15 A Person in the World of People: Morality 人存于世-道德
作者: 耶鲁大学 / 10750次阅读 时间: 2010年12月24日
标签: 道德

8k#Tk(o0~ j"e)~2T-M0Professor Paul Bloom: Let me begin by just reminding us wherewe are in this course, reminding us of what we've done and what we haveyet to do. We started by talking about the brain, the physical basis ofthought. And then we moved to some general introductions to somefoundational ideas in the study of psychology, Freud and Skinner. Wespent a bit of time on more cognitive stuff: development, language,vision, memory. Then we took a little break and the dean told us aboutlove. Then we dealt with the emotions, rationality, and evolution, anda lot of that. What we learned particularly regarding the evolution ofthe mind provided supporting material for what follows. We learnedabout cognitive neuroscience using the study of face recognition as animportant case study--human differences, behavioral genetics, natureand nurture, sex and food. My lecture was on sex. Dr. Brownell came andspoke to us about food. Today, morality. Next week, social thought andsocial behavior, mysteries; basically, a series of topics that don'tfit anywhere in the course and really make psychologists scratch theirheads. These topics are sleep, laughter, and religion, mental illness,two lectures on madness, what can go wrong in your minds, and a lastlecture on happiness. And then you're just done. You know a lot ofpsychology and a lot of stuff and you're well prepared for yourultimate major in psychology, ultimately graduate training at a goodschool.


How many people here are either psych majors or expect to becomepsych majors or cognitive science as though you could raise your handto? Okay. Good. It's nowhere near enough [laughter] and so I'll ask thequestion again. Once you deal with happiness and then mysteries, you'rereally not going to want to--What is there? Chemistry? Anthropology?[laughter] Pre-med? Give me a break. [laughter]

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DOP9^5EI#Z0Okay. We're going to deal with three facets of morality. I'm goingto talk about moral feelings, moral judgments, and then moral actionwith particular focus on why good people do bad things, which will leadus to review and discuss the Milgram study, which was presented in themovie on Monday. Now, moral feeling is what we'll start off with andwe've already discussed this in a different context. The question is,'How could moral feelings evolve?" So, moral feelings we could view asfeelings of condemnation, shame, emotions like that--shame,condemnation, pride, righteous anger, but also simple affection, caringfor other people, wanting to do well by them, being upset if aninjustice is to be done by them. And you might think that the existenceof these feelings is a mystery from an evolutionary point of view. Ifevolution is survival of the fittest, nature red in tooth and claw, howcould animals evolve moral feelings? But in fact, we know the answer tothis. And there are two answers to this.

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One answer is kin selection. So, evolution works at a level of thegenes and because of that it could give rise to animals that arethemselves altruistic. And they're altruistic because they act topreserve other animals that share the same genes. And so, I'm not goingto spend any time on this because we've discussed it in detail, but weknow from previous lectures that people will be generous to others. Andthere's an evolutionary explanation for your generosity towards kin. Itcould be mathematically worked out. Your caring, your moral feelingstowards other creatures to the extent of the proportion of genes thatyou share with them. The most altruistic behavior of all, giving yourlife to help another, can be explained in cold-blooded evolutionaryterms. Animals that are altruistic even to the point of dying to helpanother, those genes will, under some circumstances, be preserved overthe genes of people who are less caring. And that is one force towardskindness.

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A second force towards kindness is cooperation. Even if animals areunrelated, they are nice to one another. Animals will give warningcries, they will groom one another, they will exchange food, and thereason for this is that animals have evolved, our minds have evolved,to enter into sort of cooperative situations with other people and tosurmount prisoner's dilemmas, to surmount deception and cheating. Thisgives rise to some emotion including emotions that could be viewed asmoral emotions, like guilt and anger, and again, grounds altruisticbehavior in an evolutionary perspective.心理学空间 ]rM#l?`3e(sX8Ck


This is all by means of review but the question you can now ask is,"Fine. That's why moral feelings might evolve, but what do we know aspsychologists about the emergence in nature of moral feelings inindividuals? What's the psychology of moral feeling?" And this is anissue I'm going to talk about now but I'm going to return to next weekwhen we deal with issues such as liking and disliking, racial prejudiceand other things. But I want to deal now with a couple of interestingcase studies about moral feelings from a psychological point ofview.

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`/A5m4Qp;sJ KE9vq7Y0The first one I want to deal with is empathy. And empathy hasdifferent definitions but we can simply view it as the feeling thatyour pain matters to me. If you are hurt, that is, in some sense,painful for me. If you are sad, that affects my own mood. I am not aselfish creature. I am built, I am hard wired, to be attuned to yourpain. This is an old observation. Adam Smith, who is often falselyviewed as a proponent of selfishness and hardheadedness, was quiteexplicit about the pull this has. He notes:心理学空间#I0j+AYC;_[/f*s

When we see a stroke aimed and just ready to fall upon theleg or arm of another person, we naturally shrink and draw back our ownleg or arm and when it does fall we feel it in some measure and arehurt by it as well as the sufferer. If you see somebody being kicked inthe groin in a movie, you might yourself tense up. If you see somebodybang their thumb with a hammer, you might cringe.

