Kernberg, O.F. (1982). Self, Ego, Affects, and Drives.
作者: Otto F. Kernberg / 7402次阅读 时间: 2011年11月13日
来源: (1982). Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Ass
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Kernberg, O.F. (1982). Self, Ego, Affects, and Drives. J. Amer. Psychoanal. Assn., 30:893-917.

 

(1982). Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 30:893-917

Self, Ego, Affects, and Drives


Otto F. Kernberg, M.D. 

IN WHAT FOLLOWS I SHALL EXAMINE certain issues having to do with the relation of the ego to the self, clarify my views on early development and structure formation, and suggest a modification of dual instinct theory. These issues will be explored with a particular focus on the psychopathology of narcissism and the classification of nonorganic psychopathology.

The Ego and the Self

Terminological Issues

A survey of the psychoanalytic literature on theories of the ego and concepts of the self reveals the existence of considerable terminological confusion. That the terms ego and self are sometimes used interchangeably, sometimes carefully distinguished from each other, and at other times treated ambiguously probably is due to the way Freud used these words, the way Strachey translated them, and the subsequent elaborations made on them by others.

Freud preserved throughout his writings the German

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Medical Director, The New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center, Westchester Division; Professor of Psychiatry, Cornell University Medical College; Training and Supervising Analyst, Columbia University Center for Psychoanalytic Training and Research.

Presented at the panel on "Psychoanalytic Theories of the Self," at the Fall Meeting of the American Psychoanalytic Association, New York, December, 1980.

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Ich—"I"—for the ego as both a mental structure and psychic agency, and also for the more personal, subjective, experiential "self." In other words, Freud never separated what we think of as the metapsychological ego from the experiencing self. His ambiguous use of Ich resulted in a sacrifice of clarity and precision, but it kept the meaning of Ichopen-ended.

The ambiguity resulting from Freud's use of Ich was compounded, it seems to me, by Strachey's decision to translate Ichinto "ego." The word ego has an impersonal quality that seems appropriate enough for Freud's structural theory (1923), but less fitting for the more personal, subjective "self."

To illustrate the ways in which Strachey translated Ich: In the general index to Freud's collected papers in German (G. W. 18, p. 557) under Selbst, it says "s. Ich" (see ego). In the "Outline of Psychoanalysis" (G. W., 17, p. 71) he talks about the contrast of "Ichliebe" and "Objektliebe," obviously self-love in contrast to object love. The Standard Edition, however (1940, p. 148), reads, "the contrast between ego-love and object-love."

In the same work, Freud talks about the alliance between the analyst and the weakened Ich of the patient and says "the sick 'Ich' promises us the fullest honesty … we assure it strict discretion…"The German edition (p. 98) reads:

Der analytische Arzt und das geschwächte Ich des Kranken sollen, an die reale Aussenwelt angelehnt, eine Partei bilden gegen die Feinde, die Triebansprüche des Es und die Gewissensansprüche des berichs. Wir schliessen einen Vertrag miteinander. Das kranke Ich verspricht uns vollste Aufrichtigkeit, d.h. die Verfügung über allen Stoff, den ihm seine Selbstwahrnehmung liefert, wir sichern ihm strengste Diskretion zu und stellen unsere Erfahrung in der Deutung des vom Unbewussten Beeinflussten Materials in seinen Dienst.

The English translation (1940, p. 173) has it: "The sick ego promises us the most complete candour—promises, that is, to put at our disposal all the material which its self-perception yields it; we assure the patient of the strictest discretion and

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place at his service our experience…" Here the term "sick ego" has been replaced by the assurance of the patient, clearly implying that Ich refers to the whole self. These shifts in the terms utilized in the translation tend to maintain the consistency of the concept of "ego" but do less than justice to Freud's own terminology.

Another passage in the "Outline" is more faithful, and conveys the "self" aspect of Freud's use of the term "ego." Freud states that when the Ich has successfully resisted a temptation it feels elevated or strengthened in its self-esteem and confirmed in its pride.The German reads (p. 137), "Auf der anderen Seite, wenn das Ich einer Versuchung erfolgreich widerstanden hat, etwas zu tun, was dem berich anstössig wäre, fühlt es sich in seinem Selbstgefühl gehoben und in seinem Stolz bestärkt, als ob es eine wertvolle Erwerbung gemacht hätte."The English translation states (1940, p. 206), "On theother hand, if the ego has successfully resisted a temptation to do something which would be objectionable to the super-ego, it feels raised in its self-esteem and strengthened in its pride, as though it had made some precious acquisition."

