1969 The Use of an Object
作者: D. W. Winnicott / 8293次阅读 时间: 2009年9月17日
标签: Object Winnicott
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1969 The Use of an Object. Int. J. Psycho-Anal., 50:711-716 (IJP)心理学空间J7ha#`@
The Use of an Object心理学空间og!e6X \
D. W. Winnicott
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d2~!@ v+ht,|.p#e0Object-relating can be described in terms of the experience of the subject.  Description of object-usage involves consideration of the nature of the  object. I am offering for discussion the reasons why, in my opinion, a  capacity to use an object is more sophisticated than a capacity to relate to  objects; and relating may be to a subjective object, but usage implies that  the object is part of external reality.心理学空间)m8t-y|zHXp#Cs9b

4QI/iB+c:Vf0This sequence can be observed: (1) Subject relates to object. (2) Object is  in process of being found instead of placed by the subject in the world. (3)  Subject destroys object. (4) Object survives destruction. (5) Subject can  use object.心理学空间 j9m:Hbku7OC!r)x

9zh@m"z3okr0The object is always being destroyed. This destruction becomes the  unconscious backcloth for love of a real object; that is, an object outside  the area of the subject's omnipotent control.心理学空间^c*z4o!v*I8H;b1HGS
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Study of this problem involves a statement of the positive value of  destructiveness. The destructiveness plus the object's survival of the  destruction places the object outside the area in which projective mental  mechanisms operate, so that a world of shared reality is created which the  subject can use and which can feed back into the subject.
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In this paper I propose to put forward for discussion the idea of the use of  an object. The allied subject of relating to objects seems to me to have had  our full attention. The idea of the use of an object has not, however, been  so much examined, and it may not even have been specifically studied.心理学空间n(eLjo k$r
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This work on the use of an object arises out of my clinical experience and  is in the direct line of development that is peculiarly mine. I cannot  assume, of course, that the way my ideas have developed has been followed by  others, but I would like to point out that there has been a sequence, and  the order that there may be in the sequence belongs to the evolution of my  work.心理学空间 Boo+b+hHA:}4E
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My work on transitional objects and phenomena which followed on naturally  after 'The Observation of Infants in a Set Situation' (Winnicott, 1941) is  fairly well known. Obviously the idea of the use of an object is related to  the capacity to play. I have recently given attention to the subject of  creative playing (Winnicott, 1968a). This is near to my present subject.  Then also there is a natural development from my point of view along the  line of the concepts of the holding environment, this facilitating the  individual's discovery of the self. Arising out of failure in this area of  the facilitating environment can be seen the whole subject of the  development of character disorders associated with the setting up of various  kinds of false self, these representing failures of self-establishment and  self-discovery. All this makes sense, for me, of the special focus that  there is in my work on what I have called transitional phenomena and the  study of the minute details that are available to the clinician that  illustrate the gradual build-up of the individual's capacity to play and the  capacity to find and then to use the 'external' world with its own  independence and autonomy.心理学空间s@!yE*q]

