NEUROTIC SPEECH 神经症的言说
In his ‘Rome Discourse’ Lacan drew attention to a second clinical paradox in the relations between speech and language. After having categorized as psychotic those people who talk freely and fluently without really speaking, he defined people who also speak beyond the words they consciously use as neurotic. In the first (psychotic) situation, language operates without speech, whilst in the second (neurotic) case speech also functions beyond verbalized language. Whereas psychotics do not manage to speak, however articulate the sentences they produce, neurotics cannot prevent themselves from saying more than what they intend to convey (Lacan 1977e[1953]:69–70).
在他的“罗马辞说”，拉康注意到第二个临床悖论，在言说与语言之间的关系。他将那些人们归类为精神病者，那些自由地侃侃而谈而没有确实在言谈的人们。他定义那些人们，那些言说超过他们意识所使用的字词的人们，作为是神经症者。在第一个情况，精神病的情况，语言没有言说地运作。而在第二个情况，神经症的情况，言说也发挥功能，超越文词化的语言。精神病者没有成功地言说，无论他们产生的句子多么清楚。神经症者则是无法阻止他们自己言说超过他们意图要表的东西。
Twenty years later, in his seminar Encore, Lacan rephrased this insight as follows: ‘I speak without knowing it. I speak with my body and I do so unbeknownst to myself. Thus I always say more than I know’ (Lacan 1998a[1972–73]:119).
二十年后，在他的研讨班“再来”，拉康重新铨释这个洞见，如下：「我不知道言说地言说，我用我的身体言说，我这样言说，我自己却不知道。因此，我总是说出超过我知道的东西。」
Here, Lacan aimed less at a reintegration of the communicative value of non-verbal cues in psychoanalysis—he actually vilified clinicians who interpreted the patients’ bodily movements as well as their associations (Lacan 1966b[1955]:337) —than at restoring neurotic symptoms, inhibitions and anxieties as meaningful units of analysis. To Lacan, this neurotic paradox, much more than its psychotic counterpart, encompassed ‘the privileged domain of psychoanalytic discovery’ because Freud would not have developed psychoanalysis if he had not regarded neurotic symptoms (ranging from bodily disorders to slips of the tongue) as being sustained by an unconscious idea (wish, representation) that tries to express itself (Lacan 1977e[1953]:69).
在此，拉康目标并不是朝中重新融合精神病者的非文辞的线索的沟通的价值—他实际上贬低那些临床医生，当他们铨释病人的身体的动作与他们的联想。拉康的目标是要恢复神经症者的症状，压抑与焦虑，作为是精神分析的有意义的单位。对于拉康，这个神经症的悖论，远超过它的精神病的伙伴，它涵盖精神分析的发现的特权的领域。因为弗洛伊德本来不会发展精神分析，假如他当时没有将神经症的症状（范围从生理的疾病到口误），视为是由尝试表达它自己的无意识的观念（愿望，表象）所维持。
As to the nature of this neurotic economy, Freud had already cleared most of the ground in two seminal essays on the neuropsychoses of defence from the mid-1890s (Freud 1894a; 1896b). In these papers, he had argued that both hysteria and obsessional neurosis originate in an unconscious act of defence against a traumatic experience, whose nature is always sexual.23 When individuals encounter something that is incompatible with the reigning mass of representations (Vorstellungsmasse) in their ego (Ich), the latter tries to maintain its integrity by driving the event out of consciousness. Freud believed that this defence (or repression) takes place via a withdrawal of the affect (a quantum of energy) from the event’s psychic representation, through which the event itself is transformed into an unconscious memory trace, while its affect is displaced to another representation.
