作者: 张红云 / 20051次阅读 时间: 2010年12月07日

Throughout, we have been discussing the felt, implicit functioning of the interaction process we term "experiencing." We have been pointing out that all appropriate behavior and interpretations of present situations depend on this felt functioning. It constitutes the thousands of meanings and past experiences which determine appropriate present behavior. In addition, it is this felt functioning to which we can respond ourselves, and this is the self-process. The functioning I am discussing is felt, meaning that we can refer to it ourselves. For example, as we read this page the words are sound images for us. These sound images are all we explicitly have in mind. However, we also have the meanings of the sound images. How? We do not say to ourselves what it all means. We feel the meanings of what we read as we go along. They function implicitly. This feeling process is an interaction between the symbols on the page and our feeling. This felt interaction process is now ongoing and gives us appropriate feelings and meanings.
When the interaction process is greatly curtailed (as in sleep, hypnosis, psychosis, 26,and isolation experiments), the inwardly felt experiencing is thereby curtailed. The individual then lacks the implicit function of felt experiencing and loses both his sense of "self" and his capacity to respond to and interpret present events appropriately. Both require the felt process just illustrated.
The peculiar phenomena which occur under these circumstances are somewhat more understandable when they are considered in terms of curtailment or stoppage of the interaction process and implicit function of felt experiencing.
I would like now to state some of the characteristics of this (hallucinatory or dreamlike) extreme structure-bound manner of experiencing.
Structures Are Perceived as Such. Ordinarily, past experiences and learnings function implicitly in felt experiencing, so that we interpret and perceive the present, not the past experiences themselves. Yet under hypnosis, in dreams, and in hallucinations, we may perceive rigid structures and past events as such. Characteristically, we do not then have the relevant aspects of felt process which usually function. Thus hallucinations and dreams are not understandable to the present individual. He is puzzled or aghast at them. They often seem to him "not his." The felt experiencing that would give him a sense of their being "his," and would let him know their meaning, is not ongoing. Dreams and hallucinations are, so to speak, decomposed pieces of what would otherwise be a functioning, felt process. This interaction process with the present is not ongoing, and hence the felt meanings are not functioning.
對結構的知覺的方式。通常,過去體驗和學習是在感受體驗過程中暗在地發揮功能,所以我們可以解釋和理解當下,而不是過去體驗本身。然而在催眠狀態下,在夢裏,在幻覺中我們對這些僵硬的結構和過去事件的知覺方式會呈現出以下所述的特點。其特性是失去了感受過程中通常發揮功能的一些方面。幻覺和夢對於個體來說不再可以理解。個體對此迷惑且驚駭。對於個體來說這好像並不是他自己。能夠帶來“屬於他的”(being “his”)這種感覺及幫助他理解其意義的感受過程停止進行了。夢和幻覺可以說分解了本應發揮功能的感受過程。這一和當下互動的過程並沒有在進行,因此感受意義也不再發揮功能。
Let me now trace through these several different kinds of circumstances how in each the interaction process is first curtailed, and how in each the function of felt experiencing is then missing.
Extreme Structure-Bound Manner Occurs Whenever the Interaction Process is Greatly Curtailed. Dreams, hypnosis, psychosis, C02 and LSD, and stimulus deprivation share at least one factor, the curtailment of ongoing interaction.
In sleep there is a great reduction of external stimuli. Dreams occur with this curtailment of the usually ongoing interaction process with the environment.
In hypnosis, too, the subject must shut off his interaction with present stimuli, and must cease his own self-responsiveness. He must concentrate on a point.
Psychosis, as has often been remarked (for example, Shlien, 1960), involves both in its genesis and later, an "isolation," a curtailment of interaction between feeling and events. Also, physical isolation from people can, in some individuals, bring on hallucinations.
精神病,經常提及到的一點(比如 Shlien, 1960),不管是最初發病時還是之後,都存在“隔離”,感受和事件之間互動的減少。和其他人物理上的隔離會讓一些個體產生幻覺。
Certain poisons (C02, LSD) are inimical to the physiological interaction process of body life. C02 narrows (and eventually stops) the process of respiration.
Experiments in which individuals are placed in soundproof and lightproof suits that also prevent touch stimuli result (after a few hours) in psychotic-like hallucinations.