3~E#\;cub9t{{0What I have to say in this present paper is extremely simple. Although it  comes out of my psychoanalytical experience I would not say that it could  have come out of my psychoanalytical experience of two decades ago, because  I would not then have had the technique to make possible the transference  movements that I wish to describe. For instance, it is only in recent years  that I have become able to wait and wait for the natural evolution of the  transference arising out of the patient's growing trust in the  psychoanalytic technique and setting, and to avoid breaking up this natural  process by making interpretations. It will be noticed that I am talking  about the making of interpretations and not about interpretations as such.  It appals me to think how much deep change I have prevented or delayed in  patients in a certain classification category by my personal need to  interpret. If only we can wait, the patient arrives at understanding  creatively and with immense joy, and I now enjoy this joy more than I used  to enjoy the sense of having been clever. I think I interpret mainly to let  the patient know the limits of my understanding. The principle is that it is  the patient and only the patient who has the answers. We may or may not  enable him or her to be able to encompass what is known or become aware of  it with acceptance.
U;Zz9Xa&A y0By contrast with this comes the interpretative work which the analyst must  do and which distinguishes analysis from self-analysis. This interpreting by  the analyst, if it is to have effect, must be related to the patient's  ability to place the analyst outside the area of subjective phenomena. What  is then involved is the patient's ability to use the analyst, which is the  subject of this paper. In teaching, as in the feeding of a child, the  capacity to use objects is taken for granted, but in our work it is  necessary for us to be concerned with the development and the establishment  of the capacity to use objects and to recognize a patient's inability to use  objects, where this is a fact.
It is in the analysis of the borderline type of case that one has the chance  to observe the delicate phenomena that give pointers to an understanding of  truly schizophrenic states. By the term 'a borderline case' I mean the kind  of case in which the core of the patient's disturbance is psychotic, but the  patient has enough psychoneurotic organization always to be able to present  psychoneurosis or psychosomatic disorder when the central psychotic anxiety  threatens to break through in crude form. In such cases the psychoanalyst  may collude for years with the patient's need to be psychoneurotic (as  opposed to mad) and to be treated as psychoneurotic. The analysis goes well,  and everyone is pleased. The only drawback is that the analysis never ends.  It can be terminated, and the patient may even mobilize a psychoneurotic  false self for the purpose of finishing and expressing gratitude. but, in  fact, the patient knows that there has been no change in the underlying  (psychotic) state and that the analyst and the patient have succeeded in  colluding to bring about a failure. Even this failure may have value if both  analyst and patient acknowledge the failure. The patient is older and the  opportunities for death by accident or disease have increased, so that  actual suicide may be avoided. Moreover, it has been fun while it lasted. If  psychoanalysis could be a way of life, then such a treatment might be said  to have done what it was supposed to do. But psychoanalysis is no way of  life. We all hope our patients will finish with us and forget us, and that  they will find living itself to be the therapy that makes sense. Although we  write papers about these borderline cases we are inwardly troubled when the  madness that is there remains undiscovered and unmet. I have tried to state  this in a broader way in a paper on classification (Winnicott, 1959?4).心理学空间 |`'yf J^:gxA

}F\@,x.q LJmT0It is perhaps necessary to prevaricate a little longer to give my own view  on the difference between object-relating and object-usage. In  object-relating the subject allows certain alterations in the self to take  place, of a kind that has caused us to invent the term cathexis. The object  has become meaningful. Projection mechanisms and identifications have been  operating, and the subject is depleted to the extent that something of the  subject is found in the object, though enriched by feeling. Accompanying  these changes is some degree of physical involvement (however slight)  towards excitement, in the direction of the functional climax of an orgasm.  (In this context I deliberately omit reference to the very important aspect  of relating that is an exercise in cross-identifications. This must be  omitted here because it belongs to a phase of development that is subsequent  to and not prior to the phase of development with which I am concerned in  this paper, that is to say, the move from self-containment and relating to  subjective objects into the realm of object-usage.) (Winnicott, 1968b.)
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8? G'};qU6eg_0Object-relating is an experience of the subject that can be described in  terms of the subject as an isolate (Winnicott, 1958), (1963). When I speak  of the use of an object, however, I take object-relating for granted, and  add new features that involve the nature and the behaviour of the object.  For instance, the object, if it is to be used, must necessarily be real in  the sense of being part of shared reality, not a bundle of projections. It  is this, I think, that makes for the world of difference that exists between  relating and usage.
If I am right in this, then it follows that discussion of the subject of  relating is a much easier exercise for analysts than is the discussion of  usage, since relating may be examined as a phenomenon of the subject, and  psychoanalysis always likes to be able to eliminate all factors that are  environmental, except in so far as the environment can be thought of in  terms of projective mechanisms. But in examining usage there is no escape;  the analyst must take into account the nature of the object, not as a  projection, but as a thing in itself.心理学空间V3X3x&P4w

