Freud 1914 On Narcissism: An Introduction
作者: freud / 14776次阅读 时间: 2009年10月18日
标签: Freud freud FREUD Freud1914 Introduction Narcissism NARCISSISM
The term narcissism is derived from clinical description and was chosen  by Paul Näcke in 1899  to denote the attitude of a person who treats his own body in the same  way in which the body of a sexual object is ordinarily treated - who  looks at it, that is to say, strokes it and fondles it till he obtains  complete satisfaction through these activities. Developed to this  degree, narcissism has the significance of a perversion that has  absorbed the whole of the subject's sexual life, and it will  consequently exhibit the characteristics which we expect to meet with in  the study of all perversions.心理学空间m6U7Wr/^ai$rj

n5w.U hj#|ku0Psycho-analytic observers were subsequently struck by the fact that  individual features of the narcissistic attitude are found in many  people who suffer from other disorders - for instance, as Sadger has  pointed out, in homosexuals - and finally it seemed probable that an  allocation of the libido such as deserved to be described as narcissism  might be present far more extensively, and that it might claim a place  in the regular course of human sexual development.1Difficulties in psycho-analytic work upon neurotics led to the same  supposition, for it seemed as though this kind of narcissistic attitude  in them constituted one of the limits to their susceptibility to  influence. Narcissism in this sense would not be a perversion, but the  libidinal complement to the egoism of the instinct of self-preservation,  a measure of which may justifiably be attributed to every living  creature.心理学空间R@)c%t$eu

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 A pressing motive for occupying ourselves with the conception of a  primary and normal narcissism arose when the attempt was made to subsume  what we know of dementia praecox (Kraepelin) or schizophrenia (Bleuler)  under the hypothesis of the libido theory. Patients of this kind, whom I  have proposed to term paraphrenics, display two fundamental  characteristics: megalomania and diversion of their interest from the  external world - from people and things. In consequence of the latter  change, they become inaccessible to the influence of psycho-analysis and  cannot be cured by our efforts. But the paraphrenic's turning away from  the external world needs to be more precisely characterized. A patient  suffering from hysteria or obsessional neurosis has also, as far as his  illness extends, given up his relation to reality. But analysis shows  that he has by no means broken off his erotic relations to people and  things. He still retains them in phantasy; i.e. he has, on the one hand,  substituted for real objects imaginary ones from his memory, or has  mixed the latter with the former; and on the other hand, he has  renounced the initiation of motor activities for the attainment of his  aims in connection with those objects. Only to this condition of the  libido may we legitimately apply the term 慽ntroversion?of the libido  which is used by Jung indiscriminately. It is otherwise with the  paraphrenic. He seems really to have withdrawn his libido from people  and things in the external world, without replacing them by others in  phantasy. When he does so replace them, the process seems to be a  secondary one and to be part of an attempt at recovery, designed to lead  the libido back to objects.?心理学空间 V3c|dN#Oh)T^n

+]1e H/z:oT)u8`ur0The question arises: What happens to the libido which has been withdrawn  from external objects in schizophrenia? The megalomania characteristic  of these states points the way. This megalomania has no doubt come into  being at the expense of object-libido. The libido that has been  withdrawn from the external world has been directed to the ego and thus  gives rise to an attitude which may be called narcissism. But the  megalomania itself is no new creation; on the contrary, it is, as we  know, a magnification and plainer manifestation of a condition which had  already existed previously. This leads us to look upon the narcissism  which arises through the drawing in of object-cathexes as a secondary  one, superimposed upon a primary narcissism that is obscured by a number  of different influences.
:bYq7E9sDsY[0?In connection with this see my discussion of the 慹nd of the world?in  the analysis of Senatspr鋝ident Schreber; also Abraham, 1908.
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S,n#qmLrVy,?0 Let me insist that I am not proposing here to explain or  penetrate further into the problem of schizophrenia, but that I am  merely putting together what has already been said elsewhere, in order  to justify the introduction of the concept of narcissism.心理学空间hX:z6c)Ia/x
This extension of the libido theory - in my opinion, a legitimate one -  receives reinforcement from a third quarter, namely, from our  observations and views on the mental life of children and primitive  peoples. In the latter we find characteristics which, if they occurred  singly, might be put down to megalomania: an over-estimation of the  power of their wishes and mental acts, the 憃mnipotence of thoughts? a  belief in the thaumaturgic force of words, and a technique for dealing  with the external world - 憁agic?- which appears to be a logical  application of these grandiose premisses.?In the children of to-day,  whose development is much more obscure to us, we expect to find an  exactly analogous attitude towards the external world.?Thus we form the  idea of there being an original libidinal cathexis of the ego, from  which some is later given off to objects, but which fundamentally  persists and is related to the object-cathexes much as the body of an  amoeba is related to the pseudopodia which it puts out. In our  researches, taking, as they did, neurotic symptoms for their  starting-point, this part of the allocation of libido necessarily  remained hidden from us at the outset. All that we noticed were the  emanations of this libido - the object-cathexes, which can be sent out  and drawn back again. We see also, broadly speaking, an antithesis  between ego-libido and object-libido. The more of the one is employed,  the more the other becomes depleted. The highest phase of development of  which object-libido is capable is seen in the state of being in love,  when the subject seems to give up his own personality in favour of an  object-cathexis; while we have the opposite condition in the paranoic's  phantasy (or self-perception) of the 慹nd of the world??Finally, as  regards the differentiation of psychical energies, we are led to the  conclusion that to begin with, during the state of narcissism, they  exist together and that our analysis is too coarse to distinguish  between them; not until there is object-cathexis is it possible to  discriminate a sexual energy - the libido - from an energy of the  ego-instincts.心理学空间 An?es`+S-{ ]
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?Cf. the passages in my Totem and Taboo (1912-13) which deal with this  subject.
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? There are two mechanisms of this 慹nd of the world?idea: in the one  case, the whole libidinal cathexis flows off to the loved object; in the  other, it all flows back into the ego.心理学空间(qntRiQ(R"~o`
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Fyz/A0k4`E}hK"As0 Before going any further I must touch on two questions which  lead us to the heart of the difficulties of our subject. In the first  place, what is the relation of the narcissism of which we are now  speaking to auto-erotism, which we have described as an early state of  the libido? Secondly, if we grant the ego a primary cathexis of libido,  why is there any necessity for further distinguishing a sexual libido  from a non-sexual energy of the ego-instincts? Would not the postulation  of a single kind of psychical energy save us all the difficulties of  differentiating an energy of the ego-instincts from ego-libido, and  ego-libido from object-libido?心理学空间l&c+uwu)iBd

