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the description of a high degree of differentiation in infant-mother communications that is present from very early on(Hoffman, 1978). Neuropsychological theorizing now assumes the storage of affective memory in the limbic cortex which, as direct brain stimulation experiments indicate, permits the reactivation not only of the cognitive, but also of the affective aspects of past experience, particularly the subjective affective coloring of that experience (Arnold, 1970). Affects, operating as the earliest motivational system, are therefore intimately linked with the fixation by memory of an internalized world of object relations (Kernberg, 1976).心理学空间[}q cc|

If we assume that affective memory structures reflecting pleasurable relations of infant and mother, in which self- and object representations are as yet undifferentiated, build up separately from the unpleasurable affective memory structures in which self- and object representations are also undifferentiated, it would seem logical to raise the following questions: "Is the biologically determined activation of affects a reflection of the activation of libidinal, aggressive (or still undifferentiated) drives, or are affects themselves—rather than drives—the essential motivational forces?" Or: "Do these affective structures rather serve to link behavior with intrapsychic registration of the infant's interactions with hismother, so that the primary motivational system consists of internalized object relations rather than either affects or drives?"心理学空间u~SZ'?#T

I would suggest that affects are the primary motivational system, in the sense that they are at the center of each of the infinite number of gratifying and frustrating concrete events the infant experiences with his environment. Affects linka series of undifferentiated self-object representations so that gradually a complex world of internalized object relations, some pleasurably tinged, others unpleasurably tinged, is constructed.

But even while affects are linking internalized object relations in two parallel series of gratifying and frustrating experiences, "good" and "bad" internalized object relations are themselves being transformed. The predominant affect of love

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or hate of the two series of internalized object relations becomes enriched, is modulated, and becomes increasingly complex.心理学空间(G{]t#KG yc%d7p

Eventually, the internal relation of the infant to mother under the sign of "love" is more than the sum of a finite number of concrete loving affect states. The same is true for hate. Love and hate thus become stable intrapsychic structures, in genetic continuity through various developmental stages, and, by that very continuity, consolidate intolibido and aggression. Libido and aggression, in turn, become hierarchically supraordinate motivational systems which express themselves in a multitude of differentiated affect dispositions under different circumstances. Affects, in short, are the building blocks or constituents of drives; affects eventually acquire a signal function for the activation of drives.

At the same time, the relatively crude, undifferentiated early affective responses evolve into differentiated affectswith diverging subjective components, cognitive implications, and behavior characteristics. Various authors have classifiedaffects phenomenologically (Plutchik, 1980). The changing affective responses to the same external object and its internal representations do not, by themselves, permit establishing continuity in the development of unconscious intrapsychic conflict by means of "primary" affects.心理学空间w gyI+sml]#[

Libido and aggression, however, manifest themselves clinically in a spectrum of concrete affect dispositions and affectstates, so that we can trace clinically the vast array of affect states and their corresponding object relations toaggression, libido or—at later stages of development—to condensations of these two drives. Also, the relation to an object changes under the influence of the biological activation of new affect states which emerge throughout development and causethe quality of the drives to shift. For example, preoedipal libidinal strivings for mother change under the impact of newly emerging sexually tinged affect states of the oedipal stage of development. These affects organize themselves into genital urges operating in continuity with earlier libidinal strivings, but with a changed心理学空间Qx;Q?CJU5{6ZI(}h

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subjective quality and different motivational implications. Similarly, aggression, directed toward the same libidinal object, also manifest in various component aggressive affective states, transcends each of these concrete aggressiveaffects, and—particularly after condensation and integration of aggressive and libidinal drives—brings about or contributes to a new complexity of object relations and a new set of higher-level or more complex, integrated affect states (such as sadness, tenderness, guilt, longing, etc.).心理学空间E*lT5fk
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Should we maintain the term "drive" for these overall, hierarchically supraordinate motivational systems, aggression andlibido? This discussion is unfortunately confused by the consequence of the translation into English of Freud's terms Trieband Instinkt. Freud preferred Trieb, best translated as "drive," precisely because he conceived of drives as relatively continuous psychic motivational systems at the border between the physical and the mental, in contrast to instincts, which he viewed as discontinuous, rigid, inborn behavioral dispositions.

Unfortunately, the Standard Edition translates Trieb mostly, if not consistently, as "instinct." In light of the contemporary prevalent conception of instincts in biology (Lorenz, 1963); (Tinbergen, 1951); (Wilson, 1975), the term "instinctive components" for inborn perceptive, behavioral, communicative, psychophysiological, and subjective experiential patterns—that is, affects, seems appropriate, in contrast to the use of the term "drives" for the motivational systems,libido and aggression. Here Freud's concept of psychological drives in contrast to biological instincts fits contemporary biological developments remarkably well (Kernberg, 1976).心理学空间xAO9L!O