R2gRS0R4|7n/sc M0For the time being may I leave it at that, that relating can be described in  terms of the individual subject, and that usage cannot be described except  in terms of acceptance of the object's independent existence, its property  of having been there all the time? You will see that it is just these  problems that concern us when we look at the area which I have tried to draw  attention to in my work on what I have called transitional phenomena.
But this change does not come about automatically, by maturational process  alone. It is this detail that I am concerned with.
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In clinical terms: two babies are feeding at the breast; one is feeding on  the self in the form of projections, and the other is feeding on (using)  milk from a woman's breast. Mothers, like analysts, can be good or not good  enough; some can and some cannot carry the baby over from relating to usage.
3Xj-t4],Y9`8`}0I would like to put in a reminder here that the essential feature in the  concept of transitional objects and phenomena (according to my presentation  of the subject) is the paradox, and the acceptance of the paradox: the baby  creates the object but the object was there waiting to be created and to  become a cathected object. I tried to draw attention to this aspect of  transitional phenomena by claiming that in the rules of the game we all know  that we will never challenge the baby to elicit an answer to the question:  did you create that or did you find it?
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I am now ready to go straight to the statement of my thesis. It seems I am  afraid to get there, as if I fear that once the thesis is stated the purpose  of my communication is at an end, because it is so very simple.
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To use an object the subject must have developed a capacity to use objects.  This is part of the change to the reality principle.心理学空间L?mtfRTZm O

Q1X{o%J.Pm0This capacity cannot be said to be inborn, nor can its development in an  individual be taken for granted. The development of a capacity to use an  object is another example of the maturational process as something that  depends on a facilitating environment.1
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In the sequence one can say that first there is object-relating, then in the  end there is object-use; in between, however, is the most difficult thing,  perhaps, in human development; or, the most irksome of all the early  failures that come for mending. This thing that there is in between relating  and use is the subject's placing of the object outside the area of the  subject's omnipotent control, that is, the subject's perception of the  object as an external phenomenon, not as a projective entity, in fact  recognition of it as an entity in its own right.2
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This change (from relating to use) means that the subject destroys the  object. From here it could be argued by an armchair philosopher that there  is therefore no such thing in practice as the use of an object; if the  object be external, then the object is destroyed by the subject. Should the  philosopher come out of his chair and sit on the floor with his patient,  however, he will find that there is an intermediate position. In other  words, he will find that after 'subject relates to object' comes 'subject  destroys object' (as it becomes external); and then may come 'object  survives destruction by the subject'. But there may or may not be survival.  A new feature thus arrives in the theory of object-relating. The subject  says to the object: 'I destroyed you', and the object is there to receive  the communication. From now on the subject says: 'Hullo object!' 'I  destroyed you.' 'I love you.' 'You have value for me because of your  survival of my destruction of you.' 'While I am loving you I am all the time  destroying you in (unconscious) fantasy.' Here fantasy begins for the  individual. The subject can now use the object that has survived. It is  important to note that it is not only that the subject destroys the object  because the object is placed outside the area of omnipotent control. It is  equally significant to state this the other way round and to say that it is  the destruction of the object that places the object outside the area of the  subject's omnipotent control. In these ways the object develops its own  autonomy and life, and (if it survives) contributes in to the subject,  according to its own properties.
{N`va$s3T^.i0In other words, because of the survival of the object, the subject may now  have started to live a life in the world of objects, and so the subject  stands to gain immeasurably; but the price has to be paid in acceptance of  the ongoing destruction in unconscious fantasy relative to object-relating.心理学空间,?qo6blo*c
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Let me repeat. This is a position that can only be arrived at by the  individual in early stages of emotional growth through the actual survival  of cathected objects that are at the time in process of becoming destroyed  because real, becoming real because destroyed (being destructible and  expendable).
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From now on, this stage having been reached, projective mechanisms assist in  the act of noticing what is there, but are not the reason why the object is  there. In my opinion this is a departure from orthodox psychoanalytic  theory, which tends to think of external reality only in terms of the  individual's projective mechanisms.
P"WSs*E XL0I have now nearly made my whole statement. Not quite, however, because it is  not possible for me to take for granted an acceptance of the fact that the  first impulse in the subject's relation to the object (objectively  perceived, not subjective) is destructive.
Ms(o](W+C#Ve0^ O0The central postulate in this thesis is that whereas the subject does not  destroy the subjective object (projection material), destruction turns up  and becomes a central feature in so far as the object is objectively perceived, has autonomy, and belongs to 'shared'  reality. This is the difficult part of my thesis, at least for me.
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pCD c(HG#d6C0It is generally understood that the reality principle involves the  individual in anger and reactive destruction, but my thesis is that the  destruction plays its part in making the reality, placing the object outside  the self. For this to happen, favourable conditions are necessary.
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This is simply a matter of examining the reality principle under high power.  As I see it, we are familiar with the change whereby projection mechanisms  enable the subject to take cognizance of the object, without projection  mechanisms being the reason for the object's existence. At the point of  development that is under survey the subject is creating the object in the  sense of finding externality itself, and it has to be added that this  experience depends on the object's capacity to survive. (It is important  that this means 'not retaliate'.) If it is in an analysis that these matters  are taking place, then the analyst, the analytic technique, and the analytic  setting all come in as surviving or not surviving the patient's destructive  attacks. This destructive activity is the patient's attempt to place the  analyst outside the area of omnipotent control, that is, out in the world.  Without the experience of maximum destructiveness (object not protected) the  subject never places the analyst outside and therefore can never do more  than experience a kind of self-analysis, using the analyst as a projection  of a part of the self. In terms of feeding, the patient, then, can only feed  on the self and cannot use the breast for getting fat. The patient may even  enjoy the analytic experience but will not fundamentally change.心理学空间@oP:b n