The peculiarly similar experiences which arise under these widely different conditions hint at something similar. At least one factor they all share is the curtailment of the ongoing interaction process which, as felt, is experiencing. We would thus expect a lack of the implicit functioning which ongoing experiencing usually provides. 27,
And indeed this is shared by the phenomena which occur in all these circumstances. The peculiar character of these phenomena is understandable as a rigidity or lack of this felt functioning which usually interprets every present situation for us, and to which we respond in self-process. Thus appropriate interpreting of situations and sense of self are lost.
Lack of Implicit Function. The implicit function (see definition 4) of felt experiencing becomes rigid (not in process) or "literal" in all these conditions. In hypnosis, for example, when the individual is told to "raise your hand," he will lift the palm of his hand up by his wrist. He will not, as when awake, interpret the idiomatic phrase appropriately (it means, of course, to raise one's whole arm up into the air). The same "literal" quality occurs in dreams and in psychosis. Much of what has been called "primary process," "schizophrenic thinking," or the schizophrenic's inability to "abstract" his "concrete" thinking, his "taking the part for the whole" (Goldstein, 1954), really consists of this literal and rigid manner in which experiencing functions. As in dreams and hypnosis, the felt process of experiencing is curtailed and does not provide its implicit functioning.
The many implicit felt meanings that are needed for appropriate interpretations and reactions do not function, since the felt process (of which they are process aspects) is not ongoing. That is exactly what "literal" means: the lack of functioning of other meanings which should inform our interpretation of a given set of words or events.
"Loss of Self." Another characteristic shared by dreams, hypnosis, psychosis, and the phenomena obtained in stimulus-deprivation and LSD, is the loss of a sense of self. In dreams what we perceive is beyond the control, interpretation, ownership, of the self (or ego). In hypnosis the individual specifically accepts another's suggestions for his own and totally permits them to replace his own self-responding. And in psychosis so often the patient complains: "I didn't do that. Something made me do it"; or "I'm not myself"; or "These voices are not mine"; or, "Inside me I'm nothing at all." The hallucinations, voices, and things in his head are not felt to be his own. He lacks the sense of self. If he does have a sense of self (an "intact ego"), this felt sense does not inform the hallucinatory phenomena. In regard to these, he has no sense of self that implicitly contains their meaning.
This loss of self is due to the missing felt functioning of experiencing. Just as outward events (to the extent of psychosis) are not interpreted and interacted with on the basis of felt experiencing, so also this felt experiencing ii missing for self-responses.
We have defined the self as self-process. The self exists to the extent that the individual can carry his felt process forward by means of his own symbols, behaviors, or attention. Experiments with stimulus deprivation have found that individuals who develop psychosis more slowly have a greater capacity to respond 28,to themselves (the most "imagination" and "creativity;" it was called). The finding would corroborate our views since, to the extent the individual can carry forward his own experiencing, he will be maintaining (by symbols and attention) his interaction process. When the interaction process is greatly narrowed, not only do psychotic-like experiences occur, but the sense of "self" is lost. The felt process to which there can be self-response becomes static and the individual has unowned perceptions.
Static, Repetitious, Unmodifiable Manner. Insofar as the implicit function of felt experiencing is rigid, there is no way for present situations to interact with it, and to modify it so that it becomes an interpretation of the present situation. Instead we perceive a repetitious pattern that is not modified by the present situation. The sequence may "go off" as a result of being "cued" by present events, but it is not an interpretation of, or response to, present events.
The Universality of Psychotic "Contents." Experiences in the extreme structure-bound manner are not process aspects. They occur precisely to the extent that the felt process is not ongoing. It is striking how certain themes universally recur-usually the familiar "oral, anal, and genital" themes. It seems that this is the stuff of which we are all composed . . . and into which the usually ongoing process decomposes, insofar as it is not ongoing.
Psychotic Experiences Are Not "the Repressed." It is fallacious to consider these structure-bound manifestations as repressed experiences which have now "emerged" or "erupted." To so consider them raises the puzzling question: On the one hand many theories hold that adjustment requires awareness, and that repression makes maladjustment, but on the other hand they hold that the psychotic is "too aware" and needs to "rerepress" all these experiences.