至于这个神经症的经济活力的特性，弗洛伊德已经清理出大部分的场域，在两篇影响巨大的论文“论神经症这与精神病者的防卫机制”，在1950年代中叶。在这些论文里，他曾经主张，癔症与妄想神经症起源于无意识的防卫行动，抵挡创伤的经验。创伤的经验总是性。当个人遭遇某件不相和谐的东西，跟他们的自我的统辖的表象集团不相和谐的东西。自我的统辖集团尝试维持它的尊严，凭借将事件从意识驱赶出去。弗洛伊德相信，这个防卫机制（或压抑），发生，凭借将情感（能源的量子）撤退，从事件的心灵的表象。通过事件的心灵表象，事件本身被转化成为无意识的记忆的痕迹。虽然它的情感被替换成为另外一个表象。
Since repression entails the dismantling and eradication of sexual representations that are impossible to handle, neurotics can only recount their experiences in a lacunary fashion, whereby the gaps can be either exceedingly manifest—some patients say they have no memories at all of what happened to them—or smoothed over by so-called ‘screenmemories’, which generally serve to make the story coherent. Until the 1910s, Freud was convinced that neurotics had simply ‘forgotten’ the awkward representations and that one of the analyst’s tasks consisted in helping them to recover their lost memories.
因为压抑涵盖拆解与抹除那些不可能处理的性的表象，神经症者仅能够描述他们的经验，用有空隙的方式。这次差距要就是过分的明显—有些病人说，他们根本就没有记忆，对于发生在他们身上的事情。要不然，就是他们被所谓的“屏隔回忆”。“屏隔回忆”通常用来让故事前后一致。直到1910年，弗洛伊德相信，神经者就是“忘记”那些笨拙的表象。精神分析家的其中一个工作就是在于帮助他们恢复他们失去的记忆。
Yet clinical and theoretical considerations led him to think that instead of suffering from a straightforward forgetting, patients were animated by a powerful ‘not wanting to know’ (Freud 1913c:141–142). Therefore he considered it pointless for analysts to imbue their patients with the knowledge they are ostensibly lacking, because this is unlikely to bring about change in the patient’s situation—on the contrary, he might immediately erect a protective shield against the analyst’s suggestions.24
可是，临床与理论的考虑引导他认为，病人病没有遭受直接遗忘的痛苦。相反地，病人受的强烈的“不想要知的”所触动。因此，弗洛伊德认为这是没有意义的，对于精神分析家要让病人充满他们明显欠缺的这些知识。因为这并不可能导致病人的情况的改变。相反地，他可能立即竖立起保护的盔甲，对抗精神分析家的建议。
In Seminar I, Lacan reformulated this neurotic ‘not wanting to know’ as the passion of ignorance, a dimension superseding the dualism of knowing and not-knowing (Lacan 1988b[1953–54]:277–278). Simple ignorance does not equal a lack of conscious knowledge and, vice versa, a huge amount of conscious knowledge can perfectly coincide with radical ignorance. As mentioned on pp. 20–21, Lacan maintained that ignorance underpins the patient’s capacity for symbolic transference, because it enables him to regard the analyst as a supposed subject of knowing. By contrast, the ‘passion of ignorance’ is a psychic power which urges patients to prefer the deleterious status quo of their symptomatic condition over the even more painful encounter with that which caused it. The passion of ignorance thus coincides with the unconscious jouissance (enjoyment) the patient derives from his symptom.
在第一研讨班，拉康重新铨释神经症“不想要知道”，作为是无知的激情。这一个维度取代知道与不知道的双重论。单纯的无知并不相等于欠缺意识的知道，反过来说，也是一样。巨大数量的意识的知识能够完美地巧合于强烈的无知。如同在20-21页所提到，拉康主张，无知强调病人接受象征移情的能力。因为它让他能够将精神分析家视为是被认为知道的主体。对照起来，“无知的激情”是一种心灵的力量，建议病人比较喜欢他们症状的情况的巧妙的现状，胜过于那甚至更加令人痛苦的遭遇，跟引起症状的东西。无知的激情因此巧合于无意识的欢爽，病人从他的症状获得的欢爽。
In Freud’s theory repression not only causes the sexual representation to fall into the unconscious, the original affect also reconnects itself to a relatively innocuous substitute representation. Freud regarded this ‘false connection’ as the nucleus of the neurotic symptom. Whether a bodily disorder or a compulsive thought process, the neurotic symptom is a compromise between a component of the repressed event (the affect) and an element of the repressive structure (the substitute representation), and thus also an insidious ‘return of the repressed’.
