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论道德的系谱 On the Genealogy of Morals



1.

We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge—and with good reason. We have never sought ourselves—how could it happen that we should ever find ourselves? It has rightly been said: "Where your treasure is, there will your heart be also" [Matthew 6:21]; our treasure is where the beehives of our knowledge are. We are constantly making for them, being by nature winged creatures and honey-gatherers of the spirit; there is one thing alone we really care about from the heart—"bringing something home." Whatever else there is in life, so-called "experiences"—which of us has sufficient earnestness for them? Or sufficient time? Present experience has, I am afraid, always found us "absent-minded": we cannot give our hearts to it—not even our ears! Rather, as one divinely preoccupied and immersed in himself into whose ear the bell has just boomed with all its strength the twelve beats of noon suddenly starts up and asks himself: "what really was that which just struck?" so we sometimes rub our ears afterward and ask, utterly surprised and disconcerted, "what really was that which we have just experienced?" and moreover: "who are we really?" and, afterward as aforesaid, count the twelve trembling bell-strokes of our experience, our life, our being—and alas! miscount them.—So we are necessarily strangers to ourselves, we do not comprehend ourselves, we have to misunderstand ourselves, for us the law "Each is furthest from himself" applies to all eternity—we are not "men of knowledge" with respect to ourselves.

2.

My ideas on the origin of our moral prejudices—for this is the subject of this polemic—received their first, brief, and provisional expression in the collection of aphorisms that bears the title Human, All-Too-Human. A Book for Free Spirits. This book was begun in Sorrento during a winter when it was given to me to pause as a wanderer pauses and look back across the broad and dangerous country my spirit had traversed up to that time. This was in the winter of 1876-77; the ideas themselves are older. They were already in essentials the same ideas that I take up again in the present treatises—let us hope the long interval has done them good, that they have become riper, clearer, stronger, more perfect! That I still cleave to them today, however, that they have become in the meantime more and more firmly attached to one another, indeed entwined and interlaced with one another, strengthens my joyful assurance that they might have arisen in me from the first not as isolated, capricious, or sporadic things but from a common root, from a fundamental will of knowledge, pointing imperiously into the depths, speaking more and more precisely, demanding greater and greater precision. For this alone is fitting for a philosopher. We have no right to isolated acts of any kind: we may not make isolated errors or hit upon isolated truths. Rather do our ideas, our values, our yeas and nays, our ifs and buts, grow out of us with the necessity with which a tree bears fruit—related and each with an affinity to each, and evidence of one will, one health, one soil, one sun.—Whether you like them, these fruits of ours?—But what is that to the trees! What is that to us, to us philosophers!

3.

Because of a scruple particular to me that I am loth to admit to—for it is concerned with morality, with all that has been hitherto celebrated on earth as morality—a scruple that entered my life so early, so uninvited, so irresistibly, so much in conflict with my environment, age, precedents, and descent that I might almost have the right to call it my "a priori"—my curiosity as well as my suspicions were bound to halt quite soon at the question of where our good and evil really originated. In fact, the problem of the origin of evil pursued me even as a boy of thirteen: at an age in which you have "half childish trifles, half God in your heart" [Goethe’s Faust, lines 3781f.], I devoted to it my first childish literary trifle, my first philosophical effort—and as for the "solution" of the problem I posed at that time, well, I gave the honor to God, as was only fair, and made him the father of evil. Was that what my "a priori" and the alas! so anti-Kantian, enigmatic "categorical imperative" which spoke through it and to which I have since listened more and more closely, and not merely listened?

Fortunately I learned early to separate theological prejudice from moral prejudice and ceased to look for the origin of evil behind the world. A certain amount of historical and philological schooling, together with an inborn fastidiousness of taste in respect to psychological questions in general, soon transformed my problem into another one: under what conditions did man devise these value judgments good and evil? and what value do they themselves possess? Have they hitherto hindered or furthered human prosperity? Are they a sign of distress, of impoverishment, of the degeneration of life? Or is there revealed in them, on the contrary, the plenitude, force, and will of life, its courage, certainty, future?

Thereupon I discovered and ventured divers answers; I distinguished between ages, peoples, degrees of rank among individuals; I departmentalized my problem; out of my answers there grew new questions, inquiries, conjectures, probabilities—until at length I had a country of my own, a soil of my own, an entire discrete, thriving, flourishing world, like a secret garden the existence of which no one suspected.—Oh how fortunate we are, we men of knowledge, provided only that we know how to keep silent long enough!

4.

The first impulse to publish something of my hypotheses concerning the origin of morality was given me by a clear, tidy, and shrewd—also precocious—little book in which I encountered distinctly for the first time an upside-down and perverse species of genealogical hypothesis, the genuinely English type, that attracted me—with that power of attraction which everything contrary, everything antipodal possesses. The title of the little book was The Origin of the Moral Sensations; its author Dr. Paul Rée; the year in which it appeared 1877. Perhaps I have never read anything to which I would have said to myself No, proposition by proposition, conclusion by conclusion, to the extent that I did to this book: yet quite without ill-humor or impatience. In the above-mentioned work, on which I was then engaged, I made opportune and inopportune reference to the propositions of that book, not in order to refute them—what have I to do with refutations!—but, as becomes a positive spirit, to replace the improbable with the more probable, possibly one error with another. It was then, as I have said, that I advance for the first time those genealogical hypotheses to which this treatise is devoted—ineptly, as I should be the last to deny, still constrained, still lacking my own language for my own things and with much backsliding and vacillation. One should compare in particular what I say in Human, All-Too-Human, section 45, on the twofold prehistory of good and evil (namely, in the sphere of the noble and in that of the slaves); likewise, section 136, on the value and origin of the morality of asceticism; likewise, section 96 and 99 and volume II, section 89, on the "morality of mores," that much older and more primitive species of morality which differs toto caelo [diametrically, literally, by the whole heavens] from the altruistic mode of evaluation (in which Dr. Rée, like all English moral genealogists, sees moral evaluation as such); likewise, section 92, The Wanderer, section 26, and Dawn, section 112, on the origin of justice as an agreement between two approximately equal powers (equality as the presupposition of all compacts, consequently all law); likewise The Wanderer, sections 22 and 33, on the origin of punishment, of which the aim of intimidation is neither the essence nor the source (as Dr. Rée thinks—it is rather only introduced, under certain definite circumstances, and always as an incidental, as something added).

5.

Even then my real concern was something much more important than hypothesis-mongering, whether my own or other people’s, on the origin of morality (or more precisely: the latter concerned me solely for the sake of a goal to which it was only one means among many). What was at stake was the value of morality—and over this I had to come to terms almost exclusively with my great teacher Schopenhauer, to whom that book of mine, the passion and the concealed contradiction of that book, addressed itself as if to a contemporary (—for that book, too, was a "polemic"). What was especially at stake was the value of the "unegoistic," the instincts of pity, self-abnegation, self-sacrifice, which Schopenhauer had gilded, deified, and projected into a beyond for so long that at last they became for him "value-in-itself," on the basis of which he said No to life and to himself. But it was against precisely these instincts that there spoke from me an ever more fundamental mistrust, an ever more corrosive skepticism! It was precisely here that I saw the great danger to mankind, its sublimest enticement and seduction—but to what? to nothingness?—it was precisely here that I saw the beginning of the end, the dead stop, a retrospective weariness, the will turning against life, the tender and sorrowful signs of the ultimate illness: I understood the ever spreading morality of pity that had seized even on philosophers and made them ill, as the most sinister symptom of a European culture that had itself become sinister, perhaps as its by-pass to a new Buddhism? to a Buddhism for Europeans? to—nihilism?

For this overestimation of and predilection for pity on the part of modern philosophers is something new: hitherto philosophers have been at one as to the worthlessness of pity. I name only Plato, Spinoza, La Rochefoucauld, and Kant—four spirits as different from one another as possible, but united in one thing: in their low estimation of pity.

6.

This problem of the value of pity and of the morality of pity (—I am opposed to the pernicious modern effeminacy of feeling—) seems at first to be merely something detached, an isolated question mark; but whoever sticks with it and learns how to ask questions here will experience what I experienced—a tremendous new prospect opens up for him, a new possibility comes over him like a vertigo, every kind of mistrust, suspicion, fear leaps up, his belief in morality, in all morality, falters—finally a new demand becomes audible. Let us articulate this new demand: we need a critique of moral values, the values of these values themselves must first be called in question—and for that there is needed a knowledge of the conditions and circumstances in which they grew, under which they evolved and changed (morality as consequence, as symptom, as mask, as tartufferie, as illness, as misunderstanding; but also morality as cause, as remedy, as stimulant, as restraint, as poison), a knowledge of a kind that has never yet existed or even been desired. One has taken the value of these "values" as given, as factual, as beyond all question; one has hitherto never doubted or hesitated in the slightest degree in supposing "the good man" to be of greater value than "the evil man," of greater value in the sense of furthering the advancement and prosperity of man in general (the future of man included). But what if the reverse were true? What if a symptom of regression were inherent in the "good," likewise a danger, a seduction, a poison, a narcotic, through which the present was possibly living at the expense of the future? Perhaps more comfortably, less dangerously, but at the same time in a meaner style, more basely?—So that precisely morality would be to blame if the highest power and splendor actually possible to the type man was never in fact attained? So that precisely morality was the danger of dangers?

7.

Let it suffice that, after this prospect had opened up before me, I had reasons to look about me for scholarly, bold, and industrious comrades (I am still looking). The project is to traverse with quite novel questions, and as though with new eyes, the enormous, distant, and so well hidden land of morality—of morality that has actually existed, actually been lived; and does this not mean virtually to discover this land for the first time?

If I considered in this connection the above-mentioned Dr. Rée, among others, it was because I had no doubt that the very nature of his inquiries would compel him to adopt a better method for reaching answers. Have I deceived myself in this? My desire, at any rate, was to point out to so sharp and disinterested an eye as his a better direction in which to look, in the direction of an actual history of morality, and to warn him in time against gazing around haphazardly in the blue after the English fashion. For it must be obvious which color is a hundred times more vital for a genealogist of morals than blue: namely gray, that is, what is documented, what can actually be confirmed and has actually existed, in short the entire long hieroglyphic record, so hard to decipher, of the moral past of mankind!

This was unknown to Dr. Rée; but had he read Darwin—so that in his hypotheses, and after a fashion that is at least entertaining, the Darwinian beast and the ultramodern unassuming moral milksop who "no longer bites" politely link hands, the latter wearing an expression of a certain good-natured and refined indolence, with which is mingled even a grain of pessimism and weariness, as if all these things—the problems of morality—were really not worth taking quite so seriously. But to me, on the contrary, there seems to be nothing more worth taking seriously, among the rewards for it being that some day one will perhaps be allowed to take them cheerfully. For cheerfulness—or in my own language gay science—is a reward: the reward of a long, brave, industrious, and subterranean seriousness, of which, to be sure, not everyone is capable. But on the day we can say with all our hearts, "Onwards! our old morality too is part of the comedy" we shall have discovered a new complication and possibility for the Dionysian drama of "The Destiny of the Soul"—and one can wager that the grand old eternal comic poet of our existence will be quick to make use of it!

8.

If this book is incomprehensible to anyone and jars on his ears, the fault, it seems to me, is not necessarily mine. It is clear enough, assuming, as I do assume, that one has first read my earlier writings and has not spared some trouble in doing so: for they are, indeed, not easy to penetrate. Regarding my Zarathustra, for example, I do not allow that anyone knows the book who has not at some time been profoundly wounded and at some time profoundly delighted by every word in it; for only then may he enjoy the privilege of reverentially sharing in the halcyon element out of which that book was born and in its sunlight clarity, remoteness, breadth, and certainty. In other cases, people find difficulty with the aphoristic form: this arises from the fact that today this form is not taken seriously enough. An aphorism, properly stamped and molded, has not been "deciphered" when it has simply been read; rather, one has then to begin its exegesis, for which is required an art of exegesis. I have offered in the third essay of the present book an example of what I regard as "exegesis" in such a case—an aphorism is prefixed to this essay, the essay itself is a commentary on it. To be sure, one thing is necessary above all if one is to practice reading as an art in this way, something that has been unlearned most thoroughly nowadays—and therefore it will be some time before my writings are "readable"—something for which one has almost to be a cow and in any case not a "modern man": rumination.

Sils-Maria, Upper Engadine,

July 1887

  我们应当归功于这些英国心理学家的还有初探道德发生史的尝试,可惜他们并没有就此提出任何疑点。我承认,他们本身就是个疑点,他们甚至在写书之前就把一些基本观点提出来了——他们本身就很有意思!这些英国心理学家们到底想要做什么?人们发现他们总是在有意或无意地做着同一件事:就是把我们内心世界中的龌龊部分暴露出来,从中寻找积极的、先进的、于人类发展有决定作用的因素,而这是些人类智慧的尊严最不愿意看到的部位,他们就是在这些习惯势力中,在健忘中,在盲目和偶然的思想网络和思想机制中,在任何一种纯粹被动的、机械的、反射性的、微不足道的和本质上是愚蠢的部位找寻积极的因素。到底是什么东西使得这些心理学家总是朝着这一个方向努力?是否是一种隐秘的、恶毒的、低级的、连他们自己都不愿意承认的贬低人类的本能?是否是一种悲观主义的猜忌,一种对失意的、干瘪的、逐渐变得刻毒而幼稚的理想主义的怀疑?是否是对于基督教(和柏拉图)的一种渺小的、隐秘的、从未跨过意识门槛的愤忿和积怨?抑或是对于稀奇的事物、对于令人头疼的反论、对于存在本身的可疑点和荒唐处的一种贪婪的嗜好?当然,也可能是一种混合,其中含有少许卑劣、少许忧郁、少许反基督教、少许快感、少许对调味品的需求?……

可是有人告诉我说,这不过是些冷血的、乏味的老青蛙,它们在人的周围爬行跳跃,好像是在它们自己的天地中:在一个泥塘中一样。我很不愿意听到这些,而且我不相信这些。假如允许人在不知情的情况下表达一个愿望的话,那么我真心地希望这些人能够是另外一副样子,希望这些灵魂的研究者们和显微观察者们能够是基本上勇敢的、高尚的、自豪的动物,能够知道如何控制他们的情感,并且训练他们自己为真理牺牲所有的欲望——为任何一种真理,哪怕是朴素的、辛辣的、丑陋的、令人不快的、非基督教的、非道德的真理,因为这种真理确实存在着。

1.

These English psychologists, whom one has also to thank for the only attempts hitherto to arrive at a history of the origin of morality—they themselves are no easy riddle; I confess that, as living riddles, they even possess one essential advantage over their books—they are interesting! These English psychologists—what do they really want? One always discovers them voluntarily or involuntarily at the same task, namely at dragging the partie honteuse of our inner world into the foreground and seeking the truly effective and directing agent, that which has been decisive in its evolution, in just that place where the intellectual pride of man would least desire to find it (in the vis inertiae of habit, for example, or in forgetfulness, or in a blind and chance mechanistic hooking-together of ideas, or in something purely passive, automatic, reflexive, molecular, and thoroughly stupid)—what is it really that always drives these psychologists in just this direction? Is it a secret, malicious, vulgar, perhaps self-deceiving instinct for belittling man? Or possibly a pessimistic suspicion, the mistrustfulness of disappointed idealists grown spiteful and gloomy? Or a petty subterranean hostility and rancor toward Christianity (and Plato) that has perhaps not even crossed the threshold of consciousness? Or even a lascivious taste for the grotesque, the painfully paradoxical, the questionable and absurd in existence? Or finally—something of each of them, a little vulgarity, a little gloominess, a little anti-Christianity, a little itching and need for spice?

But I am told they are simply old, cold, and tedious frogs, creeping around men and into men as if in their own proper element, that is, in a swamp. I rebel at that idea; more, I do not believe it; and if one may be allowed to hope where one does not know, then I hope from my heart they may be the reverse of this—that these investigators and microscopists of the soul may be fundamentally brave, proud, and magnanimous animals, who know how to keep their hearts as well as their sufferings in bounds and have trained themselves to sacrifice all desirability to truth, every truth, even plain, harsh, ugly, repellent, unchristian, immoral truth.—For such truths do exist.—

  二

  那么就向那些想支配这些道德史学家的好人们致敬吧!可惜的是,历史精神本身肯定会背弃这些道德史学家,恰恰是历史上的全体好人自己弃他们于艰难境地!他们全体都遵循已经陈旧的哲学家习俗,基本上不用历史的方法思维,这点是没有疑问的。他们撰写的道德谱系从一开始着手调查“好”的观念和判断的起源时就立刻暴露了其拙劣。他们宣称,“最初,不自私的行为受到这些行为的对象们,也就是这些行为的得益者们的赞许,并且被称之为好;后来这种赞许的起源被遗忘了,不自私的行为由总于是习惯地被当作好的来称赞,因此也就干脆被当作好的来感受——似乎它们自身就是什么好的一样。”我们立刻发现,在这第一段引言中已经包含了英国心理学家的特异性的全部典型特征。我们已经看到了“有益”、“遗忘”、“习惯”,最后还有错误,所有这些都被当成了受人尊敬的依据,迄今为止比较高贵的人们甚至引以为自豪。就像引一种人类的艺术特权为自豪一样。这种自豪应当受到羞辱,这种尊敬应当被贬值:目的达到了吗?……

我现在才看清了,这种理论是在错误的地方寻找和确定“好”的概念的起源:“好”的判断不是来源于那些得益于“善行”的人!其实它是起源于那些“好人”自己,也就是说那些高贵的、有力的、上层的、高尚的人们判定他们自己和他们的行为是好的,意即他们感觉并且确定他们自己和他们的行为是上等的,用以对立于所有低下的、卑贱的、平庸的和粗俗的。从这种保持距离的狂热中他们才取得了创造价值、并且给价值命名的权利:这和功利有什么关系!功利的观点对于维持最高等级秩序的热情、突出等级的价值判断的热情表达恰恰是如此陌生和极不适宜:此刻方才出现了那种卑微的热情的对立感觉,这种热情以每一种功于心计的精明,以每一种功利的算计为前提,——而且不止一次地,不是特殊情况,而是永久的。高尚和维持距离的狂热,就是我们说过的上等的、统治艺术的那种持久的、主导的整体和基本感觉,与一种低下的艺术、一个“下人”的关系——这就是“好”和“坏”对立的起源。(主人有赐名的权利,这意味着人们可以把语言的来源理解为统治者威权的表达:他们说,“这是什么,那是什么”;他们用声音给每一物、每一事打下烙印,并且通过这种方法将其立即据为己有。)从这个起源出发——“好”这个词从一开始就根本没有必要和“不自私”的行为相关联:那是道德谱系学家们的偏见。事实上,只是在贵族的价值判断衰落的时候,“自私”和“不自私”的这种全面对立才越来越被强加于人的良知,——用我的话说,群体本能终于用言辞(而且用多数的言辞)得到了表述。此后还要经过很长的一段时间这种本能才会在群众中变成主人,使对道德价值的评定形成,并且陷入上述那种对立(这就是目前欧洲的状况:如今占据着统治地位的是成见,成见正被看作是和“道德”,“不自私”,“公平”相等同的概念,而且已经具有了一种“固定观念”和脑病特有的威力)。

2.

All respect them for the good spirits that may rule in these historians of morality! But it is, unhappily, certain that the historical spirit itself is lacking in them, that precisely all the good spirits of history itself have left them in the lurch! As is the hallowed custom with philosophers, the thinking of all of them is by nature unhistorical; there is no doubt about that. The way they have bungled their moral genealogy comes to light at the very beginning, where the task is to investigate the origin of the concept and judgment "good." "Originally"—so they decree—"one approved unegoistic actions and called them good from the point of view of those to whom they were done, that is to say, those to whom they were useful; later one forgot how this approval originated and, simply because unegoistic actions were always habitually praised as good, one also felt them to be good—as if they were something good in themselves." One sees straightaway that this primary derivation already contains all the typical traits of the idiosyncrasy of the English psychologists—we have "utility," "forgetting," "habit," and finally "error," all as the basis of an evaluation of which the higher man has hitherto been proud as though it were a kind of prerogative of man as such. This pride has to be humbled, this evaluation disvalued: has that end been achieved?

Now it is plain to me, first of all, that in this theory the source of the concept "good" has been sought and established in the wrong place: the judgment "good" did not originate with those to whom "goodness" was shown! Rather it was "the good" themselves, that is to say, the noble, powerful, high-stationed and high-minded, who felt and established themselves and their actions as good, that is, of the first rank, in contradistinction to all the low, low-minded, common and plebeian. It was out of this pathos of distance that they first seized the right to create values and to coin names for these values: what had they to do with utility! The viewpoint of utility is as remote and inappropriate as it possibly could be in face of such a burning eruption of the highest rank-ordering, rank-defining value judgments: for here feeling has attained the antithesis of that low degree of warmth which any calculating prudence, any calculus of utility, presupposes—and not for once only, not for an exceptional hour, but for good. The pathos of nobility and distance, as aforesaid, the protracted and domineering fundamental total feeling on the part of a higher ruling order in relation to a lower order, to a "below"—that is the origin of the antithesis "good" and "bad." (The lordly right of giving names extends so far that one should allow oneself to conceive the origin of language itself as an expression of power on the part of the rulers: they say "this is this and this," they seal every thing and event with a sound and, as it were, take possession of it.) It follows from this origin that the word "good" was definitely not linked from the first and by necessity to "unegoistic" actions, as the superstition of these genealogists of morality would have it. Rather it was only when aristocratic value judgments declined that the whole antithesis "egoistic" "unegoistic" obtruded itself more and more on the human conscience—it is, to speak in my own language, the herd instinct that through this antithesis at last gets its word (and its words) in. And even then it was a long time before that instinct attained such dominion that moral evaluation was actually stuck and halted at this antithesis (as, for example, is the case in contemporary Europe: the prejudice that takes "moral," "unegoistic," "désintéressé" as concepts of equivalent value already rules today with the force of a "fixed idea" and brain-sickness).