Naturally, there are innumerable examples of such uses of the word Ich before 1923, to designate subjective experience and self-esteem—what Rapaport might have critically designated the "anthropomorphization" of the concept ego. My point is that this characteristic—which I consider a strength, not a weakness of Freud's concept of Ich—persists throughout his entire work. The most dramatic example is probably his statement in Civilization and its Discontents(1930) where theStandard Edition, faithful to the German original, reads, "Normally, there is nothing of which we are more certain than the feeling of our self, of our own ego" (p. 65).The German version says (G. W. 14, p. 423), "Normalerweise ist uns nichts gesicherter als das Gefühl unseres Selbst, unseres eigenen Ichs."Here self and ego are explicitly equated! Perhaps Freud's equation gave Strachey cause for some uneasiness, for it was precisely at this point that he inserted a footnote calling the reader's attention to his remarks

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(in his introduction to The Ego and the Id) on Freud's use of "ego" and "self." These brief remarks constitute the only reference in the Standard Edition I have found to the problem. In an editorial footnote (Freud, 1923, p. 8), Strachey says:

In a few places in the Standard Edition where the sense seemed to demand it, 'das Ich' has been translated by 'the self'. There is a passage inCivilization and its Discontents(1930), towards the beginning of the fourth paragraph of Chapter 1, in which Freud himself explicitly equates 'das Selbst' and 'das Ich'. And, in the course of a discussion of the moral responsibility for dreams (1925), p. 133, below, he makes a clear distinction between the two uses of the German word 'Ich'.

But, pursuing the matter further, we find the following (p. 133): "what is unknown, unconscious and repressed in me is not my 'ego' …" with Strachey's footnote: "As Freud himself points out in the next paragraph, the German 'Ich' here stands for something more like the English 'self'." But the sentence Strachey is referring to in that next paragraph (which has to do with assuming responsibility for one's actions and says nothing about the ego and the self) states: "It is true that in the metapsychological sense this bad repressed content does not belong to my 'ego' … but to an 'id' upon which my ego is seated."

Strachey's effort to restrict the translation of Freud's Ich to "ego" has had an effect on our understanding of Freud'sthinking. I agree with Laplanche and Pontalis (1973), who, in their extensive discussion of this issue (pp. 131ff.), claim that Freud always maintained the ambiguity, the internal tension of his concept of the Ich—so fatefully translated into "ego" rather than "I" or "self"—to indicate its system properties as well as the fact that, as part of these system properties, the ego is the seat of consciousness and with it, the consciousness of one's self or of the self as a person.

A second source of difficulty is the use of "self" to describe the person or individual interacting with other persons or "objects," as in Hartmann's (1950) statement:

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But actually, in using the term narcissism, two different sets of opposites often seem to be fused into one. The one refers to the self (one's own person) in contradistinction to the object, the second to the ego (as a psychic system) in contradistinction to other substructures of personality. However, the opposite of object cathexis is not ego cathexis, but cathexis, of one's own person, that is, self-cathexis; in speaking of self-cathexis, we do not imply whether this cathexis is situated in the id, ego, or superego. This formulation takes into account that we actually do find "narcissism" in all three psychic systems; but in all of these cases there is opposition to (and reciprocity with) object cathexis. It therefore will be clarifying if we definenarcissism as the libidinal cathexis not of the ego but of the self. (It might also be useful to apply the term self-representation as opposed to objectrepresentation.) [p. 127].

Hartmann is here making a distinction that, as we shall see, permitted the development of Jacobson's (1964) crucial contributions to ego psychology, namely, the distinction between the self as the person and the intrapsychic representationof the person or self-representation, a third term requiring clarification.

Jacobson (1964), addressing these problems of terminological confusion, said, "They refer to the ambiguous use of the term ego; i.e., to the lack of distinction between the ego, which represents a structural mental system, the self, which I defined above, and the self representations. Hartmann (1950) … suggested the use of the latter term (analogous to object representations) for the unconscious, preconscious, and conscious endopsychic representations of the bodily and mental self in the system ego. I have worked with this concept for years, because I found it indispensable for the investigation of psychotic disorders" (pp. 18-19). Jacobson, in agreement with Hartmann, defines the self "as referring to the whole person of an individual, including his body and body parts as well as his psychic

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organization and its parts … the 'self' is an auxiliary descriptive term, which points to the person as a subject in distinction from the surrounding world of objects" (p. 6n).