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Here is a good illustration of somebody in anticipatory pain.[laughter] Now--It's a very British face actually. [laughter] Now, weknow certain things about this empathy, some which might be surprising.The pain of others is aversive even for babies. We know this because ifbabies hear other babies crying they will get upset. The crying ofbabies is aversive to babies.

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Now, some of you may be sufficiently cynical to say, "That could beexplained in other ways. For one thing, one theory is that babies hearother babies cry, because babies are so stupid they think theythemselves are crying; if they're crying they must be in some sort ofpain so they cry some more." But clever psychologists have ruled thisout. What they did was a study where they exposed babies totape-recorded sounds of other babies crying and tape recorded sounds ofthemselves crying. Babies cry more to this pain of other babies thanthey do to their own pain, suggesting that their response is to someextent a response to the "otherness" of the characters.


Yjl_9Bw0We know pain is--of others is aversive for chimpanzees and we knowthis in certain ways. But we know this, in particular, from a series ofstudies that would be unethical if they were to be done today. In thesestudies, they put a chimpanzee in a room and there's a lever. And whenthe chimpanzee slaps the lever, it gets some food. Trivial, smartanimal, piece of cake. But the room has a window leading to anotherroom. And in the other room another chimpanzee is placed. This secondchimpanzee is not a relative of the first chimpanzee and they've neverseen each other before. Now, when the first chimpanzee hits the leverthe second chimpanzee gets a painful electric shock, putting the firstchimpanzee in a horrible dilemma. In order to feed himself, he has totorture another animal. Chimpanzees do not starve themselves to death.It's very unlikely any of you would either but they go a long timewithout food, suggesting they do not want to cause this otherchimpanzee pain. It only works within species. So, in anotherexperiment they put a rabbit in the other room and the chimpanzee wouldslap the lever repeatedly to make the rabbit scream in pain [laughter]and jump.心理学空间Q I ]l)@"aD r

:C| g0fM+Cw Fq,g0Now, we've known for a long time that empathetic feeling is notlogically linked to morality. This is a point made by Aristotle. Icould see you writhing in pain. That could cause me pain but it doesn'tmean I'm going to be nice to you. I could run away from you. I couldturn my head or I could blame you for causing me this misery. But itdoes happen that emotional--that this sort of empathy does lead tomoral concern and action. If we do an experiment and we induce you tofeel empathetic to somebody, we get you to feel what they're feeling,you're more likely to be nice to them. And people differ in the extentto which they feel empathy. People differ to the extent it will hurtthem to watch me slam my thumb with a hammer. If you are high empathy,you're more likely to be a nice person than if you're low empathy,suggesting there is some connection between empathetic feeling andliking.

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Now, empathetic feeling, like any other human capacity, differsacross people. Some of us have a lot of it. Some of us don't have muchof it. There is some reason to believe that in the population known as"psychopaths," a population we'll return to later on when we discussmental illness, this sort of instinctive empathy is broken and the painof others just doesn't bother them very much. I have some illustrativequotes here. In Damon's book, a wonderful book on psychopathy, he talksabout a thirteen-year-old mugger who specialized in mugging blindpeople. And when asked about the pain he caused his victims heresponded, "What do I care? I'm not her," which is logically correctbut, in a sense, inhuman. The fact that it's another person should makeyou care.


U$exaU7RO0The serial killer Gary Gilmore basically said the pain of othersgratified him and caused him no unhappiness at all. "I was alwayscapable of murder. I can become totally devoid of feelings of others,unemotional. I know I'm doing something grossly--" and here is a verybad word "--wrong. I can still go ahead and do it." And Ted Bundy, wheninterviewed at one point, said he was astonished that people made sucha fuss about all of his murders because he said, "I mean, there are somany people." And if any of you here are nodding in agreement at thesesentiments, [laughter] that's not such a good sign. These areparticularly callous and cold-blooded statements suggesting that thisinstinctive empathy, this aspect of moral thought, is not--is presentin most of us but not in all of us.心理学空间'IoA(D:KXq'd

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The second case study of moral feeling is "in-group" and"out-group." In our affections, in our caring, who we like, who we feelclose to, whose pain bothers us, we are not indiscriminate. I care alot more about my children than I do about my friends and I care moreabout my friends than I care about strangers. We're all like that. Wealso favor our group over others in every possible way. You are amember of many groups. You are men. You are women. You're Yalestudents. You're young. You're white, you're black, you're Asian.You're a member of these groups and, as we will discuss repeatedly whenwe talk about social cognition and social behavior, this membershipmatters a lot to you. What's particularly interesting is even groupsthat are formed, that you were not born with, that are formed on thefly, exert a huge amount of control over your moral feelings and moralattitudes. And the best example of this is discussed in detail in thetextbook. And this is the Robber's Cave study. And this Robber's Cavestudy serves as a nice illustration of morality in everyday life.


z5x4?A~)N&w ko1\0The study was, eleven- and 12-year-old boys at a camping program.These were well-adjusted, pretty rich kids, racially homogeneous, andthey were put into separate cabins. And the cabins were given leadersand they gave themselves names. Being unimaginative boys, they calledthemselves "The Eagles" and "The Rattlers" but as--what happened was,being separated they developed distinctive cultures. And when thesegroups were set in competition against each other, the Eagles versusthe Rattlers, the within-group intensity grew. The Eaglersbegan--Eagles began to care a lot more about other Eagles than aboutanybody else.心理学空间?x:Cc[Ot

6L#@#G{ z@M&a0So, there's within-group solidarity. And then there were negativestereotypes. So, these groups developed different cultures. It was arandomly cut apart--kind of like Yale College is actually, where youget a random assortment of people. But despite the fact that theassortment is random, the division is random, cultures begin to emerge.The Eagles prided themselves on being clean living, not using cusswords and treating each other with respect. They viewed the Rattlers asdirty and tough and kind of slovenly slobs. The Rattlers viewed theEagles as goody-goody kids. It's cruel.

