The prevailing control theories of motivation and self-regulation focused heavily on error correction driven by negative feedback loops in a machine metaphor of human functioning. I regarded regulation by negative discrepancy as telling only half the story and not the more interesting half. Social cognitive theory posited dual control in self-regulation—proactive discrepancy production in which individuals create negative discrepancies for themselves to be mastered by setting themselves challenging goals and standards accompanied by discrepancy reduction by mobilizing the efforts and resources needed to fulfill those standards.
Social cognitive theory lends itself readily to social applications. Our knowledge of self-regulatory mechanisms served as the basis for the development of new models for health promotion and disease risk reduction. The dominant health practices focus heavily on the supply side with mounting pressure on health systems to reduce, ration, and curtail health services to contain soaring health costs. The self-management models developed in collaboration with Robert De Busk and Kate Lorig at the Stanford Medical School focused on the demand side. They promote effective self-regulation of health habits that keep people healthy so they do not require costly medical care. These self-management models are now being integrated into mainstream health care systems and disseminated internationally. The interactive online formats enable people to exercise some control over their health wherever they may live.
Self-regulatory mechanisms also play a key role in the exercise of moral agency rooted in self-sanctions. As another aspect of social cognitive theory our program of research in this domain sought to clarify the nature and function of moral agency. The various lines of research examined how individuals construct moral standards from the mix of social influences; the processes by which people select, weigh, and integrate morally-relevant information in making moral judgments; and the self-regulatory mechanisms whereby moral judgments are linked to moral conduct through self-sanctions (Bandura, 1991b, 2004c). This theoretical approach addressed the dual nature of moral agency—the inhibitive form manifested in the power to refrain from behaving inhumanely, and the proactive form expressed in the power to behave humanely.
Moral standards do not function as unceasing internal regulators of conduct. In their everyday life, people often use a variety of sociocognitive means to selectively disengage moral self-sanctions from detrimental conduct. To guide research on this aspect of moral agency the theory specified the forms moral disengagement takes and the points in a control process at which they come into play. Through selective moral disengagement, people who, in other areas of their lives, are considerate and compassionate can get themselves to support detrimental social policies, carry out harmful organizational and social practices, and perpetrate large-scale inhumanities at the social systems level (Bandura 1999).
In nonagentic microdeterministic theories, behavior is the product of nonconscious processes in which environmental inputs activate subpersonal neuronal modules that cause the actions. If people's actions are the product of the nonconscious workings of their neuronal machinery, and their conscious states are simply the epiphenomenal outputs of lower level brain processes, it is pointless to hold anyone responsible for what they do.
The subpersonal workings of the biological machinery are nonethical. A theory that humans have no conscious control over what they do, in fact, represents a position on morality. It is one of moral nonaccountability that is socially consequential. Would a nonagentic conception of human nature erode personal and social ethics that undergird a civil society? How would people create and maintain a civil society if its members are absolved of any personal accountability for their actions?
In this brief memoir, I traced the social influences that played important roles in my life and reviewed my life's work in a disciplinary pursuit which has been highly fulfilling. I have recently completed a half century of active academic service at Stanford and am saddled up for continued exploration into the second half. In my instructional activities, I am now lecturing to offspring of my former students (Stanford Magazine, 2005). A variety of theoretical issues regarding the nature of human agency, collaboration in diverse programs of research at Stanford and abroad, and development of new models for personal and social change have kept me too busy to create a postscript to my professional career. This memoir affords me the opportunity to acknowledge my indebtedness to the many people who lightened my labors and enriched my scholarship over these many years. I also thank them for the gift of their friendship. I do so in the eloquent words of the poet Yeats: “Ask where my glory most begins, and ends. And I say my glory was I had such friends.”
As I reflect on my journey to this octogenarian milepost, I am reminded of the saying that it is not the miles traveled but the amount of tread remaining that is important. When I last checked, I still have too much tread left to gear down or to conclude this engaging Odyssey.
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Author's Note
A few sections in this autobiography include revised and elaborated material from Bandura A. (2005). The evolution of social cognitive theory. In K. G. Smith & M. A. Hitt (Eds.) Great Minds in Management (pp. 9-35) Oxford: Oxford University Press.