It seems to me that Hartmann, by attempting to free the term "ego" from Freud's ambiguity, impoverished it. Like Strachey, he wanted to give the ego concept consistency. And in placing the "self" in contradistinction to the object, Hartmann in effect removed the "self" from metapsychology. The definition of "self" in the Glossary of Psychoanalytic Terms and Concepts(Moore and Fine, 1968) confirms this idea. It states: "The total person of an individual in reality, including his body and psychic organization; one's 'own person' as contrasted with 'other persons' and objects outside one's self. The 'self' is a common-sense concept; its clinical and metapsychological aspects are treated under self image, selfrepresentation, etc. See ego, identity, narcissism" (p. 88). To call the self a "common-sense concept" effectively removes it from psychoanalytic consideration. In my view, historically speaking, Hartmann's fateful separation of the concept of ego from self and of self from self-representation created a problem in the development of psychoanalytic theory, namely, the artificial separation of structural, experiential, and descriptive aspects of ego functions. This separation unnecessarily complicated conceptualizing the relations between "impersonal" ego functions, subjectivity, and character structure. For example, Jacobson's (1964) effort to develop a metapsychology of the experiential aspects of the self was made more difficult by what she felt was a need to differentiate, at every step, ego functions from self-functions, the affective investment of self-representations and object representations from diffuse activation of affects.

I therefore propose eliminating from further consideration, for the purpose of this discussion, the use of the concept of self as opposed to object. This concept of the self leads to psychosocial descriptions and to confusing psychoanalytic with sociological concepts, a confusion found in, for example, some of Erikson's writings.

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The replacement of the topographical by the structural model of the psychic apparatus led Freud to examine the roots of the ego in the id, as a surface precipitation of it, and to the idea that the ego was dependent on the apparatus ofperception and consciousness. The ego became an apparatus of regulation and adaptation to reality simultaneously with its carrying out defensive functions and compromise solutions to conflicts between the id, superego, and external reality. The structural perspective apparently reduced Freud's emphasis on the functions of self-awareness and self-feeling, on self-esteem regulation with the ego, or rather, some of these functions were temporarily understood mostly in terms of intersystemic conflicts.

However, Freud also maintained an ambiguity in his concept of the origins of the ego, and it is no coincidence that object-relations approaches as well as contemporary ego psychology have their origin in his formulation of the structure of the ego. His much-quoted statement in The Ego and the Id(1923) is still pertinent:

When it happens that a person has to give up a sexual object, there quite often ensues an alteration of his ego which can only be described as a setting up of the object inside the ego, as it occurs in melancholia; the exact nature of the substitution is as yet unknown to us. It may be that by thisintrojection, which is a kind of regression to the mechanism of the oral phase, the ego makes it easier for the object to be given up or renders that process possible. It may be that this identification is the sole condition under which the id can give up its objects. At any rate the process, especially in the early phases of development, is a very frequent one, and it makes it possible to suppose that the character of the ego is a precipitate of abandoned object-cathexes and that it contains the history of those object-choices [p. 29]

This is in consonance with Freud's (1914) paper "On Narcissism,"

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and with his understanding of the superego as also derived from the internalization of parental objects.

Jacobson rescued the self by elaborating on the concept of self-representation. And just as she found this concept indispensable for investigating psychotic disorders, so I have found it indispensable for understanding neurotic, borderline, and narcissistic pathology as well as normal development.

Insofar as the self as person is a psychosocial, behavioral, and interactional entity, I suggest replacing "self" with "character." Character reflects various configurations of normal or abnormal ego structure, expressed in repetitive behaviorpaterns. It is true that character defenses include the symbolic expression of self- and object representations, and have therefore, a self-representational quality as well, but the terms character defense, character formation, and characterstructure are more precise and clinically more useful than that of the "self" when referring to the "person."