:Fg UCS0As regards the first question, I may point out that we are bound to  suppose that a unity comparable to the ego cannot exist in the  individual from the start; the ego has to be developed. The auto-erotic  instincts, however, are there from the very first; so there must be  something added to auto-erotism - a new psychical action - in order to  bring about narcissism.
R.[7P} F H0To be asked to give a definite answer to the second question must  occasion perceptible uneasiness in every psycho-analyst. One dislikes  the thought of abandoning observation for barren theoretical  controversy, but nevertheless one must not shirk an attempt at  clarification. It is true that notions such as that of an ego-libido, an  energy of the ego-instincts, and so on, are neither particularly easy to  grasp, nor sufficiently rich in content; a speculative theory of the  relations in question would begin by seeking to obtain a sharply defined  concept as its basis. But I am of opinion that that is just the  difference between a speculative theory and a science erected on  empirical interpretation. The latter will not envy speculation its  privilege of having a smooth, logically unassailable foundation, but  will gladly content itself with nebulous, scarcely imaginable basic  concepts, which it hopes to apprehend more clearly in the course of its  development, or which it is even prepared to replace by others. For  these ideas are not the foundation of science, upon which everything  rests: that foundation is observation alone. They are not the bottom but  the top of the whole structure, and they can be replaced and discarded  without damaging it. The same thing is happening in our day in the  science of physics, the basic notions of which as regards matter,  centres of force, attraction, etc., are scarcely less debatable than the  corresponding notions in psycho-analysis.
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The value of the concepts 慹go-libido?and 憃bject-libido?lies in the fact  that they are derived from the study of the intimate characteristics of  neurotic and psychotic processes. A differentiation of libido into a  kind which is proper to the ego and one which is attached to objects is  an unavoidable corollary to an original hypothesis which distinguished  between sexual instincts and ego-instincts. At any rate, analysis of the  pure transference neuroses (hysteria and obsessional neurosis) compelled  me to make this distinction and I only know that all attempts to account  for these phenomena by other means have been completely unsuccessful.心理学空间A KYQ T]8x(` x-X{8o

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 In the total absence of any theory of the instincts which would  help us to find our bearings, we may be permitted, or rather, it is  incumbent upon us, to start off by working out some hypothesis to its  logical conclusion, until it either breaks down or is confirmed. There  are various points in favour of the hypothesis of there having been from  the first a separation between sexual instincts and others,  ego-instincts, besides the serviceability of such a hypothesis in the  analysis of the transference neuroses. I admit that this latter  consideration alone would not be unambiguous, for it might be a question  of an indifferent psychical energy which only becomes libido through the  act of cathecting an object. But, in the first place, the distinction  made in this concept corresponds to the common, popular distinction  between hunger and love. In the second place, there are biological  considerations in its favour. The individual does actually carry on a  twofold existence: one to serve his own purposes and the other as a link  in a chain, which he serves against his will, or at least involuntarily.  The individual himself regards sexuality as one of his own ends; whereas  from another point of view he is an appendage to his germ plasm, at  whose disposal he puts his energies in return for a bonus of pleasure.  He is the mortal vehicle of a (possibly) immortal substance - like the  inheritor of an entailed property, who is only the temporary holder of  an estate which survives him. The separation of the sexual instincts  from the ego-instincts would simply reflect this twofold function of the  individual. Thirdly, we must recollect that all our provisional ideas in  psychology will presumably some day be based on an organic substructure.  This makes it probable that it is special substances and chemical  processes which perform the operations of sexuality and provide for the  extension of individual life into that of the species. We are taking  this probability into account in replacing the special chemical  substances by special psychical forces.心理学空间 r.Xz;ae,z6|
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 I try in general to keep psychology clear from everything that  is different in nature from it, even biological lines of thought. For  that very reason I should like at this point expressly to admit that the  hypothesis of separate ego-instincts and sexual instincts (that is to  say, the libido theory) rests scarcely at all upon a psychological  basis, but derives its principal support from biology. But I shall be  consistent enough to drop this hypothesis if psycho-analytic work should  itself produce some other, more serviceable hypothesis about the  instincts. So far, this has not happened. It may turn out that, most  basically and on the longest view, sexual energy - libido - is only the  product of a differentiation in the energy at work generally in the  mind. But such an assertion has no relevance. It relates to matters  which are so remote from the problems of our observation, and of which  we have so little cognizance, that it is as idle to dispute it as to  affirm it; this primal identity may well have as little to do with our  analytic interests as the primal kinship of all the races of mankind has  to do with the proof of kinship required in order to establish a legal  right of inheritance. All these speculations take us nowhere. Since we  cannot wait for another science to present us with the final conclusions  on the theory of the instincts, it is far more to the purpose that we  should try to see what light may be thrown upon this basic problem of  biology by a synthesis of the psychological phenomena. Let us face the  possibility of error; but do not let us be deterred from pursuing the  logical implications of the hypothesis we first adopted of an antithesis  between ego-instincts and sexual instincts (a hypothesis to which we  were forcibly led by analysis of the transference neuroses), and from  seeing whether it turns out to be without contradictions and fruitful,  and whether it can be applied to other disorders as well, such as  schizophrenia.心理学空间*b"P1? V${8k-ADrza