在弗洛伊德的理论，压抑不但引起性的表象，掉落于无意识里。原初的情感也重新连接它自己跟比较无害的替换的表象。弗洛伊德将这个“虚假的连接”视为是神经症的症状的核心。无论是生理的疾病或是强迫性的思想的过程，神经症者的症状都是一种妥协，处于被压抑的事件（情感）的成分，与压抑的结构（替换的表象）的元素之间。因此，这也是“被压抑的东西的潜在的回转”。
Via the neurotic symptom, an aspect of the event which had been driven out of consciousness tries to express itself again, although the individual can no longer understand this. For Lacan, this part of Freud’s theory implied that the neurotic symptom conveys a hidden meaning, which the patient can only understand once she has found the laws according to which its constitutive components have been bound up with each other.
经由神经症的症状，从意识里被驱赶出来的事件的一个层面，尝试要再次表达它自己。虽然个人不再能够理解这个。对于拉康，弗洛伊德的这个部分暗示着：神经症的症状传递一个隐藏的意义。仅有当病人已经找到这些法则，她才能够理解这个隐藏的意义。依照这个法则，它的组成的成分彼此互相连接一块。
Put differently, the neurotic symptom means something, but it is impossible to grasp that meaning until the language system governing its combinations has been discovered. Whilst being generally ‘silent’, neurotic symptoms continue to speak in a language that is unknown to the individual, prompting Lacan to compare them to blazons, enigmas, hieroglyphics, oracles, seals, etc. (Lacan 1977e[1953]:69–70) and to identify them eventually as metaphors (Lacan 1977g[1957]:175). All of these figures include a message, but its exact nature remains a mystery as long as one has not found the proper code to decipher them.25
换句话说，神经症者具有某个意义。但是我们不可能理解那个意义，直到统辖它的组合的语言系统已经被发现。神经症的症状通常都是“沉默”，它们却继续言说，用个人自己并不知道的语言。这引起拉康要将它们比喻为盾章，谜团，象形文字，预言，封印，等等。并且最后将它们辨认为隐喻。所有的这些东西都包含一个讯息。但是这个讯息的确实的特性始终处于神秘当中，只有我们还没有找到合适的符码来解答它们。
Now it becomes clear how the neurotic’s speech differs from the psychotic communication detailed above. Unlike psychotic individuals, neurotics have no privileged access to the true meaning of their words and their general living conditions. They are continuously under the impression that the words they use do not capture exactly what they want to say or, conversely, that these words express much more than they have intended to. Whereas psychotics engage in a stereotypical form of communication which is unmarked by redundancies and ambiguities, neurotics are incessantly aware of the inadequacy of language for conveying their experiences.
现在，显而易见的是，神经症者的言说，不同于以上详述的精神病的沟通。不像精神病的个人，神经症者对于他们的字词的真实意义与他们的通常的生活情况，并没有任何特权的接近。他们继续拥有这个印象：他们使用的字词并没有确是捕捉到他们想要说出的东西。或许反过来说，这些字词表达远超过他们意图要说出的东西。精神病者参与沟通的典型化的形式，这些沟通仍然是沟通，尽管充满累赘语与模糊嗳昧。神经症者则是持续地知的语言的不能胜任，来传递他们的表达。
Sometimes they feel that they simply lack or cannot find the words to say something; at other times they are surprised by the fact that they have said something they did not want to say at all. Moreover, whilst psychotics are being pervaded by an infallible, full knowledge about themselves and others, neurotics are troubled time and again by the realization that their knowledge is incomplete, inconsistent and incoherent.