@#g*}.if,UT!ew ]7d0And if the analyst is a subjective phenomenon, what about waste-disposal? A  further statement is needed in terms of output.
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In psychoanalytic practice the positive changes that come about in this area  can be profound. They do not depend on interpretative work. They do depend  on the analyst's survival of the attacks, which includes the idea of absence  of a change to retaliation. These attacks may be very difficult for the  analyst to stand, especially when they are expressed in terms of delusion or  through manipulation which makes the analyst actually do things that are  technically bad. (I refer to such a thing as unreliability at moments when  reliability is all that matters, as well as to survival in terms of keeping  alive and the absence of the quality of retaliation.)心理学空间)p zr ~,~w
The analyst feels like interpreting, but this can spoil the process and for  the patient can seem like a kind of self-defence, the analyst parrying the  patient's attack. Better to wait till after the phase is over, and then  discuss with the patient what has been happening. This is surely legitimate,  for as analyst one has one's own needs; but verbal interpretation at this  point is not the essential feature and brings its own dangers. The essential  feature is the analyst's survival and the intactness of the psychoanalytic  technique. Imagine how traumatic can be the actual death of the analyst when  this kind of work is in process, although even the actual death of the  analyst is not as bad as the development in the analyst of a change towards  retaliation. These risks simply must be taken by the patient. Usually the  analyst lives through these phases of movement in the transference, and  after each phase there comes reward in terms of love, reinforced by the fact  of the backcloth of unconscious destruction. 心理学空间)O!nj!e0x-iR3|:l