  三

  可是第二:那种关于“好”的价值判断的起源的假说除了在历史上是完全站不住脚的以外,在心理分析方面也是荒诞不经的。不自私的行为的功利被说成是该行为受到称赞的根源,而这个根源却被遗忘了——怎么可能遗忘呢?也许这种行为的功利曾在某时失效?情况恰恰相反,事实上这种功利在所有的时代都司空见惯,而且不断地得到重新强调;因此,功利不是从意识中消失了,不是被遗忘了,而是必然地越来越清晰地显现在意识中。这样一来那种反对派理论倒是更为清晰合理了(那理论并不因此而更正确——)。例如赫伯特·斯宾塞就表述了这派理论:他认为“好”的概念就其本质来说与“有益”、“实用”相通,因此在“好”和“坏”的判断中人类总结并确认的正是他们关于有益——实用和有害——不实用的那些未被遗忘和遗忘不掉的经验。根据这种理论,“好”即是那种迄今一直被证明是有益的:因此,好被看成“最高等级的有价值的”效用,被看成“自身有价值的”效用。正像我所说的,这种解释方法也是错误的,但是它本身至少是清晰合理的,而且从心理的角度上看也是站得住脚的。

3.

In the second place, however: quite apart from the historical untenability of this hypothesis regarding the origin of the value judgment "good," it suffers from an inherent psychological absurdity. The utility of the unegoistic action is supposed to be the source of the approval accorded it, and this source is supposed to have been forgotten—but how is this forgetting possible? Has the utility of such actions come to an end at some time or other? The opposite is the case: this utility has rather been an everyday experience at all times, therefore something that has been underlined again and again: consequently, instead of fading from consciousness, instead of becoming easily forgotten, it must have been impressed on the consciousness more and more clearly. How much more reasonable is that opposing theory (it is not for that reason more true—) which Herbert Spencer, for example, espoused: that the concept "good" is essentially identical with the concept "useful," "practical," so that in the judgments "good" and "bad" mankind has summed up and sanctioned precisely its unforgotten and unforgettable experiences regarding what is useful-practical and what is harmful-practical. According to this theory, that which has always proved itself useful is good: therefore it may claim to be "valuable in the highest degree," "valuable in itself." This road to an explanation is, as aforesaid, also a wrong one, but at least the explanation is in itself reasonable and psychologically tenable.

  有个问题为我指出了通向正确道路的方向,这个问题的提出本来是因为在词源学中出现了各种不同的表述“好”的词言文字:在这里我发现所有这些名称都把我们引回到同一个概念转化——基本概念的等级含义往往是“高尚”、高贵”,由此又必然转化出含有“精神高尚”,“高贵”意思的“好”,含有“精神崇高”,“精神特权”意思的“好”;这一转化又总是伴随以另外那种转化,“普通的”、“粗俗的”、“低贱的”终于被转化成“坏”的概念,这后一种转化的最有力的例证就是德文字“坏”本身;“坏”字(“Schlecht”)和“简朴”

  (“Schlicht”)通用——请比较“直截了当”(“Schlechtweg”,直译:“坏的方式”),“简直不堪”(“Schlechter-dings”,直译:“坏的事物”)——因此“坏”这个字起初就是这样不屑一顾地径直把简朴的,普通的人置于高尚的对立面。大约到了三十年战争时期,也就是说到了很晚的时候,上述内容才转变为现在通用的意思。——这就为我的道德谱系的研究展示了一条重要的线索,它之所以这么晚才被找到是因为在现代世界上,民主的偏见对所有追根溯源的工作施加了障碍性的影响,甚至连那个看来是最客观的自然科学和生理学领域也不例外,当然我在此只能是点出问题而已。那么这种偏见,一旦它燃起仇恨的烈焰,能给道德和历史造成什么样的特殊危害?这已由臭名昭著的布克尔事件表明了。起源于英国的现代精神的平民主义在它的故乡的土地上再次爆发,激烈得有如一座喷发的火山,伴随着迄今为止所有的火山都发出的那种令人扫兴的、噪音过大的、粗野的、不容争辩的声音。——

4.

The signpost to the right road was for me the question: what was the real etymological significance of the designations for "good" coined in the various languages? I found they all led back to the same conceptual transformation—that everywhere "noble," "aristocratic" in the social sense, is the basic concept from which "good" in the sense of "with aristocratic soul," "noble," "with a soul of a high order," "with a privileged soul" necessarily developed: a development which always runs parallel with that other in which "common," "plebeian," "low" are finally transformed into the concept "bad." The most convincing example of the latter is the German word schlecht [bad] itself: which is identical with schlicht [plain, simple]—compare schlechtweg [plainly], schlechterdings [simply]—and originally designated the plain, the common man, as yet with no inculpatory implication and simply in contradistinction to the nobility. About the time of the Thirty Years' War, late enough therefore, this meaning changed into the one now customary.

With regard to a moral genealogy this seems to me a fundamental insight; that it has been arrived at so late is the fault of the retarding influence exercised by the democratic prejudice in the modern world toward all questions of origin. And this is so even in the apparently quite objective domain of natural science and physiology, as I shall merely hint here. But what mischief this prejudice is capable of doing, especially to morality and history, once it has been unbridled to the point of hatred is shown by the notorious case of Buckle [Henry Thomas Buckle (1821-1862), English historian]; here the plebeianism of the modern spirit, which is of English origin, erupted once again on its native soil, as violently as a mud volcano and with that salty, noisy, vulgar eloquence with which all volcanos have spoken hitherto.—

  五

  说到我们的问题,我们完全有理由称其为一种安静的问题,它只是有选择地针对少数几个听众。同样有趣的是我们发现,那些标志着“好”的词汇和词根至今仍然含有某种不同一般的东西,使高尚者据此感到他们才是上等人。他们固然经常根据他们对权力的考虑称呼自己(称为“强有力的人”,“主人”,“领主”),或者根据这种考虑的最明显的标志称呼自己,例如称为“有钱人”,“占有者”(这个意思取自阿瑞阿语,在伊朗语和斯拉夫语中也有类似的表达),不过这些高尚者也根据一种典型的特性称呼他们自己这就是我们所要探讨的问题。例如他们称自己是“真实的”:最先这样做的是希腊贵族,其代言人是麦加诗人蒂奥哥尼斯。用来表达这个意思的词:esthlos的词根意味着一个人只要是存在的,现实的,真切的,他就是真正的人;而后,经过一个主观的转变,真正就变成了真实:在概念转化的这个阶段,真实成了贵族的口头禅,而且彻底地包含在“贵族的”词义里,以示和被蒂奥哥尼斯认之为并描述为不诚实的下等人相区别——一直到贵族没落以后,该词才最终被保留下来用于标志精神贵族,与此同时该词也变熟、变甜了。在kakos和deilois这两个词中(a-gathos的反义词:庶民)都强调了懦弱:这也许是一个提示,循此方向我们必须去寻找意思清楚得多的aga-thos的词源。拉丁文中的坏(malus)字可以用来指深肤色,特别是黑头发的人为粗俗的人,即在雅利安人以前居住在意大利土地上的居民,他们和成为统治者的黄头发雅利安征服者种族最明显的区别就是颜色;至少克尔特语为我提供了正好类似的情况——fin(例如Fin—Qal这个名词),就是用来标志贵族的,最后被用来标志好、高贵、纯洁、本原是黄头发,以此和肤色暗、头发黑的土著居民相对照。

顺便说一下,凯尔特人纯粹是黄头发人种。有人(譬如维尔科夫)错把德国人种分布图上的那些暗色头发人种聚居地段同什么凯尔特人的后裔和血缘联系在一起。其实,在这些地段居住着的是雅利安以前的德国居民(在整个欧洲情况几乎相同,从根本上说,被征服的种族最终再一次占了上风,在肤色上,在缺乏头脑上,甚至在智识本能和社会本能上,有谁赞成我们如下的观点,难道不是时髦的民主,难道不是更为时髦的无政府主义,尤其是现在所有的欧洲社会主义者对于“公社”这种最原始的社会形式的共同偏爱,难道它们的主旨不像是一种惊人的尾声,象征着征服者和主人种族的雅利安人甚至在生理上都处于劣势了吗?……)

拉丁文字bonus我斗胆译为斗士;假如我可以将bonrs引溯到一个更为古老的词duonus(请比较bellum和du-ellum,以及duen-lum,在我看来,这中间好像保存了那个duonus),那么donus就可以译成与人纷争的人、挑起争端的人(duo),斗士:我们看到,在古罗马是什么使一个人形成他的“善良”。我们德国人的“好”本身难道不是标志“神圣者”,“神圣种族”的人吗?而且这难道不是和哥特人的人民(起初是贵族)的名称相一致吗?在此不宜阐述这些猜测的原因——

5.

With regard to our problem, which may on good grounds be called a quiet problem and one which fastidiously directs itself to few ears, it is of no small interest to ascertain that through those words and roots which designate "good" there frequently still shines the most important nuance by virtue of which the noble felt themselves to be men of a higher rank. Granted that, in the majority of cases, they designate themselves simply by their superiority in power (as "the powerful," "the masters," "the commanders") or by the most clearly visible signs of this superiority, for example, as "the rich," "the possessors" (this is the meaning of arya; and of corresponding words in Iranian and Slavic). But they also do it by a typical character trait: and this is the case that concerns us here. They call themselves, for instance, "the truthful"; this is so above all of the Greek nobility, whose mouthpiece is the Megarian poet Theognis [Theognis of Megara, 6th Cent. B.C.]. The root of the word coined for this, esthlos [Greek: good, brave], signifies one who is, who possesses reality, who is actual, who is true; then, with a subjective turn, the true as the truthful: in this phase of conceptual transformation it becomes a slogan and catchword of the nobility and passes over entirely into the sense of "noble," as distinct from the lying common man, which is what Theognis takes him to be and how he describes him—until finally, after the decline of the nobility, the word is left to designate nobility of soul and becomes as it were ripe and sweet. In the word kakos [Greek: bad, ugly, ill-born, mean, craven], as in deilos [Greek: cowardly, worthless, vile, wretched] (the plebeian in contradistinction to the agathos [Greek: good, well-born, gentle, brave, capable]), cowardice is emphasized: this perhaps gives an indication in which direction one should seek the etymological origin of agathos, which is susceptible of several interpretations. The Latin malus [Bad] (beside which I set melas [Greek: black, dark]) may designate the common man as the dark-colored, above all as the black-haired man ("hic niger est—" [From Horace's Satires]), as the pre-Aryan occupant of the soil of Italy who was distinguished most obviously from the blond, that is Aryan, conqueror race by his color; Gaelic, at any rate, offers us a precisely similar case—fin (for example in the name Fin-Gal), the distinguishing word for nobility, finally for the good, noble, pure, originally meant the blond-headed, in contradistinction to the dark, black-haired aboriginal inhabitants.

The Celts, by the way, were definitely a blond race; it is wrong to associate traces of an essentially dark-haired people which appear on the more careful ethnographical maps of Germany with any sort of Celtic origin or blood-mixture, as Virchow [Rudolf Virchow (1821-1902), German pathologist and liberal politician] still does: it is rather the pre-Aryan people of Germany who emerge in these places. (The same is true of virtually all Europe: the suppressed race has gradually recovered the upper hand again, in coloring, shortness of skull, perhaps even in the intellectual and social instincts: who can say whether modern democracy, even more modern anarchism and especially that inclination for "commune," for the most primitive form of society, which is now shared by all the socialists of Europe, does not signify in the main a tremendous counterattack—and that the conqueror and master race, the Aryan, is not succumbing physiologically, too?

I believe I may venture to interpret the Latin bonus [Good] as "the warrior," provided I am right in tracing bonus back to an earlier duonus [Old form of bonus; duellum old form of bellum (war)] (compare bellum=duellum=duen-lum, which seems to me to contain duonus). Therefore bonus as the man of strife, of dissention (duo), as the man of war: one sees what constituted the "goodness" of man in ancient Rome. Our German gut [good] even: does it not signify "the godlike," the man of "godlike race"? And is it not identical with the popular (originally noble) name of the Goths? The grounds for this conjecture cannot be dealt with here.—

  六

  政治优越观念总是引起一种精神优越观念,这一规则暂时尚未有例外(虽然有产生例外的机会),当最高等级是教士等级的时候,这一规则表现为教士们喜欢采用一种向人们提醒教士职能的称呼来作为他们的共同标志。譬如在这里我们第一次碰上了像“纯洁”和“不纯洁”这样的对立的等级观念,同样也是在这里后来产生了不再具有等级意义的“好”和“坏”的观念。但是人们应该当心,不要立刻把“纯洁”与“不纯洁”这种观念看得过重、太广,甚至看成象征性的:古人类的所有观念都应当从一开始就被理解为一堆我们几乎不能想像地粗糙的、笨拙的、浅薄的、狭窄的、直截了当的,特别是不具有代表性的东西,“纯洁的人”的最初的意思不过是洗澡的人,拒绝吃某种感染腹疾的食品的人,不和肮脏的下层妇女睡觉的人,厌恶流血的人——只此而已,岂有它哉!此外,当然,从以教士为主的贵族的全部行为可以看清楚,为什么恰恰是在这种早期阶段,价值的对立能够以一种危险的方式内向化、尖锐化。事实上,由于这种价值的对立在人与人之间最终扯开了一道鸿沟,就连精神自由的阿基利斯也难于毫不畏惧地逾越这道鸿沟。早在一开始就有某种有害的因素孕含在这种贵族气派中,孕含在这统治者的、疏远商贸的、部分是深思熟虑、部分是感情爆发的习惯中,其结果是各个时期的教士们都很快地、不可避免地感染上那种肠道疾病和神经衰弱,可是他们为自己找到了什么方法来医治他们这些疾病?——难道人们不能说这种医疗方法的最终结果已经显示比它要治愈的疾病本身还要危险百倍吗?人类自身仍然在受着那些教士们的医疗方式的后果的煎熬!让我们试想某种饮食方式(禁忌肉类),试想斋戒、节制性欲、“向沙漠”逃循(维尔·米切尔式的孤立,当然不包括由此产生的强饲法和营养过度,那里包含了医治禁欲主义理想的所有歇斯底里发作的最有效的方法);再试想,教士们的全部敌视感官的和懒惰而诡诈的形而上学,他们依据苦行僧的和使用玻璃扣而且观念固执的婆罗门的方式实行的自我催眠术,以及对其根治术——虚无的、最后的、非常可以理解的普遍厌倦(或者对上帝的厌倦——渴望和上帝结成一种神秘联盟是佛教徒所渴望的虚无,涅盘——仅此而已!)在教士们那儿一切都变得格外危险,不仅仅是医疗方式和治疗技术,而且还包括傲慢、报复、敏锐、放荡、爱情、权力追求、贞操、疾病——凭心而论,无论如何还应当加上一句:只有在这块土地上,在这块对人类和教士的生存来说基本上是危险的土地上,人才能够发展成为一种有趣的动物,只有在这里,人的精神才更高深,同时也变得凶恶了——正是这两个原因使得人迄今为止优越于其它的动物。

6.

To this rule that a concept denoting political superiority always resolves itself into a concept denoting superiority of soul it is not necessarily an exception (although it provides occasions for exceptions) when the highest caste is at the same time the priestly caste and therefore emphasizes in its total description of itself a predicate that calls to mind its priestly function. It is then, for example, that "pure" and "impure" confront one another for the first time as designations of station; and here too there evolves a "good" and a "bad" in a sense no longer referring to station. One should be warned, moreover, against taking these concepts "pure" and "impure" too ponderously or broadly, not to say symbolically: all the concepts of ancient man were rather at first incredibly uncouth, coarse, external, narrow, straightforward, and altogether unsymbolical in meaning to a degree that we can scarcely conceive. The "pure one" is from the beginning merely a man who washes himself, who forbids himself certain foods that produce skin ailments, who does not sleep with the dirty women of the lower strata, who has an aversion to blood—no more, hardly more! On the other hand, to be sure, it is clear from the whole nature of an essentially priestly aristocracy why antithetical valuations could in precisely this instance soon become dangerously deepened, sharpened, and internalized; and indeed they finally tore chasms between man and man that a very Achilles of a free spirit would not venture to leap without a shudder. There is from the first something unhealthy in such priestly aristocracies and in the habits ruling in them which turn them away from action and alternate between brooding and emotional explosions, habits which seem to have as their almost invariable consequences that intestinal morbidity and neurasthenia which has afflicted priests at all times; but as to that which they themselves devised as a remedy for this morbidity—must one not assert that it has ultimately proved itself a hundred times more dangerous in its effects than the sickness it was supposed to cure? Mankind itself is still ill with the effects of this priestly naïveté in medicine! Think, for example, of certain forms of diet (abstinence from meat), of fasting, of sexual continence, of flight "into the wilderness" (the Weir Mitchell isolation cure—without, to be sure, the subsequent fattening and overfeeding which constitute the most effective remedy for the hysteria induced by the ascetic ideal): add to these the entire antisensualistic metaphysics of the priests that makes men indolent and overrefined, their autohypnosis in the manner of fakirs and Brahmins—Brahma used in the shape of a glass knob and a fixed idea—and finally the only-too-comprehensible satiety with all this, together with the radical cure for it, nothingness (or God—the desire for a unio mystica with God is the desire of the Buddhist for nothingness, Nirvana—and no more!). For with the priests everything becomes more dangerous, not only cures and remedies, but also arrogance, revenge, acuteness, profligacy, love, lust to rule, virtue, disease—but it is only fair to add that it was on the soil of this essentially dangerous form of human existence, the priestly form, that man first became an interesting animal, that only here did the human soul in a higher sense acquire depth and become evil—and these are the two basic respects in which man has hitherto been superior to other beasts!

  七

  读者已经可以猜测出,教士的价值方式可以多么轻易地脱离骑士——贵族的价值方式而向其反面发展了。在每一次这种脱离发生时都有一个契机,都是发生在教士阶层和斗士阶层相互嫉妒、无法和解的时候。骑士——贵族的价值判断的前提是一个强有力的体魄,是一种焕发的、丰富的、奔放的健康,以及维持这种体魄和健康的条件:战斗、冒险、狩猎、跳舞、比赛等等所有强壮的、自由的、愉快的行动。贵族化教士的价值方式,正像我们所看到的,具有其它的前提:战斗对他们来说是糟糕造了!正如我们所知,教士是最凶恶的敌人——为什么这么说?因为他们最无能。从无能中生长出来的仇恨既暴烈又可怕,既最富才智又最为阴毒。世界历史上最大的仇恨者总是教士,最富有才智的仇恨者也总是教士——在教士的报复智慧面前,其它所有的智慧都黯然失色。没有这种无能者提供的才智,人类历史将会过于乏味——让我们举个最重大的事例。在地球上,所有反对“高贵者”、“有力者”、“主人”、“权力拥有者”的行动都不能和犹太人在这方面的所为同日而语:犹太人,那个教士化的人民,深知只需彻底地重新评定他们的敌人和压迫者的价值,也就是说,以一种最富有才智的行动而使自己得到补偿。这正适合于教士化的人民,这个有着最深沉的教士化报复心理的人民。正是犹太人敢于坚持不懈地扭转贵族的价值观念(好=高贵=有力=美丽=幸福=上帝宠儿),而且咬紧了充满深不可测的仇恨(无能的仇恨)的牙关声称“只有苦难者才是好人,只有贫穷者、无能者、卑贱者才是好人,只有忍受折磨者、遭受贫困者、病患者、丑陋者才是唯一善良的、唯一虔诚的,只有他们才能享受天国的幸福,——相反,你们这些永久凶恶的人、残酷的人、贪婪的人、不知足的人、不信神的人,你们也将遭受永久的不幸、诅咒,并且被判入地狱!”……我们知道,是谁继承了这种犹太人对价值的重新评价。一想起这可怕的、祸及全体大众的首创,这一由犹太人提出的所有战争挑战中最根本的挑战,我就记起我在另一场合(《善恶的彼岸》第一一八页)说过的话——即犹太人开始了道德上的奴隶起义:那起义已经有了两干年的历史,我们今天对此模糊不清只是因为那起义取得了完全的成功……

7.

One will have divined already how easily the priestly mode of valuation can branch off from the knightly-aristocratic and then develop into its opposite; this is particularly likely when the priestly caste and the warrior caste are in jealous opposition to one another and are unwilling to come to terms. The knightly-aristocratic value judgments presupposed a powerful physicality, a flourishing, abundant, even overflowing health, together with that which serves to preserve it: war, adventure, hunting, dancing, war games, and in general all that involves vigorous, free, joyful activity. The priestly-noble mode of valuation presupposes, as we have seen, other things: it is disadvantageous for when it comes to war! As is well known, the priests are the most evil enemies—but why? Because they are the most impotent. It is because of their impotence that in them hatred grows to monstrous and uncanny proportions, to the most spiritual and poisonous kind of hatred. The truly great haters in world history have always been priests; likewise the most ingenious [Geistreich] haters: other kinds of spirit [Geist] hardly come into consideration when compared with the spirit of priestly vengefulness. Human history would be altogether too stupid a thing without the spirit that the impotent have introduced into it—let us take at once the most notable example. All that has been done on earth against "the noble," "the powerful," "the masters," "the rulers," fades into nothing compared with what the Jews have done against them; the Jews, that priestly people, who in opposing their enemies and conquerors were ultimately satisfied with nothing less than a radical revaluation of their enemies' values, that is to say, an act of the most spiritual revenge. For this alone was appropriate to a priestly people, the people embodying the most deeply repressed [Zurückgetretensten] priestly vengefulness. It was the Jews who, with awe-inspiring consistency, dared to invert the aristocratic value-equation (good = noble = powerful = beautiful = happy = beloved of God) and to hang on to this inversion with their teeth, the teeth of the most abysmal hatred (the hatred of impotence), saying "the wretched alone are the good; the poor, impotent, lowly alone are the good; the suffering, deprived, sick, ugly alone are pious, alone are blessed by God, blessedness is for them alone—and you, the powerful and noble, are on the contrary the evil, the cruel, the lustful, the insatiable, the godless to all eternity; and you shall be in all eternity the unblessed, accursed, and damned!" . . . One knows who inherited this Jewish revaluation . . . In connection with the tremendous and immeasurably fateful initiative provided by the Jews through this most fundamental of all declarations of war, I recall the proposition I arrived at on a previous occasion (Beyond Good and Evil, section 195)—that with the Jews there began the slave revolt in morality: that revolt which has a history of two thousand years behind it and which we no longer see because it—has been victorious.