A better formulation, I think, would be to interpret this observation as follows: Optimally these universal past experiences function implicitly in felt experiencing. When that ongoing process ceases, decomposed static patterns occupy the center of the sensorium.
The implications of this reformulation can be seen, for example, in the following. "The psychosis," in this view, is not these supposedly underlying contents (in that sense everyone is "psychotic"). Rather, "the psychosis" is the curtailment or cessation of the interaction process of feeling and events. When, therefore, we label an individual "borderline psychotic," this does not mean that certain dangerous contents lie down there in him. Rather, he is "isolated," "uninvolved," "not quite there," "withdrawn," or "out of touch with himself"; i.e., his manner of experiencing is highly structure bound. To prevent "the psychosis" from occurring, one must respond as much as possible to such feelings as do implicitly function, so as to carry forward and reconstitute ongoing interaction and experiencing.
The view of "latent psychotic contents" leads to two dangerous errors: either one decides that the individual's feelings of difficulty and trouble had better be ignored (lest they "blossom into" full psychosis), or one "interprets" them and "digs" them "out." Either decision denies and pushes away the personal interaction and the individual's implicitly functioning feelings. Either decision will result in psychosis-they involve the same self verifying misconception that "contents" are psychotic.
There is nothing "psychotic" about any "underlying contents." What is psychotic is the structure-bound manner of experiencing, the absence or literal rigidity of felt experiencing and interaction.
Whether "borderline" or seemingly "gone," the person will "come alive" if interaction and experiencing [25] is reconstituted by personal responses which carry forward what does still function .[26]
無論是“邊緣的”或是看起來“無望的”,只要對個體仍有功能的部分進行適切的人際回應,並重建互動與體驗過程[25],這個個體便又會“活了起來”。 [26]


As implicitly functioning felt meanings are carried forward and the process is reconstituted and made more immediate in manner, there is a constant change in "content." As referent movement occurs, both symbolization and direct referent change. There is a sequence of successive "contents." Sometimes these successive 29,contents are said to "emerge" as if they had always been there, or as if the final basic content is now finally revealed. But I prefer to call this content mutation. It is not a change only in how one interprets but, rather a change both in feeling and in symbols. The contents change because the process is being newly completed and reconstituted by responses. What the contents will be depends greatly on the responses.
An example of content mutation has already been given (definitions 8-9). Here are more examples of content mutation:
The client is in terror. She says there will be "doom." The world will fly to pieces. Something awful will happen. There is a monster.
Here is "the psychosis" someone might say. At any rate, a common enough psychotic content.
She is awfully afraid, she says. I respond that she is afraid and that I want to keep company and be with her, since she is afraid. She repeats that she is afraid. No matter how much or little meaningful symbology there is to the "doom," she is afraid now.
Minutes or months later she can say:
"I'm afraid of being lost. I'm lost. I'm so lost!"
"For years I have had to know exactly what to do every moment. I'd plan to know exactly what to do so I'd be distracted. It's like blinders. I'd be afraid to look up, sort of. I need someone or something to hold on to, or I'll disappear."
This is more understandable than world doom. The content seems now to be "objectloss" or "passive-dependent needs." Whatever it is, the response needed must provide contact: I grasp her hand; or I talk gently, saying something, pertinent or not-something from me to maintain contact and not to talk away the fear of being lost. In terms of process unity such talking and such touching are really the same, in that they both reestablish interaction. To do so it must be personal and it must convert the need to "hold on" into a successfully ongoing contact, real or symbolic.
"I need to hold on, but I'm a monster. No one can love me. You must be sick of me. I need so much, all I do is need.: I'm just selfish and evil. I'll suck you dry if I can. I'm just a horrible mouth."
Oral needs, oral incorporation, are now the contents that might be proposed.
But her need does feel endless, infinite, hungry. "Sure," I say, "It feels endless, bottomless, and awful to you. It's like you want to be fed and held forever."
Then, or some other time, she may say: "I'm just a baby. I hate that child. An ugly child. I was an ugly child. Nobody could like me the way I am."
But we have come a long way when the monster is now a child! A child is quite a nice thing. What became of the monster? A child is quite a human, every day, daylight thing. What became of the terror? The psychosis?
