The manner in which our patients bring forward their associations during the work of analysis gives us an opportunity for making some interesting observations. ‘Now you’ll think I mean to say something insulting, but really I’ve no such intention.’ we realize that this is a rejection, by projection, of an idea that has just come up. Or: ‘You ask who this person in the dream can be. It’s not my mother.’ We emend this to:‘So it is his mother.’ In our interpretation, we take the liberty of disregarding the negation and of picking out the subject-matter alone of the association. It is as though the patient had said: ‘It’s true that my mother came into my mind as I thought of this person, but I don’t feel inclined to le tthe association count.’
There is a very convenient methodby which we can sometimes obtain a piece of information we want aboutunconscious repressed material. ‘What’, we ask, ‘would you consider the mostunlikely imaginable thing in that situation? What do you think was furthest fromyour mind at that time?’ If the patient falls into the trap and says what hethinks is most incredible, he almost always makes the right admission. A neatcounterpart to this experiment is often met with in an obsessional neurotic whohas already been initiated into the meaning of his symptoms. ‘I’ve got a newobsessive idea,’ he says, ‘and it occurred to me at once that it might mean so and so. But no; that can’t betrue, or it couldn’t have occurred to me.’ What he is repudiating, on groundspicked up from his treatment, is, of course, the correct meaning of theobsessive idea.
Thus the content of a repressedimage or idea can make its way into consciousness, on condition that it isnegated. Negation is a way of taking cognizance of what is repressed; indeed itis already a lifting of the repression, though not, of course, an acceptance ofwhat is repressed. We can see how in this the intellectual function isseparated from the affective process. With the help of negation only oneconsequence of the process of repression is undone - the fact, namely, of theideational content of what is repressed not reaching consciousness. The outcomeof this is a kind of intellectual acceptance of the repressed, while at thesame time what is essential to the repression persists.【1】 In the course ofanalytic work we often produce a further, very important and somewhat strangevariant of this situation. We succeed in conquering the negation as well, andin bringing about a full intellectual acceptance of the repressed; but therepressive process itself is not yet removed by this.
Since to affirm or negate thecontent of thoughts is the task of the function of intellectual judgement, whatwe have just been saying has led us to the psychological origin of thatfunction. To negate something in a judgement is, at bottom, to say: ‘This issomething which I should prefer to repress.’ A negative judgement is theintellectual substitute for repression; its ‘no’ is the hall-mark ofrepression, a certificate of origin like, let us say, ‘Made in Germany’. Withthe help of the symbol of negation, thinking frees itself from the restrictionsof repression and enriches itself with material that is indispensable for itsproper functioning.
The function of judgement isconcerned in the main with two sorts of decisions. It affirms or disaffirms thepossession by a thing of a particular attribute; and it asserts or disputesthat a presentation has an existence in reality. The attribute to be decidedabout may originally have been good or bad, useful or harmful. Expressed in thelanguage of the oldest - the oral - instinctual impulses, the judgement is: ‘Ishould like to eat this’, or ‘I should like to spit it out’; and, put moregenerally: ‘I should like to take this into myself and to keep that out.’ Thatis to say: ‘It shall be inside me’ or ‘it shall be outside me’. As I have shownelsewhere, the original pleasure-ego wants to introject into itself everythingthat is good and to eject from itself everything that is bad. What is bad, whatis alien to the ego and what is external are, to begin with, identical.【2】
判断的功能主要和两种决定有关。（其中的一种）通过某件事物的某种独特属性来肯定或者否定对该事物的占有；（另一种）断言或争议一种呈现（presentation，主观的）在现实中是否存在。（It affirms ordisaffirms the possession by a thing of a particular attribute; and it assertsor disputes that a presentation has an existence in reality.）用以做决定的属性可能从本质上来说就有好有坏，有用或者有害。用口欲期的本能冲动的语言来说：我应该喜欢吃这个，或者我应该吐出来那个；更普遍地讲，我应该喜欢把这些带进我自己，把那些留在外面。也就是说，某些将在我里面，另一些将在我外面。正如我在其他地方已经展现，最初的快乐自我（pleasure-ego）想吸取每件好的事情到它自身，同时驱逐每一件不好的事情。坏的，与自我孤立的，以及外部的，这些最开始都是一个意思。
The other sort of decision madeby the function of judgement - as to the real existence of something of whichthere is a presentation (reality-testing) - is a concern of the definitivereality-ego, which develops out of the initial pleasure-ego. It is now nolonger a question of whether what has been perceived (a thing) shall be takeninto the ego or not, but of whether something which is in the ego as a presentationcan be rediscovered in perception (reality) as well. It is, we see, once more aquestion of external and internal. What is unreal, merely a presentation andsubjective, is only internal; what is real is also there outside. In this stageof development regard for the pleasure principle has been set aside.