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Finally, [laughter] it all evolved into hostilities, raids andviolence. The Eagles burnt a Rattlers banner, cuss words wereoccasionally used, and so Sherif, the psychologist designing all ofthis, went, "Excellent," [laughter] and then the problem--He then says,"Now we've created two different warring cultures. That was fun.[laughter] What do we do to make them friends again? And then we figureout how to--now we've done that and this'll solve all sorts ofproblems." So they started off. They wanted to have--They set up peacetalks where a representative of the Eagle and a representative of theRattler were set to meet and plan ways so that they could disarm andstop using cuss words and everything like that. This failed. The kidswho engaged in the peace talks were ostracized by their own groups astreasonists. That failed. They decided to set up individualcompetitions like the Olympics where they--where people wouldn'tcompete as Eagles or Rattlers but rather they would compete asindividuals. That failed too. Like the Olympics, people--the teams tooktheir--they took their individual accomplishments as reflecting on thegroup and it evolved into Eagles versus The Rattlers.心理学空间 C!]B*]h*v t


They shared meals, they turned--which turned into food fights andmore cuss words. They shared movies, more fights, more cuss words. Theyshared fun with firecrackers, [laughter] which was a disastrous thingwhich nearly brought the experiment to an end. [laughter] They broughtin a religious figure to give them sermons on brotherly love.[laughter] The sermons were entirely unsuccessful. What's interestingis they--the Eagle--they took them to heart. These were good kids. Theywere respectful of religious authority but the lessons they took fromthem is "I should learn to love my neighbor." If I'm a Rattler, Ishould learn to love my fellow Rattler and appreciate him as a fellow,as a person. "I love him. It's love, not like those scummy Eagles."[laughter] They all failed.心理学空间a2Xwb tP0H9E p

pJ U l/D`H|i0Here's what worked. Sherif told the kids--all of the kids--that thewater line to the camp was cut and they all had to defend the camp.What this did was it established a super ordinate goal, that is a goalthat everybody shared, and perhaps more important a common enemy. Thisis where the solution, by the way, to bringing together--and you couldwrite this down--to bringing together all the warring countries andreligions of this planet is an alien attack. [laughter] By the logic ofthe Sherif it will bring us all together as a group.


4YH7\4Z'W0S#P0A different question is, there in that experiment the "groupiness"was established in a very powerful way. They lived separately, theyinteracted with each other, they had their own names. The psychologistTajfel after World War II was interested in the question of what couldmake a group. In other words, what do I have to do to you to put you ina different group from him? What do I have to do to this class--thisside of the class to put you in a different group from this side anddifferent from that side? And what would I have to do for those groupsto matter such that, for instance, if I separate you in one group andyou're in another group and I give you a hundred dollars will you givethe money more to him or to him, will you give it more to your owngroup or to another group? And what he found was you don't needmuch.心理学空间z7A&j?l5vK"`ba

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In one experiment he showed people pictures of modern art and basedon their responses he described them as Klee lovers or Kandinskylovers. Now, this is all made up. They were just random assignments butthe Klee lovers viewed themselves as more similar to other Klee lovers.They thought the Klee lovers tended to be smarter than the Kandinskylovers and the Klee lovers would devote more resources to themselvesthan to others. This is why it's called "minimal groups." You don'tneed much to make you into a group.


D)QIrdh0And in fact, later experiments just flipped a coin. So the lot--theexperiment goes like this. I ask everybody in this class to take out acoin. You all flip it. Everyone who has heads, you're one group.Everyone who has tails, you're the other group. Then I ask people inthe heads group, "Which group do you--Putting yourself aside, whichgroup on average do you think is smarter?" You'd say, "Well, you know,it kind of works out that the heads group is kind of really--heads,smart." Which group--"Here is some money. You have to distribute it."You're more likely--It's a subtle effect when you make the groups sominimal but you're more likely to give it to your own group than toothers and this suggests that moral feelings are exquisitely attunednot necessarily only to individuals but also to the psychology ofgroups.

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Any questions at this point about moral feelings? Yes.心理学空间IX$Im5vV

VaG_6z0Student: How you formed the groups--How is that morality?


Professor Paul Bloom: It's morality--It bears on moralitybecause it bears on--So, the question is, "How does group membership,how does that relate to the topic of morality?" And the answer is themoral feelings we're talking about are feelings like empathy andcaring. For me to have a moral feeling towards you means you matter tome. If you were to be harmed, I would view it as wrong. And the groupexperiment suggests that the extent to which these moral feelingsoperate are partially determined by the groups to which we belong to.If I'm American and you're from another country, I will viewmyself--this is a very--kind of obvious finding--my obligations to youwill be seen as less than if you were another American. If I'm a Kleelover and you're a Kandinsky lover, I don't think you quite deserve asmuch as me.