/A!l/T)xlj)W"T0It appears to me that the idea of a developmental phase involving survival  of object does affect the theory of the roots of aggression. It is no good  saying that a baby of a few days old envies the breast. It is legitimate,  however, to say that at whatever age a baby begins to allow the breast an  external position (outside the area of projection) then this means that  destruction of the breast has become a feature. I mean the actual impulse to  destroy. It is an important part of what a mother does, to be the first  person to take the baby through this first version of the many that will be  encountered, of attack that is survived. This is the right moment in the  child's development, because of the child's relative feebleness, so that  destruction can fairly easily be survived. Even so it is a very tricky  matter; it is only too easy for a mother to react moralistically when her  baby bites and hurts.3But this language involving the breast is jargon. The  whole area of development and of management is involved in which adaptation  is related to dependence, apart, that is, from the important detail of  relating to the breast.
;nnD?5}r3Q&jq0It will be seen that, although destruction is the word I am using, this  actual destruction belongs to the object's failure to survive. Without this  failure, destruction remains potential. The word 'destruction' is needed,  not because of the baby's impulse to destroy, but because of the object's  liability not to survive.心理学空间,H,q7a,m}%[4o@|
The way of looking at things that belongs to my presentation of this paper  makes possible a new approach to the whole subject of the roots of  aggression. For instance, it is not necessary to give inborn aggression more  than that which is its due in company with everything else that is inborn.  Undoubtedly inborn aggression must be variable in a quantitative sense in  the same way that everything else that is inherited is variable as between  individuals. The variations in inborn aggression are slight as compared with  the total inheritance of that which can lead to aggressiveness. By contrast,  the variations are great that arise out of the differences in the  experiences of various newborn babies according to whether they are or are  not seen through this very difficult phase. Such variations in the field of  experience are indeed immense. Moreover, the babies that have been seen  through this phase well are likely to be more aggressive clinically than the  ones who have not been seen through the phase well, and for whom aggression  is not something that can be encompassed (become ego-syntonic), or can be  retained only in the form of a liability to be the object of attack.
)^%C#[MW"I:EHt0This involves a rewriting of the theory of the roots of aggression since  most of that which has already been written by analysts has been formulated  without reference to that which is being discussed in this paper. The  assumption is always there, in orthodox theory, that aggression is reactive  to the encounter with the reality principle, whereas here it is the  destructive drive that creates the quality of externality.
mh Sl4\6`Q Jn0Let me look for a moment at the exact place of this attack and survival in  the hierarchy of relationships. More primitive and quite different is  annihilation. Annihilation means 'no hope'; cathexis withers up because no  result completes the reflex to produce conditioning. Attack in anger  relative to the encounter with the reality principle is a more sophisticated  concept, postdating the destruction that I postulate here. In the  destruction of the object to which I am referring there is no anger. There  could be said to be joy at the object's survival. From this moment, or  arising out of this phase, the object is in fantasy always being destroyed.  This quality of 'always being destroyed' makes the reality of the surviving  object felt as such, strengthens the feeling tone, and contributes to object  constancy. The object can now be used.心理学空间4?Uve shK6h;`+S

|/smIu+on9b0I wish to conclude with a note on using and usage. By 'use' I do not mean  'exploitation'. As analysts, we know what it is like to be used, which means  that we can see the end of the treatment, be it several years away. Many of  our patients come with this problem already solved. They can use objects and  they can use us and can use analysis, just as they have used their parents  and their siblings and their homes. However, there are many patients who  need us to be able to give them a capacity to use us. In meeting the needs  of such patients, we shall need to know what I am saying here about our  survival of their destructiveness. A backcloth of unconscious destruction of  the analyst is set up and we survive it or, alternatively, we shall become  involved in yet another analysis interminable.心理学空间 UQ%~.sHXgX g

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StT8un+X*~'{S01In choosing the title for my Hogarth book I was showing  how much I was influenced by Dr Phyllis Greenacre at the Edinburgh Congress.  Unfortunately, I failed to put into the book an acknowledgement of this  fact.心理学空间 fA\8@V TWy

a%ym9Ab02I was influenced in my understanding of this point by W.  Clifford M. Scott (personal communication, c. 1940).
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3In fact, the baby's development is immensely complicated if he or she  should happen to be born with a tooth, so that the gum's attack on the  breast can never be tried out.
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2SyJ?&O)Q)y ?0WINNICOTT, D. W. 1941 The observation of infants in a set situation In  Collected Papers London: Tavistock Publications, 1958
t0kLG D0j}D,C8}0WINNICOTT, D. W. 1958 The capacity to be alone In Winnicott 1965心理学空间OHj8\?
WINNICOTT, D. W. 1959?4 Classification: Is there a psycho-analytic  contribution to psychiatric classification In Winnicott 1965心理学空间)]L^/[&LHT1cq
WINNICOTT, D. W. 1962 Ego integration in child development In Winnicott 1965
$V#BEs1ZN^0WINNICOTT, D. W. 1963 Communicating and not communicating leading to a study  of certain opposites In Winnicott 1965心理学空间H:o J@:W#R
WINNICOTT, D. W. 1964 Roots of aggression In The Child, the Family, and the  Outside World Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
Q];ERR0WINNICOTT, D. W. 1965 The Maturational Processes and the Facilitating  Environment London: Hogarth Press.心理学空间 V)p&D%{ht
WINNICOTT, D. W. 1967 The location of cultural experience Int. J.  Psycho-Anal. 48 368?72
B6o4Ms5F)F#l D0WINNICOTT, D. W. 1968a Playing: its theoretical status in the clinical  situation Int. J. Psycho-Anal. 49 591?99www.psychspace.com心理学空间网
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