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 It would, of course, be a different matter if it were proved  that the libido theory has already come to grief in the attempt to  explain the latter disease. This has been asserted by C. G. Jung (1912)  and it is on that account that I have been obliged to enter upon this  last discussion, which I would gladly have been spared. I should have  preferred to follow to its end the course embarked upon in the analysis  of the Schreber case without any discussion of its premisses. But Jung's  assertion is, to say the least of it, premature. The grounds he gives  for it are scanty. In the first place, he appeals to an admission of my  own that I myself have been obliged, owing to the difficulties of the  Schreber analysis, to extend the concept of libido (that is, to give up  its sexual content) and to identify libido with psychical interest in  general. Ferenczi (1913b), in an exhaustive criticism of Jung's work,  has already said all that is necessary in correction of this erroneous  interpretation. I can only corroborate his criticism and repeat that I  have never made any such retractation of the libido theory. Another  argument of Jung's, namely, that we cannot suppose that the withdrawal  of the libido is in itself enough to bring about the loss of the normal  function of reality, is no argument but a dictum. It 慴egs the  question??and saves discussion; for whether and how this is possible was  precisely the point that should have been under investigation. In his  next major work, Jung (1913) just misses the solution I had long since  indicated: 慉t the same time? he writes, 憈here is this to be further  taken into consideration (a point to which, incidentally, Freud refers  in his work on the Schreber case) - that the introversion of the libido  sexualis leads to a cathexis of the "ego", and that it may possibly be  this that produces the result of a loss of reality. It is indeed a  tempting possibility to explain the psychology of the loss of reality in  this fashion.?But Jung does not enter much further into a discussion of  this possibility. A few lines later he dismisses it with the remark that  this determinant 憌ould result in the psychology of an ascetic anchorite,  not in a dementia praecox? How little this inapt analogy can help us to  decide the question may be learnt from the consideration that an  anchorite of this kind, who 憈ries to eradicate every trace of sexual  interest?(but only in the popular sense of the word 憇exual?, does not  even necessarily display any pathogenic allocation of the libido. He may  have diverted his sexual interest from human beings entirely, and yet  may have sublimated it into a heightened interest in the divine, in  nature, or in the animal kingdom, without his libido having undergone an  introversion on to his phantasies or a return to his ego. This analogy  would seem to rule out in advance the possibility of differentiating  between interest emanating from erotic sources and from others. Let us  remember, further, that the researches of the Swiss school, however  valuable, have elucidated only two features in the picture of dementia  praecox - the presence in it of complexes known to us both in healthy  and neurotic subjects, and the similarity of the phantasies that occur  in it to popular myths - but that they have not been able to throw any  further light on the mechanism of the disease. We may repudiate Jung's  assertion, then, that the libido theory has come to grief in the attempt  to explain dementia praecox, and that it is therefore disposed of for  the other neuroses as well.
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Certain special difficulties seem to me to lie in the way of a direct  study of narcissism. Our chief means of access to it will probably  remain the analysis of the paraphrenias. Just as the transference  neuroses have enabled us to trace the libidinal instinctual impulses, so  dementia praecox and paranoia will give us an insight into the  psychology of the ego. Once more, in order to arrive at an understanding  of what seems so simple in normal phenomena, we shall have to turn to  the field of pathology with its distortions and exaggerations. At the  same time, other means of approach remain open to us, by which we may  obtain a better knowledge of narcissism. These I shall now discuss in  the following order: the study of organic disease, of hypochondria and  of the erotic life of the sexes.心理学空间'B vT?$X s7k/a
In estimating the influence of organic disease upon the distribution of  libido, I follow a suggestion made to me orally by S醤dor Ferenczi. It is  universally known, and we take it as a matter of course, that a person  who is tormented by organic pain and discomfort gives up his interest in  the things of the external world, in so far as they do not concern his  suffering. Closer observation teaches us that he also withdraws  libidinal interest from his love-objects: so long as he suffers, he  ceases to love. The commonplace nature of this fact is no reason why we  should be deterred from translating it into terms of the libido theory.  We should then say:(the sick man withdraws his libidinal cathexes back  upon his own ego, and sends them out again when he recovers. 慍oncentrated  is his soul? says Wilhelm Busch of the poet suffering from toothache, 慽n  his molar's narrow hole.?Here libido and ego-interest share the same  fate and are once more indistinguishable from each other. The familiar  egoism of the sick person covers both. We find it so natural because we  are certain that in the same situation we should behave in just the same  way. The way in which a lover's feelings, however strong, are banished  by bodily ailments, and suddenly replaced by complete indifference, is a  theme which has been exploited by comic writers to an appropriate  extent.心理学空间-z[\(G;_T

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The condition of sleep, too, resembles illness in implying a  narcissistic withdrawal of the positions of the libido on to the  subject's own self, or, more precisely, on to the single wish to sleep.  The egoism of dreams fits very well into this context. In both states we  have, if nothing else, examples of changes in the distribution of libido  that are consequent upon an alteration of the ego.心理学空间,?1FYs6x