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Moral judgment is an area that is tremendously exciting and there'sa lot of recent research on this. By moral judgment I mean notempathetic feelings, not feelings of caring and love or approval anddisapproval, so they're not feelings of caring and love and empathy,but notions like something is good or bad, something--like something isfair or unfair. So, there are three hallmarks for moral judgments. So,suppose I say I don't like strawberry ice cream. That's an evaluation.That's a judgment but it's not a moral judgment. Why not? Because Idon't think it carries a sense of obligation. I don't think anybody'sobliged to eat or not to eat strawberry ice cream. And it doesn't carrya notion of sanctions, meaning I don't think anybody should be punishedfor eating strawberry ice cream. On the other hand, if I say I don'tlike baby killers, that actually is a moral judgment in my case. So[inaudible] I say, "Well, I don't like baby killers. You like to killbabies. I actually think we are obliged not to kill babies." If youdisagree with me, you're wrong and you should stop killing thosebabies. [laughter] Should you fail to stop killing those babies, Ithink you should be punished for killing babies." And that's what myjudgment about "no killing babies" makes it a moral judgment.心理学空间0O*q@pjBG1\

}0L.{(c7HAE"f0Now, some people attempted to look at this the wrong way and say,"Look. What a weird topic, morality. I don't believe in morality. Ibelieve in Nietzsche. I don't believe in ethics," but I don't believeyou if you were to say that because morality isn't--morality as we talkabout it in this context isn't just regarding your position on bigquestions like political issues or big moral questions like abortion orcapital punishment. Rather, some sort of moral judgment happens all thetime, often unconsciously. So, as you live your life you have to answerquestions like what should you eat? Any moral vegetarians here? I'mjust raising my hand to encourage people. [laughter] Okay. Anybody giveto charity? Anybody not give to charity? Good. [laughter] Differentfrom the moral vegetarians I noticed. Who do you socialize with?There's homeless people around Yale and New Haven. What do you give tothem? Do you avoid their eyes? Do you--What do you want to do with yourlife? Who do you have sex with? Under what context or conditions? Theseare moral questions.


q)eb*p%?0My favorite moral dilemma is as I'm walking down the street and Isee somebody I sort of know, do I avoid eye so we don't have aconversation [laughter] or do I say, "Hey. How are you doing?" or do Ikind of do the nod hoping that there won't be more than this nod?[laughter] And then after I leave and I say, "Oh, I should have madeeye contact with that person. I'm such a jerk. [laughter] There is ahomeless person [simulating making great eye-contact with them]"[laughter] and--but these are day-to-day moral questions we strugglewith all the time and so there's a centrality in the study of how we domoral reasoning.

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So, what do we know about moral reasoning? Well, we know that thereare some universals. There are some aspects of moral reasoning thatshow up everywhere on earth. And there is some evidence, though it'snot particularly strong at this point, that these same intuitions showup in young children and in nonhuman primates like chimpanzees,capuchins, macaques and so on. And these are things like anger atcheaters, gratitude toward sharers, the sort of things you'd expect tocome out in a prisoner's dilemma, feelings that some things are rightand some things are wrong. These are foundational.

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Vc [f)B0But at the same time the study of moral reasoning is afascinated--fascinating issue for those of us interested incross-cultural psychology because there are plain differences acrosscultures. So, the anthropologist Richard Shweder gives a list here ofhuman differences:

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People have found it quite natural to be spontaneouslyappalled, outraged, indignant, proud, disgusted, guilty and ashamed byall sorts of things. Then there's a long list: "masturbation,homosexuality, sexual abstinence, polygamy, abortion, circumcision,corporal punishment, capital punishment, Islam, Christianity, Judaism,capitalism, democracy, flag burning, miniskirts, long hair, no hair,blah blah, parents and children sleeping in the same bed, parents andchildren not sleeping in the same bed, women being allowed to work,women not being allowed to work.

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If I put it down in a list and got people to tick it off, what youall thought, there would be some differences. Some of you think meateating is okay. Some of you do not. Some of you--You might havedifferent views about divorce. Most of you believe women should beallowed to work. Most of you will be in favor or not morally scoldingof homosexuality. You'll be lukewarm about polygamy. Nobody would likeabstinence and so on. [laughter] But if we gave that same list topeople in a different culture, they'd tick off entirely differentthings. These are ways in which people vary. I don't think people varyin their feelings about baby killing. I don't think people vary aboutthe feelings of I do something for you and then you don't do somethingfor me. I think that's gut-level, hard-wired, evolved to solveprisoner's dilemmas. But these are important issues and these vary alot from culture to culture and a good theory of psychology has toexplain how these differences arise.