  八

  ——可是你们没有听懂?你们没有看到某种东西需要两千年的时间才能取得成功?……这没有什么奇怪的:所有长期性的发展都很难观察、很难判断。可这是个大事:从那报复的树干中,从那犹太的仇恨中,从那地球上从未有过的最深刻、最极端的、能创造理想、转变价值的仇恨中生长出某种同样无与伦比的东西,一种新的爱,各种爱中最深刻最极端的一种:——从其它哪根树干中能够长出这种爱?……

但是也不要误以为这种爱是对那种报复渴望的否定,是作为犹太仇恨的对立面而萌发的!不是的!事实恰好相反!这种爱正是从那树干中长出来的,是它的树冠,是凯旋的、在最纯洁的亮度和阳光下逐渐逐渐地伸展开来的树冠。既使在光线和高度的王国里,这树冠也似乎以同样的渴求寻求着那仇恨的目的、胜利、战利品、诱惑,这种渴求使那种仇恨的根在所有的深渊中越扎越深,在所有的罪恶中越变越贪。拿撒勒斯的这位耶稣,爱的人格化福音,这位把祝福和胜利带给贫苦人、病患者、罪人的“救世主”,——他难道不正是最阴险可怕、最难以抗拒的诱惑吗?这诱惑和迂回不正是导向那些犹太的价值和理想的再造吗?难道以色列不正是通过这位“救世主”的迂回,这位以色列表面上的仇敌和解救者来达到其精心策划的报复行动的最后目标的吗?这难道不算是报复的一种真正重大的策略所使用的秘密非法的艺术吗?这不是一种有远见的、隐蔽的、缓慢的和严密策划的报复吗?以色列本身不正是这样被迫当着整个世界像唾弃死敌一样唾弃其报复的真正工具、并且让它钉在十字架上,从而使“整个世界”,即所有以色列的敌人,都不假思索地吞下这诱饵吗?难道还有人能从精神的所有诡计中再想出一种更加危险的诱饵吗?什么东西的诱惑人、陶醉人、麻痹人、使人堕落的力量能和“神圣的十字架”这个象征、“钉在十字架上的上帝”那恐怖的自相矛盾、上帝为了人类幸福而把自己钉在十字架上这种无法想像的最后的残酷行动的神秘色彩相提并论?

至少可以肯定,以色列以这种情景,用其对迄今为止所有价值的报复和重新评定,不断地战胜了一切其它的理想,战胜一切更高贵的理想。——

8.

But you do not comprehend this? You are incapable of seeing something that required two thousand years to achieve victory?—There is nothing to wonder at in that: all protracted things are hard to see, to see whole. That, however, is what has happened: from the trunk of that tree of vengefulness and hatred, Jewish hatred—the profoundest and sublimest kind of hatred, capable of creating ideals and reversing values, the like of which has never existed on earth before—there grew something equally incomparable, a new love, the profoundest and sublimest kind of love—and from what other trunk could it have grown?

One should not imagine it grew up as the denial of that thirst for revenge, as the opposite of Jewish hatred! No, the reverse is true! That love grew out of it as its crown, as its triumphant crown spreading itself farther and farther into the purest brightness and sunlight, driven as it were into the domain of light and the heights in pursuit of the goals of that hatred—victory, spoil, and seduction—by the same impulse that drove the roots of that hatred deeper and deeper and more and more covetously into all that was profound and evil. This Jesus of Nazareth, the incarnate gospel of love, this "Redeemer" who brought blessedness and victory to the poor, the sick, and the sinners—was he not this seduction in its most uncanny and irresistible form, a seduction and bypath to precisely those Jewish values and new ideals? Did Israel not attain the ultimate goal of its sublime vengefulness precisely through the bypath of this "Redeemer," this ostensible opponent and disintegrator of Israel? Was it not part of the secret black art of truly grand politics of revenge, of a farseeing, subterranean, slowly advancing, and premeditated revenge, that Israel must itself deny the real instrument of its revenge before all the world as a mortal enemy and nail it to the cross, so that "all the world," namely all the opponents of Israel, could unhesitatingly swallow just this bait? And could spiritual subtlety imagine any more dangerous bait than this? Anything to equal the enticing, intoxicating, overwhelming, and undermining power of that symbol of the "holy cross," that ghastly paradox of a "God on the cross," that mystery of an unimaginable ultimate cruelty and self-crucifixion of God for the salvation of man?

What is certain, at least, is that sub hoc signo [Under this sign] Israel, with its vengefulness and revaluation of all values, has hitherto triumphed again and again over all other ideals, over all nobler ideals.——

  九

  ——“可是您还谈论什么更高贵的理想!让我们顺应现实吧!人民获得了胜利——或者说是‘奴隶’获得了胜利,或者说是‘暴民’,或者说是‘百姓’,随便您怎么去称呼它,反正这胜利是由于犹太人而获得的,而发起的!任何其他的人民都未曾有过这样一种世界历史使命。‘主人’被打败了,平民的道德取得了胜利。这种胜利同时又可以被看成是一种败血症(它已经在各个种族中融通蔓延),我不否认,无疑地,人类中毒了。‘拯救’人类于‘主人’的统治的事业正获全胜。一切都明显地犹太化了,或者基督化了,或者暴民化了。(不管用什么词吧!)这种毒症在人类全身的蔓延看来是不可阻止的了,其蔓延的速度从现在起倒是可能不断地放慢,变得更细致、更微弱、更审慎——人们还有时间……如今教会还能有什么了不起的任务,甚至还有什么存在的理由?也许人们可以不需要教会?请回答吧。看上去教会是在阻止和控制而不是促进毒症的蔓延?这正可能是它的有用之处。可以肯定地说,教会简直就是粗鲁村野的东西,是和细腻的智慧,和一种本来很时髦的趣味相对立的,它难道不应当至少自我完善一点儿吗?……它如今得罪的人要比它诱惑的人多了……假如没有教会,我们之中有谁会成为自由思想家?是教会而不是它的毒素在和我们作对……撇开教会,我们还是热爱毒素的……——

这是一位“自由思想家”对我的讲话的反应——他是一个诚实的家伙,反正他明显地表现出他是一个民主主义者,他一直在倾听我讲话,而且不容我沉默,可是我在这个问题上却有充分的理由沉默。

9.

"But why are you talking about nobler ideals! Let us stick to the facts: the people have won—or 'the slaves' or 'the mob' or 'the herd' or whatever you like to call them—if this has happened through the Jews, very well! in that case no people ever had a more world-historic mission. 'The masters' have been disposed of; the morality of the common man has won. One may conceive of this victory as at the same time a blood-poisoning (it has mixed the races together)—I shan't contradict; but this in-toxication has undoubtedly been successful. The 'redemption' of the human race (from 'the masters,' that is) is going forward; everything is visibly becoming Judaized, Christianized, mob-ized (what do the words matter!). The progress of this poison through the entire body of mankind seems irresistible, its pace and tempo may from now on even grow slower, subtler, less audible, more cautious—there is plenty of time.— To this end, does the church today still have any necessary role to play? Does it still have the right to exist? Or could one do without it? Quaeritur [One asks]. It seems to hinder rather than hasten this progress. But perhaps that is its usefulness.— Certainly it has, over the years, become something crude and boorish, something repellent to a more delicate intellect, to a truly modern taste. Ought it not to become at least a little more refined?— Today it alienates rather than seduces.— Which of us would be a free spirit if the church did not exist? It is the church, and not its poison, that repels us.— Apart from the church, we, too, love the poison.—"

This is the epilogue of a "free spirit" to my speech; an honest animal, as he has abundantly revealed, and a democrat, moreover; he had been listening to me till then and could not endure to listen to my silence. For at this point I have much to be silent about.

  十

  奴隶在道德上进行反抗伊始,怨恨本身变得富有创造性并且娩出价值:这种怨恨发自一些人,他们不能通过采取行动做出直接的反应,而只能以一种想像中的报复得到补偿。所有高贵的道德都产生于一种凯旋式的自我肯定,而奴隶道德则起始于对“外界”,对“他人”,对“非我”的否定:这种否定就是奴隶道德的创造性行动。这种从反方向寻求确定价值的行动——值得注意的是,这是向外界而不是向自身方向寻求价值——这就是一种怨恨:奴隶道德的形成总是先需要一个对立的外部环境,从物理学的角度讲,它需要外界刺激才能出场,这种行动从本质上说是对外界的反应。高贵的价值评定方式则相反;这些价值是自发地产生和发展的,它只是为了更心安理得、更兴高采烈地肯定自己才去寻找其对立面。

它们的消极的概念如“低贱”、“平庸”、“坏”都是在与它们的积极的概念相比较后产生的模糊的对照,而它们的积极的概念则是彻底地渗透于生命和热情的基本概念:“我们是高贵者,是好人;我们是美的、是幸福的。”如果说贵族的价值方式有过失,强暴现实,那么这种情况就发生于他们不够了解的领域,他们不是去了解实情,而是矜持地进行自卫:有时他们会错误地判断一个他们所蔑视的领域,比如平民的领域,地位低下的人民的领域。另一方面,人们也要考虑到,不管怎么说,蔑视的情绪、倨傲的情绪、自负的情绪的产生,人们对蔑视情景的伪造,这都远远无法和无能者以受压抑的仇恨向他的对手(当然是虚构的)进行报复的那种虚伪相比。事实上,在这种蔑视中有过多的疏忽和轻浮,过多的不顾事实和不耐烦,夹杂着本来就过多的与生俱来的愉快心情,使这种蔑视能够把它的对象转变成真正的丑角和怪物。请注意,希腊贵族为了和地位低下的人民拉开距离,在所有有关的词句中加上几乎是仁慈的声调,怜悯、关怀、容忍这类的词一直不断地相互搅拌,并且包裹上糖衣,直至最后几乎所有和平民有关的词句就只省下了诸如“不幸”、“可怜”这类的表达(参见deilos,deilaios,poneros,mo-chtheros,最后两个词的本意认平民为工作奴隶和负重的牲畜)——而另一方面,“坏”、“低贱”、“不幸”这类词又没完没了地用一个单音,用一种“不幸”占优势的音色,轰击着希腊人的耳朵;这是古老的、更高贵的贵族价值方式的传家宝,即使在蔑视时也不会须臾背弃。“出身高贵者”的确感到他们自己是“幸福者”,他们不是先和他们的敌人比较,然后才来人为地造就他们的幸福,或者使人相信,或者骗人相信他们的幸福(所有充满仇恨的人们都惯于此道)。他们浑身是力,因此也必然充满积极性,同样,他们知道,不能把行动从幸福中分离出去,他们把积极行动看成幸福的必要组成部分。

所有这些都和无能者以及受压抑者阶层的“幸福”形成鲜明的对立,他们这些人感染了有毒和仇恨的情感,这些情感很快就被消极地表现为麻醉、晕眩、安宁、自由、“安息日”、修养性情和伸展四肢等。高贵的人生活中充满自信和坦率(“血统高贵”强调“真诚”,或许还有“天真”),而怀恨的人既不真诚也不天真,甚至对自己都不诚实和直率,他的心灵是斜的,他的精神喜欢隐蔽的角落、秘密的路径和后门;任何隐晦的事都能引起他的兴趣,成为他的世界、他的保障、他的安慰,他擅长于沉默、记忆、等待,擅长于暂时地卑躬屈膝、低声下气。这种仇恨者的种族最终必然会比任何一个高贵的种族更加聪明,而且它对聪明尊崇的程度也大不相同:它把聪明当做其生存的首要条件,而高贵者只是把聪明当作奢侈和精致的一种高雅的变味品来享受:——即使在这方面,聪明比起无意识的调节本能那样一种完美的功能性保障也早已不那么重要了,甚至比起一种特定的不聪明来,比起某种更加勇敢的蛮干,哪怕蛮干会招灾树敌,比起那为所有时代的高尚灵魂都要重新认识的激怒、热爱、敬畏、感激和报复等等狂热的情感爆发来,聪明早已不再重要了。当一个高贵的人感受到怨恨的时候,这怨恨会爆发,并且消耗在一种瞬间的反应中,因此也就不会起毒化作用:此外,在许多场合下,高贵者丝毫不感到怨恨,而所有的软弱者和无能者却会毫无例外地感到怨恨。

具有坚强完美的天性的人的标志是根本不会长期地把自己的敌人、不幸和失误看得很严重,因为他们有丰富的塑造力、修复力、治愈力,还有一种忘却力(现代世界上有个很好的例子,他就是米拉保,他记不住任何别人对他的侮辱和抵毁,他不能原谅别人,只是因为他把一切全忘记了。)这种人猛然一甩就抖落了许多寄生虫,而这些寄生虫却深入其他人的皮下;也只有在这种情况下地球上才可能出现所谓的“爱自己的敌人”。一个高贵者已经向他的敌人表示了多少尊重!而这种尊重本身就是通向爱的桥梁……是的,他以己度自己的敌人,以自己的高标准要求敌人!是的,除了这种丝毫不值得蔑视,而且非常值得尊敬的敌人,他不能容忍其他种的敌人!试想,一个充满仇满恨的人构想出来的“敌人”将是什么样的——这正是他的行动,他的创造:他构想了“丑恶的敌人”,构想了“恶人”,并且把它作为基本概念,然后又从此出发产生了余念,设想了一个对立面,即“好人”——

  也就是他自己。

10.

The slave revolt in morality begins when ressentiment itself becomes creative and gives birth to values: the ressentiment of natures that are denied the true reaction, that of deeds, and compensate themselves with an imaginary revenge. While every noble morality develops from a triumphant affirmation of itself, slave morality from the outset says No to what is "outside," what is "different," what is "not itself"; and this No is its creative deed. This inversion of the value-positing eye—this need to direct one's view outward instead of back to oneself—is of the essence of ressentiment; in order to exist, slave morality always first needs a hostile external world; it needs, physiologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act at all—its action is fundamentally reaction.

One should not overlook the almost benevolent nuances that the Greek nobility, for example, bestows on all the words it employs to distinguish the lower orders from itself; how they are continuously mingled and sweetened with a kind of pity, consideration, and forbearance, so that finally almost all the words referring to the common man have remained as expressions signifying "unhappy," "pitiable" (campore deilos, deilaios, poneros, mochtheros, the last two of which properly designate the common man as work-slave and beast of burden) [Greek: The first four mean wretched; and also, deilos: cowardly, worthless, vile; deilaios: paltry; poneros: oppressed by toils, good for nothing, worthless, knavish, base, cowardly; mochtheros: suffering hardship, knavish]—and how on the other hand "bad," "low," "unhappy" have never ceased to sound to the Greek ear as one note with a tone-color in which "unhappy" preponderates: this as an inheritance from the ancient nobler aristocratic mode of evaluation, which does not belie itself even in its contempt (—philologists should recall the sense in which oïzyros [woeful, miserable, toilsome; wretch], anolbos [unblest, wretched, luckless, poor], tlemon [wretched, miserable], dystychein [to be unlucky, unfortunate], xymphora [misfortune] are employed). The "well-born" felt themselves to be the "happy"; they did not have to establish their happiness artificially by examining their enemies, or to persuade themselves, deceive themselves, that they were happy (as all men of ressentiment are in the habit of doing); and they likewise knew, as rounded men replete with energy and therefore necessarily active, that happiness should not be sundered from action—being active was with them necessarily a part of happiness (whence eu prattein [To do well in the sense of faring well] takes its origin)—all very much the opposite of "happiness" at the level of the impotent, the oppressed, and those in whom poisonous and inimical feelings are festering, with whom it appears as essentially narcotic, drug, rest, peace, "sabbath," slackening of tension and relaxing of limbs, in short passively.

While the noble man lives in trust and openness with himself (gennaios [high-born, noble, high-minded] "of noble descent" underlines the nuance "upright" and probably also "naïve"), the man of ressentiment is neither upright nor naïve nor honest and straightforward with himself. His soul squints; his spirit loves hiding places, secret paths and back doors, everything covert entices him as his world, his security, his refreshment; he understands how to keep silent, how not to forget, how to wait, how to be provisionally self-deprecating and humble. A race of such men of ressentiment is bound to become eventually cleverer than any noble race; it will also honor cleverness to a far greater degree: namely, as a condition of existence of the first importance; while with nobler men cleverness can easily acquire a subtle flavor of luxury and subtlety—for here it is far less essential than the perfect functioning of the regulating unconscious instincts or even that a certain imprudence, perhaps a bold recklessness whether in the face of danger or of the enemy, or that enthusiastic impulsiveness in anger, love, reverence, gratitude, and revenge by which noble souls have at all times recognized one another. Ressentiment itself, if it should appear in the noble man, consummates and exhausts itself in an immediate reaction, and therefore does not poison: on the other hand, it fails to appear at all on countless occasions on which it inevitably appears in the weak and impotent.

To be incapable of taking one's enemies, one's accidents, even one's misdeeds seriously for very long—that is the sign of strong, full natures in whom there is an excess of the power to form, to mold, to recuperate and to forget (a good example of this in modern times is Mirabeau [Honoré Gabriel Riqueti, Comte de Mirabeau (1749-1791), a French Revolutionary statesman and writer], who had no memory for insults and vile actions done him and was unable to forgive simply because he—forgot). Such a man shakes off with a single shrug many vermin that eat deep into others; here alone genuine "love of one's enemies" is possible—supposing it to be possible at all on earth. How much reverence has a noble man for his enemies!—and such reverence is a bridge to love.— For he desires his enemy for himself, as his mark of distinction; he can endure no other enemy than one in whom there is nothing to despise and very much to honor! In contrast to this, picture "the enemy" as the man of ressentiment conceives him—and here precisely is his deed, his creation: he has conceived "the evil enemy," "the Evil One," and this in fact is his basic concept, from which he then evolves, as an afterthought and pendant, a "good one"—himself!

  十一

  正好相反,精神高贵者预先自发地创造了“好”的基本概念,也就是说从自身获得了这一概念,而后才由此引伸出一种关于“坏”的概念!这种起源于高贵的“坏”和那种产生于不知魇足的仇恨的大锅中的“恶”——这看上去同样是“好”物概念的反义词的—“坏”和—“恶”是多么不相同啊!前者是附产品,是一种附加成分,一种补充色调,而后者却是本源、是起点,在奴隶的道德观念中是原始的创造活动。可是在这里同样被称为“好”的概念并不相同:最好还是过问一下,依照仇恨的道德究竟谁是“恶人”。最确切的答案是:这里的所谓“恶人”恰恰是另一种道德中的“好人”、高贵者、强有力者、统治者,他们只不过是被仇恨的有毒眼睛改变了颜色、改变了含义、改变了形态。

11.

This, then, is quite the contrary of what the noble man does, who conceives the basic concept "good" in advance and spontaneously out of himself and only then creates for himself an idea of "bad"! This "bad" of noble origin and that "evil" out of the cauldron of unsatisfied hatred—the former an after-production, a side issue, a contrasting shade, the latter on the contrary the original thing, the beginning, the distinctive deed in the conception of a slave morality—how different these words "bad" and "evil" are, although they are both apparently the opposite of the same concept "good." But it is not the same concept "good": one should ask rather precisely who is "evil" in the sense of the morality of ressentiment. The answer, in all strictness, is: precisely the "good man" of the other morality, precisely the noble, powerful man, the ruler, but dyed in another color, interpreted in another fashion, seen in another way by the venomous eye of ressentiment.

