Psychology as the Behaviorist Views it.
John B. Watson (1913).
John B. Watson (1913).
Psychology as the behaviorist views it is a purely objective experimentalbranch of natural science. Its theoretical goal is the predictionand control of behavior. Introspectionforms no essential part of its methods, nor is the scientificvalue of its data dependent upon the readiness with which theylend themselves to interpretation in terms of consciousness. Thebehaviorist, in his efforts to get a unitary scheme of animalresponse, recognizes no dividing line between man and brute.The behavior of man, with all of its refinement and complexity,forms only a part of the behaviorist's total scheme of investigation.
consciousness.It has taken as its problem, on the one hand, the analysis ofcomplex mental states (or processes) into simple elementary constituents,and on the other the construction of complex states when the elementaryconstituents are given. The world of physical objects (stimuli,including here anything which may excite activity in a receptor),which forms the total phenomena of the natural scientist, is lookedupon merely as means to an end. That end is the production ofmental states that may be 'inspected' or 'observed'. The psychologicalobject of observation in the case of an emotion, for example,is the mental state itself. The problem in emotion is the determinationof the number and kind of elementary constituents present, theirloci, intensity, order of appearance, etc. It is agreedthat introspection is the method par excellence by meansof which mental states may be manipulated for purposes of psychology.On this assumption, behavior data (including under this term everythingwhich goes under the name of comparative psychology)have no value per se. They possess significance only inso far as they may throw light upon conscious states.1Such data must have at least an analogicalor indirect reference to belong to the realm of psychology.
It has been maintained by its followers generally thatpsychology is a study of the science of the phenomena ofIndeed, at times, one finds psychologists who are sceptical ofeven this analogical reference. Such scepticism is often shownby the question which is put to the student of behavior, 'whatis the bearing of animal workupon human psychology?' I used to have to study over this question.Indeed it always embarrassed me somewhat. I was interested inmy own work and felt that it was important, and yet I could nottrace any close connection between it and psychology as my questionerunderstood psychology. I hope that such a confession will clearthe atmosphere to such an extent that we will no longer have towork under false pretences. We must frankly admit that the factsso important to us which we have been able to glean from extendedwork upon the senses of animals by the behavior method have contributedonly in a fragmentary way to the general theory of human senseorgan processes, nor have they suggested new points of experimentalattack. The enormous number of experiments which we have carriedout upon learning have likewise contributed little to human psychology.It seems reasonably clear that some kind of compromise must beaffected: either psychology must change its viewpoint so as totake in facts of behavior, whetheror not they have bearings upon the problems of 'consciousness';or else behavior must stand alone as a wholly separate and independentscience. Should human psychologists fail to look with favor uponour overtures and refuse to modify their position, the behavioristswill be driven to using human beings as subjects and to employmethods of investigation which are exactly comparable to thosenow employed in the animal work.
Any other hypothesis than that which admits the independent valueof behavior material, regardless of any bearing such materialmay have upon consciousness, will inevitably force us to the absurd positionof attempting to construct the conscious content of theanimal whose behavior we have been studying. On this view, afterhaving determined our animal's ability to learn, the simplicityor complexity of its methods of learning, the effect of past habitupon present response, the range of stimuli to which it ordinarilyresponds, the widened range to which it can respond under experimentalconditions -- in more general terms, its various problems andits various ways of solving them -- we should still feel thatthe task is unfinished and that the results are worthless, untilwe can interpret them by analogy in the light of consciousness.Although we have solved our problem we feel uneasy and unrestfulbecause of our definition of psychology: we feel forced to saysomething about the possible mental processes of our animal. Wesay that, having no eyes, its stream of consciousness cannot containbrightness and color sensations as we know them -- having no tastebuds this stream can contain no sensations of sweet, sour, saltand bitter. But on the other hand, since it does respond to thermal,tactual and organic stimuli, its conscious content must be madeup largely of these sensations; and we usually add, to protectourselves against the reproach of being anthropomorphic,'if it has any consciousness'. Surely this doctrine which callsfor an anological interpretation of all behavior data may be shownto be false: the position that the standing of an observationupon behavior is determined by its fruitfulness in yielding resultswhich are interpretable only in the narrow realm of (really human)consciousness.
associative memory',while certain others were supposed to lack it. One meets thissearch for the origin of consciousness under a good many disguises.Some of our texts state that consciousness arises at the momentwhen reflex and instinctive activities fail properly to conservethe organism. A perfectly adjusted organism would be lacking inconsciousness. On the other hand whenever we find the presenceof diffuse activity which results in habit formation, we are justifiedin assuming consciousness. I must confess that these argumentshad weight with me when I began the study of behavior. I fearthat a good many of us are still viewing behavior problems withsomething like this in mind. More than one student in behaviorhas attempted to frame criteria of the psychic-- to devise a set of objective, structural and functional criteriawhich, when applied in the particular instance, will enable usto decide whether such and such responses are positively conscious,merely indicative of consciousness, or whether they are purely'physiological'. Such problems as these can no longer satisfybehavior men. It would be better to give up the province altogetherand admit frankly that the study of the behavior of animals hasno justification, than to admit that our search is of such a 'willo' the wisp' character. One can assume either the presence orthe absence of consciousness anywhere in the phylogenetic scalewithout affecting the problems of behavior by one jot or one tittle;and without influencing in any way the mode of experimental attackupon them. On the other hand, I cannot for one moment assume thatthe paramecium respondsto light; that the rat learns a problem more quickly by workingat the task five times a day than once a day, or that the humanchild exhibits plateaux in his learning curves. These are questionswhich vitally concern behavior and which must be decided by directobservation under experimental conditions.
This emphasis upon analogy in psychology has led the behavioristsomewhat afield. Not being willing to throw off the yoke of consciousnesshe feels impelled to make a place in the scheme of behavior wherethe rise of consciousness can be determined. This point has beena shifting one. A few years ago certain animals were supposedto possess 'Darwin'stime. The whole Darwinian movement was judged by the bearing ithad upon the origin and development of the human race. Expeditionswere undertaken to collect material which would establish theposition that the rise of the human race was a perfectly naturalphenomenon and not an act of special creation. Variations werecarefully sought along with the evidence for the heaping up effectand the weeding out effect of selection; for in these and theother Darwinian mechanisms were to be found factors sufficientlycomplex to account for the origin and race differentiation ofman. The wealth of material collected at this time was consideredvaluable largely in so far as it tended to develop the conceptof evolution in man. It is strange that this situation shouldhave remained the dominant one in biology for so many years. Themoment zoology undertook the experimental study of evolution anddescent, the situation immediately changed. Man ceased to be thecenter of reference. I doubt if any experimental biologist today,unless actually engaged in the problem of race differentiationin man, tries to interpret his findings in terms of human evolution,or ever refers to it in his thinking. He gathers his data fromthe study of many species of plants and animals and tries to workout the laws of inheritance in the particular type upon whichhe is conducting experiments. Naturally, he follows the progressof the work upon race differentiation in man and in the descentof man, but he looks upon these as special topics, equal in importancewith his own yet ones in which his interests will never be vitallyengaged. It is not fair to say that all of his work is directedtoward human evolution or that it must be interpreted in termsof human evolution. He does not have to dismiss certain of hisfacts on the inheritance of coat color in mice because, forsooth,they have little bearing upon the differentiation of the genus homointo separate races, or upon the descent of the genus homofrom some more primitive stock.
This attempt to reason by analogy from human conscious processesto the conscious processes in animals, and vice versa:to make consciousness, as the human being knows it, the centerof reference of all behavior, forces us into a situation similarto that which existed in biology in