Such content mutation can occur within a few minutes or over months. It may occur in such words and symbols as above or in purely socially acceptable language, or with bizarre incoherent words, or in silence. The point I am trying to make is that the 30,content changes as one responds and thereby carries forward and reconstitutes an interaction process. Such interaction constitutes felt experiencing, and contents are always aspects thereof. As the process changes, the contents change. I term it content mutation.
Content mutation occurs strikingly with so-called "psychotic contents." The monsters, weird fears, infinite hungers, and doom-expectant terrors are so often aspects of isolation, loss of self and interaction. They are not psychotic "things" in a person, but a narrowed or stopped interaction process. As the interaction process is restored the contents change and, also, they become more understandable and commonly human.
But content mutation occurs not only with quite dramatic expressions, such as in the above example. It occurs equally with the often silent, unexpressive, and "unmotivated" individuals with whom we have so largely been working in the current research on psychotherapy with schizophrenics (Rogers et al., 1961; Gendlin, 1961b, 1962a, 1962c), although these individuals often conceptualize so little of what they are feeling. The following is a further example of content mutation:
An individual talks about a chain of circumstances which disturb him. Numerous patterns, characteristics, and personality "contents," seem noticeable in his report of these circumstances.
內容並不總像上述例子中伴隨著戲劇化的表達。在比較沉默的,不太表達,以及“動機不明”的個體——我們曾大量做過的對精神分裂症的心理治療的那些個體——也一樣會發生(Rogers et al., 1961; Gendlin, 1961b, 1962a, 1962c)。雖然這些個體對他們感受的概念化非常少。下面是另外一個內容轉變的例子:
Perhaps with the aid of responses, he goes on to find that this chain of circumstances really makes him very angry. That's it! He is furious. He wishes he could harm and destroy the people involved. He is afraid he will attack them when he next sees them. He hopes he will be able to control this destructive desire. He is amazed at his own hostility and his own fear of it. He hardly needs further to report the circumstances, so deeply true is his experience of this anger and destructive need. Again, now,' we are tempted to consider personality "contents." Our first deductions now seem too broad. Here, really, we have some contents of this man's personality. We are familiar with this fear of one's own hostility and what some of the bases of the hostility probably are.
But let us say the man continues (and I continue to respond to his felt meanings). He imagines himself attempting to vent his anger at these people. He finds now that he is not afraid he will uncontrollably attack and harm them. It is more likely (of all things!) that he will not be able even to yell at them, because perhaps he will cry. His voice would choke up, he is sure. In fact, it is somewhat choked up right now. This thing is not really hostility, it now appears. It is rather that he feels so hurt! They should not have done this to him! They hurt him, and . . . what can he do? And now he feels, with some relief, that he finally is in touch with what all this really means to him. (We may now propose a third group of personality contents, again different.)
But, as he continues, it turns out that the circumstances as such do not really matter. No wonder! It seemed all along quite a petty thing to be so upset about. The content is really something else and that is what hurts. And he finds now it is not a hurt after all. Rather, it brought home to him that he feels weak and helpless. "I'm not really hurt" (he now finds), "it's more that it points up to me how I can't make it in the world" (passivity, castration, we may now say).
但是,當他繼續,我們發現,這些情況其實並不重要。沒什麼的!看起來是這麼小的事情,不值得為之煩擾。內容又變成了一些其他的,這是那個真正傷害的東西。而且他發現現在已經不能算是傷害了。而且,這讓他意識到他現在感覺虛弱和無助。“我並不真地覺得受傷”(他現在發現), “這更像是這讓我知道我無法在這個世界上獲得成功!”(被動,閹割,我們現在可能會說)
The term "content mutation" can be applied to this sequential shifting of what seems to be the "content." Contents are process aspects of ongoing feeling process. They 31,can be symbolized because they function implicitly in that feeling process. As it is carried forward, there is referent movement and change in what can be symbolized. It is not merely a shifting of interpretation. There is referent movement--that is to say, that which is being symbolized is changing.
Content mutation does not imply that all our concepts are simply map, plicable. Often they are correct in terms of predicting the individual's other behaviors, and often they enable us to guess or be sensitively ready for a next content mutation. However, the concepts of personality contents are static and much too general [27] and empty. They are never a substitute for direct reference, referent movement, and content mutation.

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