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V]k&\,x)oZ$H0And Shweder has a theory which is quite interesting. Shweder arguesthat there are three styles of thought, three different frameworks ofmoral thought, three different ethics. There's an ethics of autonomy.This is what moral philosophers within our culture view as morality,notions of rights, of equality, of freedom. But many cultures focus onan ethics of community, bringing together duty, status, hierarchy, andinterdependence. Other cultures focused more on an ethics of divinitywhere notions such as purity, sanctity, pollution and sin arerelevant.


lp ~b l8H(J Nu0So for example, when we're talking about the rights of men and womenand what they should be allowed to do, many people in our societyfollowing an ethics of autonomy will argue that they should have equalrights in all domains of behavior. Since they are sentient, freecreatures, they should have a right to do whatever they want unlessthere is a compelling argument against it and a compelling argumentwould have to involve some infringement of the freedom of other people.On the other hand, if you're in an ethics of community you might arguethat men and women have different rights and differentresponsibilities. They may be born to perform certain things and assuch they're duty bound to follow them. If you're from an ethics ofdivinity, you may appeal to religious injunctions against certainactions and behaviors and these may differentially restrict thebehavior of men and women. You might believe for instance, that womenshould not prepare food when menstruating because it would contaminatethe food. You may believe that there's--there are severe restrictionsabout who could have sex with one another that don't have to do withhuman rights and human freedom. It has to do with the way things shouldbe because of issues of pollution and sin.心理学空间{}A3C"l8s v _|9euK

!Ipl`0K l-h0Now, Western cultures, as I've said, are highly invested in anethics of autonomy and so debates we have in our culture tend to beframed in terms of an ethics of autonomy. If we have a debate aboutabortion in this class, people--some people might say, "Look. The fetusis a sentient being and as such it has a right to survive and shouldn'tbe killed by its mother." Other people would argue, "No. A woman hasfull freedom over her own body and as long as a fetus is within thebody they--she has a right to control it." If we're arguing about hatespeech, we could talk about the balance between the rights of thefreedom of speech versus the right to a certain quality of educationfree of harassment and humiliation. Those are the ways we frame thingsbut one of the more interesting discoveries in this field is thatalthough people think that they're governed by the ethics of autonomy,even people within our culture, even highly educated people within ourculture, even people like you show moral judgments that are not quiteas simple.心理学空间2{7i&j.j w

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So, this is the work of Jonathan Haidt at University of Virginia.And Haidt finds if you ask people, they believe in our culture thatthey hold to an ethics of autonomy. If it doesn't harm anyone, it'sokay. So, if I was to ask you your attitudes about sex, most ofyou--not all of you, you come from different cultures, you havedifferent attitudes--but most of you would say sex between consentingadults is okay as long as nobody gets hurt, as long as nobody gets hurtpeople's rights are respected. So, gay marriage, for instance, or gaysex would be okay with you because it is--nobody is harmed and theseare consenting adults. Haidt points out that there are certain problemswith this argument and he illustrates this problem--these problems withstories like this:心理学空间.||7l(hI,vtN)S

Julie and Mark are brother and sister. They are travelingtogether in France on summer vacation from college. One night they arestaying alone in a cabin near the beach. They decide it would beinteresting and fun if they tried making love. At the very least, itwould be a new experience for each of them. Julie was already takingbirth control pills but Mark uses a condom too just to be safe. Theyboth enjoy making love but they decide not to do it again. They keepthat night a special secret which makes them feel even closer to eachother. What do you think about that? Was it okay for them to makelove?

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5sZh6\v0Who says yes? Good. I know that some people would say yes, shoot uptheir hands, and they look around in astonishment that no one else iswith them. [laughter] Who says no? Okay. Who is not sure? You're notsure. That's the weirdest of all. [laughter] Haidt finds that thedistribution even among this--If you--Look. If you go home and you askyour parents, they say, "Ew. What is--What are you learning at Yale?"[laughter] This is a very unusual culture and where some people willsay it's okay.心理学空间1\_z(Kz-Vo r

\ E F$pXX+m&Dc0What Haidt finds is most people say it doesn't and then he simplyasks them, being a good psychologist, "Okay. What's wrong with it?" Andthis is the brother/sister case. And the responses are interesting.Because people view themselves as committed to an ethics of autonomy,they can't just say it's disgusting. So, they exhibit what Haidtdescribes as "moral dumbfounding," meaning that they struggle to findan explanation. They say it's terrible because they'll have a kid andthe kid'll grow up freaky [laughter] and then the experimenter--it's aninterview situation--says, "Well, no. Remember they're both using a lotof birth control." "Maybe she's under age." "No, not under age." Andfinally, "Well, it's just wrong."心理学空间u8UL-k8@?(mFJ8Z1H'A.D

-w!\7S^~0Similarly, another one of the scenarios--[laughter] This isn't asbad as you might expect. [laughter] The family dog is playing outsideand gets hit by a car. [laughter] They bring it in and they say, "Oh,Fido's dead, Fido's dead, but what's for dinner?" So, they cook it andeat it. Who says it's okay? Good. [laughter] Who says it's not okay?Okay. Then they notice that their toilet is kind of dirty. "But whoa,there is an American flag." [laughter] They then use the toilet toclean the flag. Who says that's okay? [laughter] Anybody think it's notokay? And just keep in mind we're getting sort of even responses here.On all of these, the majority of people who are not college students inelite universities say, "Oh, that's so wrong."