I propose, instead, to reserve the term "self" for the sum total of self-representations in intimate connection with the sum total of object representations. In other words, I propose defining the self as an intrapsychic structure that originates from the ego and is clearly embedded in the ego. To conceptualize the self in this way is to remain close to Freud's implicit insistence that self and ego are indissolubly linked. The libidinal investment of the self—thus defined—is related to the libidinal investment of the representations of significant others, and the libidinal investment of one's own person corresponds to the libidinal investment of others (external objects). All these investments are related and reinforce each other.

Developmental Issues

It seems to me that the structural theory, particularly as developed by Jacobson (1964) and Mahler (1979), contains a rich and sophisticated developmental concept of the self, a contemporary elaboration of the dual aspects of Freud's Ich.

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There are two aspects of Freud's (1923) formulations regarding the origin of the ego that have been elaborated and gradually integrated with contemporary psychoanalytic formulations regarding earliest development. The first is his ideathat the ego differentiates from the id or an original undifferentiated ego-id matrix by its crystallization around the system perception-consciousness. The second is his suggestion that the character of the ego is a precipitate, by means ofinternalization, of the representations of instinctually invested objects. That the infant's perception and consciousnessshould be particularly activated at times of his actual interactions with mother, and that evolving instinctual investments of her should leave traces in the early ego's field of consciousness, is probably a broad enough statement to cover very contrasting psychoanalytic approaches. The differences, however, between competing psychoanalytic approaches focus on a number of issues that lead us directly to current controversies regarding the origin of the self (as I have redefined it).

1. Can we conceive an infant's capacity to differentiate himself from mother from the beginning of life? Melanie Klein (1946) and her followers (Segal, 1979); (Fairbairn, 1954) within the British "middle group," clearly appear to think so. In contrast, Jacobson, Mahler, myself, and also Winnicott (1958), (1965) question this idea, and assume an initially undifferentiated stage.

2. If an initially undifferentiated state of varying duration is assumed, does it contain a "purely narcissistic"primary omnipotent self-representation, or does it contain undifferentiated self-object representations? This question, apparently abstract, is nevertheless crucial, in my view, in terms of a contemporary metapsychology ofnarcissism.

Jacobson (1964) proposed restricting the term primary narcissism to the undifferentiated stage of development which she saw as one of undifferentiated drive cathexes of the "primary psychophysiological self," marked only by states of rising and diminishing tensions. At the same time, she considered the

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psychophysiological self a purely descriptive concept, unrelated to any further metapsychological considerations.

Jacobson saw the origin of the ego as intimately linked to the originally fused self-images and object images—to what I am calling the originally undifferentiated self-object representation in it. She saw this original fusedimage as invested by what, following Freud's terminology, she called "secondary narcissism." She here initiated what I think is the prevalent contemporary ego-psychology answer to this question, namely, that the first instinctual, particularly libidinal, investment is to an undifferentiated self-object representation. Later, the gradual differentiation of self- and object representations will determine a differentiated investment of libido(and aggression) as well. As differentiated self-representations and object representations are built up, so is libidinal investment in the self-representation and in the object representation.

With the differentiation of self and object, the investment of the external object is experienced as a continuation of the investment of the earlier, undifferentiated version of it. Object representations and external objects are now invested simultaneously and reinforce each other. This view, which contrasts with earlier psychoanalytic assumptions about a prolonged state of the infant's psychological isolation from the human environment, is reinforced by actual infant observation and the impressively early discriminatory reactions to environmental stimuli reflecting mother's interaction with him—more about this later.

Jacobson's formulation solves, in my view, the issue of the origin of instinctual investment of self and objects—the question of whether narcissism predates object investment or whether they occur simultaneously, and it linksstructure formation within the ego to the setting up of internalized representations of self and object as primaryorganizing substructures. It creates the basis for description of the vicissitudes of self- and object representations—multiple, contradictory, nonintegrated at first, gradually consolidating into integrated self- and object concepts.

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Jacobson's formulations contribute a theoretical background against which to view Mahler's (1979) research on autistic and symbiotic childhood psychosis—and on the stages of normal and abnormal separation-individuation. Mahler provides both direct observational and psychoanalytic data that permit one to trace the stages ofdevelopment Jacobson postulates.