  在这里我们至少要否定一点:谁要是把那种“好人”只认作敌人,那么他除了邪恶的敌人就什么也不认识。同样是这种人,他们被如此严格地束缚在习俗、敬仰、礼节、感戴之中,甚至被束缚在相互监视、彼此嫉妒之中,他们在相互态度的另一方面却显示出如此善于思考,善于自我克制,如此温柔、忠诚、自豪、友好;一旦来到外界,接触到各种陌生事物,他们比脱笼的野兽好不了多少,他们摆脱了所有社会的禁锢,享受着自由,他们在野蛮状态中弥补着在和睦的团体生活中形成的长期禁锢和封闭所带来的紧张心理,他们返回到了野兽良心的无辜中,变成幸灾乐祸的猛兽,他们在进行了屠杀、纵火、强暴、殴打等一系列可憎的暴行之后也许会大摇大摆、心安理得地离去,仿佛只是完成了一场学生式的恶作剧,他们也许还相信,在很长一段时间内诗人们又有值得歌咏和颂扬的素材了。所有这些高贵种族的内心都是野兽,他们无异于非常漂亮的、伺机追求战利品和胜利的金发猛兽;隐藏着的内心时不时地会爆发出来,野兽必然要重新挣脱,必然要回到野蛮状态中去——罗马的贵族、阿拉伯的贵族、日耳曼的和日本的贵族,荷马史诗中的英雄和斯堪的纳维亚的海盗,他们都同样具有这种需要。 Here there is one thing we shall be the last to deny: he who knows these "good men" only as enemies knows only evil enemies, and the same men who are held so sternly in check inter pares by custom, respect, usage, gratitude, and even more by mutual suspicion and jealousy, and who on the other hand in their relations with one another show themselves so resourceful in consideration, self-control, delicacy, loyalty, pride, and friendship—once they go outside, where the strange, the stranger is found, they are not much better than uncaged beasts of prey. There they savor a freedom from all social constraints, they compensate themselves in the wilderness for the tension engendered by protracted confinement and enclosure within the peace of society, they go back to the innocent conscience of the beast of prey, as triumphant monsters who perhaps emerge from a disgusting [Scheusslichen] procession of murder, arson, rape, and torture, exhilarated and undisturbed of soul, as if it were no more than a student's prank, convinced they have provided the poets with a lot more material for song and praise. One cannot fail to see at the bottom of all these noble races the beast of prey, the splendid blond beast prowling about avidly in search of spoil and victory; this hidden core needs to erupt from time to time, the animal has to get out again and go back to the wilderness: the Roman, Arabian, Germanic, Japanese nobility, the Homeric heroes, the Scandinavian Vikings—they all shared this need.
  高贵的种族不论走到哪里都留下了形成“野蛮人”的概念的痕迹,就连他们的最高等的文化中也显露出他们对于此种行为的一种意识,甚至是一种自豪(例如佩利克勒斯在那篇著名的葬礼演说辞中对他的雅典人民说:“我们的果敢打开了进入所有土地和海域的通道,在四外都不分好坏地树立起永恒的纪念碑。”)高贵种族的这种表现得如此疯狂、荒谬、突兀的“果敢”,这种不捉摸,这种甚至对他们自己的行动都难以把握(佩利克勒斯特别强调了雅典人的rathumia),他们的这种满不在乎,以及对安全、肉体、生命、舒适的蔑视,对所有破坏行为,对所有胜利的淫欲和残酷的淫欲的那种令人恐惧的兴致和发自内心的爱好——所有这一切都为他们的受害者勾画出“野蛮人”、“邪恶的敌人”的形象,或许是“哥特人”或者“汪达尔人”的形象。日耳曼人在初掌政权时激发的(现在又再次激发的)深刻和冷酷的不信任还总是那种无法消除的恐惧的尾声,许多世纪以来,欧洲怀着这种恐惧目睹了金发的日耳曼猛兽的震怒(虽然所有的古日耳曼人和我们德意志人之间几乎不存在概念上的联系,更不用说血源上的联系了)。 It is the noble races that have left behind them the concept "barbarian" wherever they have gone; even their highest culture betrays a consciousness of it and even a pride in it (for example, when Pericles says to his Athenians in his famous funeral oration "our boldness has gained access to every land and sea, everywhere raising imperishable monuments to its goodness and wickedness"). This "boldness" of noble races, mad, absurd, and sudden in its expression, the incalculability, even incredibility of their undertakings—Pericles specially commends the rhathymia [original meaning: ease of mind, without anxiety; also: carelessness, remissness, frivolity.] of the Athenians—their indifference to and contempt for security, body, life, comfort, their hair-raising [Entsetzliche] cheerfulness and profound joy in all destruction, in all the voluptuousness of victory and cruelty—all this came together, in the minds of those who suffered from it, in the image of the "barbarian," the "evil enemy," perhaps as the "Goths," the "Vandals." The deep and icy mistrust the German still arouses today whenever he gets into a position of power is an echo of that inextinguishable horror with which Europe observed for centuries that raging of the blond Germanic beast (although between the old Germanic tribes and us Germans there exists hardly a conceptual relationship, let alone one of blood).
我有一次注意到赫西奥特的困难处境,当时他正思考文化时代的序列问题,并试图用金、银、铁来标志它们。他善于巧妙地处理光辉的、但也是如此可怖、如此残暴的荷马时代遗留下来的矛盾,使用的方法无非是把一个时代一分为二,然后依序排列——首先是特洛伊和底比斯的那个英雄和半神的时代,这是贵胄们仍旧保留在记忆中的那个时代,在那个时代有他们自己的祖先;接下去是金属的时代,也就是那些被践踏者、被剥夺者、被残害者、被拖走和被贩卖者的后代所看到的那个世界:据说这是矿石的时代,坚硬、冷酷、残忍、没有情感和良心;一切都被捣毁并沾满血污。 I once drew attention to the dilemma in which Hesiod found himself when he concocted his succession of cultural epochs and sought to express them in terms of gold, silver, bronze: he knew no way of handling the contradiction presented by the glorious but at the same time terrible and violent world of Homer except by dividing one epoch into two epochs, which he then placed one behind the other—first the epoch of the heroes and demigods of Troy and Thebes, the form in which that world had survived in the memory of the noble races who were those heroes' true descendants; then the bronze epoch, the form in which that same world appeared to the descendants of the downtrodden, pillaged, mistreated, abducted, enslaved: an epoch of bronze, as aforesaid, hard, cold, cruel, devoid of feeling or conscience, destructive and bloody.
假定,现在被当作“真理”的东西果如其然,假定一切文化的意义就在于把“人”从野兽驯化成一种温顺的、有教养的动物、一种家畜,那么我们就必须毫不犹豫地把所有那些反对的和仇恨的本能,那些借以最终羞辱并打倒了贵胄及其理想的本能看作是真正的文化工具,当然无论如何不能说,那些具有这种本能的人本身同时也体现了文化。其实,相反的结论的正确性不仅是可能的,不!这在如今已是有目共睹的了!这些具有贬低欲和报复欲本能的人,这些所有欧洲的和非欧洲的奴隶的后代,特别是所有前亚利安居民的后代,他们体现的是人类的退让!这些“文化工具”是人类的耻辱,其实是一种怀疑,一种对“文比”的反驳!人们完全有理由惧怕并防犯所有高贵种族内心的金发猛兽,如果有人能够领悟到,不恐惧则永远无法摆脱失败者、贬低者、萎靡者、中毒者的嫉妒的眼光,难道他还会千百次地选择恐惧吗?这不正是我们的灾难吗?如今是什么构成了我们对“人”的反感?人使我们受苦,这是没有疑问的了,当然不是因为我们惧怕他,其实他已经没有什么值得惧怕的了。 Supposing that what is at any rate believed to be the "truth" really is true, and the meaning of all culture is the reduction of the beast of prey "man" to a tame and civilized animal, a domestic animal, then one would undoubtedly have to regard all those instincts of reaction and ressentiment through whose aid the noble races and their ideals were finally confounded and overthrown as the actual instruments of culture; which is not to say that the bearers of these instincts themselves represent culture. Rather is the reverse not merely probable—no! today it is palpable! These bearers of the oppressive instincts that thirst for reprisal, the descendants of every kind of European and non-European slavery, and especially of the entire pre-Aryan populace—they represent the regression of mankind! These "instruments of culture" are a disgrace to man and rather an accusation and counterargument against "culture" in general! One may be quite justified in continuing to fear the blond beast at the core of all noble races and in being on one's guard against it: but who would not a hundred times sooner fear where one can also admire than not fear but be permanently condemned to the repellent sight of the ill-constituted, dwarfed, atrophied, and poisoned? And is that not our fate? What today constitutes our antipathy to "man"?—for we suffer from man, beyond doubt.
虫“人”已经登台,而且是蜂拥而至。“驯服的人”、不可药救的中庸者、令人不快的人已经知道把自己看成是精英,是历史的意义,是“上等人”。是的,他们的这种感觉并不是完全没有理由的,因为他们感到自己和大批失败者、病患者、疲惫者、萎靡之间尚有距离,在这段距离之后,当今的欧洲正在开始发臭,因此他们觉得自己至少还是比较适度的,至少还是有生活能力的,至少还是肯定生活的…… Not fear; rather that we no longer have anything left to fear in man; that the maggot "man" is swarming in the foreground; that the "tame man," the hopelessly mediocre and insipid man, has already learned to feel himself as the goal and zenith, as the meaning of history, as "higher man"—that he has indeed a certain right to feel thus, insofar as he feels himself elevated above the surfeit of ill-constituted, sickly, weary and exhausted people of which Europe is beginning to stink today, as something at least relatively well-constituted, at least still capable of living, at least affirming life.
  十二

  此刻,我不拟压抑我的感叹和我最后的期望。什么东西是我完全无法忍受的?是我独自一人无法结束的?是令我窒息、使我忍受煎熬的?是恶劣的空气!恶劣的空气!是某种失败的东西在接近我,是我被迫去嗅一种失败者的内脏……

12.

At this point I cannot suppress a sigh and a last hope. What is it that I especially find utterly unendurable? That I cannot cope with, that makes me choke and faint? Bad air! Bad air! The approach of some ill-constituted thing; that I have to smell the entrails of some ill-constituted soul!

除此之外,人还有什么不能忍受的?苦难、贫困、恶劣天气、久病不愈、艰辛、孤寂?人基本上是能够对付其余这些困难的;人生来就是一种地下的、战斗的存在;人总是会不断地接触到光亮,不断地经历他的胜利的黄金时刻——然后就停留在那儿,好像生来就是这样的坚不可摧,这样急切准备迎接新的、更艰难、更遥远的战斗,就像一张弓,任何困难都只能使它绷得更紧。 How much one is able to endure: distress, want, bad weather, sickness, toil, solitude. Fundamentally one can cope with everything else, born as one is to a subterranean life of struggle; one emerges again and again into the light, one experiences again and again one's golden hour of victory—and then one stands forth as one was born, unbreakable, tensed, ready for new, even harder, remoter things, like a bow that distress only serves to draw tauter.
不过我时常得到恩赐——假设在善恶的彼岸当真存在着上界的恩赐者——使我能看一眼,而且也只能看一眼某种完美的、圆满的、幸福的、有力的、凯旋的、多少还能引起恐惧的东西!看一眼为人作辨护的人,看一眼人的那残存的、正在消失的机运,以便能够保持对人的信任!…… But grant me from time to time—if there are divine goddesses in the realm between good and evil—grant me the sight, but one glance of something perfect, wholly achieved, happy, mighty, triumphant, something still capable of arousing fear! Of a man who justifies man, of a complementary and redeeming lucky hit on the part of man for the sake of which one may still believe in man!
  因为事实是欧洲人正在变得渺小和平均,因为看到这种情况就使人厌倦……我们如今已不再能够看到任何会变得更伟大的东西。我们担心的是,人还在继续走下坡路,还在变得更仔细、更温和、更狡黠、更舒适、更平庸、更冷漠、更中国式、更基督化——毫无疑问,人总是在变得“更好”—— For this is how things are: the diminution and leveling of European man constitutes our greatest danger, for the sight of him makes us weary.— We can see nothing today that wants to grow greater, we suspect that things will continue to go down, down, to become thinner, more good-natured, more prudent, more comfortable, more mediocre, more indifferent, more Chinese, more Christian—there is no doubt that man is getting "better" all the time.
  这正是欧洲的劫难——在我们停止惧怕人的同时,我们也失去了对他的热爱、尊敬、期望,失去了对人的追求,看到人就会事感到格外厌倦——这不是虚无主义又是什么?我们对人感到厌倦了…… Here precisely is what has become a fatality for Europe—together with the fear of man we have also lost our love of him, our reverence for him, our hopes for him, even the will to him. The sight of man now makes us weary—what is nihilism today if it is not that?— We are weary of man.
  十三

  言归正传,关于“好人”观念的另外一个起源,也就是仇恨者想像出来的那种好人,这个问题出需要有一个解。

13.

But let us return: the problem of the other origin of the "good," of the good as conceived by the man of ressentiment, demands its solution.

  羊羔怨恨猛兽毫不奇怪,只是不能因为猛兽捕食羊羔而责怪猛兽。如果羊羔们私下里议论说:“这些猛兽如此之恶,难道和猛兽截然不同,甚至相反的羊羔不能算是好的吗?”那么这样的一种理想的建立并没有什么可以指摘的,尽管猛兽会投过讥讽的一瞥,它们也许会自言自语地说,“我们并不怨恨这些好羊羔,事实上我们很爱它们,没有什么东西比嫩羊羔的味道更好了。 That lambs dislike great birds of prey does not seem strange: only it gives no grounds for reproaching these birds of prey for bearing off little lambs. And if the lambs say among themselves: "these birds of prey are evil; and whoever is least like a bird of prey, but rather its opposite, a lamb—would he not be good?" there is no reason to find fault with this institution of an ideal, except perhaps that the birds of prey might view it a little ironically and say: "we don't dislike them at all, these good little lambs; we even love them: nothing is more tasty than a tender lamb."
”要求强者不表现为强者,要求他不表现征服欲、战胜欲、统治欲,要求他不树敌,不寻找对抗,不渴望凯旋,这就像要求弱者表现为强者一样荒唐。一定量的力相当于同等量的欲念、意志、作为,更确切些说,力不是别的,正是这种欲念、意志、作为本身,只有在语言的迷惑下(理性语言对事物的表述是僵死的,是彻底的谬误),这种力才会显示为其它,因为语言把所有的作为都理解和错解为受制于一个作为着的“主体”。正像常人把闪电和闪电的光分开,把后者看一个主体的行动、作为并且称其为闪电一样,常人的道德也把强力和它的表现形式分离开来,似乎在强者的背后还有一个中立的基础,强力的表现与否和这个中立的基础毫无关系。可事实上并没有这样的基础;在作为、行动、过程背后并没有一个“存在”;“行动者”只是被想像附加给行动的——行动就是一切。常人让闪电发光,那实际上等于给行动加倍,使之变成行动——行动:也就是把同样一件事一会儿称为原因,一会儿又称为结果。自然科学家也不强似常人,他们说,“力在运动中,力是始因。”我们的全部科学,虽然是极为冷静的,排除了情绪干扰的,但是却仍然受着语言的迷惑,而且始终没能摆脱那些强加上去的替换外壳,即所谓“主体”。

  例如,原子就是这样一个替换外壳,同样,康德的“物自体”也是这样一个替换外壳:毫不奇怪,那些被压抑的、在暗中闪耀的报复和仇恨的情感利用了这样一种信念,甚至是空前热烈地信奉这样的信念:即强者可以自由地选择成为弱者,猛兽可以自由地选择变成羔羊。这样一来,他们就为自己赢得了把成为猛兽的归类为猛兽的权利……
To demand of strength that it should not express itself as strength, that it should not be a desire to overcome, a desire to throw down, a desire to become master, a thirst for enemies and resistances and triumphs, is just as absurd as to demand of weakness that it should express itself as strength. A quantum of force is equivalent to a quantum of drive, will, effect—more, it is nothing other than precisely this very driving, willing, effecting, and only owing to the seduction of language (and of the fundamental errors of reason that petrified in it) which conceives and misconceives all effects as conditioned by something that causes effects, by a "subject," can it appear otherwise. For just as the popular mind separates the lightning from its flash and takes the latter for an action, for the operation of a subject called lightning, so popular morality also separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum behind the strong man, which was free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such substratum; there is no "being" behind doing, effecting, becoming; "the doer" is merely a fiction added to the deed—the deed is everything. The popular mind in fact doubles the deed; when it sees the lightning flash, it is the deed of a deed: it posits the same event first as cause and then a second time as its effect. Scientists do no better when they say "force moves," "force causes," and the like—all its coolness, its freedom from emotion notwithstanding, our entire science still lies under the misleading influence of language and has not disposed of that little changeling, the "subject" (the atom, for example, is such a changeling, as is the Kantian "thing-in-itself"); no wonder if the submerged, darkly glowering emotions of vengefulness and hatred exploit this belief for their own ends and in fact maintain no belief more ardently than the belief that the strong man is free to be weak and the bird of prey to be a lamb—for thus they gain the right to make the bird of prey accountable for being a bird of prey.
与此同时,那些被压迫者、被蹂躏者、被战胜者,他们出于无能者渴求复仇的狡猾在窃窃私语:“我们要和那些恶人有所区别,让我们做好人!所有不去侵占、不伤害任何人,不进攻,不求报的人,所有把报复权上交给上帝的人,所有像我们这样隐蔽自己、避开一切罪恶,甚至很少有求于生活的人,像我们这样忍耐、谦恭、正义的人都是好人。”如果冷静而不带偏见地倾听,这段话的真实含义其实不过是:“我们这些弱者的确弱;但是只要我们不去做我们不能胜任的事,这就是好。”但是这种就连昆虫都具有的最低等的智力(昂虫在危险时刻也会佯死,以免行动“过多”),这个冷酷的现实却由于无能的伪造和自欺而被包裹在退缩、平静、等待的道德外衣中,就好像弱者的弱原是他的本质,他的作为,他的全部的、唯一的、必然的、不可替代的真实存在,是一种自发的举动,是某种自愿的选择,是一种行动,一种功绩。这类人相信,一个中立的、随意选择的“主体”必然产生于一种自我保护、自我肯定的本能,这种本能惯于把所有的慌言都神圣化。上述主体,或者说得通俗一点,就是灵魂,或许是迄今为止地球上最好的信仰了,因为它使绝大多数会死亡的人,使各种各样的弱者和受压抑者能够进行高超的自我欺骗,使他们能够把软弱解释为自由,把软弱的这种或那种表现解释为功绩。 When the oppressed, downtrodden, outraged exhort one another with the vengeful cunning of impotence: "let us be different from the evil, namely good! And he is good who does not outrage, who harms nobody, who does not attack, who does not requite, who leaves revenge to God, who keeps himself hidden as we do, who avoids evil and desires little from life, like us, the patient, humble, and just"—this, listened to calmly and without previous bias, really amounts to no more than: 'we weak ones are, after all, weak; it would be good if we did nothing for which we are not strong enough"; but this dry matter of fact, this prudence of the lowest order which even insects possess (posing as dead, when in great danger, so as not to do "too much"), has, thanks to the counterfeit and self-deception of impotence, clad itself in the ostentatious garb of the virtue of quiet, calm resignation, just as if the weakness of the weak—that is to say, their essence, their effects, their sole ineluctable, irremovable reality—were a voluntary achievement, willed, chosen, a deed, a meritorious act. This type of man needs to believe in a neutral independent "subject," prompted by an instinct for self-preservation and self-affirmation in which every lie is sanctified. The subject (or, to use a more popular expression, the soul) has perhaps been believed in hitherto more firmly than anything else on earth because it makes possible to the majority of mortals, the weak and oppressed of every kind, the sublime self-deception that interprets weakness as freedom, and their being thus-and-thus as a merit.
  十四

  有谁想上下求索一番、看看理想是怎么制造出来的?谁有这份胆量?……好,让我们开始吧!这儿有一条缝,可以经常窥见这些阴暗的作坊。请稍候片刻,我的冒失大胆先生,您的眼睛必须先习惯于这变幻无常的光线,……好了,现在请告诉我,那里发生了些什么事?说出来您都看到了些什么,您这个最危险的好奇家伙——现在我是倾听者——

14.

Would anyone like to take a look into the secret of how ideals are made on earth? Who has the courage?— Very well! Here is a point we can see through into this dark workshop. But wait a moment or two, Mr. Rash and Curious: your eyes must first get used to this false iridescent light.— All right! Now speak! What is going on down there? Say what you see, man of the most perilous kind of inquisitiveness—now I am the one who is listening.—

  ——“我什么也没看见,但是我听到的却更多。在那儿从每个角落里都发出一种审慎、狡猾、轻微的耳语。我觉得他们在说慌,每个声响都像沾了蜜糖般的柔软,他们说无疑软弱应当被当作功绩来称赞——您说对了,他们正是这样。”——

  ——还有什么?
—"I see nothing but I hear the more. There is a soft, wary, malignant muttering and whispering coming from all the corners and nooks. It seems to me one is lying; a saccharine sweetness clings to every sound. Weakness is being lied into something meritorious, no doubt of it—so it is just as you said"—

—Go on!

  ——“不报复的无能应被称为‘善良’,卑贱的怯懦应改为‘谦卑’,向仇恨的对象屈服应改为‘顺从’(根据他们对一个人顺从,这个人吩咐他们屈服,他们称这个人为上帝)。弱者的无害,他特有的怯懦,他倚门而立的态度,他无可奈何的等待,在这儿都被冠上好的名称,被称为‘忍耐’,甚至还意味着美德;无能报复被称为不愿报复,甚至还可能称为宽恕(“因为他们不知道他们干的是什么,只有我们才知道他们干的是什么!”)。他们还在议论‘爱自己的敌人’——而且边说边淌汗。”

  ——接着说!
—"and impotence which does not requite into 'goodness of heart'; anxious lowliness into 'humility'; subjection to those one hates into 'obedience' (that is, to one of whom they say he commands this subjection—they call him God). The inoffensiveness of the weak man, even the cowardice of which he has so much, his lingering at the door, his being ineluctably compelled to wait, here acquire flattering names, such as 'patience,' and are even called virtue itself; his inability for revenge is called unwillingness to revenge, perhaps even forgiveness ('for they know not what they do—we alone know what they do!'). They also speak of 'loving one's enemies'—and sweat as they do so."

—Go on!

  ——“我敢断定他们非常悲惨,所有这些耳语者和躲在角落里的伪造者,虽然他们挤做一团取暖。可是他们告诉我说,他们的悲惨是被上帝选中的标志,就像人们鞭打自己最庞爱的狗一样;或许这种悲惨还是一种准备、一种考验、一种训练;或许它竟是以黄金作为巨额利息最终获得补偿的东西,不,不是用黄金,而是用幸福补偿。他们把这种幸福称之为“极乐”。

  ——说下去!
—"They are miserable, no doubt of it, all these mutterers and nook counterfeiters, although they crouch warmly together—but they tell me their misery is a sign of being chosen by God; one beats the dog one likes best; perhaps this misery is also a preparation, a testing, a schooling, perhaps it is even more—something that will one day be made good and recompensed with interest, with huge payments of gold, no! of happiness. This they call 'bliss.'"

—Go on!

  ——“现在他们向我解释说,尽管他们必须去舔强者和主人的唾沫(不是出于恐惧,绝对不是!而是因为上帝吩咐他们尊敬所有的上级),但他们不仅比这个地球上的那些强者、主人更好,而且他们的‘境况也会更好’,至以有朝一日会更好。可是,够了!够了!空气污浊!空气污浊!我觉得这些制造理想的作坊散发着一股弥天大谎的气味。”
—"Now they give me to understand that they are not merely better than the mighty, the lords of the earth whose spittle they have to lick (not from fear, not at all from fear! but because God has commanded them to obey the authorities) —that they are not merely better but are also 'better off,' or at least will be better off someday. But enough! enough! I can't take any more. Bad air! Bad air! This workshop where ideals are manufactured—it seems to me it stinks of so many lies."
  ——“不,请稍等一下!您还没讲到这些黑色艺术家的绝招呢!他们能把任何一种黑色的物体造成白色的、牛奶般的、纯洁的东西。您难道没有注意到他们魔术的高超?难道没有注意到他们那最大胆、最细致、最聪明、最有欺骗性的手腕?请注意一下!这些满怀报复和仇恨心理的寄生虫,他们从报复和仇恨中究竟造出了些什么?您到底有没有听到那些词句?如果只听他们的言谈,您是否会知道,这些人纯属忌恨者?”