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Finally, there is this one. And this one really is as bad as onemight expect. [laughter] A guy is lonely so he purchases a frozenchicken from the supermarket, brings it home and has relations with it.[laughter] Then he cooks it and eats it. [laughter] Look. This is ascientific paper in thePsych Review.[laughter] Okay. Who saysthat's okay? [laughter] Good. And I notice there is consistency amongpeople. The people who think it's okay have every right to say thatthey believe, if they really, sincerely believe it's okay, they arecommitted to an ethics of autonomy. Those of you who think it's notokay, none of these, should ask yourself why and should then scrutinizeyour reasons. People are very smart and they could present--easilypresent reasons why. They could say, "Oh, disease," but these reasonstend not to be sincere. If you take away the considerations that thereaction stays. And these are then interesting case studies of how ourmoral judgment is governed by factors that we might not be consciousof. Our moral intuitions can surprise us.心理学空间`ZZgZ@I~


The motivation for Milgram's work, and this is the final thing we'lltalk about in the context of morality--The motivation for Milgram'swork was the Holocaust and he was interested in exploring why such athing could happen. I should note by the way--you know from the moviethat Milgram was a Yale professor. He left Yale when he didn't gettenure, moved to Harvard, didn't get tenure there too. He was--He had areputation by then as a mad doctor. He ended up at City University ofNew York, became a full professor at age thirty three, died in hisearly '50s, did not lead a good life but had extraordinary discoveries.Another discovery which we'll talk about next week is--Has anybodyheard the phrase "six degrees of separation?" Milgram, and we'll talkabout that later. Milgram had a powerful imagination.


Okay. So we know--This is all review. There is the guy. How many ofyou laughed when you saw the movie [A movie on Milgram's conformitystudies called "Obedience"]? Interesting question why and we'll talkabout that in a little while. Shocks, "slight shock" to "XXX." Thereis--This is just repeating what you've seen. The learner protests ashe's being shocked more and more but the experimenter continues torequest obedience. For those of you who haven't seen the movie, again,the setup is someone is a subject. They don't know--They think thatthey're teaching somebody in a memory game but actually the person whois being shocked is a confederate who is trained to react in certainways as he's being increasingly shocked. And the finding is that themajority of people will deliver fatal shocks to this person who theyhad never met based on the instructions of another person.


Now, there are some immediate bad explanations for this. Oneexplanation is these are really strange people. "These are an abnormalgroup of psychopaths." But we know that's not true. It's beenreplicated with many subjects. There's no reason to believe that thesubjects in Milgram's original study were in any way unusual. It's alsoa misreading to say that people are, in general, sadistic. You rememberfrom the movie nobody got pleasure from giving the shocks. They feltacutely uncomfortable, embarrassed, conflicted, under a huge amount ofstress. They weren't liking doing this.

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There were follow-up studies. This is the original study. If youtake it away from Yale, some of the authority goes away, and similarly,the extent to which there are fatal shocks goes down. As the teacher iswith the learner next to him, it goes down. If you have to put theguy's hand on it, you're less likely to kill him. If the experimentergives you instructions by phone, you're less likely to do it. If anordinary man, not the guy in a white lab coat but an ordinary guy,says, "Hey, keep shocking him, that's okay," you're less likely to doit, and if there is a rebellion, if somebody else rebels and says, "Iwon't do it," you are much more likely not to do it yourself. There aresome--Oh, sorry. Yeah, and if you could get to choose your own shocklevel, you could keep--then very, very few people go all the way. So,these are an important list of factors as to the factors that can makesomebody less likely to bring it up to the killing level. And as aresult we can look at those factors and think about what is the perfectsituation for making somebody do something like this and the perfectsituation not to.

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4g dk| F+A|y0Some more serious critiques of Milgram: Milgram's experiment is whywe have human-subjects committees. This is a terribly stressfulexperiment to do to people and, as I say now about a lot of studiesthat I describe in this class, it would not today be done. People didsay they were happy to have participated and only 2% said that theywere sorry, but still serious damage could have been done and perhapswas done. These people left the lab having learnt about themselves thatthey'll kill another person if someone tells them to, and aspsychologists I don't think we have any right to do that to people. Ithink people can learn this--these things about themselves. We have noright to put you in a circumstance where you believe you killedsomebody and then tell you it was just pretend--we just made you killsomebody. And that's a serious ethical criticism.

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Historians and sociologists have brought in things back to thequestions that Milgram was interested in and argue--and this iscontroversial--the extent to which obedience really is a good model foracts of genocide. So, just to take one example among many, Goldhagenargued that the participants in Nazi Germany and in the Holocaust wereactually not people who were obediently following orders but ratherwere enthusiastic, people who volunteered to do it. Still Milgram'swork is interesting in many--for many reasons, in large part because heprovides an illustration of the perfect situation for getting somebodyto do a terrible thing and the perfect situation has certainingredients. It includes authority, in this case the authority of Yaleand the authority of science. "This is an experiment that must go on."The notion of a self-assured experimenter--The results would be verydifferent if the experimenter himself seemed nervous, unwilling toproceed, confused, but he was confident and he kept saying that he willtake responsibility. There was distance between the learner and theexperimenter. Recall you get less of an effect if you have to touch theguy but distance makes it easier for you to kill him. And finally,there's a new situation and no model of how to behave. One of thereasons why the Milgram experiment is so nice to know is that if thisever happens to you, not as an experiment but in real life, it will nolonger be new to you. You'll know what sort of thing this is and you'llbe able to examine it in that light.心理学空间p.f5v1fe

t u^8dQ,a5_0I want to end this lecture summing up, drawing a lot upon Milgramand some other work, and talk first about two forces for evil and thento end by talking about two forces for good. The first force for evilis deindividuation of self. And what this means is--one reason whypeople are so bad in groups is because you could diffuse yourresponsibility. If I'm running through the street alone with a baseballbat smashing through windows, it's me and I know it's me. If I'm withtwenty other people, it's not me anymore. It's part of the group and Idon't feel as bad. Responsibility becomes diffuse. One of the powers ofa group then is it diminishes responsibility.