However, Jacobson's pushing back the stage of "primary narcissism" to an assumed earliest phase of diffuse dischargeonto the "psychophysiological self" left obscure the issue of the origin and development of drives and theirrelation to instinctual investment of self- and object representations. Jacobson's formulation of self- and object investments assumes that the nature of libidinal and aggressive drives differs.

3. Still another question regarding the development of the ego and the self relates to the question of whether the self originates only from blissful states of merger with mother and their corresponding undifferentiated self-object representations, or whether it originates from the integration of such states with states of merger of self- and object representations under the impact of painful, frightening, frustrating, or even catastrophic experiences. This question is crucial because completely different developmental schemata evolve according to how one responds to it.

Probably all psychoanalysts who have dealt with this question would agree that the gratifying, blissful states constitute the core of the ego's self-feeling or self-experience. Some would go so far as to consider the building up of an integrated concept of the self on the basis of such early merger experiences as constituting the final, integrated, normal self.

In such a view, the normal self would reflect the appropriately toned-down derivative of the originally blissful merged self-object representation. According to this view, frustrating experiences and the aggression triggered by them would not be part of the original self, but part of the "not-me" experience, an external threat to the self, not intrinsically linked with it. Although

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Kohut has not actually formulated a comprehensive model of earliest development, his theory (1972), (1977) might fit this line of thinking. At a metapsychological level, this thinking permits omitting aggression from the structural analysis of ego and self-development.

The alternative concept is that self-development also occurs at times of heightened frustration and painful or traumatic experiences. Such experiences determine the building up of merged self-object representations under the aegis of frustrationand pain. These mental representations are invested with aggression. They will later evolve into frightening, aggressive, and devalued experiences of the self and into frightening, aggressive, sadistic representations of objects. They eventually lead to the existence of multiple contradictory self- and object representations that are a developmental challenge duringseparation-individuation, and explain the pathological fixation at the rapprochement subphase of development (Mahler, 1971) in which differentiated yet nonintegrated self-representations and contradictory representations of significant objects determine the syndrome of identity diffusion. In contrast, the normal integration of contradictory self- and object representations marks the transition from separation-individuation "toward object constancy."

This latter concept—of self-development under both libidinal and aggressive conditions—is common to Jacobson, Mahler, and myself, on the one hand, and also to Fairbairn and Klein; Winnicott's developmental model leaves the impression of a certain ambiguity in this regard. Because in Kleinian thinking the problem of self and object differentiation has hardly been explored (with the exception of a partial examination of this issue in one paper by Bick [1968]) the correlation of Jacobson's, Mahler's, and my views with Kleinian developmental schemata cannot really be achieved. Fairbairn's (1954)assumption of an integrated "pristine" ego from birth on raises other problems in terms of developmental timetables.

Speaking metapsychologically, the concept of the origin of

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self-representations and self-experience under the impact of both aggressively and libidinally invested states of merger leads to conceptualizing the self as the product of the eventual integration of such contradictory self-representations and, in the process, of the corresponding integration of the derivatives of libidinal and aggressive drive investments as well. In fact, the proposed model conceives of the self as invested with both libidinal and aggressive drive derivatives fused or integrated in the context of the integration of their component self-representations. This model solves the puzzling question of how psychic-structure formation, self-development, and instinctual developments correlate. It also suggests an explanation for the concept of neutralization of drives (Hartmann, 1955).

The self, then, is an ego structure that originates from self-representations first built up in the undifferentiatedsymbiotic phase in the context of infant-mother interactions under the influence of both gratifying and frustrating experiences. Simultaneously the system perception-consciousness evolves into broader ego functions as well—the developing control over perception, voluntary motility, the setting up of affective memory traces, and the system preconscious. The self as a psychic structure originates from both libidinally and aggressively invested self-representations. It is, in short, an ego function and structure that evolves gradually from the integration of its component self-representations into a supraordinate structure that incorporates other ego functions—such as memory and cognitive structures—and leads to the dual characteristics implied in Freud's Ich.