  ——“我懂了,我再把耳朵竖起来(对!对!对!把呼吸也屏住)。现在我才听到他们已经一再重复过的话:‘我们这些好人——我们是正义者。’他们把他们所追求的东西不叫做报复,而称之为‘正义的凯旋’;他们仇恨的并不是他们的敌人,不是!他们仇恨‘非正义’,仇恨‘无视上帝’;他们信仰和期望的不是复仇,不是陶醉于甜蜜的复仇(荷马曾经说过,这种陶醉比蜜糖还甜),而是‘上帝的胜利’,是正义的上帝战胜不信上帝的人;这个地球上还值得他们爱的不是那些满怀仇恨的弟兄们,而是他们称之为‘充满爱心的弟兄们’,也就是他们所说的地球上所有的好人和正义的人。”

  ——他们把那种在悲惨生活中给了他们安慰的、关于所谓的未来极乐世界的幻觉叫做什么?

  ——“什么?我听得准确吗?他们把它叫做‘终审日’,他们的王国,即‘上帝的王国’到来之日——在这一天到来之前,他们暂且生活在‘信仰’、‘爱’和‘期望’之中。”

  ——够了!够了!
—"No! Wait a moment! You have said nothing yet of the masterpiece of these black magicians, who make whiteness, milk, and innocence of every blackness—haven't you noticed their perfection if refinement, their boldest, subtlest, most ingenious, most mendacious artistic stroke? Attend to them! These cellar rodents full of vengefulness and hatred—what have they made of revenge and hatred? Have you heard these words uttered? If you trusted simply to their words, would you suspect you were among men of ressentiment? . . .

—"I understand; I'll open my ears again (oh! oh! oh! and color my nose). Now I can really hear what they have been saying all along: 'We good men—we are the just'—what they desire they call, not retaliation, but 'the triumph of justice'; what they hate is not their enemy, no! they hate 'injustice,' they hate 'godlessness'; what they believe in and hope for is not the hope of revenge, the intoxication of sweet revenge (—'sweeter than honey' Homer called it), but the victory of God, of the just God, over the godless; what there is left for them to love on earth is not their brothers in hatred but their 'brothers in love,' as they put it, all the good and just on earth."

—And what do they call that which serves to console them for all the suffering of life—their phantasmagoria of anticipated future bliss?

—"What? Do I hear aright? They call that 'the Last Judgment,' the coming of their kingdom, of the 'Kingdom of God'—meanwhile, however, they live 'in faith,' 'in love,' 'in hope.'"

—Enough! Enough!

  十五

  信仰什么?爱什么?期望什么?无疑,这些软弱者也希望有朝一日他们能成为强者,有朝一日他们的“王国”也能来临,他们就把这个王国称这“上帝的王国”——他们事事处处都如此谦卑!可是为了获得在这个王国生活的经历,人必须活很长时间的、必须越过死亡,是的,必须获得永生才能够永久地在“上帝的王国”里使自己那“在信仰、爱期望中”渡过的尘世生活得到补偿。可是补偿什么?用什么来补偿?……

15.

In faith in what? In love of what? In hope of what?— These weak people—some day or other they too intend to be the strong, there is no doubt of that, some day their "kingdom" too shall come—they term it "the kingdom of God," of course, as aforesaid: for one is so very humble in all things! To experience that one needs to live a long time, beyond death—indeed one needs eternal life, so as t be eternally indemnified in the "kingdom of God" for this earthly life "in faith, in love, in hope." Indemnified for what? How indemnified?

我觉得但丁在这里犯了一个大错误,他凭着一种能唤起恐惧感的机灵在通往他的地狱的大门上写下了“我也是被永恒的爱创造的”,——不管怎么说,在通往基督教的天堂和“永恒的极乐”的大门上应当更有理由写上“我也是被永恒的仇恨创造的”,让真理站在通往谎言的大门上!那个天堂的极乐又是什么呢?…… Dante, I think, committed a crude blunder when, with a terror-inspiring ingenuity, he placed above the gateway of his hell the inscription "I too was created by eternal love"—at any rate, there would be more justification for placing above the gateway to the Christian Paradise and its "eternal bliss" the inscription "I too was created by eternal hate"—provided a truth may be placed above the gateway to a lie! For what is it that constitutes the bliss of this Paradise?
我们大概可以猜出答案来了,但是最好还是请一位在这类事情上享誉很高的权威;托马斯·阿奎那,伟大的教师和圣人,来为我们证实一下吧,他用羊羔般温柔的口吻说道:“享福总比受罚能给人以更大的快乐。同样,在天国里,人们会因为亲眼看见恶人受罚而感到快乐。”如果读者愿意听,这儿有一位成功的神父用更强烈的语气表述了同样的思想,他试图劝阻他的基督徒们不要公开地为所欲为——为什么?他非常激烈地写道:“上帝的拯救将给我们以一种完全不同的欢乐,我们拥有的不是身强力壮的人而是殉道者,如果我们想要血,我们就有基督的血……但是想想看,在他凯旋归来之日等待我们的是什么吧!”接下去他继续描绘那迷人的幻景:“是的,还有奇迹会发生——在那最后的永恒的终审日。异教徒从来就不相信会有那一天到来,他们讥讽地说,这整个旧世界连同它的历代居民就将毁于一场大火的那一天决不会到来。可是那一日的奇迹将会是多么宏大,多么广阔!那种景象将会使我惊讶,我将会怎样地大笑,欢乐,狂喜啊!我将会看到那些国王们,那些据称是伟大的国王们,和丘比特一道,和那些在黑暗的深渊中呻吟着的、接到升天通知的人们一道在天堂受到欢迎!我还将看到那些亵渎了耶稣的名字的地方行政官们在火焰中熔化,那火焰比他们出于对基督徒的仇恨而点燃的火焰还要炽热。我还将看到那些先知、那些哲学家们,他们曾教导他们的学生说上帝对任何事都不关心,人并没有灵魂,如果有,那些灵魂也决不会回到他们原来的躯体中。面对着聚在一起的学生们,那些哲学家将会羞愧脸红!此外我还将看到诗人们在审判员席前颤抖,这不是拉达曼陀斯的坐席,不是米诺斯的坐席,而是基督的坐席,是他们从未抬眼看过的基督!而后我还将听到悲剧演员的声音,在他们自己的悲剧中他们的声音更加动人;还有表演家,他们的肢体在火中格外地轻柔。我还会看到四轮马车夫被火轮烧得通红!接下去可以看见体育运动员,他们不是在他们的运动场上,而是被推进火堆——除非我到那时也不想看这一场景,可是依着我的愿望我却要看个够,因为他们曾经把愤怒和怨恨出在上帝的身上;我会说:“这就是他干的,那个木匠或者妓女的儿子(特图里安在这里模仿犹太人的谩骂,我们马上就可以看到,他在犹太法典中用的称呼是耶稣的母亲),那个不遵守安息日的人,那个有魔鬼帮助的撒马利亚人。他就是犹大出卖给你们的那个人,挨了一顿芦杆和拳头,污了一身唾沫,被迫喝了胆汁和醋的那个人。他就是那个被信徒们秘密偷走的人,所以人们说他已经升天了,除非是园丁把他挪走了,以免来访的人群践踏他的菜地!这是何等样的景象!何等样的狂喜!哪个罗马执政官、会计官、教士能给予你这样的赠礼?可是所有这一切却属于我们,对于精神想像力的信仰勾画了这副图景。但是那些耳闻不见,目睹不到、心感不觉的事物究竟是些什么?我相信,这是比在马戏场、剧院、圆形剧场,或者任何体育场里所能感受到的更大的快乐。”——原文如此。 We might even guess, but it is better to have it expressly described for us by an authority not to be underestimated in such matters, Thomas Aquinas, the great teacher and saint. "Beati in regno coelesti," he says, meek as a lamb, "videbunt poenas damnatorum, ut beatitudo illis magis complaceat." [The blessed in the kingdom of heaven will see the punishments of the damned, in order that their bliss be more delightful for them.]….
  十六

  让我们来总结一下。“好与坏”和“善与恶”这两种对立的价值观在这个地球上进行了一场旷日持久的恶战,虽然第二种价值观长期以来一直稳占上风,但是只要战争仍在持续,胜负的问题就悬而未决;甚至可以说,在此期间战争又升级了,因而它也就变得更深刻,更具有斗智的性质了,结果是目前也许还找不到更确切的标志来标记那超越这种对立的“更高级的自然力”,即更智慧的自然力,那种对立的另一真实的战场。这场战斗的象征在所有人类历史上垂训千古,这就是“罗马人对以色列人,以色列人对罗马人”。

16.

Let us conclude. The two opposing values "good and bad," "good and evil" have been engaged in a fearful struggle on earth for thousands of years; and though the latter value has certainly been on top for a long time, there are still places where the struggle is as yet undecided. One might even say that it has risen ever higher and thus become more and more profound and spiritual: so that today there is perhaps no more decisive mark of a "higher nature," a more spiritual nature, than that of being divided in this sense and a genuine battleground of these opposed values.

  迄今为止,还没有比这更重大的战斗,更严峻的课题、更仇视的对立,罗马人把以色列人看成某种违反自然的反常怪物;罗马人认为犹太人“对整个人类充满了仇恨”。如果人们有权把人类的得救和未来同贵族的价值观,即罗马的价值观的无条件统治联系起来,那么罗马人的这种看法就是对的。 The symbol of this struggle, inscribed in letters legible across all human history, is "Rome against Judea, Judea against Rome": —there has hitherto been no greater event than this struggle, this question, this deadly contradiction. Rome felt the Jew to be something like anti-nature itself, its antipodal monstrosity as it were: in Rome the Jew stood "convicted of hatred for the whole human race"; and rightly, provided one has a right to link the salvation and future of the human race with the unconditional dominance of aristocratic values, Roman values.
  可是反过来犹太人又是怎样看待罗马人的呢?有千百种迹象表明他们的观念,而我们只需再读一遍圣约翰的《启示录》,那文字史上最偏执狂热的发泄、那对良知的报复。请不要低估基督徒坚韧不拔的本能,他以此为这本仇恨之书贴上了爱的信徒的名字,附加了他狂热地偏爱的那些福音信条——但是不管有多少文字上的诈骗,这里面潜藏着一个事实:罗马人曾经是强壮的、高贵的民族,世界上还没有哪个民族能像罗马人那样,甚至梦想像罗马人那样强壮和高贵;罗马人的所有遗迹、每一个刻痕都是迷人的、庄重的,只要人们能够猜出其中的意思。反之,犹太人却是杰出的、充满怨恨的教士民族,他们具有一种不可比拟的民俗道德天才,我们只需拿中国人和德国人这些有相似天赋的民族和犹太人相比,就可以感受到谁是第一流的天才,谁是第五流的, How, on the other hand, did the Jews feel about Rome? A thousand signs tell us; but it suffices to recall the Apocalypse of John, the most wanton of all literary outbursts that vengefulness has on its conscience. (One should not underestimate the profound consistency of the Christian instinct when it signed this book of hate with the name of the disciple of love, the same disciple to whom it attributed that amorous-enthusiastic Gospel: there is a piece of truth in this, however much literary counterfeiting might have been required to produce it.) For the Romans were the strong and noble, and nobody stronger and nobler has yet existed on earth or ever been dreamed of: every remnant of them, every inscription gives delight, if only one divines what it was that was there at work. The Jews, on the contrary, were the priestly nation of ressentiment par excellence, in whom there dwelt an unequaled popular-moral genius: one only has to compare similarly gifted nations—the Chinese or the Germans, for instance—with the Jews, to sense which is of the first and which of the fifth rank.
目前他们之中谁取胜了,是罗马人还是犹太人?可是这里还有什么疑问?想想看,在罗马本土人们把谁当作至高无上的价值的化身,向之鞠躬礼拜——而且不仅在罗马,在差不多整整半个地球上,哪儿的人们变得驯服了,或者将要变得驯服了,那儿的人们就向三个犹太男人和一个犹太女人鞠躬(向拿撒勒斯的耶稣,向渔夫彼得,向地毯匠保罗,向玛丽亚,那个起初被称为耶稣的人的母亲)。这真是奇怪,罗马无疑是战败了。 Which of them has won for the present, Rome or Judea? But there can be no doubt: consider to whom one bows down in Rome itself today, as if they were the epitome of all the highest values—and not only in Rome but over almost half the earth, everywhere that man has become tame or desires to become tame: three Jews, as is known, and one Jewess (Jesus of Nazareth, the fisherman Peter, the rug weaver Paul, and the mother of the aforementioned Jesus, named Mary). This is very remarkable: Rome has been defeated beyond all doubt.
的确,在文艺复兴时期,古典的理想、高贵的价值观念曾经历了光辉夺目的复苏。罗马就像一个假死苏醒的人一样在那座新建的犹太式罗马城的重压下面蠢动起来,那新罗马俨然是一座世界性的犹太教堂,它被称为“教会”。但是,很快地犹太教又一次获胜,这要归功于发生在德国和英国的运动,它被称为宗教改革,而实质上是平民的怨恨运动。伴随这场运动而来的是:教会的重振和古罗马再次被置于古老的墓穴安宁之中。 There was, to be sure, in the Renaissance an uncanny and glittering reawakening of the classical ideal, of the noble mode of evaluating all things; Rome itself, oppressed by the new superimposed Judaized Rome that presented the aspect of an ecumenical synagogue and was called the "church," stirred like one awakened from seeming death: but Judea immediately triumphed again, thanks to that thoroughly plebeian (German and English) ressentiment movement called the Reformation, and to that which was bound to arise from it, the restoration of the church—the restoration too of the ancient sepulchral repose of classical Rome.
法国革命使犹太教再次取得了对古典理想的更具决定意义的、更深刻的胜利,因为从此,欧洲最后的政治高贵,那盛行于十七——十八世纪的法国精神,在民众怨恨本能的压力下崩溃了,地球上还从未听见过这样热烈的喝彩,这样喧嚣的欢呼!可是在这一过程中出现了一个极为惊人的、根本无法预料的现象:古典理想本身现形了,在人类的眼前和意识中再一次展现出前所未有的光辉;它比以往更强大、更简单、更显著,它大声疾呼反对怨恨者古老的谎言口号:“多数人享有特权”,它反对底层意志、降尊意志、平均意志和使人倒行退化的意志;它喊出可怕的担是令人振奋的反对口号:“少数人享有特权!”拿破仑的出现就橡最后一个路标才指示出另外的出路一样。拿破仑,这个最孤独的人,这个跚跚来迟的人,他具体地体现了高贵理想自身的问题——或许我们应当思考,问题究竟何在:拿破仑这个非人和超人的综合体…… With the French Revolution, Judea once again triumphed over the classical ideal, and this time in an even more profound and decisive sense: the last political noblesse in Europe, that of the French seventeenth and eighteenth century, collapsed beneath the popular instincts of ressentiment—greater rejoicing, more uproarious enthusiasm had never been heard on earth! To be sure, in the midst of it there occurred the most tremendous, the most unexpected thing: the ideal of antiquity itself stepped incarnate and in unheard-of splendor before the eyes and conscience of mankind—and once again, in opposition to the mendacious slogan of ressentiment, "supreme rights of the majority," in opposition to the will to the lowering, the abasement, the leveling and the decline and twilight of mankind, there sounder stronger, simpler, and more insistently than ever the terrible and rapturous counterslogan "supreme rights of the few"! Like a last signpost to the other path, Napoleon appeared, the most isolated and late-born man there has ever been, and in him the problem of the noble ideal as such made flesh—one might well ponder what kind of problem it is: Napoleon, this synthesis of the inhuman and superhuman.
  十七

  到此为止了吗?那些重大的理想对抗就这样被永久地搁置起来了吗?还是只不过推迟了,长时间的推迟了?……

是否有朝一日那古老的、憋闷己久的火势必会复燃成可怕得多的烈焰?不仅如此,这难道不正是有人全心全力渴望的吗?甚至有人要求,以至努力促使这一天的到来。

如果此时此刻有谁像我的读者一样刚刚开始思考,开始拓展思维,他还很难迅速地得出结论,而我则有足够的理由做出结论,因为还是在很早以前我就很清楚我想要什么,我提出那句危险的口号是为了什么,那句口号写在我上一本书的扉页上:“善恶的彼岸”,至少我没有写上“好坏的彼岸”。

17.

Was that the end of it? Had that greatest of all conflicts of ideals been placed ad acta [Disposed of] for all time? Or only adjourned, indefinitely adjourned?

Must the ancient fire not some day flare up much more terribly, after much longer preparation? More: must one not desire it with all one's might? even will it? even promote it?

Whoever begins at this point, like my readers, to reflect and pursue his train of thought will not soon come to the end of it—reason enough for me to come to an end, assuming it has long since been abundantly clear what my aim is, what the aim of that dangerous slogan is that is inscribed at the head of my last book Beyond Good and Evil.— At least this does not mean "Beyond Good and Bad." ——

  注意:

  我想利用这篇论文为我提供的时机,公开并正式地表达一个愿望,到目前为止我只是偶尔地同学者们提到过这个愿望,这就是:如果哪个哲学系想要通过提供一系列的学术奖金来促进道德史的研究,那么我目前的这本书也许会对这项计划起有力的推动作用。鉴于这种可能性我想提出下列问题,以供参考。这些问题不论是对于语言学家、历史学家、还是对于以哲学为职业的学者来说都是非常值得关注的:
Note [Anmerkung]. I take the opportunity provided by this treatise to express publicly and formally a desire I have previously voiced only in occasional conversation with scholars; namely, that some philosophical faculty might advance historical studies of morality through a series of academic prize-essays—perhaps this present book will serve to provide a powerful impetus in this direction. In case this idea should be implemented, I suggest the following question: it deserves the attention of philologists and historians as well as that of professional philosophers:
  “语言科学,特别是对语源学的研究,给道德观念的历史发展带来的什么样的启示?”

——此外,显然还有必要争取生理学家和医学家来帮助解决这一问题(即迄今为止的价值判断的价值这个问题)。在这里,也仅仅是在这种情况下,应当委托专业哲学家来充当代言人和协调人,因为他们成功地把哲学、生理学和医学之间的那种本来是非常冷淡、非常多疑的关系变成了友好的,富有成果的交往。事实上,所有那些历史研究和人种学研究所熟知的品行戒律,所有那些“你应当……”条款,都要求首先进行生理的阐释和说明,然后才能进行心理的分析,所有类似的问题都要首先经过医学知识的评判。问题的症结在于:各种品行戒律或“道德”价值到底是什么?如果不从各种不同的角度去观察它们,就无法精细地分解“价值目标”。比如某种东西对于某一种生物的长久生存来说可能有明显的价值(对于这种生物提高适应特定气候的能力,或对于它维持最多的数量来说),但是对于造就一种更强壮的生物来说,它就不会具有同样的价值了。大多数的利益和极少数的利益是相互对立的价值观点,认定前者是更高的价值,这属于英国生理学家的天真……现在所有的科学都在为哲学家未来的使命进行准备工作,而哲学家的使命就是:他们必须解决价值的难题,必须确定各种价值的档次。

"What light does linguistics, and especially the study of etymology, throw on the history of the evolution of moral concepts?"

On the other hand, it is equally necessary to engage the interest of physiologists and doctors in these problems (of the value of existing evaluations); it may be left to academic philosophers to act as advocates and mediators in this matter too, after they have on the whole succeeded in the past in transforming the originally so reserved and mistrustful relations between philosophy, physiology, and medicine into the most amicable and fruitful exchange. Indeed, every table of values, every "thou shalt" known to history or ethnology, requires first a physiological investigation and interpretation, rather than a psychological one; and every one of them needs a critique on the part of medical science. The question: what is the value of this or that table of values and "morals"? should be viewed from the most divers perspectives; for the problem "value for what?" cannot be examined too subtly. Something, for example, that possessed obvious value in relation to the longest possible survival of a race (or to the enhancement of its power of adaptation to a particular climate or to the reservation of the greatest number) would by no means possess the same value if it were a question, for instance, of producing a stronger type. The well-being of the few are opposite viewpoints of value: to consider the former a priori of higher value may be left to the naïveté of English biologists.— All the sciences have from now on to prepare the way for the future task of the philosophers: this task understood as the solution of the problem of value, the determination of the order of rank among values.


  豢养一种动物,允许它承诺,这岂不正是大自然在人的问题上的两难处境吗?这不正是关于人的真正难题所在吗?至于这个难题已经在很大程度上获得了解决,这在那些善于充分估价健忘的反作用力的人看来,想必是更让人吃惊的事。健忘并不像人们通常所想像的那样,仅仅是一种惯性,它其实是一种活跃的,从最严格的意义上讲是积极主动的障碍力。由于这种障碍力的存在,那些只是为我们所经历、所知晓、所接受的东西在其被消化的过程中(亦可称之为“摄入灵魂”的过程),很少可能进入意识,就像我们用肉体吸收营养(即所谓的“摄入肉体”)的那一整套千篇一律的过程一样。意识的门窗暂时地关闭起来了,以免受到那些本来应由我们的低级服务器官对付的噪音和争斗的骚扰,从而使意识能够获得片刻的宁静、些许的空白,使意识还能够有地方留给新的东西,特别是留给更为高尚的工作和工作人员,留给支配、预测和规划(因为我们机体的结构是寡头式的)——这就是我们恰才说到的积极健忘的功用,它像个门房,像个灵魂秩序的保姆,像个安宁和规矩的保姆,显而易见,假如没有健忘,那么幸福、快乐、期望、骄傲、现实存在,所有这些在很大程度上也不复存在。如果有一个人,他的这一障碍机关受损或失灵,那么这个人就像(而且不只是像……)一个消化不良的人。他将什么也不能够“成就”。恰恰是在这个必须要健忘的动物身上,遗忘表现为一种力量,一种体魄强健的形式。这个动物为自己培养了一种反作用力,一种记忆,他借助这种力量在特定的情况下——在事关承诺的情况下,公开地表现出健忘。因此,他绝不仅仅是被动地无法摆脱已建立的印象,不是无法消除曾经许下的、无法实现的诺言,而是积极主动地不欲摆脱已建立的印象,是持续不断地渴求曾经一度渴求的东西,是名符其实的意志记忆。所以在最初的“我要”、“我将要做”和意志的真实发泄、意志的行为之间无疑可以夹进一个充满新鲜事物、陌生环境、甚至意志行为的世界,而无需扯断意志的长链。但这一切的前提条件是什么?为了能够支配未来,人就得事先学会区别必然和偶然,学会思考因果,学会观察现状和远景,并且弄清什么是目的,什么是达到这一目的所需要的手段,学会准确地预测,甚至估计、估算——为了能够像许诺者一样最终实现关于自己的未来的预言,人本身就得先变得可估算、有规律,有必然性!