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$iC8MH.e2e)R v0You could diminish responsibility in other ways. Another way ofdiminishing responsibility is you could accept orders. It's not me. I'mjust an instrument of somebody else telling me what to do. And yetanother way of diminishing responsibility is anonymity. Here's aquestion. In so many violent acts and so many people go to war, whatthey do is they paint their faces or they put on masks. Why? Well,there's anonymity from others. If I'm wearing a mask as I do myterrible stuff, nobody will know it's me, but there's also apsychologically liberating effect. If I'm anonymous, it's not me and Icould do terrible things without feeling the same moralresponsibility.心理学空间y6F,sA(th i6B;H)x

oz'kV+y/w8G0This analysis has explained why people don't always help others inneed. If there's a group, responsibility to help decreases and this iscaptured in different ways but the main idea is we all think someoneelse will help so we don't. There's a diffusion. This [slide] justsummarizes some studies--some famous studies supporting this. And theclassic example, which is discussed in detail in the textbook, is theKitty Genovese case where somebody was murdered in the common lot thatapartment buildings surrounded while dozens of people watched, dozensof good, normal people watched and did nothing. If there's some adviceI've heard on this, which is pretty good advice: If you're ever in apredicament on a city street, you have a heart attack, you broke yourleg, you're being mugged and everything, and there's--this is based onthe research, screaming "Help" is often not very successful because ifI'm with ten people and there's somebody screaming "Help," I look atthe other nine people. They're not doing anything. They're looking atme. I'm not doing anything. We keep walking. What is useful is point tosomebody and say, "You in the green sweater, call the police," and thepsychological evidence is if you--if somebody's--if I am wearing thegreen sweater and somebody asks me to call the police I will call thepolice. I'm a good guy. I wouldn't sit aside when somebody's beingharmed. On the other hand, if somebody says, "Somebody call thepolice," well, I got things to do and so diffusion of responsibilityexplains both when we're willing to do terrible things and also whenwe're willing to help people who are in trouble.

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Denigration of others. There's a lot of ways to make other peoplematter less. So, this is the flip side. The way to do terriblethings--One way to do terrible things is to lose yourself so you're notan individual anymore but another way to do terrible things is so thatthe person you're doing it to isn't an individual. How do you do that?Well, you have psychological distance or physical distance. I'm morelikely to kill you if you're very far away than if you're close. Idon't--I could describe you and start to think about you not as aperson and language can be used for this. Instead of people you coulduse terms like "cargo," instead of murder, extermination. Humor is verypowerful in denigrating and demoting people. When you start laughing atsomebody you think of them as less of a person and we'll get to that alittle bit more when we talk about laughter.


8ed!CE3T/k0You could take away their names. One of the more interesting thingsin the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights is a very interestingright. It says, "Every person has a right to a name." And you mightthink what a strange right but there's a cleverness to it. When youtake away somebody's name they matter less. People have names. Peoplehave distinct, individual names that mark them as people and once youknow somebody's name you are less likely to do bad things to them. Andanother option which I'm interested in from the standpoint of my ownresearch is you could see them as disgusting.心理学空间,f `d*| Q/m(B^$GM

@Dj%j+mf{0Disgust is what Paul Rozin has called "the body and soul emotion."And we know certain things about disgust. It is a human universal. Itis a basic emotion with a characteristic facial expression. RememberPaul Ekman's work on the basic emotions, the universals of emotionalexpression? Disgust is one of them and it is universally elicited bycertain things like this list. Wherever you go, feces, urine, blood,vomit, rotten flesh and most meat will be disgusting. Now, if that wasall we had to say about disgust, it wouldn't affect morality very muchbut we know that people can be seen as disgusting. And Charles Darwinactually, who was an astute observer of human behavior, tells a nicestory to illustrate this: how "a native touched with his finger somecold preserved meat and plainly showed disgust at its softness whilst Ifelt utter disgust at my food being touched by a naked savage thoughhis hands did not appear dirty."


9q:dt^N0bR9GW0People can be disgusting and if people are seen as disgusting theymatter less. The philosopher and legal scholar Martha Nussbaum nicelysummarizes this: "Thus, throughout history certain disgust propertieshave repeatedly and monotonously been associated with Jews, women,homosexuals, untouchables, lower class people. All of those areimagined as tainted by the dirt of the body." Any--I won't read thisbut this is a typical bit of Nazi propaganda. Any genocidal movementthat has left behind a written record has been shown to use themechanism of disgust to dehumanize people and make them easier to kill.I'll skip that.