?p6VG U%F @0Hypochondria, like organic disease, manifests itself in distressing and  painful bodily sensations, and it has the same effect as organic disease  on the distribution of libido. The hypochondriac withdraws both interest  and libido - the latter specially markedly - from the objects of the  external world and concentrates both of them upon the organ that is  engaging his attention. A difference between hypochondria and organic  disease now becomes evident: in the latter, the distressing sensations  are based upon demonstrable changes; in the former, this is not so. But  it would be entirely in keeping with our general conception of the  processes of neurosis if we decided to say that hypochondria must be  right: organic changes must be supposed to be present in it, too.心理学空间 VwJEB@
But what could these changes be? We will let ourselves be guided at this  point by our experience, which shows that bodily sensations of an  unpleasurable nature, comparable to those of hypochondria, occur in the  other neuroses as well. I have said before that I am inclined to class  hypochondria with neurasthenia and anxiety-neurosis as a third 慳ctual?neurosis.  It would probably not be going too far to suppose that in the case of  the other neuroses a small amount of hypochondria was regularly formed  at the same time as well. We have the best example of this, I think, in  anxiety neurosis with its superstructure of hysteria. Now the familiar  prototype of an organ that is painfully tender, that is in some way  changed and that is yet not diseased in the ordinary sense, is the  genital organ in its states of excitation. In that condition it becomes  congested with blood, swollen and humected, and is the seat of a  multiplicity of sensations. Let us now, taking any part of the body,  describe its activity of sending sexually exciting stimuli to the mind  as its 慹rotogenicity? and let us further reflect that the considerations  on which our theory of sexuality was based have long accustomed us to  the notion that certain other parts of the body - the 慹rotogenic?zones -  may act as substitutes for the genitals and behave analogously to them.  We have then only one more step to take. We can decide to regard  erotogenicity as a general characteristic of all organs and may then  speak of an increase or decrease of it in a particular part of the body.  For every such change in the erotogenicity of the organs there might  then be a parallel change of libidinal cathexis in the ego. Such factors  would constitute what we believe to underlie hypochondria and what may  have the same effect upon the distribution of libido as is produced by a  material illness of the organs.
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7q Z\6YRphy(J0We see that, if we follow up this line of thought, we come up against  the problem not only of hypochondria, but of the other 慳ctual?neuroses -  neurasthenia and anxiety neurosis. Let us therefore stop at this point.  It is not within the scope of a purely psychological inquiry to  penetrate so far behind the frontiers of physiological research. I will  merely mention that from this point of view we may suspect that the  relation of hypochondria to paraphrenia is similar to that of the other  慳ctual?neuroses to hysteria and obsessional neurosis: we may suspect,  that is, that it is dependent on ego-libido just as the others are on  object-libido, and that hypochondriacal anxiety is the counterpart, as  coming from ego-libido, to neurotic anxiety. Further, since we are  already familiar with the idea that the mechanism of falling ill and of  the formation of symptoms in the transference neuroses - the path from  introversion to regression - is to be linked to a damming-up of object-libido,?we  may come to closer quarters with the idea of a damming-up of ego-libido  as well and may bring this idea into relation with the phenomena of  hypochondria and paraphrenia.心理学空间v-l*PS&l$e@d

8] b6DT1XR j0At this point, our curiosity will of course raise the question why this  damming-up of libido in the ego should have to be experienced as  unpleasurable. I shall content myself with the answer that unpleasure is  always the expression of a higher degree of tension, and that therefore  what is happening is that a quantity in the field of material events is  being transformed here as elsewhere into the psychical quality of  unpleasure. Nevertheless it may be that what is decisive for the  generation of unpleasure is not the absolute magnitude of the material  event, but rather some particular function of that absolute magnitude.  Here we may even venture to touch on the question of what makes it  necessary at all for our mental life to pass beyond the limits of  narcissism and to attach the libido to objects. The answer which would  follow from our line of thought would once more be that this necessity  arises when the cathexis of the ego with libido exceeds a certain  amount. A strong egoism is a protection against falling ill, but in the  last resort we must begin to love in order not to fall ill, and we are  bound to fall ill if, in consequence of frustration, we are unable to  love. This follows somewhat on the lines of Heine's picture of the  psychogenesis of the Creation:心理学空间UP"O'eR;W4[ivaH

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4\Ke`)X V5R0We have recognized our mental apparatus as being first and foremost a  device designed for mastering excitations which would otherwise be felt  as distressing or would have pathogenic effects. Working them over in  the mind helps remarkably towards an internal draining away of  excitations which are incapable of direct discharge outwards, or for  which such a discharge is for the moment undesirable. In the first  instance, however, it is a matter of indifference whether this internal  process of working-over is carried out upon real or imaginary objects.  The difference does not appear till later - if the turning of the libido  on to unreal objects (introversion) has led to its being dammed up. In  paraphrenics, megalomania allows of a similar internal working-over of  libido which has returned to the ego; perhaps it is only when the  megalomania fails that the damming-up of libido in the ego becomes  pathogenic and starts the process of recovery which gives us the  impression of being a disease.
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I shall try here to penetrate a little further into the mechanism of  paraphrenia and shall bring together those views which already seem to  me to deserve consideration. The difference between paraphrenic  affections and the transference neuroses appears to me to lie in the  circumstance that, in the former, the libido that is liberated by  frustration does not remain attached to objects in phantasy, but  withdraws on to the ego. Megalomania would accordingly correspond to the  psychical mastering of this latter amount of libido, and would thus be  the counterpart of the introversion on to phantasies that is found in  the transference neuroses; a failure of this psychical function gives  rise to the hypochondria of paraphrenia and this is homologous to the  anxiety of the transference neuroses. We know that this anxiety can be  resolved by further psychical working over, i.e. by conversion,  reaction-formation or the construction of protections (phobias). The  corresponding process in paraphrenics is an attempt at restoration, to  which the striking manifestations of the disease are due. Since  paraphrenia frequently, if not usually, brings about only a partial  detachment of the libido from objects, we can distinguish three groups  of phenomena in the clinical picture: (1) those representing what  remains of a normal state or of neurosis (residual phenomena); (2) those  representing the morbid process (detachment of libido from its objects  and, further, megalomania, hypochondria, affective disturbance and every  kind of regression); (3) those representing restoration, in which the  libido is once more attached to objects, after the manner of a hysteria  (in dementia praecox or paraphrenia proper), or of an obsessional  neurosis (in paranoia). This fresh libidinal cathexis differs from the  primary one in that it starts from another level and under other  conditions. The difference between the transference neuroses brought  about in the case of this fresh kind of libidinal cathexis and the  corresponding formations where the ego is normal should be able to  afford us the deepest insight into the structure of our mental  apparatus.