   二

  这就是责任的起源的漫长历史。我们已经看到,那项培养一种可以许诺的动物的任务包含了较近期的、作为先决条件和准备工作的任务,即先在一定程度上把人变成必然的、单调的、平等的、有规律的,因而也是可估算的。我称之为“道德习俗”①的非凡劳动,人在人类自身发展的漫长历程中所从事的真正的劳动,人的全部史前劳动都因而有了意义,得到了正名,不管这些劳动中包含了多少冷酷、残暴、愚蠢、荒谬,但是借助于道德习俗和社会紧箍咒的力量,人确实会被变得可以估算。如果我们站在这一非凡过程的终点,处于树木终于结出果实,社团及其道德习俗终于暴露了目的的时候,我们就会发现,这棵树木最成熟的果实是自主的个体,这个个体只对他自己来说是平等的,他又一次摆脱了一切道德习俗的约束,成了自治的、超道德习俗的个体(因为“自治”和“道德习俗”相悖);总而言之,我们发现的是一个具有自己独立的长期意志的人,一个可以许诺的人,他有一种骄傲的、在每一条肌肉中震颠着的意识,他终于赢得了这意识、这生动活泼的意识,这关于力量和自由的真实意识,总之,这是一种人的成就感。这个获得了自由的人,这个真的能够许诺的人,这个自由意志的主人,这个行使主权的人,他怎能不意识到自己比所有那些不能许诺,不能为自己辩护的人都要优越?试想,他激发了多少信任?多少恐惧?多少尊敬?——他“理应”被人信任、惧怕和尊敬。再试想,这个能够统治自己的人,他怎能不势所必然地也去统治周围的环境、自然,以及所有意志薄弱、不可信任的人?“自由”人,具有长久不懈的意志的人,也有他的价值标准:他从自己的角度出发去尊敬或蔑视别人,他必然会尊敬和他同等的、强壮的、可信赖的人(即可以许诺的人),也就是说任何一个能够像自主的人那样对诺言抱审慎持重态度的人;他不轻信,他的信任就标志着杰出;他的话是算数可信的,因为他知道他自己有足够的力量应付不测,甚至“抵抗命运”;同样,他也必然要随时准备用脚踢那些随意许诺的削肩的轻浮鬼,随时准备鞭打那些说话不算数的骗子。他骄傲地意识到,负责任是非同寻常的特权,是少有的自由,是驾驭自己的权力。这种意识已经深入到他的心底,变成了他的本能,一种支配性的本能。他会把这种本能叫做什么呢?他是否有必要为它找个名称?当然,这个独立自主的人肯定地会把这种本能称之为他的良心……

  coc1①参见《曙光》第七,十三,十六页。coc2

   三

  他的良心?……显然,“良心”这个概念(我们现在看到的是它的最高的,近乎惊人的形式)已经经历了一个漫长的历史和形式转换过程。如前所述,能够为自己称道,能够骄傲地肯定自己——这是一种成熟的果实,但也是近期的果实——这果实要酸涩地在树上挂悬多久啊!可是还有更长的时间根本看不到这种果实的影子!——没有人能够许诺它的出现,尽管树木已经具备了一切适应这种果实生长的条件!“人这种动物的记忆是怎么出现的?这半是愚钝、半是轻率的片刻理解力,这积极主动的健忘到底是怎么被打上记忆的烙印,一直保留到今天的?……”可以想见,这个古老的难题无法只靠温文尔雅的回答和手段得到解决;也许在人的整个史前时期根本不存在比人的记忆术更为阴森可怖的东西了。“人烙刻了某种东西,使之停留在记忆里:只有不断引起疼痛的东西才不会被忘记。”——这是人类心理学的一个最古老(可惜也是最持久)的原理。有人还想说,在这个世上,只要哪以还有庄重、严厉、机密,只要哪里的人和民众还生活在暗淡的阴影中,曾经一度被普遍地许诺、担保、赞誉的那种恐怖的残余就会继续起作用:过去,那最漫长、最深沉、最严酷的过去,每当我们变得严厉”起来的时候,它就会对我们大喝一声,从我们心底喷涌而出;每当人们认为有必要留下记忆的时候,就会发生流血、酷刑和牺牲;那最恐怖的牺牲和祭品(诸如牺牲头生子),那最可怕的截肢(例如阉割),那些所有宗教礼仪中最残酷的仪式(所有的宗教归根结底都是残酷的体系),——所有这一切都起源于那个本能,它揭示了疼痛是维持记忆力的最强有力的手段。从某种意义上讲,这里还应当算上全部禁欲主义行为:有些思想需要延续不断,无所不在,难以忘却,需要被“固定”下来,通过这些“固定思想”,以及禁欲程序和生活方式,给整个神经和思想系统催眠,目的是为了把这些思想从和其它思想的竞争中解脱出来,使其变成“难以忘却”的。人类的“记忆力”越差,他们的习俗就越是可怕。严酷的惩罚条例特别为我们提供了一个标准,可以用来衡量他们花费了多少努力以克服健忘,并且在现代为眼下这些情感和欲念的奴隶们保留一些适用于社会共同生活的原始要求。我们这些德国人当然不会把我们自己看成是一个特别残酷和铁石心肠的民族,更不会看成是一个特别放荡不羁和得过且过的民族;可是只要看看我们古老的惩罚条例就不难发现,造就一个“思想家的民族”需要进行何等的努力(我们要说,在欧洲人民中至今还可以找到最多的信任、严厉、乏味和求实精神,这些特性使得我们能够培养出各式各样的欧洲官人)。为了控制他们的暴民本能和野蛮粗俗,这些德国人用了可怖的方法维持记忆。想想古老的德国刑罚,比如石刑(据说是用石磨盘咂罪人的头)、车磔(这是惩罚术王国中德国天才的原始发明和专长!)、钉木刺、“四马分尸”、油煎或酒煮(十四世纪和十五世纪还在用此刑)、广泛使用的剥皮(“刀切皮”)、胸前割肉,还有给罪犯涂上蜂蜜,放在太阳下曝晒,让蚊蝇呆咬。借助着这些刑罚人们终于记住了五、六个“我不要”,人们就此许下诺言,以便能够享受社团生活的好处——确实!借助于这种记忆,人们终于达到了“理性”!——啊!理性,严厉,控制感情,所有这些意味着深思熟虑的暗淡的东西,所有这些人类的特权和珍品,它们的代价有多高啊!在这些“好东西”背后有多少血和恐怖啊!

   四

  可是另外那种“暗淡的东西”,那种对于负罪的意识,那一整套“良心谴责”,又都是怎么问世的呢?还是回到我们的道德谱系家们这儿来吧。让我再重复一遍(也许我还未曾提到过),他们毫无用处;他们只有自己那五柞长的、纯粹是“现代化”的经历;他们不了解过,也没有愿望了解过去;特别是他们缺乏一种历史本能,一种在这儿恰恰是必要的“第二预感能力”;——然而他们竟要写作道德的历史:这种尝试势必以产生和事实不符的结果而告终。以往的这些道德谱系家们恐伯连在梦里都未曾想到过,“负罪”这个主要的道德概念来源于“欠债”这个非常物质化的概念;惩罚作为一种回报,它的发展和有关意志自由的任何命题都毫无关系。当然,历史总是需要首先发展到了人性的高级阶段,“人”这种动物才开始把那些非常原始的罪行区分为“故意的”、“疏忽的”、“意外的”、“应负刑事责任的”,并且开始在对立的立场上进行量刑。那个现在变得如此般廉价,显得如此般自然、如此般必要的观念,那个解释了公正感的由来的观念,那个被迫承认“罪犯应当受到惩罚,因为他本来有其它的选择余地”的观念,它的的确确地很晚才出现的,是人的精练的辨别形式和决断形式;如果有谁把它挪到人类发展之初,他就是粗暴地曲解了古人类的心理。在整个人类历史的一段极为漫长的时期里是不存在着刑罚的,因为人们能够使肇事者对自己的行为负责。当时奉行的原则也并不只是惩罚有罪的人,而是像今天的父母惩罚他们的孩子那样,出于对肇事者造成的损失的气忿——但是这种气忿是有限度的,也是可以缓和的,因为人们会想到任何损失都可以找到相应的补偿,甚至使肇事者感到疼痛也可以做为一种补偿。这种古老的、根深蒂固的、也许现在已无法根除的观念,这种用疼痛抵偿损失的观念是怎么产生的?我已经猜到了:它产生于债权人和债务人之间的契约关系中。这种契约关系和“权利主体”的观念一样古老,而后者还涉及到买卖、交换、贸易、交通的基本形成。

  五

  上述这些事实使人一提起这些契约关系就会理所当然地对由这些关系造成和认可的古人类产生各种怀疑和抵触情绪;正是在这里需要许诺,正是在这里需要让许诺者记住诺言,正是在这里人会起疑心,也正是这里发现了冷酷、残忍、疼痛。为了让人相信他关于还债的诺言,为了显示他许诺的真诚,同时也为了牢记还债是自己的义务,债务人通过契约授权债权人在债务人还不清债务时享有他尚且“拥有的”,尚能支配的其它东西。便如他的身体,或者他的妻子,或者他的自由,甚至他的生命;在某些宗教意识浓厚的环境中,债务人甚至要转让他的后世幸福,他的灵魂得救的机会,乃至于他在坟墓中的安宁,例如在埃及,债权人让债务人的尸体在坟墓中也得不到安宁,而埃及人恰恰是讲究这种安宁。具体地说就是债权人可以对债务人的尸体随意进行凌辱和鞭笞,例如可以从尸体上割下和债务数量相等的肉等等:在早期,哪里有这种观念,哪里就有精确的、法定的、对每一肢体、对身体的每一部位的细致可怕的估价。所以当罗马的十二条法规声称在这种情况下债权人割肉多少并不重要:“若论割多割少,无异于诈骗一样”(Siplusminusvesecuerent,nefraudesto),我就认为这已经是进步了,已经是更自由、更大度、更罗马式的法律观念的明证了。让我们来弄清上述整个补偿方式的逻辑,这种方式实在是够怪诞的了。等量补偿实现了,但不是直接地用实利(不是用同等量的钱、地、或其它财物)来赔偿债权人的损失,而是以债权人得到某种快感来作为回报或者相应补偿。这种快感来自于能够放肆地向没有权力的人行使权力,这种淫欲是“为了从作恶中得到满足而作恶”,这种满足寓之于强暴:债权人的社会地位越低下,他就越是追求这种满足,而且这种满足很容易被他当作最贵重的点心,当作上等人才能尝到的滋味。通过“惩罚”债务人,债权人分享了一种主人的权利:他终于也有一次能体验那高级的感受,他终于能够把一个人当“下人”来蔑视和蹂躏;如果惩罚的权利和惩罚的施行已经转移到“上级”手里,他至少可以观看这个债务人被蔑视和被蹂躏。因此补偿包含了人对他人实施残酷折磨的权利。

  六

  在这个义务与权利的领域里开始出现了一批道德概念,如“负罪”、“良心”、“义务”、“义务的神圣”等等,它们的萌发就像地球上所有伟大事物的萌发一样,基本上是长期用血浇灌的。难道我们不能补充说,那个世界从来就没有失去血腥和残忍的气味?就连老康德也不例外,他那“绝对命令”就散发着残酷的气味。同样是在这个领域里“罪孽和痛苦”第一次发生了阴森可怕的观念上的联系,而且这种联系或许已经变得无法切断了。让我们再问一遍:痛苦在什么情况下可以补偿“损失”?只要制造痛苦能够最大限度地产生快感,只要造成的损失,以及由于损失而产生的不快能用相对应的巨大满足来抵偿:制造痛苦本来是一种庆贺,就像刚才所说的那样,债权人越是不满意他的社会地位,他就越是重视这种庆贺。上述这些纯属推测,因为对这种隐秘的东西追根究底是很困难,也是很难堪的,而且如果有谁在这时突然抛出“报复”的概念,他就只能蒙蔽和混淆视线,而不是把问题简化(“报复”本身也正是要引导向同一个问题,即:“制造痛苦怎么会产生满足感?”)。我认为,驯服的家畜(比如说现代人,比如说我们)极力表现其谨慎,甚至于伪善,直到能够与构成古代人巨大欢快的残酷(这残酷简直就是他们所有快乐的配料)程度相抵。可是另一方面古代人对残酷表现出来的需求又是那么天真无邪,而且他们的这种“无所谓的恶毒”,或者用斯宾诺莎的话说就是“恶毒的共感”,已经原则上被当成了人的正常的特性,从而也就成了为良心所真心诚意接受的东西!明眼人或许能发现,时至今日还有许多这种人类最古老、最原始的欢快的残余。在《善恶的彼岸》中,甚至更早些时候,在《曙光》中我就小心地指出了:残酷在被不断地升华和“神化”,这种残酷贯穿了整个上等文化的历史,它甚至还在很大意义上创造了上等文化的历史。无论如何,人们在举行王侯婚礼和大规模公众庆典时开始不考虑对某人实行处决、鞭笞或火刑,这并不是很久以前的事。当时没有哪个高贵的家族不备专人,以供人随意发泄狠毒和进行残酷的戏弄(让我们回想一下公爵夫人宫廷中的董·魁克多这类人。如今我们在读他的书时舌头上还满是苦涩,甚至是痛苦,我们因此对这种痛苦的制造者感到非常陌生、非常不能理解——他们竟然心安理得地把董·魁克多的书当作最逗乐的书来读,他们简直要笑话死他了)。看别人受苦使人快乐,给别人制造痛苦使人更加快乐——这是一句严酷的话,但这也是一个古老的、强有力的、人性的、而又太人性的主题,尽管也许就连猴子也会承认这一主题:因为有人说猴子早已先于人类设想出,而且“表演”了许多稀奇古怪的残酷手法。没有残酷就没有庆贺——人类最古老、最悠久的历史如是教诲我们——而且就连惩罚中也带着那么多的喜庆!

  七

  不过,我阐述这些思想的意图绝不是要帮助我们的悲观主义者们向他们那走了调的、嘎嘎作响的、厌倦生命的磨盘上加水;相反,应当明确地指出,在人类还未曾对他们的残酷行为感到耻辱的时候,地球上的生活比有悲观主义者存在的今天还是要欢乐。随着人们对人的耻辱感的增长,人类头顶上的天空也就越来越阴暗。悲观主义者疲惫的目光、对于生命之谜的怀疑、厌倦人生者的冷冰冰的否定——这些都不是人类最狠毒的时代的特征。它们刚刚开始出现,它们是沼地植物,有了沼地才有它们,它们属于沼地——我指的是病态的娇柔化和道德化趋势,由于有了这种趋势“人”这种动物终于学会了对他的所有的本能感到耻辱。在变成“天使”的途中(我不想在此用一个更冷酷的字眼)人调理了他那败环的胃和长了舌苔的舌,这使他不仅厌恶动物的快乐和无邪,而且对生命本身也感到腻味,有时他甚至对自己也捂鼻子,并且很不和谐地同教皇殷诺森三世一道开列可厌事物的目录:“不洁的产物,在母亲体内让人恶心的哺育,人赖以生长的物质实体的败环,唾沫、小便、人粪等分泌物发出的恶臭。”如今,痛苦总是自然而然地被用作反对存在的第一条论据,总是对存在提出最重大的疑问,这使我们回忆起人们做相反的价值判断的时代。那时人们不想回避痛苦,相反,他们在痛苦中看到一种奇异的魅力,一种真正的生命的诱饵。或许那个时候疼痛不像今天这样厉害——我这样说为了安慰娇柔者——至少一个治疗过内脏严重发炎的黑人患者的医生可以下这样的断言(黑人在这里代表史前人),炎症的程度会使体格最好的欧洲人感到绝望,可是黑人却无所谓。事实上,当我们数到前万名、或者前千万名文化教养过度的人时就会发现,人的忍受疼痛的能力的曲线奇迹般地突然下降。我相信,和一个歇斯底里的女才子在一夜中所忍受的疼痛相比,迄今为止为寻求科学的答案而动用了计量器调查过的所有动物的痛苦都是不屑一顾的。或许现在还允许一种可能性存在:那就是残酷的欲望也不一定就要全部消失,就像如今疼痛感加剧了那样,这种欲望只需加上某种理想的、微妙的成分,也就是说,它在出现时必须被翻译成幻想的和精神的语言,并且要用简直难以想像的名称装扮起来,使最温柔伪善的良心也不会对它产生怀疑(一个名称就是“悲剧的同情心”,另一个名称就是“苦难的怀旧情绪”)。起来反对痛苦的不是痛苦自身而是痛苦的无谓,但是不论是对于把痛苦解释成整个神秘的拯救机器的基督来说,还是对于那些惯于从观望者、或者痛苦制造者的角度理解所有痛苦的天真的古代人来说,一种无谓的痛苦都是根本不存在的。由于在世界上创造出了,或者勿宁说中否定了,那隐蔽的、没有揭露的、无法证明的痛苦,于是当时的人就几乎是必须要发现众神这些所有高尚和低贱的中间人,简言之,就是要发现某种同样是隐蔽的、同样是在暗处的、而且是不会轻易地错过一场有趣的悲剧的东西。借助于这种发现,生命在当时和以后就一直被理解为造物;生命本身得到了正名,它的“不幸”也得到了正名。现在也许需要新的发现(比如把生命看成谜,看成认识论的难题)。“为一个神所喜闻乐见的任何不幸都是正当的”。这就是古代的感情逻辑?——说真的,这难道仅仅是古代的感情逻辑?众神被想像成残酷的戏剧的爱好者——噢!只需看看加尔文和路德就可以知道这古老的想像在我们欧洲的人性中延伸了多远!无论如何,除了从残酷中取乐,希腊人笃定不会向他们的众神呈奉更合适的造福配料了。那么荷马为什么让他的神轻视人的命运呢?此外,特洛伊战争以及类似悲剧的梦魔到底有什么意义?没有疑问,对于众神来说,这就是喜剧了,而且因为诗人在史诗中比其他人都进行了更多的关于“神”的艺术创造,想必诗人本人也认为这是喜剧……可是后来的希腊道德哲学家们却认为神也抬眼关注道德问题,关注英雄主义和品德高尚者的自我折磨:“负有使命的赫拉克利斯”登台了,他对此亦有自知,因为没有观众的道德行为对于演员民族来说是不可想像的。这项当时主要是为了欧洲而完成的发明,这项关于“自由意志”,关于人之善恶的绝对自发性的如此之冒失、如此之危险的哲学发明,难道不是首先为了证明:神对于人的兴趣,对于人类品德的兴趣,是永不衰竭的吗?在这个世俗的舞台上从来就不允许开拓真正的新鲜事物、挖掘真正前所未闻的对立、现实、灾难:只有神可以预知这个完全由决定论控制的世界,因此神也很快就对它感到厌倦了——所以那些作为众神之友的哲学家们有充分的理由不指望他们的神治理这样一种决定论的世界!古代世界基本上是公众的、开放的世界,这整个古代世界都充满了对“观众”的柔情,当想到幸福时绝无法排除戏剧和庆贺——我们已经说过了,即使是在实行重大的惩罚时也是喜庆的!……

  八

  再重复一遍,我们已经看到,罪恶感和个人责任感起源于最古老、最原始的人际关系中,起源于买主和卖主的关系,债权人和债务人的关系中;在这种关系中第一次产生了人反对人的现象,第一次出现了人和人较量的现象。我们发现,不管文明的发展水平有多低,都在某种程度上有这类关系存在。价格的制定、价值的衡量、等价物的发明和交换——这些活动在相当大的程度上占据了古代人的思想,甚至在某种意义上它们就是古代人的思想:从这里培育出了最古老的关于精确性的意识,同样,人类最早的骄傲,人对于其它动物的优越感也由此而产生。或许我们对于“人”(man-us)的称呼也是出于这种自我感觉的表达。人把自己看成是衡量价值的,是有价值、会衡量的生物,看成是“本身会估价的动物”。买和卖,连同它们的心理属性,甚至比任何一种最初的社会组织形式和社会联合还要古老:在人们最原始的表示权利的方式中,恰恰是那些关于交换、契约、罪孽、权利、义务、协调等等的萌芽意识首先转化出最粗放、最原始的公共群体(和其它类似的群体比较而言),与此同时还形成了比较、计量和估价权力的习惯。有鉴于这种笨拙的连续性,有鉴于这种跚跚来迟,而后又固执地朝着同一方向发展的古代思想,人们马上就可以得出一个普遍结论,即:“任何事物都有它的价格”,“所有的东西都是可以清偿的”:这是正义的最古老和最天真的道德戒律,是地球上一切“善行”、“公允”、“好意”、以及“客观性”的开端。这种初期的正义是在大致上力量均等者中间通行的好意,是他们之间的相互容忍,是通过一种协调达成的“谅解”,如果是关系到力量薄弱者,那则要通过强迫达到一种调和。