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Mt l2@ a7~0I want to end though on a positive note. And the positive note areforces for good. So, forces for bad are to lose yourself as anindividual, lose yourself in a crowd, lose yourself because there issome authority using you as an instrument, lose yourself because you'reanonymous, plus treat others not as people, as numbers, as objects, asdisgusting things, but there are some forces for good. These include"contact" and "interdependence." What this often--What this can beviewed as, as an extended version of selfish gene theory, which is thatto the extent you're interconnected with other people you care aboutthem more for purely selfish reasons. Robert Wright presented this in avery blunt way, but I think his quote is quite moving: "One of the manyreasons I don't want to bomb the Japanese is that they built myminivan." And the idea is he has economic codependence with thesepeople. They're a different group. He might want to kill them undernormal circumstances but the interdependence gives rise to a moralconnection.


W.J0I?&Yv i0Thomas Friedman proposed the "Golden Arches Theory of HumanConflict," which said that no two countries which each have aMcDonald's will ever go to war because McDonald's forces globalinterdependence. This was falsified in the NATO bombing of, I think,Sarajevo but still his heart's in the right place, the idea thatinterconnection makes you more likely to get along with otherpeople.

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More generally, there's what's been called "The Contact Hypothesis."So, interdependence is one thing but what's maybe more interesting isthat simple contact with other people. Particularly if you're of equalstatus, you have a common goal, and you have social support makes youlike people more. There are now dozens, probably hundreds, of studiesthat show that people who would otherwise show animosity towards oneanother, like blacks and whites in the United States, like each othermore if they're brought together. And there's a lot of socialpsychology research as to the conditions in which you have to bringthem together. The Robber's Cave study talked about before is a niceexample. It was not easy to bring them together but when they had acommon goal that brought them--that caused the interconnection and thenthe contact led to moral feeling.心理学空间k0G8i2k)D6\\ G

+C3dD&bI @0The military is a superb example. The military in the United Stateswas a situation which brought together people who wouldn't otherwisehave any contact and they liked each other. There has been study afterstudy showing that people in the military who were otherwise, forinstance, racists after working with people of different races likedthem more because you had all of the right ingredients. You had--Theyhad--They worked together for a common goal, the military supportedbringing these people together, and they were brought together on anequal and fair footing.心理学空间)Wq/Y%zW+r gHi*T


There is, of course, a lot of debate about universities like Yale tothe extent in which they promote interdependence--sorry, they promotepositive contact between groups. And you could think of yourself as anexercise. If these are the conditions for contact, to what extent arethey met in the university setting between, say blacks and whites,people from the American South versus people from the American North,people from other countries versus people from the United States? And Iknow there's debate on campus about the extent to which there issegregation within the Yale community. And you could ask yourselfthe--about the extent of that segregation and how that reflects--whatrole that should play with regard to the Contact Hypothesis.心理学空间%K ?"} T!Z0i-em3j/M

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Finally, and this is the last thing I'll say: If you take anotherperson's perspective, you'll care more about them. This is the finalforce for good from a moral perspective. JFK, when making the plea forequal rights, didn't produce an abstract philosophical argument butrather tried to invite his listeners who were white to engage inperspective taking.心理学空间O%Sa cN5o+d5Dm

If an American, because his skin is dark, cannot eat lunchin a restaurant open to the public--[and so on and so on and so on],then who among us would be content to have the color of his skinchanged and stand in his place? Who among us would be content with thecounsels of patience and delay?

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h Vp&R/iL]/A+pc0Again, Nussbaum goes on and talks about how in Greek dramas--Greekdramas invited people to take the perspectives of those who they wouldnever imaginably be or even be in contact with and argue that thisgave--led to an empathetic expansion. I think one of the greatestcircles for moral good is storytelling where you're invited to take theperspective of another and see the world as they do.

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Finally, there are direct ways. You can ask people--and this is away which we talk to our children when we try to get our children toexpand their moral concern of compassion. We say, "Try to see it fromtheir point of view. How would you feel if--"Then there's indirectways. You can, for instance, use the power of metaphor. There could befamiliar things that you are close to and you could bring in togethernew things as falling under the rubric of these familiar things. So, ifI wanted to cause you to feel moral concern for a fetus, I would dowell to describe it as a pre-born child. If I wanted you to care aboutan animal, I would do well to describe it as if it were human. If Iwanted to think about all of you and get--and establish more of aconnection with you, I would not describe you as unrelated strangers.Rather, you are my brothers and my sisters. And of course, anypolitical movement that tries to bring us together--people togethersays--uses a family metaphor.心理学空间U9_;|f d


Finally, when Steven Spielberg tried to get us to entertain thenotion that computers and robots are sentient moral beings he did notshow us one that looked like this [a faceless mechanical-lookingrobot]. He showed us one that looked like that [a cute childactor].心理学空间z@^dRk)e1F


Okay. The reading response for next week is a simple one. I knowI've been giving difficult reading responses. This is simple. You couldwrite it up very short and that will be a passing grade if you justwrite it up very short. You could also write it up a bit longer.Suppose the Milgram experiment had never been done and it was beingdone for the first time here. What would you do? What do you thinkeveryone else would do? Okay. I'll see you next week.

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N] OeL0Z M0[end of transcript]

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