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%~NCsE*g0I shall try here to penetrate a little further into the mechanism of  paraphrenia and shall bring together those views which already seem to  me to deserve consideration. The difference between paraphrenic  affections and the transference neuroses appears to me to lie in the  circumstance that, in the former, the libido that is liberated by  frustration does not remain attached to objects in phantasy, but  withdraws on to the ego. Megalomania would accordingly correspond to the  psychical mastering of this latter amount of libido, and would thus be  the counterpart of the introversion on to phantasies that is found in  the transference neuroses; a failure of this psychical function gives  rise to the hypochondria of paraphrenia and this is homologous to the  anxiety of the transference neuroses. We know that this anxiety can be  resolved by further psychical working over, i.e. by conversion,  reaction-formation or the construction of protections (phobias). The  corresponding process in paraphrenics is an attempt at restoration, to  which the striking manifestations of the disease are due. Since  paraphrenia frequently, if not usually, brings about only a partial  detachment of the libido from objects, we can distinguish three groups  of phenomena in the clinical picture: (1) those representing what  remains of a normal state or of neurosis (residual phenomena); (2) those  representing the morbid process (detachment of libido from its objects  and, further, megalomania, hypochondria, affective disturbance and every  kind of regression); (3) those representing restoration, in which the  libido is once more attached to objects, after the manner of a hysteria  (in dementia praecox or paraphrenia proper), or of an obsessional  neurosis (in paranoia). This fresh libidinal cathexis differs from the  primary one in that it starts from another level and under other  conditions. The difference between the transference neuroses brought  about in the case of this fresh kind of libidinal cathexis and the  corresponding formations where the ego is normal should be able to  afford us the deepest insight into the structure of our mental  apparatus.


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We have, however, not concluded that human beings are divided into two  sharply differentiated groups, according as their object-choice conforms  to the anaclitic or to the narcissistic type; we assume rather that both  kinds of object-choice are open to each individual, though he may show a  preference for one or the other. We say that a human being has  originally two sexual objects - himself and the woman who nurses him -  and in doing so we are postulating a primary narcissism in everyone,  which may in some cases manifest itself in a dominating fashion in his  object-choice.心理学空间 V5M,e'Od

SqS1\P GE0A comparison of the male and female sexes then shows that there are  fundamental differences between them in respect of their type of  object-choice, although these differences are of course not universal.  Complete object-love of the attachment type is, properly speaking,  characteristic of the male. It displays the marked sexual overvaluation  which is doubtless derived from the child's original narcissism and thus  corresponds to a transference of that narcissism to the sexual object.  This sexual overvaluation is the origin of the peculiar state of being  in love, a state suggestive of a neurotic compulsion, which is thus  traceable to an impoverishment of the ego as regards libido in favour of  the love-object. A different course is followed in the type of female  most frequently met with, which is probably the purest and truest one.  With the onset of puberty the maturing of the female sexual organs,  which up till then have been in a condition of latency, seems to bring  about an intensification of the original narcissism, and this is  unfavourable to the development of a true object-choice with its  accompanying sexual overvaluation. Women, especially if they grow up  with good looks, develop a certain self-contentment which compensates  them for the social restrictions that are imposed upon them in their  choice of object. Strictly speaking, it is only themselves that such  women love with an intensity comparable to that of the man's love for  them. Nor does their need lie in the direction of loving, but of being  loved; and the man who fulfils this condition is the one who finds  favour with them. The importance of this type of woman for the erotic  life of mankind is to be rated very high. Such women have the greatest  fascination for men, not only for aesthetic reasons, since as a rule  they are the most beautiful, but also because of a combination of  interesting psychological factors. For it seems very evident that  another person's narcissism has a great attraction for those who have  renounced part of their own narcissism and are in search of object-love.  The charm of a child lies to a great extent in his narcissism, his  self-contentment and inaccessibility, just as does the charm of certain  animals which seem not to concern themselves about us, such as cats and  the large beasts of prey. Indeed, even great criminals and humorists, as  they are represented in literature, compel our interest by the  narcissistic consistency with which they manage to keep away from their  ego anything that would diminish it. It is as if we envied them for  maintaining a blissful state of mind - an unassailable libidinal  position which we ourselves have since abandoned. The great charm of  narcissistic women has, however, its reverse side; a large part of the  lover's dissatisfaction, of his doubts of the woman's love, of his  complaints of her enigmatic nature, has its root in this incongruity  between the types of object-choice.
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kl2q5K%D-^ U0Perhaps it is not out of place here to give an assurance that this  description of the feminine form of erotic life is not due to my  tendentious desire on my part to depreciate women. Apart from the fact  that tendentiousness is quite alien to me, I know that these different  lines of development correspond to the differentiation of functions in a  highly complicated biological whole; further, I am ready to admit that  there are quite a number of women who love according to the masculine  type and who also develop the sexual overvaluation proper to that type.
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Even for narcissistic women, whose attitude towards men remains cool,  there is a road which leads to complete object-love. In the child which  they bear, a part of their own body confronts them like an extraneous  object, to which, starting out from their narcissism, they can then give  complete object-love. There are other women, again, who do not have to  wait for a child in order to take the step in development from  (secondary) narcissism to object-love. Before puberty they feel  masculine and develop some way along masculine lines; after this trend  has been cut short on their reaching female maturity, they still retain  the capacity of longing for a masculine ideal - an ideal which is in  fact a survival of the boyish nature that they themselves once  possessed.心理学空间 y};y'S F erR
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What I have so far said by way of indication may be concluded by a short  summary of the paths leading to the choice of an object.
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(1) According to the narcissistic type:心理学空间0y&Z3R&Q:@Cvi
(a) what he himself is (i.e. himself),心理学空间3~0}D4oM qNM6p
(b) what he himself was,
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(b) the man who protects him,
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The significance of narcissistic object-choice for homosexuality in men  must be considered in another connection.心理学空间,G1x6y7T-H0T%L&qg