  九

  还是用史前时期来作比较(当然这个史前时期对于任何时代都是现存的,或者可能重现的),公社的存在当然也是为了其成员的那一重要的基本关系:也就是债权人和他的债务人之间的关系。人们生活在一个公社里,享受着公社的优越性(那是何等样的优越性啊!我们今天往往会低估它!)。他们受到援助和保护,生活在平和与信任之中;他们不需要担心遭到危害和敌意,而那些公社“之外”的人,那些“不安分者”,却要担这份忧,——德国人懂得”痛苦“氌lend的原意是什么——人们恰恰是把这危害和敌意抵押给了公社,让公社去承担责任。如果换一种情况会怎么样呢?可以肯定,如果公社是受骗的债权人,那么它会尽力地使自己得到补偿的。这里讲的情况是肇事者起码造成了直接损失,若撇开损失不谈,肇事者首先是一个“犯人”,一个反对整体的违约者、毁誓者,他的所作所为关系到他一向从公社生活享有的一切优惠和安逸。罪犯是个债务人,他不仅不偿还他获得的优惠和预支,而且竟然向他的债权人发动进攻:鉴此,他不仅要依照情理失去所有那些优惠,而且更重要的是要让他记住,这些优惠的代价是什么。受了损失的债权人——公社,愤怒地把犯人推回到野蛮的、没有法律保护的状态。他迄今为止一直受到保护,所以这种状态就使他备受打击——各种敌意都可以发泄在他身上。在文明发展的这个阶段上,“惩罚”的方式只不过是反映和模仿了人们对于可憎的、丧失了保护的、被唾弃的敌人的正常态度。罪犯本人不仅丧失了所有的权利和庇护,而且失去了获得任何宽宥的机会,他们受着战争法则和胜利庆贺的无情而又残酷的摆布——这就解释了为什么各种形式的战争和战争的祭礼都在历史上呈现了惩罚。

  十

  如果一个公社的实力加强了,它就不会再把个别人的违法行为看得那么严重;在公社看来,违法行为就不再会像过去那样对整体的生存产生威胁;不幸的制造者将不再被当作“不安分者”而逐出公社,公众不再会像过去那样没有节制地拿他出气,——事实上整体从此开始小心谨慎地为不幸的制造者辩护,保护他不受那种愤怒情绪,特别是直接受害者的愤怒情绪的伤害。努力缓和违劣行为的直接受害者的愤怒情绪,旨在限制事态的发展,预防更大范围的、甚或是全面的参与和骚乱;试图寻找等价物,用以调节全部交易;特别是越来越坚定地要求在某种程度上对任何违劣行为实行抵偿,至少是在某种程度上把罪犯和他的罪行分离开来——所有这些行动都在惩罚规则的长期发展中刻下了越来越突出的痕迹。随着一个公社的实力和自我意识的增长,它的惩罚规则也就会愈益温和。任何削弱和处心积虑破坏这种惩罚规则的举动都会重新引出更严酷的惩罚方式。“债权人”越是变得富有,他就越是会相应地变得人性化起来,直到最后他拥有的财富的数量使他不再能承受损失为止。社会的权力意识也在考虑之列,因为它能够使社会享受到它所能得到的最高级的奢侈,即对社会的损害者不施行惩罚。“其实我体内的寄生虫与我有何相干?那么让它们说话吧!让它们生活和繁殖吧!我还很健壮,不会受影响!……由于对损失睁一只眼闭一只眼,由于允许无力赔偿者逃之夭夭”,所以提倡“一切都可以抵偿,一切都必须抵偿”的正义感消失了——就像世间所有好事一样,这种正义的消失是一种自我扬弃。我们知道这种正义的自我扬弃给自己起了一个多美的名字——它叫“宽宥”;很明显,宽宥已经成了最有权力者的特权,或者勿宁说,成了他的权利的彼岸。

  十一

  在此我不能不表示反对意见,否定近来尝试着在另外一种基础上——也就是在仇恨的基础上探索正义的起源的倾向。因为有人断定心理学家们会有兴趣就近对仇恨本身进行一番研究,于是就在他们的耳边吹风说:这株(仇恨的)植物目前在无政府主义和反犹主义的土壤中正生长得郁郁葱葱,当然像过去一样,它总是在背阴处才枝叶繁茂,就如同紫罗兰,只是气味不同罢了。物以类聚,毫不奇怪,恰恰是在这些圈子里往往可以看到那些坚持不懈的、以正义的名义美化报复的努力,就好像正义本来只不过是受害者感觉的延续,而且由于有了报复,逆反的情绪就会在事后受到完全彻底的尊重。对于上述议论我是最不会表示反对意见了。我甚至认为所有涉及到生理的问题的提出都是有功的。迄今为止,生理问题和那种反动的价值之间的关系一直被忽视了。我想强调指出的一点是:从怨恨精神内生长出来的这种新式的科学公正是为仇恨、嫉妒、猜忌、怀疑、积怨和报复服务的,一旦遇到其它的情绪,这种“科学的公正”就会当即失效,而代之以仇极怨深的腔调。在我看来,那些产生于其它生理价值的情绪,我指的是本原是主动的情绪,如统治欲、占有欲等等(参看E·杜林的《生命的价值》,《哲学教程》等),比起那种逆反在先,科学地估定和高估价值在后的情绪要高明许多。关于总的趋向就先讲这么多。说到杜林的关于应在反动感情的土壤中寻找正义的故乡的原话,我们应当用另一句生硬的反话来对映这句热爱真理的话,最后被正义的精神征服的土壤是反动感情的土壤。如果正义的人真的对于损害他的人都保持正义(而且不仅是冷淡地、有节制地、疏远地、无所谓地保持正义:保持正义永远是一种积极态度),如果在受到人身伤害、讥讽、嫌疑的情况下,正义直视的目光也不因此而黯淡,高贵、明达、既深邃而又温和的客观性也不因此而减退的话,那么人就是达到了一种完美或极其练熟的境地——连明智的人也不曾有此奢望,对此我们无论如何也不应当轻信。固然,普遍的情况是:就连最正派的人也已经对少量的侮辱、暴虐、阿谀司空见惯了,所以他们能够睁眼看鲜血、闭目对公道。主动的、进攻的、侵犯的人总是比反动的人离正义更近百步;主动者根本不需要像反动者那样错误地、偏颇地评价事物;因此事实上进攻型的人总是具有更强烈、更勇敢、更高贵、同时也更自由的眼光,具有更好的良心。相反,我们应当已经猜到了,究竟是谁在良心里发明了“良心谴责”?——正是怨恨者!只要看看,对于法的运用和对于法的真正需求在历史上的哪个阶段里开始通行?是在反动者统治的阶段吗?根本不是!是在主动者、强健者、自发者、好斗者统治的阶段!如果不怕惹恼那位鼓吹家(他本人曾经坦白说“报复学说就像正义的红丝线贯串在我的全部工作和努力之中。”),那么我要说,从历史的角度看,世间一切法律都提倡斗争、反对相反的情绪;提倡主动进攻势力方面的战争,支持它们诉诸实力,以制止和约束反动者放纵的激情,强迫达成和解。哪里伸张和维护正义,哪里就有一股强大的势力相对立于从属的、软弱的势力(这势力可能是群体,也可能是个人)。强大的势力在寻找打消怨恨者怒气的办法:它们有时从报复者的手中挖出怨恨的对象;有时发动战争,打击破坏和平和秩序的人,以此来取代报复;有的设想、提议、必要时强迫达成和解;有时提出某种标准化的损失抵偿物,从而一劳永逸地使怨恨有的放矢。但是至高无上的力量用以反对敌意和怨恨的优势的最关键的一着还是:只要它有足够的力量,就要建立法规,强行解释,什么在它看来是合法的、正确的,什么是非法的、应当禁止的。在建立了法规之后,它就要把个别人或整个群体的越轨和肆意行动当作违法行为,当作抵制至高权力本身的行为来处理。这样一来,它就可以用这种违法造成的报失来转移它的从属者的情绪,从而最终达到和任何报复心理所想要达到的正好相反的目的:报复仅仅注意、仅仅承认受害者的观点,而至高的权力却训练人们的眼光在评价行为时要变得越来越不带个人情绪,甚至受害者本人的眼光也要如此,虽然就像我们所提到过的,这要在最后才能实现。由此看来,“正确”和“错误”的概念产生在建立了法规之后,而不是像杜林所想要的那样,从伤害的行为中产生。仅就正确和错误概念本身而言,它们没有任何意义。仅就某一种伤害、暴虐、剥削、毁灭行为本身而言,它们并不是自在的“错误”,因为生命的本质在起作用,也就是说,在生命的基本功能中那些具有伤害性、暴虐性的、剥削性、毁灭性的东西在起作用。不能想像生命中没有这种特性。还有一点应更加提请我们注意:从最高的生理立场出发,只应当在例外的情况下实行法制,因为法制有时会限制发自力量之源的生命意志,使生命意志的总目标屈从于个别手段,屈从于为了创造更大的权力单位而实施的手段。把一种法律规范想像成绝对的和普遍的,不是把它当作权力联合体的战斗武器,而是把它当作反对所有战斗的武器(根据杜林的陈词滥调,任何意志都应当把任何其它的意志视为同调),这是一种敌视生命的原则,是对人的败坏和瓦解,是对人类未来的谋杀;是一种疲惫的象征,一条通向虚无的秘密路径。

  十二

  关于惩罚的起源和惩罚的目的我还有一句话要讲:有两个有区别的问题,或者说两个应当被区别开来的问题,它们总是被人们混为一谈。以往的道德起源家们又是怎样对待这一问题的呢?他们的作法一向很天真,他们随意从惩罚中找出一个“目的”,比如说报复、或者威慑,然后轻而易举地把这种目的归结为事物的发端、惩罚的始因,这就算是大功告成了。但是,在研究法的发生史的过程中,“法的目的”应当是最后探讨的课题。当然,在史学领域里最重要的结论是经过努力,而且也只应经努力而得出,这个结论就是:一件事的起因和它的最终的用途、它的实际应用,以及它的目的顺序的排列都全然不是一回事;所有现存的事物,不管它的起源什么,总是不断地被那些掌握权柄的人改头换面,根据他们的需要加以歪曲;在生物世界中发生的一切都是征服和战胜,因此所有的征服和战胜也就都意味着重新解释与重新正名,在这一重新解释与正名的过程中,以往的“意义”和“目的”就会不可避免地被掩盖,甚至被全部抹掉。即使人们清楚地了解了所有生理器官的用途,甚至认识了法律机构的用途,社会风俗的用途,政治习惯以至于艺术形式或宗教祭礼形式的用途,人们也并不会因此而了解它们的发生史——不管这一切在老派的耳朵听来是多么令人不舒服——,因为自古以来,人们就自以为把握了事物、形式、机构的确有证据的目的、用途,以及它们出现的原因;人们相信眼睛的被造是为了看,手的被造是为了握,同样,人们想像惩罚也是为了惩罚而被发明的。但是所有的目的、所有的用途都不过是一个事实的标志:一种向往力量的意志战胜了力量相对薄弱者,而后根据自己的需要为这种意志的功能打印上意义。因此,一件“事”、一个器官、一种习惯的全部历史可能就是一串不间断的锁链,连接着各种重新解释和重新正名,至于这些解释和正名的起因本身并没有相互联系的必要,相反,它们的相继排列、相互交替只不过是偶然的因素使然。因此,一件事、一种习俗、一个器官的“发展”并不是朝着一个目标的发展的渐进过程,并不是一种逻辑的、简捷的、最节约人力财力的渐进过程,而是一个由比较深刻、相对独立、自发产生的征服过程组成的序列,在这个序列里还要包括出现在每个过程中的阻力,以自我保护和逆反为目标的形式转换,取得成效的对抗行动。形式是可变的,而“意义”的可变性更大……这在任何一个有机体内都不例外:每逢整个机体的主要生长期开始,机体各个器官的“意义”也随之改变;在有些情况下,个别器官的衰老和数量的减少(比如由于有些组成部分的死亡)可能是整体的完善和力量增长的征兆。我要说的是:就连意义和实用价值的部分失效、萎缩、退化、丧失、乃至死亡也是真实的渐进过程的条件,这个过程往往表现为一种向往更强大的力量的意志和方式,而且这种意志和方式贯彻往往不惜以牺牲无数微弱力量为代价,甚至连衡量“进步”幅度的标准都是根据为进步而付出的牺牲量来确定的。为了个别更强壮的人种的繁荣而牺牲大批的人——这也可能是一种进步……我特别强调这一史学方法论的主要观点,主要是因为这个观点从根本上和当前占统治地位的本能与时尚相悖,这种观点宁可固守无所不在的强力意志的理论,宁可相信事件发生的绝对偶然性和机械的无目的性。反对所有统治者和即将成为统治者的民主主义偏见,现代的薄古主义(我为一件坏事造一个坏字)逐渐地侵蚀到精神领域、最高精神领域里来了;在我看来,它已经战胜了整个生理学和生命学说,而且很显然它对这些学说的破坏是通过偷换一个基本概念,一个内在的主动性概念而实现的;反之,在那种民主主义偏见的压力下,人们把“适应”,也就是一种二流的主动性、一种纯粹的反应性,摆到优先的地位。人们,比如说赫伯特·斯宾塞,就是这样给生命本身下定义的,他把生命称为一种对于外部环境的目的越来越明确的内在“适应”。可是这样一来就曲解了生命的本质——它的强力意志,就忽视了自发的,进攻型的,优胜的,重新阐释、重新建立和形成的力量(要知道,“适应”即是依据这种力量进行调整)的本质优越性;这样一来也就否定了有机体内那些通过生命意志显示了主动性和创造性的高级官能的主导作用。读者或许还记得赫胥黎是怎样谴责斯宾塞的“行政虚无主义”的,可是目前的问题比“行政的”问题更紧要。

  十三

  回到惩罚这个课题上来,我们必须区分惩罚的两种不同的特性。首先是它的比较恒久的特性,这种特性表现为习俗、仪式、“戏剧”,表现为程序中的某一严格的步骤;其次是惩罚的可变的特性,这种特性表现为意义、目的,表现为对形成这种程序的期望。以此类推,这里没有别的前提。依照恰才阐述过的史学方法论的主要观点,程序本身就会成为某种比它在惩罚方面的用途更为古老、更为早期的东西,而它在惩罚方面的用途只是被塞给、被强加给早已存在着的、但从另一种意义上说是多余的程序的。简言之,事情并不像我们的天真的道德和法律起源家们一直想像的那样,他们以为创造程序是为了惩罚,就像人们以为创造手是为了抓东西一样。说到惩罚的另外那个特性,那个可变的特性,也就是惩罚的“意义”,在晚近的文化阶段(比如说在当今的欧洲),惩罚事实上早已不只是意义单一的概念,而是多种意义的组合。惩罚的全部历史,它的为各种不同的目的所用的历史,最后都集结为一体,难以分解,难以剖析,而且必须强调指出的是,对它根本无法下定义。我们现在没法断定,执行惩罚本来是为了什么,所有对全过程进行了符号式的压缩的概念都逃避定义,只有那些没有历史的概念才能够被定义。可是从早些时候的一个研究看来,那个“各种意义”的组合倒还更容易分解,且更容易推演。我们现在尚且可以看到,组合的各因素是怎样根据每一个别情况改变它们的价值的,而后又是怎样重新组合,使得有时这种因素、有时那种因素压倒其它因素,跃据主导地位的。在特定的情况下,甚至单一的因素(比如说威慑的目的)也可能扬弃所有其它因素。为了使读者至少了解惩罚的“意义”其实是多么不确定、多么次要、多么偶然,并且使读者了解,同样一个程序是会怎样地被利用,被解释,被装扮,以便为完全不同的目的服务,我在这里列了一个提纲,这是我从一小部分偶然收集到的资料中抽象出来的:

  为了消除破坏的危害性,防止进一步的破坏而实施的惩罚。

  为了以某种方式(甚至用一种感情补偿方式)向受害者补偿损失而实施的惩罚。

  通过惩罚来孤立破坏平衡的一方,使失衡现象不继续发展。

  利用惩罚使那些惩罚的决策人和执行者产生恐惧感。

  通过惩罚抵消犯人迄今享受的优惠(比如强迫他去矿山作苦役)。

  用惩罚来排除蜕化的成员(在有些情况下排除整个族系,例如根据中国的法律,这是一种保持种族纯洁的方法,一种维护社会模式的工具)。

  把惩罚当作庆贺,也就是说对终于被打倒的敌人实行强暴和嘲弄。

  通过惩罚建立记忆,不论是对受惩罚者而言(即所谓对他实行“改造”),还是对于目击者而言。

  惩罚作为当权者要求犯人支付的一种酬金,因为当权者保护了犯人免受越轨的报复。

  只要强悍的种族仍然坚持报复的自然状态,并要求把这种自然状态当作它的特权,那么惩罚就要和这种报复的自然状态进行调和。

  用惩罚向那个和平、法规、秩序和权威的敌人宣战,并且规定战争规范。据信这个敌人危害了集体生活,背弃了集体生活的前提,人们将把这个敌人当作一个叛逆者、变节者、破坏和平者,用战争赋予人们的工具和他作斗争。

  十四

  这个提纲肯定是不全面的,惩罚显然是被用滥了,因此我们就更有理由从中删除一种臆想的用途,尽管在民众的意识中,这是最主要的用途,——对于惩罚的信念如今虽已濒临崩溃,但是信念却恰恰在惩罚中不断地找到它最强有力的支柱。惩罚据说是具有价值的,为的是要在犯人心中唤起一种负罪感,人们在惩罚中寻找那种能引起灵魂反馈的真实功能,他们把这种灵魂反馈称为“良心谴责”、“良心忏悔”。但是这种臆测即使用于今天也是曲解现实、歪曲心理的,如果应用于人类最漫长的历史、应用于人的史前时期,那就更要差之里了!恰恰是在罪犯和囚徒中绝少有人真心忏悔,监狱和教养所不是这些蛀虫类喜爱的哺乳场所。所有认真的观察家都会赞同这一点,尽管他们总是不怎么情愿地、非常违心地说出这类的判断。总的来说,惩罚能使人变得坚强冷酷、全神贯注,惩罚能激化异化感觉,加强抵抗力量。假如出现这样情况:惩罚消耗精力,引起可悲的衰竭和自卑,那么这种结果无疑比惩罚的一般效果,比那种以干瘪、阴郁的严肃为特征的效果更不能令人满意。可是如果我们真的仔细思考一下人类历史以前的那数千年,我们就可以毫不犹豫地断定:恰恰是惩罚最有效地阻止了负罪感的发展。至少从惩罚机器的牺牲者的角度看是这样的。所以我们不应当忽略,罪犯在目睹了法律的和执法的程序之后在多大程度上实行自我克制,在多大程度上感觉到自己的所作所为是卑鄙的。其实他看到的无非是法在干着同样的勾当,只不过是以好的名义,以良心的名义干的,诸如刺探、谋骗、收买、设陷、那一整套精细狡诈的公安技巧、起诉艺术,更不要说那些为情理所不能容的劫掠、强暴、咒骂、监禁、拷打、谋杀,所有这些行动都不受法官的斥责和判决,只是在特定的条件下,出于特殊的用途才有例外。“良心谴责”这种我们地球的植被上最神秘、最有趣的植物不是从这片土地上生长出来的。事实上,在相当长的一段时间里,法官、惩罚执行者本人,根本就不曾意识到他是和“罪犯”打交道,他认为他是在和一个惹祸的人打交道,在和一个不负责任的不幸事件打交道,而那个将要受罚的人也感觉他的受罚是一种不幸,因此他在受罚时没有“内心痛苦”,只是觉得突然之间发生了某种未曾预料的事件,一种可怕的自然事件:一块岩石由天而降,把他砸碎,他已没有力量再进行抗争。

  十五

  斯宾诺莎曾经不无尴尬地承认了这一事实(这使他的注释家们感到恼火,因为他们,如基诺·费舍,正按部就班地曲解他在这里的原意)。有一天下午,不知是被哪段回忆所触动,斯宾诺开始思考这样一个问题:在他本人身上究竟还保留了多少那种著名“良心谴责”,斯宾诺莎把善与恶统统归结为人的幻觉,他顽强地捍卫他的“自由的”上帝的尊严,反对那些污蔑上帝做任何事都是经过深思熟虑的亵渎者(“这可就意味着让上帝屈从命运,那上帝可就真的成了荒谬愚蠢之最了”——)。在斯宾诺莎看来,世界已经返回天真,返回到发明良心谴责以前的境地,可是在这一过程中良心谴责又变成了什么?“开心的反面”,他终于自言自语道。“一种悲伤,伴随着对过去某件出乎意料的事的想像。”①数千年来,那些遭到惩罚的惹祸者和斯宾诺莎别无二致,关于他们的“违法行为”,他们的感觉是“这次一定是出了什么意外”,而不是“我不该这么做”。他们经受惩罚就像人们患病、遭难、或者死亡一样,带着那么一种坚定的、不加反抗的宿命态度,例如俄国人在操纵生命方面至今仍比我们这些西方人更高明。倘若在那些日子里有一种对行动的批评,那就是一种才智,这种才智会对行动进行批评。毫无疑问,我们应当首先在才智的增长中寻找惩罚的真实效用,应当在记忆的增长中寻找,应当在一种决心从此要更加审慎、更抱疑忌,更加诡秘地行事的意志中寻找,应当在意识到人对于许多事来说都是望尘莫及的明达中寻找,总之,应当在人类对于自我认识的增进中寻找惩罚的真实效用。无论是人还是野兽,它们通过惩罚所能达到的都无非是恐惧的增加、才智的增长、以及对于欲望的克制。因此,惩罚驯服了人,而不是改进了人,我们没有更多的理由还坚持相反的结论。(人云:“吃一堑长一智”。吃堑能使人长智,也能使人变坏。幸好吃堑往往只是使人变蠢。)

  coc1①《伦理学》第Ⅲ卷Propos18,School,1,2。coc2

  十六

  我不能再兜圈子了,应当初步阐述一下我自己关于“良心谴责”的起源的假说,这一假说乍听起来可能使我们感到耳生,需要我们反反复复地思索。我把良心谴责看作一种痼疾,人们罹患了这种痼疾是由于那个史无前例的深刻变迁给他们造成了压力,这种变迁将人永远地锁入了社会的和太平的囹圄。就像那些海中生灵的经历一样,他们被迫要么变成陆地动物以求生存,要么灭种绝迹,于是它们这些愉快地熟习了野蛮状态、战争环境、自由徘徊和冒险生活的半野兽们突然发现,它们的所有本能都贬值了,“暴露”了。过去它们一直是在水里浮游,现在它们必须用脚走路,必须“承担它们自身的重量:一个多么可怕的重量压到了它们身上!它们感到拙于进行最简单的操作。在这个新鲜未知的世界里,它们不能再依赖过去的那有秩序的、无意识的可靠动力来引导它们。它们被迫思想、推断、划算、联结因果——这些不幸者,它们被迫使用它们的最低劣、最易犯错误的器官:它们的“意识”。我相信,从前世上从未有过这样一种痛苦的感觉,这样一种极度的不舒服,因为那些过去的本能并没有突然间中止它们的要求,只不过是现在要满足它们的要求已经变得困难罕见了。关键是它们必须为自己找寻新的、几乎是隐秘满足。所有不允许发泄的本能转而内向,我称其为人的内向化,由于有了这种内向化,在人的身上才生长出了后来被称之为人的“灵魂”的那种东西。整个的内在世界本来是像夹在两层皮中间那么薄,而现在,当人的外向发泄受到了限制的时候,那个内在世界就相应地向所有的方向发展,从而有了深度、宽度和高度。那个被国家组织用来保护自己免受古老的自由本能侵害的可怕的屏嶂(惩罚是这个屏障中最主要的部分),使得野蛮的、自由的、漫游着的人的所有那些本能都转而反对人自己。仇恨、残暴、迫害欲、突袭欲、猎奇欲、破坏欲,所有这一切都反过来对准这些本能的拥有者自己:这就是“良心谴责”的起源。由于缺少外在的敌人和对抗,由于被禁锢在一种压抑的狭窄天地和道德规范中,人开始不耐烦地蹂躏自己,迫害自己,啃咬自己,吓唬自己,虐待自己,就像一只要被人“驯服”的野兽,在它的牢笼里用它的身体猛撞栏杆。这个为了怀念荒漠而憔悴的动物必须为自己创造一种冒险生活,一个刑房,一种不安定的、危险的野蛮状态,——这个傻瓜,这个渴望而又绝望的囚徒变成了“良心谴责”的发明者。良心谴责引发了最严重、最可怕的疾病,人类至今尚未摆脱这种疾病:人为了人而受苦,为了自身而受苦,这是粗暴地和他的野兽的过去决裂的结果,是突然的一跳一冲就进入了新的环境和生存条件的结果,是向他过去的本能,向那迄今为止一直孕育着他的力量、快乐和威严的本能宣战的结果。我们还须马上补充一点,另一方面,随着一个动物灵魂转向了自身,采取了反对自身的立场,地球上就出现了一些新奇的、深邃的、前所未闻的、神秘莫测的、自相矛盾的和前途光明的东西,从而使地球本身的面貌发生了重大的变化。实际上还需要有一个神圣的观众来给这场戏捧台。戏已开场,结局尚未可逆料。这场戏太精巧、太神奇、太有争议,所以不可能悄然无声地在某个微不足道的小行星上演出。在赫拉克利特的“伟大的孩子”(别管他是叫做宙斯还是叫做机遇)玩的那些难以置信的惊心动魄的赌博游戏中,人的地位是微不足道的。人给自己造就了一种兴趣、一种焦虑、一种希望甚至于一种信念,就好像人预示了什么,准备了什么,好像人不是一种目的,而是一种方式、一段序曲、一座桥梁、一个伟大的诺言……