有时，他们觉得他们仅是欠缺或是无法找到字词来说某件东西。还有些时候，他们对这个事实大吃一惊：他们已经说出某件他们并不想要说出的事情。而且，精神病者正充斥着绝对可靠，充分的知识，关于他们自己与别人。神经症者则是经常受的困扰，由于体会到：他们的知识是不完整，不一贯，而且不一致。
Eager to find unshakeable evidence, yet struck by its fraudulent character from the moment it is established, neurotics bear witness to a deeply ingrained feeling that nothing is really trustworthy, that they are constantly being deceived by everything and everyone, including themselves. Although they like to think that someone is reliable, or that something is genuine, neurotics realize that their opinion is but a vulnerable belief and that they could easily be duped by appearances. Distrust and suspicion, two affects that are often associated with paranoia, can thus be encountered as readily in neurosis as in psychosis, the difference being that in the latter case they rest upon a firmly rooted conviction, whereas in the former they proceed from profound uncertainty. 神经症这因为渴望找的无法动摇的证据，可是又为这个证据的欺骗的性质所迷惑，从证据被建立的开始。神经症者见证到根深蒂固的感觉：没有任何东西确实值得信任，他们不断地被欺骗，被每件事情与每个人欺骗，包括他们自己。虽然他们喜欢认为，某个人是可靠的，或是某件事情是真诚的，神经症者体会到，他们的意见仅是一个容易受到伤害的信仰。他们很容易被外表所欺骗。不信任与怀疑，这两个情感经常跟偏执狂者连想一块，在神经症者与精神病者身上，也很容易被遭遇到。差别是：在后者的情况，他们依靠根深蒂固的信念。而在前者，他们则是从深刻的不确定前进。
A psychotic patient will approach someone with due suspicion because he has read the other’s intentions, whereas a neurotic will harbour suspicion because she is doubtful about the other, due to the interference of the Other. As Lacan put it in Seminar III, the dimension of the unknown, ‘the Other of speech…is the determining factor in neurosis’ (Lacan 1993[1955–56]:168).
精神病的病人将会接近某个人，带着适当的怀疑。因为他已经阅读出他人的意图。而神经症者则是怀抱怀孕，因为她怀疑别人，由于大他者的介入。如同拉康在第三研讨班表达它，这个未知者的维度，言说的大他者，就是神经症者的决定的因素。
This structural difference between neurotic and psychotic people, despite the similarity of their symptoms and affects, often manifests itself during the so-called ‘preliminary conversations’ (the Lacanian equivalent of Freud’s ‘trial period’) when patients reflect upon the progress they are making.
神经症者与精神病者的结构上的差异，尽管他们的症状与情感的类似，经常显示它自己，在所谓的“初期的谈话”，当病人反应出他们正在从事的进展。
When a neurotic patient voices his concern over the fact that he has not experienced any improvement in his condition since the start of the consultations, he will be poised between the enticing idea that his analyst is probably not very good (indeed, that she may not be a properly trained analyst at all) and the bitter awareness that he himself is after all the one who has chosen her because of her acumen and charisma.
当神经症者表达他的关系，对于这个事实：自从看诊开始以来，他并没有经验的他的情况的任何的改进。他将会保持平衡，一方面是忍不住地认为：他的精神分析可能并不是很高明（的确，她可能根本就不是受过合适训练的精神分析家）。另一方面，他痛苦地知道，他自己毕竟就算选择这位分析家的人，因为分析家的敏锐与魅力。
A psychotic, on the other hand, will easily reach the conclusion that since she has not made any progress, her analyst must be part of the same conspiracy that is responsible for all her misery. In both instances, the patient fears that the analyst is not what he pretends to be, yet in the former (neurotic) case the suspicion rests upon doubt and uncertainty rather than firm conviction.
另一方面，精神病者将会很容易地获得这个结论：因为她还没有任何的进展，她的分析家一定是相同阴谋的部分，要为她所有的悲惨负责的阴谋。无论哪个情况，病人都害怕，精神分析家并不是他伪装成为的那个样子。可是，在前者（神经症者）的情况，这个怀疑依靠怀疑与不确定，而不是依靠坚定的信念。
Contrary to psychotics, neurotics take account of the Other of speech, which is in turn based on the installation of the ‘wall of language’ between the speaker and her interlocutors, the presence of quilting points between signifier and signified, and the acknowledgement of the Name-of-the- Father. Neurotics differ from psychotics in so far as they have assimilated the sociocultural rules embedded in language, whose principle is the paternal function.