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7XT5{D U4_:N0The primary narcissism of children which we have assumed and which forms  one of the postulates of our theories of the libido, is less easy to  grasp by direct observation than to confirm by inference from elsewhere.  If we look at the attitude of affectionate parents towards their  children, we have to recognize that it is a revival and reproduction of  their own narcissism, which they have long since abandoned. The  trustworthy pointer constituted by overvaluation, which we have already  recognized as a narcissistic stigma in the case of object-choice,  dominates, as we all know, their emotional attitude. Thus they are under  a compulsion to ascribe every perfection to the child - which sober  observation would find no occasion to do - and to conceal and forget all  his shortcomings. (Incidentally, the denial of sexuality in children is  connected with this.) Moreover, they are inclined to suspend in the  child's favour the operation of all the cultural acquisitions which  their own narcissism has been forced to respect, and to renew on his  behalf the claims to privileges which were long ago given up by  themselves. The child shall have a better time than his parents; he  shall not be subject to the necessities which they have recognized as  paramount in life. Illness, death, renunciation of enjoyment,  restrictions on his own will, shall not touch him; the laws of nature  and of society shall be abrogated in his favour; he shall once more  really be the centre and core of creation - 慔is Majesty the Baby??as we  once fancied ourselves. The child shall fulfil those wishful dreams of  the parents which they never carried out - the boy shall become a great  man and a hero in his father's place, and the girl shall marry a prince  as a tardy compensation for her mother. At the most touchy point in the  narcissistic system, the immortality of the ego, which is so hard  pressed by reality, security is achieved by taking refuge in the child.  Parental love, which is so moving and at bottom so childish, is nothing  but the parents?narcissism born again, which, transformed into  object-love, unmistakably reveals its former nature.
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mpv0p&Q1U4A O)x0The disturbances to which a child's original narcissism is exposed, the  reactions with which he seeks to protect himself from them and the paths  into which he is forced in doing so - these are themes which I propose  to leave on one side, as an important field of work which still awaits  exploration. The most significant portion of it, however, can be singled  out in the shape of the 慶astration complex?(in boys, anxiety about the  penis - in girls, envy for the penis) and treated in connection with the  effect of early deterrence from sexual activity. Psycho-analytic  research ordinarily enables us to trace the vicissitudes undergone by  the libidinal instincts when these, isolated from the ego-instincts, are  placed in opposition to them; but in the particular field of the  castration complex, it allows us to infer the existence of an epoch and  a psychical situation in which the two groups of instincts, still  operating in unison and inseparably mingled, make their appearance as  narcissistic interests. It is from this context that Adler has derived  his concept of the 憁asculine protest? which he has elevated almost to  the position of the sole motive force in the formation of character and  neurosis alike and which he bases not on a narcissistic, and therefore  still a libidinal, trend, but on a social valuation. Psycho-analytic  research has from the very beginning recognized the existence and  importance of the 憁asculine protest? but it has regarded it, in  opposition to Adler, as narcissistic in nature and derived from the  castration complex. The 憁asculine protest?is concerned in the formation  of character, into the genesis of which it enters along with many other  factors, but it is completely unsuited for explaining the problems of  the neuroses, with regard to which Adler takes account of nothing but  the manner in which they serve the ego-instincts. I find it quite  impossible to place the genesis of neurosis upon the narrow basis of the  castration complex, however powerfully it may come to the fore in men  among their resistances to the cure of a neurosis. Incidentally, I know  of cases of neurosis in which the 憁asculine protest? or, as we regard  it, the castration complex, plays no pathogenic part, and even fails to  appear at all.
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Observation of normal adults shows that their former megalomania has  been damped down and that the psychical characteristics from which we  inferred their infantile narcissism have been effaced. What has become  of their ego-Iibido? Are we to suppose that the whole amount of it has  passed into object-cathexes? Such a possibility is plainly contrary to  the whole trend of our argument; but we may find a hint at another  answer to the question in the psychology of repression.心理学空间I4rFA p9b(Z4_b

#WY1c;T;~(OW r0We have learnt that libidinal instinctual impulses undergo the  vicissitude of pathogenic repression if they come into conflict with the  subject's cultural and ethical ideas. By this we never mean that the  individual in question has a merely intellectual knowledge of the  existence of such ideas; we always mean that he recognizes them as a  standard for himself and submits to the claims they make on him.  Repression, we have said, proceeds from the ego; we might say with  greater precision that it proceeds from the self-respect of the ego. The  same impressions, experiences, impulses and desires that one man  indulges or at least works over consciously will be rejected with the  utmost indignation by another, or even stifled before they enter  consciousness. The difference between the two, which contains the  conditioning factor of repression, can easily be expressed in terms  which enable it to be explained by the libido theory. We can say that  the one man has set up an ideal in himself by which he measures his  actual ego, while the other has formed no such ideal. For the ego the  formation of an ideal would be the conditioning factor of repression.心理学空间^*qv1\ef

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This ideal ego is now the target of the self-love which was enjoyed in  childhood by the actual ego. The subject's narcissism makes its  appearance displaced on to this new ideal ego, which, like the infantile  ego, finds itself possessed of every perfection that is of value. As  always where the libido is concerned, man has here again shown himself  incapable of giving up a satisfaction he had once enjoyed. He is not  willing to forgo the narcissistic perfection of his childhood; and when,  as he grows up, he is disturbed by the admonitions of others and by the  awakening of his own critical judgement, so that he can no longer retain  that perfection, he seeks to recover it in the new form of an ego ideal.  What he projects before him as his ideal is the substitute for the lost  narcissism of his childhood in which he was his own ideal.心理学空间)v'cJP-K)K1]
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We are naturally led to examine the relation between this forming of an  ideal and sublimation. Sublimation is a process that concerns  object-libido and consists in the instinct's directing itself towards an  aim other than, and remote from, that of sexual satisfaction; in this  process the accent falls upon deflection from sexuality. Idealization is  a process that concerns the object; by it that object, without any  alteration in its nature, is aggrandized and exalted in the subject's  mind. Idealization is possible in the sphere of ego-libido as well as in  that of object-libido. For example, the sexual overvaluation of an  object is an idealization of it. In so far as sublimation describes  something that has to do with the instinct and idealization something to  do with the object, the two concepts are to be distinguished from each  other.心理学空间1ic4L"th]y