Motivational Forces: Drives, Affects, and Object Relations

It is no coincidence that the controversies in psychoanalysis about the concept of the self are so closely linked with the controversies over instinct theory, particularly the nature and role of aggression in early development. Analogous to the reaction to Freud's discoveries regarding infantile sexuality that

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imputed to psychoanalysis a morbid concern with an exaggerated view of sexuality, Freud's dual instinct theory has not ceased to arouse strong cultural reactions against the concept of aggression as a basic instinct. Imputed to "orthodox" psychoanalysts is a generally distinct, harsh, aggressive outlook on life as well as on patients' difficulties. Kohut's(1971), (1977) developmental model, emphasizing the central nature of the development of the cohesive self—the motivational force of which is not spelled out and only implied as a self-generating maturational drive—is the latest of many psychological and culturalist psychoanalytic theories that explicitly or implicitly reject instinct theory, particularly aggression, and the fundamental nature of the biological basis of human development.

Perhaps a failure to re-examine instinct theory in the light of new neuropsychological and observational-developmental data, particularly an insufficient re-examination of the relation between affects and drives, has contributed to the uncertainty in our field regarding the motivational forces of earliest development, and the origin and development of drives as overall motivational systems. That this is more than a purely theoretical issue, directly relevant to the discussion of the origin and development of the self, and, therefore, of narcissism, should be evident from what I have said so far about the development of earliest self- and object representations in the context of infant-mother interaction. What follows is an effort to integrate findings from contemporary neuropsychological studies of affects and research on infant development with a revised formulation of the dual instinct theory.

Affective behavior strongly influences object relations from birth on (Izard, 1978); (Izard and Buechler, 1979). A central biological function of inborn affective patterns—with their behavioral, communicative, and psychophysiological manifestations—is to signal to the environment (the mothering person) the infant's needs, and to thus initiatecommunication between the infant and mother that marks the beginning of intrapsychic life (Emde et al., 1978). Recent research has surprised us with

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the description of a high degree of differentiation in infant-mother communications that is present from very early on(Hoffman, 1978). Neuropsychological theorizing now assumes the storage of affective memory in the limbic cortex which, as direct brain stimulation experiments indicate, permits the reactivation not only of the cognitive, but also of the affective aspects of past experience, particularly the subjective affective coloring of that experience (Arnold, 1970). Affects, operating as the earliest motivational system, are therefore intimately linked with the fixation by memory of an internalized world of object relations (Kernberg, 1976).

If we assume that affective memory structures reflecting pleasurable relations of infant and mother, in which self- and object representatiwww.psychspace.com心理学空间网

«DEBATE BETWEEN KOHUT (HK) AND KERNBERG (OK) 科胡特与康伯格的争论 克恩伯格 | Otto F. Kernberg
《克恩伯格 | Otto F. Kernberg》
歐托·康伯格:一個結合»



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    [name] => 克恩伯格 | Otto F. Kernberg
    [note] => 欧托·康伯格/克恩伯格 Otto F. Kernberg, 1928-

欧托•康伯格1928年出生于奥地利,在智利受教育,在美国堪萨斯州,托匹卡的梅宁哲诊所接受进一步的精神医学训练,而纽约地区则是他临床与研究活动的根据地,而他也到世界各国演讲。他很可能是美国客体关系理论最具影响力却也颇受争议的提倡者(cf. Brody,1982)。
康伯格所开始着手要完成的两项理论上的目标是:(1) 把客理关系理论和精神分析本能理论整合,(2) 利用整合客体关系理论和本能理论所形成的概念模式来理解边缘型个案状况(以及边缘型状况的次型,自恋型人格)(Kernberg,1975,p.3;1976,p.131)。

康伯格的第一个目标,即对古典弗洛依德冲动理论和客体关系理论做一深具野心的结合,是传统重本能的,以原我、自我与超我三位一体为模式而和客体关系理论调和的一项企图。有些评论家认为他的结合是修正主义者,并没有完全成功(Calef & Weinshel,1979;Klein & Tribich,1981)。然而,大部分的理论家同意康伯格在他的第二个目标上是成功的。他提出对边缘型个案病理学理解的一项重大页献。就如同弗洛依德从精神官能症的临床经验中孕育出理论及费尔邦从其对类分裂型人格所从事的工作般,康伯格的著作大部分围绕着他对边缘型病人所做的治疗。这项临床工作丰富了他的努力而建构出一套模式以整合并结合传统精神分析与客体关系理论。

阅读康伯格的著作有许多困难,他的三本主要著作(1975,1976,1980)都是论文集且彼此并不必然相关。他的文笔是很浓缩性及技术性,其用词和本能模式中所用的一样,但表达的意义却经常不同于传统。
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