  十七

  我的关于良心谴责起源的假说首先认定,那种变化不是渐进的、也不是自愿的。它不代表一种适应新条件的机构性发展;它是一种断裂、一种跳跃、一种强制、一种不可抗拒的灾难。它不容抗争,甚至也无法怨恨它。其次,我的假说还认定,把一直未曾受过约束、没有定形的民众关进一个紧促的模子里,这样一种以暴力开发始的行动,必将以暴力结束。所以,最早的“国家”就是作为一可怕的暴君,作为一个残酷镇压、毫无顾忌的机器而问世、而发展的,这个过程一直发展到民众和半野兽们不仅被揉捏、被驯服,而且已经定了形。我使用了“国家”一词,我的所指是不言自明的:有那么一群黄头发的强盗、一个征服者的主人种族,他们按照战争的要求,自行组织起来,他们有力量进行组织。他们毫无顾忌地用可怕的爪子抓住那些或许在人数上占据优势,但却是无组织的漫游人种。地球上的“国家”就是这样起源的。我想,我们已经克服了那种让国家起始于“契约”的幻想。谁能发号施令,谁就是天然的“主人”,谁就在行动上和举止上显示粗暴。这种人要契约何用!这种生物无法解释,他们是命定的,没有始因,没有理性,没有顾忌,没有借口。他们闪电般地出现,太可怕,太突然,太令人折服,太“不寻常”,甚至都无法去恨他们。他们本能地造就形式、推行形式,他们是最漫不经心、最没有意识的艺术家。总之,他们在哪儿出现,哪儿就会有新的东西兴起,这新的东西就是一个活生生的统治形体,它的各个机件和功能都是泾渭分明并且相互联系的,其中不能容纳任何不是早先从整体获得意义的东西。这些天生的组织者,他们不知什么叫犯罪,什么叫责任,什么叫顾忌。他们被那种可怕的艺术家——个人主义所驱使,这个人主义矿石般地坚定,它善于以其“作品”使自己获得永久的承认,就像母亲善于以她的孩子使自己得到承认一样。良心谴责当然不是源发于这些人,这一点早已明确了。然而,如果没有这些人,如果不是他们的铁锤的打击和他们的艺术家的残暴把大批量的自由挤压出了世界,至少是赶出了视野,也就不可能有良心谴责这可憎恶的生长物。我们懂了,只有这残暴地迫使潜匿的自由之本能,只有这被压退回去的、锁入内心的、最后只能向着自己发泄和施放的自由之本能才是良心谴责的萌发地。

  十八

  我们应当注意,不要因为这个现象一出现就既丑恶又痛苦便不去加以认真思考。说到底,这就是那种积极的力量,那使暴力艺术家的作品更加出色、使暴力组织者建立了国家的力量。同样是这种力量,在这儿它内向、微小、狭隘、朝着倒退的方向,用歌德的话说就是处在“胸的迷宫”中,正是这种自由之本能,用我的话说就是强力意志,创造了良心谴责,建立了否定的理想。所以,那创新的、残暴的自然力的构成材料是人自身,是人的整个动物自身,而不是另外那个,另外那些,更伟大、更壮观的非凡人。这种秘密的自我强暴,这种艺术家的残酷,这种把自己当成一种沉重的、执拗的、痛苦的东西加以定形的乐趣——把意志、批判、对立和蔑视强加给自己的乐趣,一个甘愿分裂自己的灵魂所做的这种阴森可怕、充满恐怖欲的工作,这种为了从制造痛苦中获得乐趣而使自己受苦的工作,这种纯粹是主动的“良心谴责”最终是——我们已经猜到了——理想的和臆测的事件的真正母腹,它同时还娩出了大量新奇的美和肯定,甚至竟娩出了美本身……假如美的对立面不先自我意识自身的存在,假如丑不先对自己说:“我是丑的”,那什么又是美呢?这一暗示至少有助于解谜,有助于解释像无私、自我否定、自我牺牲这类对应的概念在什么程度上能够暗示一种理想、一种美。读者这下子就明白了,我不怀疑,无私的人、自我否定和自我牺牲的人所感受到的乐趣从一开始就是一种残酷的乐趣。关于“非个人主义”这种道德价值的起源,以及这种价值的生长土壤的划定,我就先讲这些:正是良心谴责,正是自我折磨的意志为所有非个人主义的价值提供了前提。

  十九

  毫无疑问,良心谴责是一种病,不过这是像妊娠那样的病。现在我们来寻找使这种病达到其最严重、最可怕的阶段的条件。我们将要看到,它原来是怎样问世的,这需要长长的一口气才能讲完,首先我们还必须回顾一下前面提到的论点。债务人和他的债权人之间的私法关系早已成为一个话题,现在它又一次,而且是以一种引起历史性关注和思考的方式,被解释成一种或许为我们这些现代人最不能理解的关系,也就是说它被解释为现代人和他们的祖先之间的关系。在原始部落中——我们是在讲古时候——每一代新人都承认他们对于上一代人,特别是对于部落的最初奠基者负有一种法律的责任(这绝不仅仅是一种感情的纽带,尽管我们也不能毫无根据地否认这种纽带自人类有史以来就存在)。早期社会认定,人种只有通过他们的祖先的牺牲和成功才能获得延续,而这些需要用牺牲和成功来回报。因此人们承认负有一种债务,而且债务还在继续扩大,因为作为强大精神而继续存在着的祖先们并没有停止以他们力量向他们的后人提供新的优惠和预付新的款项。是无偿的吗?可是在那个残酷的、“灵魂贫困”的时代,没有什么东西是无偿的。那么怎样才能偿还它们呢?用祭品(开始是出于最低的理解力向他们提供食物)、用庆贺、用神龛、用礼拜、特别是用服从来偿还。说到服从,这是因为所有由祖先建立起来的惯例也成了他们的后人的规章和命令。可是人们能否还清这笔债务?这里存留着疑问,而且疑问还在步步增长,它时不时不问青红皂白地迫使采取重大的补偿措施,以某种巨额代价支付“债权人”,比如最有名的是牺牲头生儿,这可是血、是人血啊。根据这种逻辑,对于祖先及其强力的恐惧,对祖先负债的意识,必然地随着部落本身力量的增长而增长;部落本身越是胜利、越是独立、越是受人尊敬、为人惧怕,对于祖先的这种恐惧和负债意识就越是增长,从无反例!部落的每一步衰落,每一场不幸的失误,每一个退化的征兆,每一个即将解体的征兆都总是会减少部落对其祖先精神的恐惧,都会降低部落对其祖先的才智、预见和实力的评价。这种粗浅的逻辑最终将导致的结论无非是:最强大的部落的祖先必终被不断增长着的恐惧想像成一个巨人,最后被推回到一种阴森可怖、不可思议的神的阴影中去:祖先最后不可避免地变成一个神。也许这就是神们的起源,也就是说源于恐惧!……如果有谁认为有必要补充说“也源于孝敬!”那么他的主张就很难为人类漫长的早期发展所证实,更不会被人类发展的中期所证实,在这个时期出现了高贵的种族,他们事实上已经向他们的造就者、他们的祖先(不管他们是英雄还是神)连本带息地偿还了所有的品质,在此期间,那些品质已明显地为他们所拥有,那些高贵的品质。后面我们还会看到众神的贵族化和“高尚化”(这和他们的“神圣化”当然不是一回事),但是现在先让我们结束这个负债意识发展的全过程吧。

  二十

  历史教导我们,关于人欠着神灵的债的意识即使在“政体”的血亲组织形式没落了以后也未曾消失。就像人类从部落贵族那里继承了“好与坏”的概念,同时也继承了他们对于等级划分的心理嗜好一样,人类继承了部落神灵和种族神灵的遗产的同时,也继承了还不清债务的负担和最终清还债务的愿望。(那些人口众多的奴隶的农奴,他们要么是被迫地,要么是由于屈从和通过模仿而接受了他们的主人的祭神礼。他们就变成了一个通道,这些遗产就通过他们向四面八方传播。)这种对于神灵的负债感持续发展了几个世纪,它总是随着人关于神的概念和人对于神的感情的演进而发展,而且现已发展到了高峰。(关于种族战争、种族凯旋、种族和解和融合的全部历史,一切发生在所有的人种最终纳入那个种族大融合之前的事情,全部都反映在关于神的起源说的混乱之中,反映在关于他们的战争、胜利与和解的传说之中。向着世界性帝国的前进也总是向着世界性神灵的前进,专制主义以其独立贵族的征服为某种形式的一神论铺平了道路。)作为迄今为止“最高神明”的基督教上帝的问世因此也就使得世上出现了负债感之最。假设我们终于进入了反向运动,那我们就可以毫不迟疑地从对基督教上帝信仰的减弱推论出:现在人的负债意识也已经相应地减弱了。是的,我们不应否认这样一种前景:无神论的全面最后胜利可能将人类从其对先人、对始因的全部负债感中解放出来。无神论和一种形式的“第二次无辜”同属未来。

  二十一

  关于“负罪”和“义务”这些概念与宗教假说之间的关系我就先简略地谈到这里。我有意不谈这些概念所经历的道德化过程,那将会使我们回到良心的问题上去,而且肯定会回到良心谴责与神的概念的纠缠中去。从我上一节的结尾看,这样一个道德化的过程似乎从未出现过,鉴此,现在似乎理应停止对这些概念的议论,因为这些概念的前提——对我们的“债权人”,即上帝的信仰已经崩溃了。可怕的是,事实情况与此相距甚远。事实上,人们以其对于负债和义务概念的道德化加工,以其将这些概念推回到良心谴责中去的努力,尝试着扭转刚才描述过的发展方向,或者至少使发展中途停顿。现在正是要给一劳永逸地清偿债务这一前景泼泼冷水;现在就是要打消人对于铁的不现实的注意力,把这注意力弹回去;

  现在那些关于负债和义务的概念应当转向——那么对准谁呢?理所当然应当先对准“债务人”,因为良心谴责目前在他身上扎根,正在侵蚀他、捉弄他,而且像癌一样在向广度和深度蔓延,最后使得他得出结论认为:因为债务是无法清还的,所以赎罪也是徒劳无功的,从而形成了罪孽无法赎清的思想,即“永恒的惩罚”的概念。可是结果矛头又对准了“债权人”,现在人们开始诅咒人的始因,诅咒人种的起源,诅咒人的祖先(诸如“亚当”、“原罪”、“非自由意志”),或者诅咒自然,因其造就了人,因其搜集了恶(所谓“诅咒自然”),甚至诅咒只剩下价值真空的存在(虚无主义式的远离存在,渴望虚无,或者渴望它的“反面”,即另一种“存在”——佛教及其同类),直到我们突然站到了那种自相矛盾的、恐怖的急救措施面前。基督教的这一绝招使备受折磨的人类找到了片刻的安慰:上帝为了人的债务牺牲了自己。上帝用自己偿付了自己,只有上帝能够清偿人本身没有能力清偿的债务——债权人自愿地为他的债务人牺牲自己,这是出于爱(能令人相信吗?),出于对他的债务人的爱……

  二十二

  说到此读者已经猜到,所有这些说教的背后究竟发生了些什么:就是那种自找痛苦的意志,就是那种倒退回去的残酷。那个内向化的、被吓得返回自身的动物人,那个被禁锢在一个“国家”中以便驯养的囚徒,他在自然地发泄制造痛苦的欲望被阻止了之后,又发明了良心谴责,用以给自己制造痛苦。正是这个进行良心谴责的人以其倒退的残酷抓住了宗教假说,从而使他的自我折磨加剧到可怕的程度。对上帝负债的想法变成了他的刑具;他在上帝身上抓到了最终与他的真实的、未脱尽的动物本能相对立的东西。他指出这种动物本能,为的是把它们当作对上帝负债的证据,当作仇恨上帝、拒绝上帝、反叛“主”、反叛“父”、反叛始祖和造物主的证据。他把自己置于“上帝”和“魔鬼”的对立之中。他对一切都掷以否定:他否定自我、否定自然、否定他自身的自然性和真实性;他把从自身挖出来的东西当作一种肯定、一种可能的、真实的、生动的东西,当作上帝,当作上帝的审判、上帝的刑罚,当作彼岸世界,当作永恒、永久的折磨,当作地狱,当作永无止境的惩罚和无法估算的债务。这种心灵残酷是一种前所未有的意志错乱:人情愿认自己是负债的、是卑鄙的、是无可救赎的;他情愿想像自己受罚,而且惩罚也不能抵销他负的债;他情愿用负债和惩罚的难题来污染和毒化事物的根基,从而永远地割断他走出这座“偏执观念”的迷宫的退路;他情愿建立一种理想,一种“神圣上帝”的理想,以此为依据证明他自己是毫无价值的。噢!这些神经错乱的、悲哀的野兽人!他们的想法有多么怪诞!他们的野兽行径一旦稍稍受到阻止,他们的反常,他们的荒唐,他们的野兽思想就会立刻爆发出来!所有这一切都非常之有趣,可是人们用一种应当受到严厉禁止的、黑色的、忧郁的、神经衰弱的悲哀目光对这些深渊注视得太久了。无疑地,这是疾病,是迄今为止摧残人的最可怕的疾病。有谁还能够听见(可惜如今人们没有耳朵听这些!),在这苦难和荒唐之夜响起了爱的呼喊,这是心醉神迷的呼喊,是在爱中寻求解脱的呼喊,它慑于一种不可克服的恐惧而离去!在人身上有这么多的恐怖!地球很久以来就已经是一所疯人院了!……

  二十三

  上述这些应该足以说明“神圣的上帝”的来历了。只要看一看希腊众神就足以使我们信服,神的观念并不一定要产生出这种病态的想像,这种我们目前还不能回避的现象;事实上有许多比这种自戕自罚(近几千年来欧洲人已深明此道)更高尚的方法,可以用来编造关于神的故事。希腊众神是一些高贵而又能自主的人的再现。在他们那里,人心中的动物感到自己神圣化了,而不是在自我摧残,不是在对自己发怒!这些希腊人长久地利用他们的神来回避良心谴责,以便能够保持心灵自由的快乐,这也就是说,他们对神的理解和基督教对它的神的利用方式相反。这些杰出而勇敢的孩子头儿们,他们在这方面走得很远。一个不亚于荷马史诗中的宙斯本人的权威曾不时地指出,他们行事过于草率,有一次他说(这是阿基斯多斯的例子,是一个非常坏的例子):

  “多么奇怪啊!那些凡人怎么会这样大声地抱怨我们这些神!”

  “他们以为恶都是来源于我们,可是他们由于自己的无知,由于违抗命运,制造了他们自己的不幸!”

  但是读者立刻注意到,就连这位奥林匹斯的旁观者和执法官也绝不因此而怨恨他们,不把他们想得很坏。“他们有多傻!”当他看到凡人的过失时这样想。“愚蠢”、“无知”、还有点儿“精神反常”——这就是为那些全盛时期的希腊人所认可的导致许多坏事和灾难的原因。愚蠢,而不是罪孽!……你们懂吗?不过,那些精神反常倒确实是问题。“是的,这种事怎么会发生在我们这些人身上?我们是一些血统高贵、生活幸福、教育良好、地位显赫、气质高贵、品德高尚的人!”许多世纪以来,每逢一个高贵的希腊人用那些无法理解的残暴和恶行玷污了自己时,其余的希腊人,就会这样发问、最后他们会摇着头说:“他肯定是被一个神愚弄了。”这是典型的希腊式遁辞,当时众神就是这样在某种程度上为人的恶行作辩护,众神成了罪恶的原因。在那个时候,人们不是惩罚自己,而是以更高贵的姿态惩罚犯罪。

  二十四

  显然,我在结束这章时有三个问题没有解答。有的读者可能会问我,“你是否在这里树立了一个理想?还是破坏了一个理想?”那么我会反问,你们曾否多次地问过自己,在地球上每建立一种理想需要付出多么昂贵的代价?需要诋毁和曲解多少事实?尊奉多少谎言?搅乱多少良心?牺牲多少神?为了建造一个圣物就必须毁掉一个圣物,这是规律——如果有谁能够证明规律失灵,敬请指出。我们这些现代人继承了数千年良心解剖和动物式自我折磨的传统。在这方面我们具有长期的训练,也许是有艺术才能,最起码是有娴熟的技巧,这是我们所习惯的口味。人用“罪恶的目光”在他的自然倾向中搜寻了太长的时间,结果这些自然倾向终于和“良心谴责”密切地联系在一起了。逆转这一方向努力是可能的,但是谁有足够的力量去做这件事?那需要把所有的非自然的倾向,把所有那些向往彼岸世界的努力,那些违抗感觉、违抗本能、违抗自然、违抗动物性的努力,简言之,把迄今为止的理想,全部敌视生活的理想、诋毁尘世的理想,总之,需要把所有这些同良心谴责联系起来。如今,这些期望和要求能对谁去说呢?……对那些好人?——人们正是利用他们来反对自己的——顺理成章的还有那些懒散的、隐退的、虚荣的、昏庸的、疲倦的人们?有什么比人使自己获得尊严的努力更能侮辱人、更能如此彻底地把人分离开来?反之,只要我们像其他所有的人一样行事,像其他人一样“过活”,整个世界又会变得多么和蔼友善!为了达到那个逆转方向的目的,需要另外一些精神,这正是我们这个时代不可能出现的。那些被战争和胜利强化的精神,那些要求征服、冒险、危难、甚至于痛苦的精神;为了达到那个目的还需要习惯于凛冽的高山空气,习惯于冬季的漫步,习惯于各种各样的冰冻和山峦;为了达到那个目的需要一种高明的鲁莽,一种去认知的最自信的勇气,这勇气是来源于伟大的健康;一言以蔽之,为了达到那个目的需要的正是这伟大的健康!人如今还可能有这种健康吗?

  但是在未来的某个时候,在一个比我们这个腐朽的、自疑的现代更为强盛的时代,那个怀有伟大的爱和蔑视的人,那个拯救世界的人,那种创造精神,还是会来临的;他那逼人的力量使他无处苟且歇息;他的孤独被人误解为逃避现实,而实际上孤独正是因为他投身现实、埋头现实、思索现实,因而一旦他离开现实、重见光明,就能够把现实从所有理想加给它的诅咒中拯救出来了,这个未来的人就这样把我们从迄今所有的理想中拯救出来了,就这样把我们从理想的衍生物中、从伟大的憎恶中、从虚无意志中、从虚无主义中拯救出来了。这一正午的报时钟声,这一使意志重获自由、使地球重获目标、使人重获希望的伟大决定,这个反基督主义者、反虚无主义者,这个战胜了上帝和虚无主义的人——他总有一天会到来。

  二十五

  可是我还要说什么?够了!够了!只有在这儿我应当沉默,否则我就会侵夺仅仅属于另外一个人的权力,他比我年轻、比我强壮、比我“更代表未来”,这权力只属于查拉斯图拉,不敬神的查拉斯图拉。

 
 

On the Genealogy of Morals
A Polemical Tract
by
Friedrich Nietzsche
Leipzig 1887


译 者:谢地坤,宋祖良,程志民 译
出 版:漓江出版社
原 价:22.80

当当价:18.00  节省4.80
卓越价:17.30  节省5.50