aU3O N:aR0P V,p"Y.G0The formation of an ego ideal is often confused with the sublimation of  instinct, to the detriment of our understanding of the facts. A man who  has exchanged his narcissism for homage to a high ego ideal has not  necessarily on that account succeeded in sublimating his libidinal  instincts. It is true that the ego ideal demands such sublimation, but  it cannot enforce it; sublimation remains a special process which may be  prompted by the ideal but the execution of which is entirely independent  of any such prompting. It is precisely in neurotics that we find the  highest differences of potential between the development of their ego  ideal and the amount of sublimation of their primitive libidinal  instincts; and in general it is far harder to convince an idealist of  the inexpedient location of his libido than a plain man whose  pretensions have remained more moderate. Further, the formation of an  ego ideal and sublimation are quite differently related to the causation  of neurosis. As we have learnt, the formation of an ideal heightens the  demands of the ego and is the most powerful factor favouring repression;  sublimation is a way out, a way by which those demands can be met  without involving repression.心理学空间.scG3^4j%`!WhP
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$Y$Vo ~X lH(`0It would not surprise us if we were to find a special psychical agency  which performs the task of seeing that narcissistic satisfaction from  the ego ideal is ensured and which, with this end in view, constantly  watches the actual ego and measures it by that ideal. If such an agency  does exist, we cannot possibly come upon it as a discovery - we can only  recognize it; for we may reflect that what we call our 慶onscience?has  the required characteristics. Recognition of this agency enables us to  understand the so-called 慸elusions of being noticed?or more correctly,  of being watched, which are such striking symptoms in the paranoid  diseases and which may also occur as an isolated form of illness, or  intercalated in a transference neurosis. Patients of this sort complain  that all their thoughts are known and their actions watched and  supervised; they are informed of the functioning of this agency by  voices which characteristically speak to them in the third person (慛ow  she's thinking of that again? 憂ow he's going out?. This complaint is  justified; it describes the truth. A power of this kind, watching,  discovering and criticizing all our intentions, does really exist.  Indeed, it exists in every one of us in normal life.心理学空间p,D6{q1ZXI.c
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Delusions of being watched present this power in a regressive form, thus  revealing its genesis and the reason why the patient is in revolt  against it. For what prompted the subject to form an ego ideal, on whose  behalf his conscience acts as watchman, arose from the critical  influence of his parents (conveyed to him by the medium of the voice),  to whom were added, as time went on, those who trained and taught him  and the innumerable and indefinable host of all the other people in his  environment - his fellow-men - and public opinion.
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In this way large amounts of libido of an essentially homosexual kind  are drawn into the formation of the narcissistic ego ideal and find  outlet and satisfaction in maintaining it. The institution of conscience  was at bottom an embodiment, first of parental criticism, and  subsequently of that of society - a process which is repeated in what  takes place when a tendency towards repression develops out of a  prohibition or obstacle that came in the first instance from without.  The voices, as well as the undefined multitude, are brought into the  foreground again by the disease, and so the evolution of conscience is  reproduced regressively. But the revolt against this 慶ensoring  agency?arises out of the subject's desire (in accordance with the  fundamental character of his illness) to liberate himself from all these  influences, beginning with the parental one, and out of his withdrawal  of homosexual libido from them. His conscience then confronts him in a  regressive form as a hostile influence from without.
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.h#b#Y-u[l0The complaints made by paranoics also show that at bottom the  self-criticism of conscience coincides with the self-observation on  which it is based. Thus the activity of the mind which has taken over  the function of conscience has also placed itself at the service of  internal research, which furnishes philosophy with the material for its  intellectual operations. This may have some bearing on the  characteristic tendency of paranoics to construct speculative systems.?
~Wq J1`3M0?I should like to add to this, merely by way of suggestion, that the  developing and strengthening of this observing agency might contain  within it the subsequent genesis of (subjective) memory and the  time-factor, the latter of which has no application to unconscious  processes.心理学空间H4?Ok {

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*F"k$?s+F#VU7K@6oK)[0It will certainly be of importance to us if evidence of the activity of  this critically observing agency - which becomes heightened into  conscience and philosophic introspection - can be found in other fields  as well. I will mention here what Herbert Silberer has called the 慺unctional  phenomenon? one of the few indisputably valuable additions to the theory  of dreams. Silberer, as we know, has shown that in states between  sleeping and waking we can directly observe the translation of thoughts  into visual images, but that in these circumstances we frequently have a  representation, not of a thought-content, but of the actual state  (willingness, fatigue, etc.) of the person who is struggling against  sleep. Similarly, he has shown that the conclusions of some dreams or  some divisions in their content merely signify the dreamer's own  perception of his sleeping and waking. Silberer has thus demonstrated  the part played by observation - in the sense of the paranoic's  delusions of being watched - in the formation of dreams. This part is  not a constant one. Probably the reason why I overlooked it is because  it does not play any great part in my own dreams; in persons who are  gifted philosophically and accustomed to introspection it may become  very evident.
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B?n1O#_v0We may here recall that we have found that the formation of dreams takes  place under the dominance of a censorship which compels distortion of  the dream-thoughts. We did not, however, picture this censorship as a  special power, but chose the term to designate one side of the  repressive trends that govern the ego, namely the side which is turned  towards the dream-thoughts. If we enter further into the structure of  the ego, we may recognize in the ego ideal and in the dynamic utterances  of conscience the dream-censor as well. If this censor is to some extent  on the alert even during sleep, we can understand how it is that its  suggested activity of self-observation and self-criticism - with such  thoughts as, 憂ow he is too sleepy to think? 憂ow he is waking up?- makes  a contribution to the content of the dream.?
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V9ax.xK C0At this point we may attempt some discussion of the self-regarding  attitude in normal people and in neurotics.
4|*ly Bg pL[ ^0In the first place self-regard appears to us to be an expression of the  size of the ego; what the various elements are which go to determine  that size is irrelevant. Everything a person possesses or achieves,  every remnant of the primitive feeling of omnipotence which his  experience has confirmed, helps to increase his self-regard.心理学空间D:e9w0C W~5o n@&~
Applying our distinction between sexual and ego-instincts, we must  recognize that self-regard has a specially intimate dependence on  narcissistic libido. Here we are supported by two fundamental facts:  that in paraphrenics self-regard is increased, while in the transference  neuroses it is diminished; and that in love-relations not being loved  lowers the self-regarding feelings, while being loved raises them. As we  have indicated, the aim and the satisfaction in a narcissistic  object-choice is to be loved.心理学空间]%Ch*I2gU{'fN,Oo c

