演化的长期结果,将演化的证据纳入考量也是合情合理的。最后,由于心理和大脑活动可能是自然界中最复杂的现象,我们需要对其特别对待,这不应该被视为一种特例。心理学空间 Z ts#d \,K9Dv`d

f)V{p RzD;z0Even with the help of neuroscience techniques more powerful than are available today, we are unlikely ever to chart the full scope of neural phenomena associated with a mental state, even a simple one. What is possible and needed, for the time being, is a gradual theoretical approximation supported by new empirical evidence.心理学空间 b/jNXY
即便有比当今的神经科学技术更强大的技术,我们也不大可能记录下与某一心理活动有关的所有神经现象,哪怕是一个简单的心理活动都不可能。目前我们能做的,是在新的实证证据帮助下,逐步建立理论。心理学空间R$u"Z I d


Accepting the hypothesized mental/neural equivalence is especially helpful with the vexing problem of downward causality. Mental states do exert their influence on behavior, as can be easily revealed by all manner of actions executed by the nervous system and the muscles at its command. The problem, some will say the mystery, has to do with how a phenomenon that is regarded as nonphysical—the mind—can exert its influence on the very physical nervous system that moves us to action. Once mental states and neural states are regarded as the two faces of the same process, one more Janus out to trick us, downward causality is less of a problem.
+Z7Tm b9xG m&d0对心理神经等价假说的接纳尤其有助于解决下向因果性这一令人烦恼的问题。心理状态的确会影响行为,所有由神经系统及其所指挥的肌肉执行的行为都可以轻而易举地证明这一点。问题或者说谜题在于,被视为非物理现象的心智如何作用于令我们产生行为的物理神经系统。一旦我们把心理状态与神经状态视为同一加工过程的两面,如同古罗马神话中欺骗我们的两面神雅努斯,那么下向因果性就不再是那么严重的问题了。

:Z `6P4^ J%T0Q.@0心理学空间2mck8Jd$Yki

On the other hand, rejecting mind/brain equivalence requires a problematic assumption: that somehow it would be less natural and plausible for neurons to create mappings of things, and for these mappings to be fully formed mental events, than it is for other cells in the organism to create, for example, the shapes of body parts or to execute body actions. When cells in the body proper are placed together in a particular spatial configuration, according to a plan, they constitute an object.心理学空间1x3lGT\:I!f rt

5o8Fsd0X%ypg0心理学空间l g2t;v6M3?\

A hand is a good example. It is made of bones, muscles, tendons, connective tissue, a network of blood vessels and another of nerve pathways, and several layers of skin, all put into place according to a specific architectural pattern. When such a biological object moves in space, it performs an action, for example, your hand pointing to me. Both object and action are physical events in space and time. Now, when neurons arranged in a two-dimensional sheath are active or inactive according to the inputs they receive, they create a pattern. When the pattern corresponds to some object or action, it constitutes a map of something else, a map of that object or that action. Grounded as it is in the activity of physical cells, the pattern is just as physical as the objects or actions it corresponds to. The pattern is momentarily drawn in the brain, carved in the brain by its activity. Why would circuits of brain cells not create some sort of imagetic correspondence for things, provided the cells are properly wired, operate as they are supposed to operate, and become active when they should? Why would the resulting momentary activity patterns necessarily be any less physical than the objects and actions were in the first place?”



TAG: 心脑等价假说
«自我概念的演进 安东尼奥·达马西奥 Antonio Damasio
《安东尼奥·达马西奥 Antonio Damasio》