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^0A Perspective on Judgment and Choice心理学空间fy3JWB@

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Z0Mapping Bounded Rationality心理学空间sc`&zFL^pJ

Daniel Kahneman

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KQ.M V1i(KL9d0SUMMARY心理学空间q4y)_5wm*{W

/^'Q)O}K%A yE8\0Early studies of intuitive judgment and decision makingconducted with the late Amos Tversky are reviewed in thecontext of two related concepts: an analysis of accessibility, the ease with which thoughts come to mind; a distinction between effortless intuition and deliberate reasoning.Intuitive thoughts, like percepts, are highly accessible. Determinants and consequences of accessibility help explainthe central results of prospect theory, framing effects, theheuristic process of attribute substitution, and the characteristic biases that result from the substitution of nonextensional for extensional attributes. Variations in the accessibility of rules explain the occasional corrections of intuitivejudgments. The study of biases is compatible with a view ofintuitive thinking and decision making as generally skilledand successful.

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