通过智力功能做出的另外一种决定——呈现的事物是否真实存在——是和有限的现实自我（the definitive reality-ego）有关的，这现实自我发展自快乐自我。现在的问题不是是否把感知到的某物吸收进自我，而是在自我中呈现的某物能否重新在现实中得到感知。我们看到，这再次是一个内在和外在的问题。不真实，仅仅是呈现和主观的，是内在的；真实的同时也是外在的。在这个发展阶段，快乐原则已经被放置一边。
Experience has shown the subjectthat it is not only important whether a thing (an object of satisfaction forhim) possesses the ‘good’ attribute and so deserves to be taken into his ego,but also whether it is there in the external world, so that he can get hold ofit whenever he needs it. In order to understand this step forward we mustrecollect that all presentations originate from perceptions and are repetitionsof them. Thus originally the mere existence of a presentation was a guaranteeof the reality of what was presented. The antithesis between subjective andobjective does not exist from the first. It only comes into being from the factthat thinking possesses the capacity to bring before the mind once moresomething that has once been perceived, by reproducing it as a presentationwithout the external object having still to be there.
The first and immediate aim,therefore, of reality-testing is, not to find an object in real perceptionwhich corresponds to the one presented, but to refind such an object, toconvince oneself that it is still there. Another capacity of the power ofthinking offers a further contribution to the differentiation between what issubjective and what is objective. The reproduction of a perception as apresentation is not always a faithful one; it may be modified by omissions, orchanged by the merging of various elements. In that case, reality-testing hasto ascertain how far such distortions go. But it is evident that a preconditionfor the setting up of reality-testing is that objects shall have been lostwhich once brought real satisfaction.
Judging is the intellectualaction which decides the choice of motor action, which puts an end to thepostponement due to thought and which leads over from thinking to acting. Thispostponement due to thought has also been discussed by me elsewhere. It is tobe regarded as an experimental action, a motor palpating, with smallexpenditure of discharge. Let us consider where the ego has used a similar kindof palpating before, at what place it learnt the technique which it now appliesin its processes of thought. It happened at the sensory end of the mentalapparatus, in connection with sense perceptions. For, on our hypothesis,perception is not a purely passive process. The ego periodically sends outsmall amounts of cathexis into the perceptual system, by means of which it samplesthe external stimuli, and then after every such tentative advance it draws backagain.
判断（judging）是一项智力行动（intellectual action），它决定了感知运动行为（motor action），结束由思维（thought）造成的延迟，带来行动。由思维带来的延迟我已在其它地方做过讨论，它可被看做是试验性行动（experimental action），一种感知运动行为的触发（motorpalpating），只消耗一小部分的能量。让我们想想在某个其它地方自我曾用到过类似的触发装置，然后自我将其学到的技能用于思维（thought）。（这个“某个其它地方”就是：）在我们的心理器官（mental apparatus）的感觉末端，这感觉末端和我们的感知觉相连。在我们的假设中感知觉并非纯被动的过程，自我间歇性地将一定能量贯注于感知觉系统，通过这种贯注过程，自我才在外界刺激中取样（找到对照的对象），然后在这一试探性过程结束之后感知觉的这一过程也完成了。
The study of judgement affordsus, perhaps for the first time, an insight into the origin of an intellectualfunction from the interplay of the primary instinctual impulses. Judging is acontinuation, along lines of expediency, of the original process by which theego took things into itself or expelled them from itself, according to thepleasure principle. The polarity of judgement appears to correspond to theopposition of the two groups of instincts which we have supposed to exist.Affirmation - as a substitute for uniting - belongs to Eros; negation - thesuccessor to expulsion - belongs to the instinct of destruction. The generalwish to negate, the negativism which is displayed by some psychotics, isprobably to be regarded as a sign of a defusion of instincts that has takenplace through a withdrawal of the libidinal components. But the performance ofthe function of judgement is not made possible until the creation of the symbolof negation has endowed thinking with a first measure of freedom from theconsequences of repression and, with it, from the compulsion of the pleasureprinciple.
对判断的研究（the studyof judgement）或许是头一遭给我们提供了从主要的本能冲动（primary instinctualimpulses）的相互作用来看待智力功能（intellectual function）的源起。判断始自自我依据快乐原则将一些东西吸收进来而将另外一些东西排除出去这个原始的过程。而判断的两极性正好和我们所假设存在的两组本能的对立想对应。肯定——作为对结合（uniting）的替代——属于爱若；否定——排除的后继者——属于破坏本能。否定的一般愿望（general wish）——一些精神病患表现出来的消极主义（negativism）——或许可以看做组力比多（libidinal components）后撤时发生的本能解离（a defusionof instincts）的信号。但是只有当否定的象征（the symbol of negation）被创造——此象征第一次使在压抑和快乐原则之中的思维有了一定的自由——此时判断才发生。
This view of negation fits invery well with the fact that in analysis we never discover a ‘no’ in theunconscious and that recognition of the unconscious on the part of the ego isexpressed in a negative formula. There is no stronger evidence that we havebeen successful in our effort to uncover the unconscious than when the patientreacts to it with the words ‘I didn’t think that’, or ‘I didn’t (ever) think ofthat’.
1 The same process is at the rootof the familiar superstition that boasting is dangerous. ‘How nice not to havehad one of my headaches for so long.’ But this is in fact the firstannouncement of an attack, of whose approach the subject is already sensible,although he is as yet unwilling to believe it.
2 See the discussion in‘Instincts and their Vicissitudes’ (1915c).