Having explained how I see the relation between drives and affects, I hasten to add that drives are manifest not simply by affects, but by the activation of a specific object relation, which includes an affect and wherein the drive is represented by a specific desire or wish. Unconscious fantasy, the most important being oedipal in nature, includes a specific wish directed toward an object. The wish derives from the drive and is more

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precise than the affect state, an additional reason for rejecting a concept that would make affects rather than drives the hierarchically supraordinate motivational system.心理学空间g^$[,r-h1{

By the same token, if drives are clinically reflected in concrete wishes toward objects, and if drives originate inaffect-laden experiences with the earliest object, could not the primary motivational system best be conceptualized as the internalized object relations? Is the search for an object the primary motivational system? Fairbairn clearly thought so, and, in light of Kohut's (1977) final rejection of drives as motivational systems for the preoedipal levels of development, it would seem that he also thought so. I have several reasons for disagreeing.

First, the organization of intrapsychic reality in terms of love and hate is more important for our understanding of continuity in intrapsychic development, unconscious conflict, and object relations than the fact that these contradictory states are originally directed toward the same object—mother—or that, in the oedipal phase, a male and a female object are the recipients of the child's dominant needs and strivings. The relation between libido and aggression, and betweenpregenital and genital strivings, provides explanatory power for the contradictory relations to the same objects.心理学空间f V2Wiac0hb

Second, the very nature of aggressive strivings results in a struggle against the consolidation of object relations and includes as a major purpose that of eliminating the frustrating, dangerous, or competing object. In this regard, it is typical of theories that consider object relations the primary motivational system to neglect the importance of aggressionand, by the same token, of unconscious intrapsychic conflict.心理学空间[U/usS"f

Third, the fundamental shift in the quality of libido under the impact of oedipal developments referred to above—inother words, the central importance of genital infantile sexuality—is also typically underestimated in theories that consider the relation to the object as hierarchically supraordinate to drives.

Returning to the issue of the motivational forces determining the origin of ego and self, I think my proposed reformulation心理学空间s,[x_a;`$ny

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of the dual instinct theory helps solve the question regarding the maturation and development of libido and aggression left open by Jacobson, provides a psychoanalytic model for earliest development that does justice to the crucial function ofaffects in activating the earliest infant-mother interactions, and explains the relation of affects to the internalizationand development of self- and object representations. This view is commensurate with Spitz's (1965), (1972) formulations regarding organizers of early ego development and also with Mahler's findings, and provides a bridge between Freud's theory of the ego as evolving from the system perception-consciousness, on the one hand, and from the precipitate of object relations, on the other, without having to assume a degree of early differentiation incommensurate with our presentknowledge of infant development.

The Self in Pathology and Normality心理学空间b4O"N#]&_q;m(t

The fundamental reason I propose to designate as the self the sum total of integrated self-representations from alldevelopmental stages, rather than simply a "composite" self-representation, is that this organization or structure plays a central role in development. The importance of differentiating the normal self from the pathological (grandiose) self of narcissistic personalities, and from the conflictually determined dissociated or split-off self in borderline personality organization, justifies, I strongly believe, the use of this term. This concept considers the self as a purely psychological entity whose origin and normal and pathological development I shall now briefly explore.

Jacobson (1971) and Mahler (1968); (Mahler et al., 1975) expanded our understanding of the genetic and developmental continuity that exists in a broad range of nonorganic psychopathology. Both Jacobson and Mahler used a structural concept. The regressive, pathological refusion and even fragmentation of self- and object representations in manic-depressive illnessand schizophrenia that Jacobson described correspond to the心理学空间 _9z6^k2USK7Q

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undifferentiated self- and object representations in the symbiotic psychosis of childhood Mahler described. Mahler's research on normal and pathological separation-individuation, and particularly her specifying the rapprochement subphase as related to borderline psychopathology, applied Jacobson's concept to the understanding of the incapacity to achieve object constancy in borderline conditions. Mahler provided the clinical evidence that permitted us to establish timetables for thedevelopmental stages of internalized object relations proposed by Jacobson. My own work on the pathology of internalizedobject relations of borderline conditions evolved in the context of that theoretical frame.心理学空间eG'ku
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Thus, it is now possible, within Freudian metapsychology, to hypothesize, developmentally and genetically, the relationbetween various types and degrees of psychopathology, on the one hand, and failure to achieve normal stages of integrationof internalized object relations and the self, on the other.

1. Psychotic illness is related to lack of differentiated self- and object representations, with a consequent blurring not only of boundaries between self- and object representations, but of ego boundaries as well. As a consequence, loss of reality testing is a key structural characteristic of psychosis.心理学空间8[HF.K~-j%AZb

2. Borderline conditions are characterized by differentiation between self- and object representations and therefore by the maintenance of reality testing, but also by an incapacity to synthesize the self as an integrated concept and the concepts of significant others. A predominance of splitting mechanisms and related dissociated or split-off, multiple self- and object representations characterizes the ego structure of these conditions, explains the defensive fixation at a level of lack of integration of the self, and the failure in the integration of thesuperego (Kernberg, 1975).心理学空间DxB#x F

3. My research into the psychopathology and treatment of narcissistic personalities has provided clinical evidence as well as theoretical considerations in support of the following ideas.心理学空间([_R3O MT

Although normal narcissism reflects the libidinal investment心理学空间W8]o3M.B&F!eD

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of the self (as defined earlier), the normal self actually constitutes a structure that has integrated libidinally and aggressively invested components. Integration of "good" and "bad" self-representations into a realistic self-concept that incorporates rather than dissociates the various component self-representations is a requisite for the libidinal investment of a normal self. This contributes to explaining the paradox that integration of love andhate is a prerequisite for the capacity for normal love.