aoaI2B?pa|5J6Jx0Further, it is easy to observe that libidinal object-cathexis does not  raise self-regard. The effect of dependence upon the loved object is to  lower that feeling: a person in love is humble. A person who loves has,  so to speak, forfeited a part of his narcissism, and it can only be  replaced by his being loved. In all these respects self-regard seems to  remain related to the narcissistic element in love.
4]+AaR*h0The realization of impotence, of one's own inability to love, in  consequence of mental or physical disorder, has an exceedingly lowering  effect upon self-regard. Here, in my judgement, we must look for one of  the sources of the feelings of inferiority which are experienced by  patients suffering from the transference neuroses and which they are so  ready to report. The main source of these feelings is, however, the  impoverishment of the ego, due to the extraordinarily large libidinal  cathexes which have been withdrawn from it - due, that is to say, to the  injury sustained by the ego through sexual trends which are no longer  subject to control.
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.S"i9[S4r0Adler is right in maintaining that when a person with an active mental  life recognizes an inferiority in one of his organs, it acts as a spur  and calls out a higher level of performance in him through  overcompensation. But it would be altogether an exaggeration if,  following Adler's example, we sought to attribute every successful  achievement to this factor of an original inferiority of an organ. Not  all artists are handicapped with bad eyesight, nor were all orators  originally stammerers. And there are plenty of instances of excellent  achievements springing from superior organic endowment. In the aetiology  of neuroses organic inferiority and imperfect development play an  insignificant part - much the same as that played by currently active  perceptual material in the formation of dreams. Neuroses make use of  such inferiorities as a pretext, just as they do of every other suitable  factor. We may be tempted to believe a neurotic woman patient when she  tells us that it was inevitable she should fall ill, since she is ugly,  deformed or lacking in charm, so that no one could love her; but the  very next neurotic will teach us better - for she persists in her  neurosis and in her aversion to sexuality, although she seems more  desirable, and is more desired, than the average woman. The majority of  hysterical women are among the attractive and even beautiful  representatives of their sex, while, on the other hand, the frequency of  ugliness, organic defects and infirmities in the lower classes of  society does not increase the incidence of neurotic illness among them.心理学空间 g5q$B,QC3Hm\6q'M
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The relations of self-regard to erotism - that is, to libidinal object-cathexes  - may be expressed concisely in the following way. Two cases must be  distinguished, according to whether the erotic cathexes are ego-syntonic,  or, on the contrary, have suffered repression. In the former case (where  the use made of the libido is ego-syntonic), love is assessed like any  other activity of the ego. Loving in itself, in so far as it involves  longing and deprivation, lowers self-regard; whereas being loved, having  one's love returned, and possessing the loved object, raises it once  more. When libido is repressed, the erotic cathexis is felt as a severe  depletion of the ego, the satisfaction of love is impossible, and the  re-enrichment of the ego can be effected only by a withdrawal of libido  from its objects. The return of the object-libido to the ego and its  transformation into narcissism represents, as it were, a happy love once  more; and, on the other hand, it is also true that a real happy love  corresponds to the primal condition in which object-libido and  ego-libido cannot be distinguished.
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The importance and extensiveness of the topic must be my justification  for adding a few more remarks which are somewhat loosely strung  together.心理学空间$B vs;m;N2a\+U9ow
The development of the ego consists in a departure from primary  narcissism and gives rise to a vigorous attempt to recover that state.  This departure is brought about by means of the displacement of libido  on to an ego ideal imposed from without; and satisfaction is brought  about from fulfilling this ideal.
Ee%BxV Z0At the same time the ego has sent out the libidinal object-cathexes. It  becomes impoverished in favour of these cathexes, just as it does in  favour of the ego ideal, and it enriches itself once more from its  satisfactions in respect of the object, just as it does by fulfilling  its ideal.
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8DBQ C.l:iA;v)|&d"x2B)E0One part of self-regard is primary - the residue of infantile  narcissism; another part arises out of the omnipotence which is  corroborated by experience (the fulfilment of the ego ideal), whilst a  third part proceeds from the satisfaction of object-libido.
5R)te/p W bC3c0The ego ideal has imposed severe conditions upon the satisfaction of  libido through objects; for it causes some of them to be rejected by  means of its censor, as being incompatible. Where no such ideal has been  formed, the sexual trend in question makes its appearance unchanged in  the personality in the form of a perversion. To be their own ideal once  more, in regard to sexual no less than other trends, as they were in  childhood - this is what people strive to attain as their happiness.心理学空间8I;xE,qijW-H

%^"]#|:U)mN:M,A0Being in love consists in a flowing-over of ego-libido on to the object.  It has the power to remove repressions and re-instate perversions. It  exalts the sexual object into a sexual ideal. Since, with the object  type (or attachment type), being in love occurs in virtue of the  fulfilment of infantile conditions for loving, we may say that whatever  fulfils that condition is idealized.心理学空间d8a vI/q A+H0l


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«精神分析学中的自恋及其自恋性障碍 自恋 Narcissism
《自恋 Narcissism》
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