本书采用的视角中包含了一个假设,认为心理状态与大脑状态其实是等价的。这是一种未得到普遍青睐的假说,更不要说被人们接受了。值得一提的是人们不接纳这一假说的原因。
In the physical world, of which the brain is unequivocally a part, equivalence and identity are defined by physical attributes such as mass, dimensions, movement, charge, and so forth. Those who reject the identity between physical states and mental states suggest that while a brain map that corresponds to a particular physical object can be discussed in physical terms, it would be absurd to discuss the respective mental pattern in physical terms. The reason given is that to date science has not been able to determine the physical attributes of mental patterns, and if science cannot do so, then the mental cannot be identified with the physical. I fear, however, that this reasoning may not be sound. Let me explain why I think so.