The specific narcissistic resistances of patients with narcissistic character pathology reflect a pathologicalnarcissism that differs from both ordinary adult narcissism and fixation at or regression to normal infantilenarcissism. In contrast to the latter, pathological narcissism reflects libidinal investment not in a normal integrated self-structure, but in a pathological self-structure. This pathological grandiose self contains real self, ideal self, and ideal object representations. Devalued or aggressively determined self- and object representations are split-off or dissociated, repressed, or projected. The psychoanalytic resolution of thegrandiose self as part of a systematic analysis of narcissistic character resistances regularly brings to the surface—that is, activates in the transference—primitive object relations, conflicts, ego structures, and defensive operations characteristic of developmental stages that predate object constancy. These transferences, however, are always condensed with oedipally derived conflicts, so that they are strikingly similar to those of patients with borderline personality organization.心理学空间W5Z&Dq(LY3u

The resolution by psychoanalytic treatment of these primitive transferences and their related unconscious conflicts and defensive operations permits the gradual integration of contradictory self- and object representations reflecting libidinal and aggressive investments and, in the process, the integration and consolidation of a normal self. Simultaneously, object relations evolve from partial into total ones, object constancy can be achieved, and both pathological self-love and pathological investment of others resolved in the same process.

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I am suggesting that pathological narcissism can only be understood in terms of the vicissitudes of libidinal and aggressive drive derivatives; pathological narcissism does not simply reflect libidinal investment in the self in contrast to libidinal investment in objects or object representations, but libidinal investment in a pathological self-structure. Similarly, the structural characteristics of narcissistic personalities cannot be understood simply in terms of fixation at an early normal level of development or by the failure of certain intrapsychic structures to develop, but as a consequence of pathological ego and superego development, derived from pathological development of the self as now defined.心理学空间'y.y*Y.D1Om?

4. The lack of controversy regarding the concept of the self as it applies to the healthier spectrum of psychopathology reflects the clinical finding of an integrated self, and the capacity for object relations in depth as reflecting the achievement of object constancy of these patients. Neurotic patients present an integrated, normal self, centered upon the conscious and preconscious aspects of the ego, although includingunconscious aspects as well. This normal self is the supraordinate organizer of key ego functions such as reality testing, ego synthesis, and above all, a consistent and integrated concept of the self and of significant others. The fact that neurotic patients may have severe disturbances in their relations with others and yet are able to maintain an observing function of their ego, to present a "reasonable and cooperative ego" as part of their armamentarium for psychoanalytic treatment, is a reflection of their having available an integrated self.

5. This brings us, finally, to a concept of the normal self that, in contrast to the pathological grandiose self, emerges naturally as the tripartite intrapsychic structure is constructed and integrated. From both clinical and theoretical viewpoints, we can thus define the self as an integrated structure that has affective and cognitive components, a structure embedded in the ego, but derived from forerunners of the ego—intrapsychic substructures that predate the integration of the tripartite structure. Within心理学空间j
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the history of ego-psychological formulations, this view represents a gradual shift away from Rapaport's (1960)depersonified concept of the origins and characteristics of the tripartite structure. The repressive barriers that remain in effect, and that maintain the dynamic equilibrium of the tripartite structure, also maintain the shadowof unconscious influence and control over the self, not in terms of an abstract psychic energy conceived of along hydraulic models, but in terms of repressed internalized object relations, libidinally and aggressively invested, that strive for reactivation through invasion of the self's intrapsychic and interpersonal field.心理学空间h\0m.DT s dn.v

The concept of the self I am proposing remains harmoniously close to Freud's original concept of the Ich, the I, the ego. It remains in relation to and dependent on the dynamic unconscious as a constant underlying current influencing psychic functions.

SUMMARY

I have explored the concepts of self, ego, affects, and drives, with special emphasis on terminological confusions and Freud's use of Selbst and Ich. I have also proposed a modification of the dual instinct theory in the light of the relationbetween affect and drives. Finally, I have proposed a developmental model on the basis of all the above considerations, and stressed its relevance for the classification of nonorganic psychopathology.

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Article Citation [Who Cited This?]心理学空间qdocv!Ge7Wb-J

Kernberg, O.F. (1982). Self, Ego, Affects, and Drives. J. Amer. Psychoanal. Assn., 30:893-917心理学空间Ah Zs4q