跟精神病者相反，神经症者考虑到言说的大他者。这个言说的大他者则是以“语言的墙壁”的安置作为基础，处于言说者与她的对谈者之间的“语言的墙壁”。能指与所指之间的缝合点的存在，与以父之名的承认。神经症者跟精神病者有所差异，因为他们已经吸收被镶嵌于语言里的社会与文化的规则。这个语言的原则就是父亲的功能。
Throughout his works, Lacan linked this psychic assimilation of the symbolic order to Freud’s concept of repression, arguing that the integration of the symbolic system is a necessary and sufficient condition for repression to occur. Drawing on data gathered from Freud’s famous case-study of the Wolf Man (1918b[1914]), he stated in Seminar I: The trauma, in so far as it has a repressing action, intervenes after the fact, nachtraglich.
在拉康的全集，拉康将这个心灵的接受象征的秩序，跟弗洛伊德的压抑的观念连接一块。拉康主张说，象征系统的融合是一个必要而且充分的情况，让压抑发生。依靠从弗洛伊德的著名的个案研究“狼人”收集的资料，拉康在第一研讨班陈述：因为创伤具有压抑的行动，创伤介入“事实之后”。
At this specific moment, something of the subject’s becomes detached in the very symbolic world that he is engaged in integrating. From then on, it will no longer be something belonging to the subject. The subject will no longer speak it, will no longer integrate it. Nevertheless, it will remain there, somewhere, spoken, if one can put it this way, by something the subject does not control. [It will be the first nucleus of what one will subsequently call his symptoms.]26 (Lacan 1988b[1953–54]:191)
在这个明确的时刻，属于主体的某件东西变得区隔，在他参与融合的象征的世界。从那时开始，那个东西不再属于主体。主体将不再言说它，将不再将它融合一块。可是，它将始终就在那里，某个地方，被某件东西言说，请容许我这样说，被主体没有控制的东西。（那就是我们随后所谓的症状的东西的核心）。
Here Lacan tried to explain how events only become painful and fall prey to repression from the moment the subject adopts a symbolic framework of norms and values. What Freud had designated as an incompatibility between two mental representations, Lacan translated as the ‘detachment’ of signifiers from the symbolic order, as a mere result of its assimilation by the subject. Hence, no event is inherently traumatic; it acquires this epithet ‘after the fact’, when it becomes meaningful through the intervention of a symbolic system.
因此，拉康尝试解释，事件如何变得仅是痛苦，并且成为压抑的猎物，从主体採用象征的架构来命名与制定价值。弗洛伊德所指明作为能指的“区隔”，跟象征秩序的区隔，作为仅是被主体吸收的结果。因此，没有一个事件是本质上的创伤。这个事件获得这个后记“事实之后”。当它经过象征的系统的介入之后，它才变得有意义。
Lacan’s view entailed that only neurotics, who have integrated the symbolic order and its distinctions between good/right and bad/wrong, separate traumatic from non-traumatic events in a culturally recognizable fashion. A psychotic, who is living in an entirely different world, can put events which a neurotic is likely to experience as shocking in a neutral or even pleasurable context, and the other way round. A psychotic man, for example, can be extremely affected by a score of ostensibly nonintrusive phenomena, whilst remaining unmoved by the fact that he has been repeatedly raped by a group of thugs in the back of a van.27 Diagnosis via speech and transference 27
拉康的观念意味著，仅有神经症者将创伤与非-创伤的事情分开，用文化层面被体认的方式。因为他们已经融合象征的秩序与它的区别善意跟正确与坏与错误。精神病者由于生活于完全不同的世界里，他们将神经症者很可能经验到的事件，当著是令人惊吓，在中立，或甚至是令人愉快的环境里，或是令人惊吓的环境当著是令人愉快。譬如，一位精神病者有时会极端地受到影响，受到许多夸张地非侵犯性的现象的影响。另一方面，他对于这个事实却又无动于衷：他已经被一群的恶棍重复地强暴，在货车的背后。
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