www.psychspace.com心理学空间网心理学空间i
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ctcI)t.x#gWu1h0A NOTE ON THE MIND-BRAIN EQUIVALENCE HYPOTHESIS
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?9^\0NThe perspective adopted in this book contains a hypothesis that is not universally liked, let alone accepted—namely, the idea that mental states and brain states are essentially equivalent. The reasons for the reluctance in endorsing such a hypothesis deserve a hearing.
Q3D2q ?f:c0本书采用的视角中包含了一个假设,认为心理状态与大脑状态其实是等价的。这是一种未得到普遍青睐的假说,更不要说被人们接受了。值得一提的是人们不接纳这一假说的原因。
2e/rT+R!jGHWSE P0心理学空间!~Y+GZp&QIn the physical world, of which the brain is unequivocally a part, equivalence and identity are defined by physical attributes such as mass, dimensions, movement, charge, and so forth. Those who reject the identity between physical states and mental states suggest that while a brain map that corresponds to a particular physical object can be discussed in physical terms, it would be absurd to discuss the respective mental pattern in physical terms. The reason given is that to date science has not been able to determine the physical attributes of mental patterns, and if science cannot do so, then the mental cannot be identified with the physical. I fear, however, that this reasoning may not be sound. Let me explain why I think so.心理学空间o3Fgi&y%E
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毫无疑问,大脑也是物理世界的一部分。在物理世界中,我们可以通过质量、尺寸、运动、电荷等物理属性来定义等价性与一致性。有人认为物理状态与心理状态不具有一致性,他们指出,虽然与特定物质客体对应的大脑映射能够从物理方面进行探讨,但如果要从物理方面来探讨不同的心理模式的话,就是一件荒唐的事情了,理由是科学迄今为止还未能确定心理模式的物理属性,而如果科学无法做到这一点,那么心理就无法等同于物理。但我认为,这恐怕并不是一个充分的理由。
%`w-CJ!p0hi!i#W&Pw/Q7p0First, we need to consider how we determine that nonmental states are physical. In the case of objects out in the world, we proceed by perceiving them with our peripheral sensory probes and by using varied instruments to execute measurements. In the case of mental events, however, we cannot do the same. This is not because mental events are not equivalent to neural states but because, given their place of occurrence—the interior of the brain—mental states are simply not available for measurement. In fact, mental events can be perceived only by part of the very same process that includes them—the mind, that is. The situation is unfortunate but says nothing whatsoever about the physicality of the mind or lack thereof. The situation does impose major qualifications on the intuitions that can emerge from it, however, and it is thus prudent to doubt the traditional view that asserts that mental states cannot be equivalent to physical states. It is unreasonable to endorse such a view purely on the basis of introspective observations. The personal perspective should be used and enjoyed for what it gives us directly: experience that can be made conscious, and that can help guide our life, provided extensive reflective analysis conducted offline—which includes scientific scrutiny—validates its counsel.
&dJw8rq?1IC?,v0我们首先需要考虑的是如何确定非心理状态就是物理的。我们利用了周围感觉探测器来感知外界的客体,并利用各种手段进行测量。然而,对于心理活动,我们无法做到这一点。这并不是因为心理活动与神经状态不等价,而是因为它们发生的位置在大脑内部,是无法测量的。事实上,这些心理活动只能通过心智来感知,而心智和这些心理活动一样,属于同一种加工。这种情形令人感到遗憾,但并未提供有关心智是否具有物理性的任何信息。 然而,这一情形的确给由此产生的直觉施加了重要的限制,因此,怀疑心理状态无法等价于物理状态这一传统观点才是明智的。仅仅基于内省观察就认同这种观点是不合理的。我们应该好好利用个人视角直接提供的经验,它能产生意识、帮助引导生活,并通过离线加工提供丰富的反思性分析,其中也包括科学研究,经验提供的忠告正是通过科学研究来验证的。
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?M5G]W02lw(Kr!@\f0The fact that neural maps and the corresponding images are found inside the brain, accessible only to the brain’s owner, is a hurdle. But where else would the maps/images be found but within a private, secluded sector of the brain, given that they are formed inside the brain to begin with? What would be surprising would be to find them outside the brain, given that brain anatomy is not designed to externalize them.